THE
SACRED BOOKS OF THE HINDUS.
TRANSLATED BY VARIOUS SANSKRIT SCHOLARS.
EDITED BY
MAJOR B. D, BASU, IM.S-Retd.
VOL. Vi.-THE VAlSESIKA SUTRAS OF KAN,
~K^*LK «
^
NANDALAL SINHA, M. A., B L.
OF THE BEHAR AND ORtSSA OEVEL SER
SECOND EDITION— REVISED AND ENLARGED.
PUBLISHED BY
SUDHINDRA NATH BASU M.B.
THE PANINI OFFICE, BEUVANE&WARl l^RAMA,
BAHADURGANJ,
Allahabad.
PRINTED BY KASHINATH! BAJPAYA AT THE VIJAYA PRESS
1923.
B
\b-K3
P K E F A C E.
The Vai&esika SiUraa of Kanada, with the Commentary of San-
kara Misra aiid extracts from tho gloss of Jayanarayana and the*
Bhasya of Chandrakanta, was first published in tho years 1910 and
1911.' Inspite of the numerous imperfections of the work, it appears
to have awakened a lively interest in the study and propagation
of one of the oldest systems of Hindu Philosophy. For, its publica
tion lias been followed by a number of very valuable contributions to
the literature of the subject from the pen of some eminent scholars.
First and foremost amongst them is the Positive Sciences of the. Ancient
Hind-tut by Dr. Brajendranath Seal, M. A. Ph. D. (1915). Dr. Seal
observes that "Hindu scientific ideas aud methodology (e. g. the in
ductive method or methods of algebraic analysis),have deeply influienced
the course of natural philosophy in Asia — in the East as well aa in the
"West in China and Japan, as well as in the Saracen Empirec'. and
enters into "a comparative estimate of Greek and Hindu sconce".
He gives very lucid expositions of the Nyaya-Vaisesika Themical The-
oi-v, of the conception of Molecular Motion (Parispanda), and of the
idons of Mechanics (Kinetics) and Acoustics, and deals very fully with
the Doctrine of Scientific Method. In the following year (I9l6y, that
accomplished scholar, Dr. Ganganaiha Jha, M. A., D. Litt., came out \\ith
an English translation of the Paddrtha-Dharma-Sam'jraha, — the Maynum,
Opus of the Vaisesikas — , that is, Prasastpada's Bhasya on the Vaisesi-
ka Sutras of Kanada, with ^ridhara's Commentary (Nyayakandali) on
the Bhfisya. In tho Introduction he explains the Vaisesika conception
of Bhuta ( 'element'), and points out that "what tthe Vaisesika means
by saying that these are the 'five bhutas', is that there are five states of
matter: solid (Earth), liquid (Water), gaseous (Air), luminous (Fire), and
ethcric (AkAfia*)." The notes he has added in the body of the book are
very illuminating, and clear up many obscure points in he text. In
the year 1917, was published the Dasa-Paddrtha.-Sdstra: Chinese Text
(translation), with Introduction, Translation and Note*, by H- Ui, Pro
fessor in the Sotoshu College, Tokyo, under the editorship of F. W.
Thomas Esquire. It is a remarkable publication in many ways. In the
Jirst place, it presents us with a Chinese version of the tenets of Kanada
in the form of Kwei-ci's quotations, probably from a commentary on the
treatise. The author tells us that the treatise was composed^ by a
follower of the Vaisesika, named Mati Chandra, and translated into
Chinese by Yuan Chvvang in 648 A. D. It is in the form of a cateciismr
and, as a catechism of the doctrines of the later school of the Vaiseskas,
it is almost unsurpassed. In the second place, the author has compiled
from Chinese records an account of the traditions current among Chi
nese scholars respecting Kanada, his work, and his school. His resear
ches fully confirm our view of the great antiquity and popularity of the
Vaisesika-Siitras. Last but not least is Indian Logic and Atomism (1921)
which is an exposition of the Nyaya and Vaisesika Systems, by A. B
Keith, D. C. L., D. Litt., a well-known orientalist. He regards them "ag
able and earnest efforts to solve the problems of knowledge ard being
on the basis of reasoned argument". He has attempted "to set out the
fundamental d< cirii ts < I il e Ms1< u s \\iih clue ieg»id to their history-
and their relations to Buddhist j hilosoj hy". Jt is gratifying to:
find that, as in the ancient past, even so at the present day, the
Vaisesika has engaged the attention of earnest students all over the-
world.
Now, what is the Vaisesika Darsana V We do not know when or
by whom the name 'Vaisesika' was first applied to the teachings of
Kanada. In the Sutras the word appears only once (in X. ii. 7) where
it means 'characteristic', 'distinguishing'. According to the rule of
.Paniui, IV. iii. 87, the word is derived from the word 'Visesa', meanintr
'a treatise on Visesa'. The word 'visesa' has various meanings ; e. g.
species, distinction, difference, excellence, superiority. Accordingly-
the word 'Vaisesika' also has been variously interpreted. "The origin
of the name", in one view,, "is in the fact that the system is distingui
shed from, and superior to, the Sfunkhya''. In another view, "fcho work
was named the Vaifiesika sastra, .since, it excelled other works in all
respects, or because it was composed by a man of superior intelligence".
h third view is that it is called Vaisesika, because it particular!}' or
specifically treats of Genus, Species, and Combination which have not
been dealt with in any other treatise and though they are included in
the predicables Substance, etc. In a fourth view, it is distinguished
.from the Samkhya in its theory of Buddhi (understanding), natnelv
that Buddhi is an attribute of the Soul, and not its instrument of know
ledge. In another view, it is distinguished from the System of Jaimini
in so far as it declares that the highest good is to be achieved by the
renunciation of the things of the world and by the contemplation of
Truth, and not by positive performances. Lastly, it is explained that
Kanada's system has come to be called "Vaisesika'' from his theory of
'visesa' inhering in the ultimate atoms (I. ii. 6). His atoms are 'math
ematical points', without parts, and possessing the same attribute and
activity in their respective classes of 'Earth', 'Water', 'Fire', and 'Air'.
It is by means of their 'visesas' or individual characteristics that thev
are distinguished from one another, and account for the variety of
things in nature. This last explanation appears to be preferable to till
the others
The Vaisesika is a Mohsa-silatra; it teaches u doctrine of release
release from the coil of mortality. According to Kauada, man must
work out his own salvation. It is given to him, if he will, to hear the
Truth from the Scriptures or from a preceptor, on high or here below
to think over it in his mind, and to meditate upon it in the recesses of
his heart. He can control his sensory and motor organs, and, by
eliminating superficial psychic states, make the mind steady in the
Soul. Steadiness of the mind in the Soul is called Yoga. Yoga is
neither a mystery nor is it mysticism. It is the realisation of the free
dom of will, of the free Self. He then becomes master of time and space.
.For him there is no distinction of past, present, and future ; no disti
nction of here, there, and elsewhere. The mind being at rest, pleasure
and pain do not arise, activity ceases, and the law of Karma is cancell-
ed for all time to come. The accumulated Karma of the past, however
remains. Having realised the fundamental freedom of the Self, he
sees what experiences are in store for him, and lives out those exper
iences in appropriate forms and surroundings brought about by the-
•creative power of will. In this way he cancels the past as well. There
after, when death takes place, and the soul finally quits its temporal
«.bode, it does not pass into other forms of finite life, but remains free
for ever till the end of Time. That freedom is called Moksa, the supremo
good, the be-all and end-all of existence.
Self-knowledge, Self-realisation, Atma-saksatkara, is then the only
means of attaining Moksa. The fundamental teaching of Kanada,
therefore, is "tattva-jnanat nihsreyasam", the supreme good results-
from the knowledge of the truth about the Soul. It is a translation of
the Vedic text, "Tarati sokaui Atma-vit", the knower of the Self over
comes Evil.
The Soul is therefore to bo known. Kauada shows how it is to be
known. Hence the Vaisesika Sastra is also called Adhydtma Sdstra, a
treatise respecting the Soul. It was not necessary for him to call
Attention to the nature of the Soul in itself, the pure Soul as it was in
the beginning and as it will be in the end. It was enough for his pur
pose to demonstrate the nature of the Soul in the interval of Time, the
suffering Soul, the Soul revolving on the wheel of births and deaths
and re-births under the Law of Karma. The universal experience of
Suffering ("Duhkha") compels an enquiry as to the means of its removal,,
namely, realisation of the truth about the Soul ; and Kauada's view is
that the Soul can be known by means of the Not-Soul.
The Soul and the Not-Soul make up Reality. The Real is that
which is knowablo and nameable-Reality therefore consists of Padar-
thas, nameables or predicables. They are not merely categoric -f
Teought, in the sense that they have no existence outside and indepen
dent of thought. They are classes of entities which have an existence
antecedent to, and independent of, our thought. They become objects
of our thought, they are-knowable and nameable, because they exist.
"In pure perception we are actually placed outside ourselves, we touch,
the reality of fch«- object in an immediate intuition "(Bergson). Tattva-
aaksatkara, immediate intuition of reality, is the aim of Kauada's phil
osophy.
By a subtle process of analysis and synthesis, Kanada divides all
nameable things into six classes: viz. substance, attribute, action, genus,
species, and combination. He then shows, that atfcrribute and action
exist by oombinaton with substance. Without substance, there were-
no attribute and action. Similarly, genus and species are correlative,
and are not absolute, except in the case of the highest geuus which ia
existence, and the lowest species which is the visosas or individual
characteristics appertaining to, inhering in the eternal substances.
Genus and spocies therefore exist by combiuatioti with substances.
Without substance, there where were no genus and species. Similarly,
combination is " the intimate connection iu the inseparably connected
things " ; e. y. of parts and wholes, of substances and their attributes,,
of action and the sent of action, of genus and soecies and substances,
in which they reside, and of eternal substances aud their ultimate-
differences. Without substance, then, there were no combination.
Substance, there-fore, is the fundamental reality.
By analysis, substance is resolved into nine kinds : viz. Earth,
Water, Fire, Air, Ether, Time, Space, Soul, and Mind. Of these Earth,
Water, Fire, and Air are, as effects, i. e., wholes made up of parts, non-
eternal.. Their ultimate atoms which are without parts, are eternal.
On the other hand, Ether, Time, Space, Soul, and Mind are without
parts, and. therefore oternal. Ether is held to be "nothing- other than
the cosmic vacuum (?) which contains all objects, and gives room for
their activities". Time and Space are complementary to Ether. The
three substances are in reality one only (Prasastapada and Chandra-
kanta). Mind, again, is entirely material, and yet capable of coining
.into intimate relation with the Soul ; it is as it were a sort of camera
•obscura to the Soul. In another view, the ultimate atoms are subject to
change ; they produce effects; and themselves undergo changes, but do
not initiate changes, jexcept in so far as they reflect themselves in the
Mind. Mind also suffers change ; it modifies in the form of everv ob
ject it comes in contact with ; otherwise it is absolutely inactive. The
Soul, on the other hand, does not suffer change of states. Tt is. the
initiator of change in everything else. Cognition, pleasure, pain,
desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, and impressiou are its attri
butes, and not its essence. They are determinations of Will, and prove
a state of "indetermination of Will" in which the Soul is truly free and
eternal, tt follows that Atoms, Minds, and Souls are the ultimate unit*
in Creation. The highest Soul, the Supreme Person, is God.
Atoms and Minds do not exist for themselves. They exist for th«
Souls, for their bhoga and apavarga, transmigration and emancipation.
In the beginning of Creation, activity is induced in them — they are set
in motion, — by Adristam, the resultant energy abiding in the Souls aa
a consequence of their previous activities. It causes the combination
of iitoms to form the body and the world. "The sphere of transmigra
tion is the common result of the individual adflsta, and every one7*
bodv and other personal circumstances are the special results of the in
dividual adrista". It has no activity during the time of the world'e
dissolution. At the end of the period of dissolution, it is set free by
the will of (rod. It then starts the process of Creation, and maintains
it ; it is t!ie sustaining energy from the beginning to the end of Crea
tion. It can be neutralised, — its force can be exhausted, — only by th»
action of the Soul (Vaisesika Sutras, V. ii. 16).
In this view the interesting references that are met with here and
there in the Vaisesika Sutras, to cosu.ology, geology, mineralogy, bot
any and plant-physiology, zoology, physiology, mechanics, acoustic*,
and other positive sciences, become explained. The doctrine of adri
sta carries the enquiry further into the field of ethics and sociology, on
the one ha id, and lo^io aid epistem>lo^y as well a* psychology and
philology, 0:1 the other F>>r, the Soul is at the core of reality, that is,
th.3 raa.1 which is kio.vi'jle aid -laudable. Every individual S ml is
the centre of a separate world of its own, which is evolved to suit its
alf's'ji. T) ki.i.v tlia S >ul, — so have invue4iate intuitiiu of it, there
fore, it is iieje-is iry t> k i-»vv the N^ot-Sjul. "'For we do not obtain an
iutuiti > i from reility, that is, an intellectual sympathy with the most
iiiti iiita part of it, — a ileii we have won its confidence by a long rello-
w »lii j with, its sn jerti^ial manifestations. (Bergson, An Introduction
to Metaphysics).
Kviada accordingly elab>r;ibes a process of thinking consideration
of things. As Dr. Deusseu rightly observes, ''India i Philosophy did
5
not start, as, for the most part, the (Ireecian did, from an investigation
free of assumptions into the existent, but rather like modern philo
sophy from t.ho critical analysis and testing of a complex of know
ledge handed down (through the Veda). " Hence the Vaisesika is also
called Manana s Astra, treatise based on reasoning, rational or critical
system. The starting point of the system is the observation and
analysis of objects, .with a view to their strict definition and a correct
appreciation of their place and function in the world of bhoga and
apavarga, probation and perfection, bondage and freedom. And
tattva-jnana, knowledge of truth, is its end and aim. To accomplish
this result, it evolves a* doctrine of Scientific Method, which, however,
is " only a subsidiary discipline, being comprehended under the wider
conception of Methodology," which proceeds by way of " (1) the pro
position (or enumeration) of the subject-matter (Uddesa), (2) the
ascertainment of the essential characters or marks, by Perception,
Inference, the Inductive Methods, etc. —resulting in definitions (by
Jaksana) or descriptions (by upalaksana) ; and (3) examination and
verification (pariksa and nirnaya)" (Seal). In this method, logic is
not pure reasoning or inference ; the reasoning is also proof. And
the Methodology evolved by Kanada and Gotama has been carried
almost to perfection in the later Nyaya, "which, inspite of its arid dia
lectics, possesses a threefold significane in the history of thought: (1)
logical, in its conceptions of Avachchhedaka and Pratiyogi, being an
attempt to introduce quantification on a connotative basis, in other
words,to introduce quantitative notions of Universal and Particular, in
both an affirmative and a negative aspect, into the Hindu theory of
Inference and Proposition regarded connotatively as the establishment
of relations among attributes or marks ; (2) scientific, in its investiga
tion of the varieties of Vyapti and TJpadhi (and of Anyathasiddha),
being an elaboration of Scientific Method, in the attempt to eliminate
the irrelevant • and (3) ontological and epistemological, in its classi
fication and precise determination of the various relations of Know
ledge and Being, with even greater rigidity and minuteness than in
Hegel's Logic of Being and Essence" (Seal).
The criterion of truth, in the Vail^sika Sutras, is the correspon
dence of thought with things and vice v-ir-ia Truth a:id reality are, in
this system, convertible terms. "* * * the existence of the concept of au
object, subjective as well as objective, is tlie lo^isal reas vi for and the
real consequence of the existence of the object" (\n). Existence per
vades the world of reality: to be real, is t>> be existe it: a^id to be exis
tent is t"> bi k -lowable aid nanjable; than is. there mist be in it
"an immediately intuitable ele:n3'it, which is lete-mi ied by the function
of o ie or in >re of our se isas. or by in-ier per^itio'i" (Si.jwart), or,
as we sh-m! I say, by th^ Mni i;l', aai all, bv m-»d;tation a -id tra isoaa-
dental or ;>u!-e perse >tio-i (t^ttva-saksatkara). Hen.ce the Vaisesika
is called a r-aalis:n, a id, — ;t dualism.
A characteristic d ><3tri-ie of the Vaifijsika is its Kriya-vada. This
is the d >ct.ri e which h >lds that self is active, or that self is affected
by pleti3ui-? or desire et^ , i'i other wjtvls, that it is a kartri or an
age it, i i tho course of t!ia eyolution, or more •jorr-jtly, revolution of
its traasnai^ratory existence.
6
•
Another characteristic doctrine of the \raisesika is its Arambha-
vada: the doctrine, namely, that the world as an effect, is not a mere
appearnace (vivarta) of the cause, nor an evolution (pariuama) of tho
cause, but is produced by aggregation of the cause which is the ulti
mate atoms. And this leads to the doctrine of Alat-karya-vada, that is,
that an effect has only a temporary existence, and that, before its pro
duction, and, after its destruction, it is non-existent.
Before we close this short notice of the scope and character <»C the
Vaisesika Philosophy, it is our pleasant duty to acknowledge our
obligations to the distinguished authors cited above. Our special
thanks are due to Dr. Sea] and 1'rofessor Ui whom \ve have freely
quoted.
Translator.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(N. B. Asterisks indicate the Aphorisms of Kanada )
BOOK I.
Of the Predicables.
CHAPTER I.
Of Substance, Attribute, and Action.
SECTION A.
Of the Problem of Evil.
Page-
Human suffering prompts an enquiry as to the means of its
removal .
Realisation of the Self alone can end all suffering
Kanada's view is that the Self can be realised by means of
the Not-Self by a person who does not covet the things
of die world ~
Sruti and Siuriti in support of the above view
SECTION B.
Of the Scope and Method of Kanada.
The scheme of the Aphorisms of Kanada o
Kanada's Methodology : Enumeration, Definition and
Demonstration ft
SECTION c.
Of Dharma.
' Dharma is to be explained. — 1 ft
Dharma (Contemplation of Truth) purifies the mind and
creates thirst after knowledge
•' Dharma brings forth Knowledge of Truth and the Supreme
Good. — 2
Vrittikara's explanation of the Aphorism a
SECTION D.
Of the. Veda.
The Veda is the Word of God, or is an exposition of Dharma,
and hence is authoritative. — 3 fl
Arguments against the authority of the Veda refuted 7
SECTION E.
Of the Supreme Good.
he Supreme Good results from the knowledge of the truth
< )out the fc>ix Predicables. — 4 g
The Supreme Good consists in the final cessation of Pain '
1 cessation of pain consists in the antecedent non-
ustence of pain brought about by the neutralisation of
tne cause of pain n
How « antecedent non-existence- is an object of volition \
of aineme ^ 110t Uie " abBolut« "oil-existence"
Non-e*i,,t«n«. «* «.;„ distinguished from the state of swoon &
11
11
Neither is it the laya or dissolution of the fudividual Self
into the Universal Self
Nor, the removal of the veil of Nescience from the Self
Nor, the unimpeded flow of the stream of consciousness ... 11
SECTION F.
Of the Categories.
Sixfold division of nameable things defended ... 12
Mere knowledge distinguished from the realisation of the
truth
Upaskara criticised by the author of Vivriti ... 13
tl Non-existence " is the seventh Predicable, not denied by
Kanada ...
Nyaya, Vaisesika, aud Sarnkhya views of the Supremo Good
are the same ...
A section of the Nyaya thinkers hold that the Supreme
Good consists in the permanent cessation of de-merit only
The division of the Predicables defended from another
point of view by Chandrakanta ... 15
Why the system of Kanfida is called Vaisesika ... 15
In reality, there are only three Predicables, Substance,
Attribute, and Action ... Itt
SECTION* G.
Of the Enumeration of Substance, Attribute and Action.
* Earth, Waters, Fire, Air, Ether, Time, Space, Self, and
Mind are the nine Substances. — 5 ... 17
" Self " includes Grod ; Metals are transformation of Tcja*
(Fire) ... 17
Darkness is not a separate Substance, but a non-entity ... 17
Chandrakanta thinks that Time and Space are included in
Akasa (Ether) ... J8
Attributes reside in Substances, are manifested by Sub
stances, and themselves manifest Substances ... 18
* Attributes are Colour, etc. — 6 ... 18
A reflection on the Samkhya theory of Buddhi (Cruder-
standing) ... 19
Pleasure and Pain do not differ in kind ... 1&
* Actions are Throwing Upwards, etc. — 7 ... 19
Action analysed ... 20
SECTION H.
Of their Resemblances and Differences.
•* Resemblances of Substance, Attribute, and Action stated. — 8 21
Ultimate stems are not anityam or perishable ... 22
* Resemablance of Substance and Attribute stated. — 9, 10 ... 22
* Actions do not originate Actions. — 11 ... 23
Difference of Substance from Attribute and Action
stated ... 24
* Substance is not destroyed by its own effect or by its own
cause. — 12 ... 24
* Attributes are destroyed i.n both ways. — 13 ... 24
* Action is destroyed by its own effect. — 14 ... . 24
* A Substance is that which possesses Action and Attribute,
and operates as a material cause. — 15 ... 25
Ill
In what sense the Self which is void of action, is a Subs
tance • •• 25
* An Attribute is that which inheres in Substance, does not
possess Attribute, and is not an independent cause of
Conjunction and Disjunction. — 10 ... 2ft
* An Action is that which inheres in one Substance only, and
is an independent cause of Conjunctions and Disjunc
tions.— 17 ... 2d
* Substance, Attribute, and Action co-exist in one and Ihe
same Substance. — 18 ... 27
* Thev have the same Attribute as their non-material or
efficient cause. — 19 ... 28
* Conjunction, Disjunction, and Impetus are the co-effects of
Action.— 20 ... 28
* Action is not an immediate cause in the production of
Substance— 21,22 ... 29
* A single Substance may be the joint effect of many Subs
tances ; but not so Action. — 23, 24 ... 30
* Certain Attributes are originated by more than one Subs
tance.— 25 ... 80
* A single Action does not relate to two or more Substances
at the same time. — 26 ... 31
* Resemblance of Substance, Attribute, and Action further
stated.— 27, 28, 29 ... 32
Twofold operation of efficient causes explained ... 32
* Actions produce Conjunctions and Disjunctions. — 30 ...
* Causality of Action further upheld. — -31 ... 33
CHPTER II.
Of Genus and Species.
SECTION A.
Of the Relation of Cause and Effect.
* Non-existence of effect follows from the non-existence of
cause. — 32 ... 35
Importance of the principle of causality explained ... 35
The Samkhya theory of Causation considered ... 35
The Yaisesika doctrine of Causality maintained ... 36
* But non-existence of cause does not follow from the non-
existence of the effect.— 33 ... 37
The bearing of the doctrine of Causality on the problem of
the Supreme Good explained ... 37
SECTION B.
Of Genus and /Species.
* Geaus and Species are relative terms distinguished by the
Understanding. — 34 ... 38
Objections to the doctrine of Jati or Universals stated ... 38
The objections answered ... ... 39
The Mimamsa doctrine of Jati considered ... 40
Marks which indicate that a thing is not a Genus, stated
and explained ... 40
* Existence is pure Genus, as it recurs everywhere. — 35 ... 41
* The characteristics of Substance, Attribute, and Action
are both Genera and Species. — 36 ... 41
IV
Proof of the existence of Genera and Specieg stated ... 12
* The Predicable Viiesa is pure Species, as it is the ultimate
principle of differenciation. — 37 ... 1-3
* Existence causes the belief that Substa ice, Attribute, and
Action are existent. — 38 ... 13
* It is a different object from Substance, Attribute, and
Action. — 39
* It exists in Attributes and Actions. — 40 ... -14
* It does not comprehend the characteristics of Subsuince,
Attribute, and Action, as alternately Genus and
Species- — 41 ... 15
* Substance-ness is a Genus. — 42 ... 45
* Substance-ness is different from Substances. — 43 ... 15
* Attribute-ness is a Genus. — 44 ... !•<;
* Attribute-ness is different from Substance, Attribute, and
Action. — 45 ... JO
* Action-ness is a Genus. — 46 ... !»>
* Action-ness is different from Substance, Attribute, and
Action. — 41 ... 17
~x~ Existence is one and universal. — 48 ... 17
BOOK II.
Of the Substances.
CHAPTER I.
Of Earth, Waters, Fire, Air, and hither.
SECTION A.
Of the Description of the Five Jjhiltas.
* Earth possesses Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch — 49 ... 1-8
* Waters possess Colour, Taste, and Touch, and are fluid and
viscid. — 50 ... 51
* Fire possesses Colour and Touch. — 51 ... 53.
Fourfold Tejas (Fire) explained ... 5:j
* Air possesses Touch. — 52 ... 54
* Cotour, Taste, fcmell, and Touch do not exist in Ether. — 53 54
Ndf' in Space and Time ... 54
* The' fluid state of Earth-substances and Fire-substances
"(metals) is caused by the action of heat, and therefore
artificial, and not natural, as it is in the case of
Waters. — 54,55 ... 55
Gold, etc. are tansformations of Fire (Tejas ... 5^5
SECTION B.
Of the Inference of Air.
* The use of Inference explained. — 56 ... 5O'
* Touch is a mark of the inference of Air. — 57 ... 57
Air is not an object of sense-perception Conditions of Per
ception discussed ... 59
* The Touch which infers Air, is Touch without Colour.— 58 tfO
* Air is a separate Substance. — 59 ... 60
* It possesses Action and Attribute. — 60 ... (50
Proof of Parama Anu or Ultimate Atom staled ... (H
* Air is eternal. — 61 ... 6'
* A;r is manifold. —62 ... 62
* Visible principle of inference of Air is not known.— 63 ... 62
* Mode of iufereice of Air stated. — 64 ... 63
* The name, Air, is derived from the Veda, — 65 ... 64
SEBTION c.
Of Existence of Gt-od.
* Language a'id Creation are marks of the inference of
superior Beings. — 66 ... 64
* Because they presuppose knowledge by Perception. — 67 65
SECTION D.
Of Inference of Ether.
* The Samkhya view stated : Actions, e. j/., egress, ingress,
etc. are marks of Ether. — 68 ... 66
* And criticised : Action appears in corporal Substances only,
and also not in more than one at a time. — 69 ... 66
* Ether, being a Substance, cannot be a non-material
cause. — 70 ... 67
~* Neither can it be the occasional (nimitta) cause of
Action. — -71 ••• 67
* An effect derives its attribute from its cause. — 72 ... 68
* Sound is not an attribute of tangible Substances. — 73 ... 68
* Nor of Soul, nor of Mind —74 ... 69
* Therefore, it is the mark of Eth^r. — 75 ... 69
Time and Space are really identical with Ether, ... 70
* Ether is a Substance and is eternal, like Air. — 76 ... 70
* It is one, like Existence. — 77 ... 70
* There is nothing to infer a plurality of Ether. — 78 ... 70
* " Separateness of one " (individuality) belongs to Ether. 79 71
Summary of the chapter ... 71
CHAPTER II.
Of the Five Bhutas, Time, and Space.
SECTION A.
Of Essential and Accidental Attributes.
* Smell perceived in a piece of cloth is due to the contact
of Hower. —80 ... 73
Smell, etc. proceeding from the material cause of subs
tance, are essential or natural ; otherwise, they are
accidental or conditional
* Smell is natural to Earth. — 81
* Similarly hotness is natural or accidental. — 82
* Hotness is natural to Fire. — 83'
* Coldness is natural to Waters. — 84
Touch which is neither hot nor cold, nor is due to the
action of heat, is natural to Air 75
SCETION B.
Of the Characteristics of Time.
* "Now," " Then," "Simultaneous,"" Slow," " Quick,"— such
are the marks of Time. — 85 «•• 75
Time is the principle of Change ; Change measures Time 76
* Like Air, Time is a Substance, and is eternal. — 86
* Like Existence, Time'is one. — 87 ••• 77
* Time is the efficient cause of all that is produced. — 88 ... 78
VI
SCETICN C.
Of the Characteristics of Space.
* " This, from this "—such is the mark of Space. — 80 ... 7H
Distance in place cannot be explained by Time ... 79
Time relations cannot be altered ; Space relations can be
altered ••• ~'«>
* Like Air, Space is a Substance, and is eternal.— 90 ... 80
* Like Existence, Space is one. — 91 80
Chandrakanta thinks, Ether, Time, and Space are but
different forms of a single Substance ... 80
* Its manifoldness is due to the variety of its effects. — 92 ... 81
* The conception of the East, South, West, and North
explainsd.— 93, 94 ... 8lj
* Similarly, the intermediate directions. — 95 ... H2
SECTION D.
Of Doubt.
* Doubt arises from the perception of the general property,
non-perception of the differentia, and the recollection
of the alternatives. — 96
Doubt is not A-Prama or Uncertain Knowledge
Doubt is neither threefold nor fivefold, as some Nyaya
teachers think
Doubt is not "Wonder" or curiosity ; nor is it knowledge
which does not produce an impression (Samskara) ... SI
Doubt is (i) internal , or (ii) external : (a) in respect of an
object in view, or (b) in respect of an object concealed
from view 84
* The property seen may have been observed in several
objects before. — 97 ... S4
* Or an object may be seen in a different form from that in
which is was seen before. — 98 84
* Doubt arises from science anb nescience also. — 99 ... 85-
Nyaya Sutra, I-i-22, considered ... 85-;
SECTION E
Of Sound.
* Sound is the object of perception by the ear. — 100 ... 86-
The doctrine of Sphota is refuted by Convention ... 86-
' Sound is an object apart from all other objects : hence
Doubt arises in respect of it. — 101 ... 87
Sound is not a Substance nor an Action. — 102,103 ... 87
* Sound is transient, not eternal. — 104, 105 ... 881
* Sound differs in property from that which is eternal. — IOC ... S()
* Sound is non -eternal, because it is an effect. — 107, 108 ... HO
* Defect in the doctrine of the eternality of Sound
stated — 109 ... 90
* Sound is produced from Conjunction, Disjunction, and also
from another Sound. — 110 ... 1)1
* Sound is non-eternal, also because of its mark, viz. to be
cognisable by the ear. — 111 ... 91
* Arguments in favour of the eternality of Sound stated and
refuted.— 112-116 ... 91-941
Vll
Two theories of the production of Sound : (a) Vichitarnga-
nyaya (successive production of single sounds) and (6)
Itadamba-golaka-nyaya (simultaneous production of
multiple sounds) ••• 94
BOOK III.
Of Soul and Mind.
CHAPTER I.
Of the Marks of Inference.
SECTION A.
Of Enquiry Respecting Soul.
* The objects of the Senses are perceived. — 117 ... 96
* Their perception is the mark of the existence of an object
different from them. — 118 ... 96
* The Body or the Senses are not the seat of perception. — llg, 97
* Because there is no consciousness in their causes. — 120 ... 97
* For consciousness does not appear in the other products of
those causes. — 121 ... 98
* And because consciousness is not known to exist in those
causes. — 122 •«« 98
Recollection of previous experience in an amputated part
of the body, the Law of Karma, recollection of infancy
in youth, instinctive acts, etc. are so many more objec
tions to a physiological theory of consciousness ... 98,99
SECTION B.
Of Fallacies of Inference,
* An identical mark cannot be a means of inference. — 123 ...
* Any one thing cannot be a mark of any other thing. — 124 100
SECTION c.
Of Marks of Inference.
* The Conjunct, the Inherent, the Co-inherent, and the Con
tradictory.— 125 • •• 100
* One effect, of another effect. — 126
•* The non-existent, of the existent. — 127
* The past, of the non-past. — 128
•* The past, of the past. — 129 102
* For a mark operates on the recollection of the " universal
relation."— 130 ••• 102
" Universal relation " discussed ... 107
SECTION D.
Of Enumeration of Fallacies.
* The unproved, the non-existent, and the dubious are false
marks— 131 •••
* E- g-j because it has horns, therefore it is a horse. — 132 ... L07
* A multifarious is also a false mark : e. g. because it has
horns, therefore it is a cow. — 133
Various kinds of " unproved " mark indicated
Threefold division of true marks described
True and false marks discussed. 109
Other examples of false mark described ««•
False marks are of three kinds, and not five, as maintained
in the Nyaya
Vlll
SECTION E.
Of Marks of Inference of Soul.
* Cognition produced from the contact of the Soul, the Sense,
and the Object, is a true mark. — 134 ... Ill
The Bauddha theory cf Recognition and Recollection
criticised m
A possible attack on the Samkhya theory of Buddhi ... 112
* Activity and inactivity observed in one's own soul, are
marks of inference of other souls. — 135 ... 113
CHAPTER II.
Of the Inference of Soul and Mind.
SECTION A.
Of the Mind.
The appearance and non-appearance of knowledge on the
contact of the Soul with the Senses and the Objects, are
marks of the existence of the Mind. — 136 J 14
Mind is not universal, but atomic ]14
Mind is a Substance, and is eternal. 137
* Mind is one — 138 Hg
The theory that there are as many minds as there are senses
in the organism, and that mind is a whole made ui> of
parts, refuted Ug
SECTION B.
Of the Said.
The marks of the inference of the Soul are many. —139 117
The body is not the seat of consciousness Hg
The Soul is a Substance, and is eternal. — 140
The doctrine that the Soul is not known by inference, but
by Revelation, stated. — 141-143 120
> But the very word "I" infers the Soul, so that the Soul 'is
known by inference as well as from Revelation.— -144 121
ine Soul is not imperceptible to the Mind 122
' But " Devadatta » (a person) is known by perception : what
is the use of inference ? 145 j22
*• Inference strengthens the intuition. — 146 123
" Devadatta goes " —is a metaphor. — 147
The metaphor raises a doubt: In « I am fair " " I " ma'v
refer to the body or to the Soul. 148 124
The intuition of « I " arises in respect of one's own Soul
only, and not of others' : hence ,t denotes the Soul
primarily.— 149 ,O4
The doctrine that the intuition of " I " js primarily i'n
respect of the body, raises the same doubt — 150-151 12«
Were consciousness an attribute of the body, one would
perceive the thoughts of another, and vice versa.— 152 12(5
The Soul is not proved by Revel; tion alone, as it is proved
by its characteristic mark of the intuition in the form
or 1 . — 153 -J27
The Vedanta doctrine criticised by Jayanarayana iQfi
How the boul is distinguished as Jiva or isvara' 129
SECTION c.
Of Plurality of Souls-
* Soul is one, because there is no difference in the productio
of pleasure, pain, and knowledge. — 154
* Plurality of Souls is proved by circumstances — U **
* The Veda also supports this view. — 156
BOOK IV.
Of the Origin of Bodies.
CHAPTER T.
Of Atoms.
SECTION A.
Of the Eternal.
* The eternal is that which is existent, and uncaused.— 157...
SECTION B.
Of Existence of Ultimate Atoms.
* The effect is the mark of the existence of the Ultimate
Atom. — 158 1 _
* The Ultimate Atoms possess Colour, etc. — 159 J»*
* The Ulimate Atom is eternal.— 160
Objections to the eternality of the Ultimate Atom stated ...
* It is an error to suppose that the Ultimate Atom is not
eternal.— 161
SECTION c.
Of Condition of Perception.
* Perception takea place from magnitude due to possession of
component parts, and from colour. — 162
* Air is not perceived by the Senses, because it has not colour
developed in it— 163 137
SECTION D.
Of Perception of Attributes.
* Perception of Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch takes place
from their special characteristics, and from their inhere-
ing in compound bodies. — 164,165 ... 188, 139
Conditions of their perception are their special charac
teristics, absence of a more powerful like attribute,
their intensity, and inherence in compound bodies
* Gravitv is not perceptible. — 166
Gravity is perceptible to Touch, says Vallabhacharya
SECTION E.
Of Hi-sensual Perception.
* Numbers, Magnitudes, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunc
tion, Priority, Posteriority, and Action are perceptible
to the eve in bodies possessing Colour, and not else
where.— 167, 168 — 141,142
SECTION F.
Of Omni-sennual Perception.
* The classes, Attribute-ness and Existence, are perceptible
to all the Senses.— 169
CHAPTER II.
Of Tangible Atomic Products.
SECTION A.
Of Threefold Product.
* Atoms produce Earth, etc. in three forms, vixt Body, Sense,
and Object. — 170 ... 143
SECTION B.
Of Body.
* The Body is not composed of the five Bhutas ; neither is it
a compound of three Bhutas. 171, 172 ... 144
* The influence of the other Bhutas is not denied. — 173 ... 145
SECTION c.
Of Twofold Body.
* Body is twofold : sexually and a-sexually-produced 174 145
The sexual body is either womb-born or is egg-born ... 146
Plants are living bodies ... [4g
* A-sexual bodies are produced by Ultimate Atoms not con
fined in direction and place 175 ... 14(5
They exist in the worlds of Varuna, etc. ... 148
* Ultimate Atoms are moved by a particular Dkarma towards
the production of the a-sexual bodies of gods and
sages. — 176 ... 147
* Thero is record of the existence of such bodies 177 ... 147
* Brahma, the first-born must have been produced a-sexuallv.
-178 ... U8
* A-sexual bodies do exist;as is seen in the Veda 179, 180... 148
Aqueous, igneous, and aerial bodies cannot but be a-sexually
produced. ... 149
Constitution of the organs of Sense described. ... 149
Manifestations of Earth, Waters, Fire, and Air described... 149
BOOK V.
Of Investigation of Action.
CHAPTER I.
Of Voluntary Action.
SECTION A.
Of Upward Movement.
* The hand moves up in the presence, and by the volition, of
the Soul.— 181 ... 151
Action analysed ... 15]
* With the hand, the pestle goes up. — 182 ... 151
* Volition is the cause neither of the rebounding of the pestle
nor of the going up of the hand with it. — 183-186 ... 152,168
SECTION B.
Of Downward Movement.
* In the absence of an impediment, a body falls from
gravity. — 187 ... 154
* It does not go upward nor sideward, because there is no
impulse towards those directions. — 188 ... 154
* A particular impulse is given by a particular volition — 189 155
* Range of motion depends upon the impulse. — 190 ... 155
SECTION c.
Of Cause of Merit and Demerit.
'• Like the reaction of the hand, the playful movements o-f
limbs by an infant are non-moral. — 191 ... 155
* So is the bursting of bodies caused by burning. — 192 ... 156
XI
* Slodp-walking is non-volitional. — 193 ...
SECTION D.
Of Indifferent Movement
* (Trass is moved by Air. — Ig4 ... 157
SECTION E.
Of Movement caused by Adristam.
* Adristam causes the jewel to move towards the thief, and
also the attraction of iron, grass, etc. by magnetic and
electric bodies, — 195 ... 157
SECTION F
Of Nature of Motion.
* Motion is not one and continuous, but consists of a series of
discreet movements. — 196 ... 15&
* Movement springs from impulse which produces impetus
which keeps up a succession of movements from point to
point— 197 ... 159
A single impetus runs through the whole series of move
ments ... 159
The Nyfiya maintains the theory of a series of impetus as
well ... 159-
* Gravity destroys the impetus, and the body falls. — 198 ... 160-
CHAPTER II.
Of Non-volitional Action.
SECTION A.
Of Action in Earth.
* ' Impulse,' ' Impact,' and conjunction with a moving body,
are causes of action in terrene substances. — 199 ... 161
* Earthquake* etc. which affect birth, and bhoga, are caused
by adristam (destiny). — 200 ... 161
SECTION B
Of Action in Water.
* Rain is caused by the gravity of water particles disengaged
from the cloud. — 201 ... 162
* Water flows in a stream or current on account of
fluidity.— 202 ... 162
* Sun and air cause the evaporation of water. — 203,204 ... 162,163
* Circulation of water in trees is caused by adristam — 205 ... 163
Water is transformed as snow, hail, etc. by the actiou of
heat.— 206-209 ...164,165
SECTION, c.
Of Action in Fire, and Air.
* Conflagration, volcanic eruption, tempest, meteor, etc. are
caused by adristam. — 210 ...
'' Adristam caused the movement of fire, air, atoms, and mind
at the time of Creation. — 211 ...
SECTION D.
Of Action in Mind.
(i) Caused by Volition Soul.
Volition of the Soul causes movement of the mind. 119 .., 266
Function of the nervous process explained 167
Pleasure and pain, cognition, volition, etc. are caused by
the conjunction of the soul with the object through the
mind and the senses. — 213
XI)
* No change can be produced in the mind when it abides in
the soul, which is the state of Yoga. — 214 ... 167
SECTION E.
Of Action in Mind, etc.
(ii) Caused by Adyistam.
* The ingoing and outgoing of life and mind at birth and
death, metabolic, physiological and other vital processes
are caused by adristam. — 215 ... 169
* Emancipation takes place in the absence of adristam.-" 216 170
How Yoga destroys adyistam is described ... 170
SECTION F.
Of Action in Shadows,
* Darkness is a non-entity. — 217,218 ... 171
SECTION G.
Of Absence of Action.
* Space, Time, Ether, Soul, Action, Attribute, Genus, Species,
Combination are void of action, as they are incorporeal
or imponderable.— 219-224 ... 172-174
BOOK VI.
Of the Investigation of Dharma and A-Dharma.
CHAPTER I.
Of Vedic Duties.
SECTION A.
Of Source of the Authority of the Veda.
* The Veda is a statement of facts by a person who has previ
ously known those facts. — 225
It is the work of an Absolute Person
The Mlmdmsd doctrine that Word is eternal, is refuted
* Allotment of names in the Brdhmana portion of the Veda is
a mark of the previous knowledge of the things
named. — 226 ... 175
"* Injunctions on gift and on acceptance of gift are also such
marks.— 227,228 ... 176
SECTION B.
Of the Reaper of Consequences.
* Result of Act accrues to the performer enly. — 229 ... 177
Exceptions to the rule considered ... 177
The Vrittikdra does not admit any exception, ... I7g
SECTION c.
Of Dharma and A-dharmas from Prescribed and Prohibited Acts.
* Entertainment of impure Brahmanas at a &rdddha does not
produce Dharraa. — 230 ... 179
* < Impurity ' consists in killing. — 231 ... 179
* Association with the impure is sinful. — 232 ... 779
* Entertainment of a pure Brahman a at a Srdddha is not
sinful— 233 ... J80
* Puiity, and not status, should be the criterion.— 234,235 ... J80
SECTION D.
Of Certain Exceptions.
* Stealing, killing, and suicide are not sinful in certain
circumstances. — 236-240 . 181-183
Zlll
CHAPTER II.
Of the Production of Dharma and A-dharma.
SECTION A.
Of the Supreme Good.
"* Acts of which the purpose is not of this world, produce
' Exaltation '—241 ... 184
Proof of Adfistam is stated ... 184
* Acts of which' the objects are not ' visible ' stated. — 242 ... 181
SECTION B.
Of Purity.
•* Parity is purity of heart ; impurity is impurity of
heart.— 243,244 ... 185,186
* What objects are pure, stated. — 245 ... 186
* Impure objects stated.— 246,247 ... 187-188
SECTION c.
Of Self-restraint.
~+ Purity must be coupled with self-restraint in order to
produce ( Exaltation.'— 248,249 ... 188
SECTION D.
Of Causes of i Faults.'
* Desire and Aversion are caused by pleasure and pain, by
habit, by adristam, and also by racial distinction. —
250-253 ... 189,190
SECTION E.
Of Effects of < Faults.'
"*• Desire and aversion cause activity towards dharma and
a-dharma. — 254 ... 191
Activity of mind, speech, and body described ... 191
SECTION P.
Effects of Dharma and A-dharma.
-* Birth and death are the results of dharma and a-dharma
255 ... 191
SECTION G.
Of the Nature of Release.
* Release is a state of permanent impossibility of' pain. — 256 192
Hew Release is attained, is described ... Ipfc
BOOK VII.
Of the Examination of Attributes and of Combination .
CHAPTER I.
Of Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, and Magnitude.
SECTION A.
Of Non-eternal Attributes.
* Aphorism I. i. 6 recalled— 257 ... 193
* Colour, etc, of Earth, etc. are non-eternal, because their
subtrata are non-eternal. — 258 ... 193
SECTION B.
Of Eternal Attributes.
* Colour, etc. of the ultimate atoms of Water, Fire, and Air
are eternal.— 259,260 ... 194
Vrittikdra's reading of Aphorism 250 explained ... 194
* Bat Colour, etc. of aqueous, ig.ieous, a id aerial bod ies are
non-eternal. — 261 ... 195
X1T
SECTION c.
Of Variety of Colour,etc. in Earth.
Colour, etc. of terrene bodies are produced from like attri
butes in their constituent cause and also from the action
of heat— 262 ... 196
Colour. ness, etc. are not mere apprehensibility by the
external senses, but are jdtis or universals which are
the characteristics of the attributes perceptible by the
external senses ... 196-199-
Process due to the action of heat is considered. Two views :
pithara-pdka (pot-baking) and pilu-pdka (atom-baking-)
distinguished ... 199-202:
* Because the substance is the same before and after the
action of heat. — 263 ... 202
SECTION D.
Of Measure or Extension.
* The minute is not perceived ; tho massive is perceived. — 264 203-
Measure is of four kinds : Largeness, Smallness, Long-ness,
and Shortness ... 203
The universal substances, Space, Time, Ether, and Soul,
are also infinite in measure, i. e, possesses extreme large
ness and long-ness ; extreme smallnrss and shortness
exist in the ultimate atoms ; the next degrees of small-
ness and shortness exist in binary atomic aggregates ;
and largeness and long-ness exist in substances from
tertiary atomic aggregates upwards 203
* Largeness is produced either from multiplicity of consti
tuent parts, or from their magnitude, or from their loose
conjunction. — 265 204
A multiplicity of constituent parts come into combination
by the direction of God 204
* Smallness is produced from opposite causes. — 266 205
1 Relative uses of ' large ' and ' small ' explained. — 267-269 205-2UU
' Largeness and Smallness do not exist in Largeness and
Smallness.— 270,271 207
* Largeness and Smallness do not exist in Attributes and
Actions. — 272 207
* Long-ness and Shortness do not exist in Long-ness and
Short-ness.. — 273 208
* Measure of eternal substances and ultimate atoms is eternal,
and measure of non-eternal substances is non-eternal—
, 274,275 _ 208,209
Measure of the ultimate atom is called parimandala. — 276 20(J
The existence of Measure in a relative sense in perceptible
bodies, is proof of the existence of Measure in a roal
sense in imperceptible substances. — 277 210
* Ether as well as the Soul is infinitely large 278 210
The Mind is infinitely small._279 21.1
> Space is all-pervading. — 280 212
* Time is all-pervading. — 281
Time is the efficient cause of all that is produced 212
CHAPTER II.
Of Number, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority,
Posteriority, and Combination.
SECTION A.
Of Attributes which exist in one object as well as in more
than one object.
* Unity is a different Attribute. — -282 ... 214
Bhilsana's view criticised ... 214
* Separateness is a different Attribute. — 283 ... 215
Separateness is distinguished from ' mutual non-existence,'
difference in property, and Genus ... 215
* Unity and Separateness do not exist in Unity and Separate-
ness.— 284 ••• 216
* Unity does not exist in Attributes and Actions, because
they are void of Number.— 285,286 ... 216,217
* If Unity did not really exist, the word could not be used
even in a relative sense. — -287 ... 217
The Sdmkhyas hold that cause and effect are one and the
same, i. e. that unity and individuality belong to them.
This is not correct •«« 217
•* Unity and Individuality do not exist in Effect and Cause.
—288 ••• 218
* The characteristic of having the attributes of the cause as
antecedents, belongs to non-eternal Unity and Indivi
duality.— 289 -. 219
Other Numbers and Separatenesses are derivative, and
embrace more than one substance ... 21g
The conception of duality analysed ... 221
How duality is destroyed , ...221-222
Sridhara, Udayana, and Sanltara- Misra on the idea of
multiplicity or manifoldness ... 223
The common consent of humanity that a thing is produced
and thai a thing is destroyed, is a refutation of the
Sdmkhya doctaine that cause and effect are identical ... 225
SECTION B.
Of Attributes which embrace more than one object.
* Conjunction and Disjunction are produced either by the
action of one of the substanees concerned, or by the
action of both, or by another Conjunction or another
Disjunction.— 290,291. .... 225,228
Production of things takes place by means of Conjunction 226
There is no Conjunction among all-pervadiug substances.
e. g. Space, Time, Ether, and Soul ... 226
Conjunction is not eternal ... 227
How Conjunction is destroyed 227
Sarvajna's view of Disjunction criticised ... 23(
How Disjunction is destroyed ... 231,282
* Coniunction and Disjunction do not exist in Conjunction
and Disjunction.— 292,293 ... 232,233
* Effect and Cause do not possess Conjunction and Disjunc
tion, because they are already in combination with each
other.— 294 ••• 233
XT!
•
SECTION c.
Of Sound and Sena?.
* The relation between a Word and its Meaning is neither
Conjunction nor Combination, because Conjunction is
an Attribute— 295-300 .
* Because Attribute also may be the meaning of a Word. — 296 234-
* Because Word and its Meaning are both inert. — 297 ••• 234.
* And because a non-entity also is denoted by Word. — 298 234
* Word and its Meaning are therefore unrelated. — 299 ... 285-
"* Intuition of Meaning from Word follows from Convention.
-301 23*
The convention is the direction of God 236
It is learnt from usage, testimony, analogy, synonymy, etc. 236
Tutata, Prabhdkara, the ' ancients,' Sankara Misra, and
Gautama on the import of Words ... 237,238-
Convention is twofold : original and modern. The first
supplies the force of a Word ; the second, the definition
of a Word ••• 73:T
SECTION D.
Of Attributes existing inonc substance and haviny reference
to all-pervading substances.
* Priority and Posteriority are produced by two bodies lying
in the same direction, at the same time, and being near
and remote. — 302 ... 238'
How they are destroyed ...239-241
* Priority and Posteriority arise from the nearness and
remoteness of the cause. — 303 ... 241
2 Priority and Posteriority do not exist in Priority and
Posteriority.— 304,306 ... 242"
SECTION K.
Of Combination.
* Combination is that relation by virtue of which arises the
intuition in the form of " This is here," with regard to
effect and cause.— 307 ... 243
The test of Consciousness invoked ... 244
Combination is eternal ... 244
The view of the Bhattas considered ... 245-
* Combination is different from Substance, Attribute, Action.
(jrenus, and Species.- — 308 ... 24-j j
* Combination is one. — 300 ... 246
The followers of Prabhdkara maintarn that Combination is
manifold, and is non-eternal. This is not reasonable ... 246 i
The Nydya doctrine that Combination is perceptible to the
senses, is not valid ... 246-
BOOK VIII.
Of Ordinary Cognition by means of Conjunction or
Combi n ation .
CHAPTER I.
Of Presentative Cognition.
SECTION A.
Of the Nature of Cognition.
* Understanding or Cognition is a property of the Soul. — 310 247
XVII
The Minkh'ja doctrine that Understanding is an evolute
o£ I'rakriti and a distinct entity from Soul, is not
reasonable ...247-24*
Coo-nition is either true knowledge or false knowledge :
"true knowledge is produced by perception, inference,
memory, or testimony : the forms of false knowledge are
doubt, error, dream, and uncertainty
* Soul, Mind, Time, Space, Air, Ether, and Ultimate Atoms
arc not knowable by ordinary perception. — 311 248-
Sense-born cognition is of two degrees : ordinary and
transcendental, as of Yogins who can see even ultimate
atoms ... 24i*
All that is demonstrable, nameable, and existent, is an
object of sense-cognition, whether ordinary or trans
cendental ... 249
Ordinary perception is either discriminative or non-dis
criminative ... 249
Dhar-makirti, and Dinndya's argument against discrimina
tive cognition stated and arswered ... 249-250
SECTION B.
Of the Production of Cognition.
* Aphorism 111, i. 18 recalled.— 312 * ... 25O
* Cognition of Attribute, Action, Genus, and,. Species is
rendered possible by means of the substances in which
they inhere. — 313,314 ... 251,252
* ilenus and Species are causes of cognition of Substance,
Attribute, and Action. — 315 ... 252
* Substance, Attribute, and Action are causes of cognition
of Substance— 316 ... 253
* Attribute and Action are not causes of cognition of Attri
bute and Action. — 317 ... 253
* Combination is a cause of cognition. — 318 ... 254
* Successive cognitions of a pillar, a jar, etc. are not related
as cause and effect-— 319,320 ... 255
Cognition is either presentative or representative. Presen-
tativo cognition is either perception or inference.
Perception is either discriminative or non-discrimina
tive : again, either ordinary or transcendental- Infer-
once is either from agreement, or from difference, or from
commonly observed marks ... 25ti
Cognition is either true knowledge or false knowledge :
jicrain. either certitude or doubt ... 257
CHAPTER II.
Of Doubly Preset tntive Cognition.
SECTION A.
Of Proof of Involved Cognition.
* ' This/ ; That ' 'Done by you ' < Feed him,' are instances
of cognition involving cognition of another thing. — 321 25$
* Tho proof is that such cognitions arise in respect of objects
seen, and do not arise in respect of objects not seen. — 322 258
SECTION B.
Of the Meaning of Artha (Object) in the Vaijusika.
* Substance, Attribute, and Action are called Object.* — 323 ... 259
*
SECTICK c.
Of the Senses and their Objects.
Bodies are not compound products of five elements.— 824 ...
Senses are relative to their corresponding attributes 25i>
* The Sense of Smell is constituted by the element of Earth.
—-325 *" -39?
* Similarly the Senses of Taste. Colour, and Touch are
constituted by the elements of Water, Fire, and Air-
326
Likewise the Sense of Hearing is a portion of Ether con
fined within the cavity of the ear
BOOK IX.
Of Ordinary and Transcendental Cognition by means of
presentation other than Conjunction and Combination.
CHAPTER I.
Of Ordinary Perception of Non -Existence
and
Of Transcendental Perception.
SF.CTIOX A.
Of Enumeration and Demonstration of Non-Ed ixtencc*.
* An effect cannot, before its production, be spoken of in
terms of action and attribute, and is therefore then non
existent. — 327
* The existent becomes non-existent.
* The existent is quite different from the non-existent.- -329... 2f»4
* What is existent in one form (e. </. a horse) is non-existent
in another form(e. g. as a cow) —330
Such reciprocal non-existence is eternal
* There is a fourth kind of non-existence kno\vn as absolute
non-existence. — 331
The ancients' and the moderns' view of absolute non-
existence
SECTION i;
Of the Ptrception of Non -exist en? i-.
* Absence of perception after destruction, and recollection
of existence before destruction, are causes of perception
of consequent non-existence.- -332 ••• 26fi
* Perceptibility after pi eduction is the cause of perception
of non-existence before production. — -333 267
* Non-apprehension of identity is the cause of the perception
of reciprocal non-existence. — 334 ••• ^tW
* Non-cognizance of production and destruction is the cause
of the perception of absolute non-existence. — 335 2Ht>'
* The judgment " The water-pot does not, exist in the room."
merely negates the connection of the existent water- pot
with the room. — 336 -'*
SECTION o.
Of Transcendental Perception.
* Perceptual cognition of the Soul results from a particular
conjunction of the Soul and the Mind in the Soul. — 337 272^
XIX
*
*
•*
SECTION D.
Of Nescience.
Dreain is produced in the same way as Reminiscence.— 348
Intensity of impressions, derangement of the bumours of
the body, and adristam are causes of dreaming ... 291
Dreams, good and evil, described 291
So is also " Consciousness accompanying dreams. "3 49 ...,, 292
Pratastapdda's and VrittiJcdra'* views on Dream stated ... 292
> Merit and De-Merit also cause Dream and Dream-memory.
350 ^^ 292
1 Nescience or False Knowledge arises from imperfection of
the Senses and also from imperfection of ImDression.
OKI T
293
1 Avidyd or False Knowledge is imperfect knowledge. — 352... 293
The forms of A-vidyd are Doubt, Error, Dream, and
Indecision go^
SECTION E.
Of Scientific Cognition.
* Scientific Cognition is cognition free from Imperfection
~363 ... 294
SECTION F
Of Cognition by Seers and Siddhas.
* The cognition of Seers and Siddhaa takes place by means
of merit. — 354 295
Vfiltiledra's and PraSastapada' s views stated 295
BOOK X.
Of the Differences of the Attributes of the Soul and of
the threefold Causes.
CHAPTER I.
Of the Attributes of the Soul.
* Pleasure and Pain are different objects, because of the
difference of their causes and because of their mutual
opposition. — 355 29ft
Prafastapdda's view stated 296
* They are not forma of Cognition.— 356-360 ... 297-300
* The relation of the body and its parts explained. — 361 301
CHAPTER II.
Of the Threefold Causes,
SECTION A.
Of Combinative and Non-combinative caiise.
Substance is the only combinative cause. — 362 .,. 302
It operates as an efficient cause also.~-363 ... 303
Actions are non-cornbinative causes 364 ... 304
Certain Attributes are non-combinative causes, and occa
sionally operate as efficient causes also 365 ... 304
* Conjunction is a non-combinative cause. — 366,367 ... 804
SKGTION B.
Of Efficient Cause.
* Heat is an efficient cause. — 368 ... 305
SECTION c.
Of Transcendental Utility of Acts.
* Of acts enjoined, of which worldly good is not the fruit,
the utility is transcendental. — 369 ... 305
or ascetics are either yukta or meditative, or viyukta
or non-meditative. The former have perceptual cogni
tion of the Soul. The Soul sometimes flashes across
ordinary hmte consciousness 272
Transcendental presentation discussed 272
> Similarly, by means of; Meditation, omniscience is attained!
— 273
<• Omniscience also belongs to the viyukta or supra-meditative*
». «. those who have reached the state of independence of
the sense-apparatus 339 2^ .
How they exhaust their karma, is described 274
Ihe Yogin* perceive Attributes and Actions through their
combination in Substances. 340
They perceive the attributes of their own souls through
their combination in their souls— o41
An argument that Kandda recognises only three independ-
fint Pr«<l i <>ahiQa * f "**
Of Other Forms of Cognition.
SECTION A.
Of Inference.
* the effect, or cause of, conjunct with, contradictory
" tl"8
27r
o~r
97 t\
CHAPTER II.
Three views of P*k»a or the minor term described 07-
Lingo, or inferential mark (the middle term) discussed 277
Place of Pardmarja or subsumption of the mark in the'
process of inference discussed
Different forms of Inference described «!«
^^J °f ratUr* i8/^ baS1'8 °f Infer«™e, »nd not the
relation of Cause and Effect. 343
How Uniformity of Nature is established
Two kinds of Inference, logical and rheiorical, described" 281
Syllogism analysed and illustrated tha terra pratijnd hetu
uddharana, upanaya, and niyamana explained 281
The Vaisesika terminology stated and explained 282
SECTION B.
Of Testimony and Other Forms of Proof
Verbal is a form of Inferential Cognition.— 344 o«o
Gesture, whether conventional or non-conventional, is not
a form of Proof
' Reason, Word Mark, (Met^s of) Proof, Instrument, the's'e"
are not- antonyms. — 345
Analogy, Presumption, Subsumption, Privation, and Tradi
tion are included in Inference, because they proceed by
the cognition of the Uniformity of Nature.~-346 28"
SKCTION c.
Of Reminiscence.
Reminiscence takes place from a particular conjunction of
the Soul aud the Mind and from past impression.-437.. 290
FrasaetapAda « explanaiion quoted «Q«
How sagely cognition is produced
• • • fi y *
XXI
The Veda is not impersonal, and is the work of a Supreme
Person absolutely free from imperfection
The purpose of sacred observance is to purify the mirror of
the mind
SECTION D.
Of the Author of the Veda.
The Veda is the work of God.— 370 307
The argument fully stated 307
THE VAJSESJKA SUTRAS OF KANADA
WITH THR
COMMENTARY OF SANKARA MISRA
AND
3XTUACTS FROM THE GLOSS OF J AYANARAYANA.
AXD
Till-: BHASYA OF CHAXDRAK ANTA.
SAXKAKA MISRA'S INTRODUCTION.
Salutation to Sri (Janesa !
I bow to llara who has the Heavenly lliver playing on the lap
if His uptied matted locks, and whose forehead is adorned with the
Umbel li slier of the Night.
Mv Salutations constantly reach those two, Kanada and Bliava-
ntitha, by whom I have been thoroughly enlightened in the Vaisesika
System.
Xole. — Kamula here does not refer to the author of the Vaisesika-Sutram, but to a >vell-
known Yaisesika teacher of a recent date.
'lihavanatha was the father of Sankara MiSra.
May success attend this venture of mine who, like a funambulist;
in the air. walk here without any support, with the only help of the
Sutram.
_y0<e Sutraiii — a. piece of rope ; an aphorism ; just as a rope-daucer walks in the air
with the help (A a (Sutram (rope), so the commentator traverses the philosophy of tho
Vaisesikiis with the help of the Sutram (aphorisms) of Kamula.
Human existence is subject to threefold afflictions. These
afflictions are partly adhyatmika, i.e., bodily and mental. They are
partly Adhibhautiku,' i.e., caused by natural agencies, e. g. man, beast,
bird, reptile and the immobile. And they are partly adhidaiyika, i.e.,
caused by supernatural powers, such as Yaksa, llaksasa, Vinayaka,
-etc. Discriminative men, struck with the threefold afflictions, looked
for the root-cause of the cessation of the threefold afflictions. They
gathered from the various Srutis (Revelations), Smritis (Recollections),
Ftihasas (Histories), and Purunas (Cosmogonies), that it is the imme
diate intuition or direct vision of the principle of the self, or simply,
self-reali/.ation, which is that cause. They then desired to know the
path also which led to the attainment of self-realization. Accordingly-
they approached the very kind sage (muni) Kanada.
VAI£ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
Now, the Muni Kanada had accomplished the knowledge of the prin
ciples (tattvas), dispassion, and lordliness. He thought within himself |
that the knowledge of the principles of the six padarthas (predicables), I
by means of their resemblances and differences, is the only royal road
to the attainment of self-realization, and that that would be easily 1
accomplished by the disciples through the dharrna (Merit or Worth) of
renunciation. He therefore resolved first to teach them dharma alone
with reference to its essential form and with reference to its character
istics, and then to teach them also the six padfirthas by means of
their enumeration, definition, and demonstration.
Note. — Dharma of renunciation. — The indirect method of Self-realization is Pravritti
Marga, i. e. through and by means of wordly experience. The direct method of Self-realization -
is Nivritti Marga, i. e. through and by means of abandonment of worldly experience.
Hence, to invite their attention, he proposes.
Jay andrdy ana's Introduction.
He who of His own will spreads out the production, preservation,
and destruction of the universe; He who, even though shining forth
in suppression of all these, still is not known by other than wise men ;
He, by knowing whom as He is in Himself, men are saved from further |
immersion into the waves of the stream of transmigration ; the same is
Bhava (i.e., the Lord of Creation), and He is easy of access by the path
of communion with Him in constant devotion.* Mayj- He be pleased t<-
give you prosperity.
I adore Bhavani (the consort of Bhava), Mahesi (the consort of
Mahesa, the Great Lord;, who, Herself bearing limbs as dark as th&j
cloud, still dispels the mass of darkness by myriads of collected rays ;.
who while cutting asunder the bond of re-birth of Her devotees, is Her-j
self bound by love to Bhava and is His constant delighter; who!
although She is born of the Immobile (the Himalaya), ^ still moves from]
place to place; and who while being the consort of the Pure (Siva), is-
seated on a corpse.
After bowing to his good preceptor, the fortunate twice-born r
Jayanarayana is writing out the vivriti (explanation or elaboration) of
the aphorisms of Kanada for the pleasure of Isvara.
Here, indeed, one and all of the disciples, desiring to throw off the
multitude of afflictions arising from birth, decrepitude, death, and the
like, hear from the various Srutis, Smritis, Itihasas, Puranas, etc., that
the vision of the reality of the Self is the fundamental means of escaping
them. Thus, there is the £ruti : " Verily, verily, the Self is to be seen,
to be heard about, to be thought over, and meditated upon. V erilyj
O verily, this is (the measure of) immortality7' (Bnhadaranyaka 2 4, 5;;
also, " When the Purusa (the in-dweller) will know himself— the Self-
"I am," then wishing 'what, for which desire, will he pursue the course
of transmigration?" And the Smriti also: "By elaborating his under
standing in three ways, namely by "sacred writings, inference, and
habitual flow of contemplation, a person attains to laudable com
munion.
C'f. Narada Bhakti Stitrarn, aphorism 58 p. 23, S. B. H., Vol. VII.
t Cf Sandilya-Sutram, III, 1, 7,|page 7If,S. B. H., Vol. VII.
KANADA SIJTRAS I, 1, 1.
Now, some disciples, who were unenvious and who had properly
studied the Vedas and the Vedaiigas, (i-e., treatises regarded as so many
limbs as it were of the Vedas) and had also achieved the gravana
(i.e., the stage of self-culture known by the name, audition, in other
words, the mere acquisition of knowledge or information as referred
to in the preceding paragraph^, with due rites approached the great
and mighty sage Kaiuida for the purpose of manana or intellection (the
second stage of self-culture, i.e., that of discriminative understanding).
Thereupon that sage, full of great compassion, taught them a system
(of self-culture) in Ten Books. There in the First Book he has stated
the entire group of paddrtlias (Predicables); in the Second Book he
has ascertained Substance; in the Third Book he has described the
Soul and the Inner Sense; in the Fourth Book he has discussed the
body and its constituents; in the Fifth Book he has established Kama,
(Action); in the Sixth Book he has considered Dharma (piety) according
to &ruti ; in the Seventh Book he has established Attribute and tiamavdya
(co-inherence or combination) ; in the Eighth Book he has ascertained
the manifestation of knowledge, its source, and soon; in the Ninth
Book he has established particular or concrete understanding; and in
the Tenth Book lie has established the differences of the attributes of
the Soul.
The operation ot this treatise (towards teaching) is three-fold:
Enumeration, Definition, and Examination or Demonstration. Classi
fication or Division is a particular form of Enumeration; and hence it
does not constitute an additional method.
Although this system is mainly concerned with the determination
of the Predicables, still, inasmuch as Dharma, being at the root of the
knowledge of the essence of the Predicables, possesses a prominence of
its own, therefore he (Kanada) proposes to ascertain that (Dharma} first
of all.
Dharma t'.y to If- f.i>plaiiif'<1.
w? sq^qr^nr: ii ? I ? I m
Sl«r Atha, now. ?[?T: Atah, therefore, [^wfc JDliarmmam, piety,
religi. n. sqreqWTW: Vyakhyasyamah, (We) shall explain.
1. Now, therefore, we shall explain Dharma. — 1.
Cpatkai-a.—' Atha,' indicates sequence to the desire of the disciples; ' Atah'— Because
disciples, skilful in, SVeu'crua (audition), etc, and uneiivioud, approached (him)," therefore
<fr the word ' atha' has the sense of auspiciousness. For it has been said : " Q,nk Ira (aum
and the word .-tt/ia— these two came out, at the beginning, by breaking through the throat of
Brahma ; hence both of them are auspicious." Audit is as it should" be. How, otherwise
is it possible on the part of the great sago, while composing the Vaisesika system of self'
culture, not to observe the auspicious ceremony, which has acquired the obligatory nature
Of a duty, by a succession of observances by pious, men ? It cannot be said, on the other
side, that the non-observance might be due to the experience of the non-appearance of fruit
even where the auspicious ceremony has been observed and of the appearance of fruit even
where it has not been observed ; since a wise man does not engage in a useless pursuit For
its usefulness becomes certain on the supposition of its observance in another birth 'in the
case of the above non-observance where the fruit still appears, and of defect in some part (of
the ceremony) in the case of the above observance, where the fruit does not still appear
VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
Again, there need be also no apprehension of its uselcssness merely on account of the non-
appearanco, for the time being, of the fruit of that, the obligatory nature of which has bet n
taught in the >Sruti ami can be inferred from the conduct of the elect or polite. Nor i,s it that
there can be no supposition of .something in another birth since an act must produce it.s fruit
in this (one) life only ,• because, as in the case of the sacrifice for the birth of a son, so in
every act the characteristic of producing fruit in one and the same life is not proved to exist.
Whereas the characteristic of producing fruit in one and the same life belongs to Kt'ir'trl
(sacrifice for rain) and other sacrifices, because these are performed with that desire alone.
Here the agent is desirous of completion, as the agent in a sacrifice is desirous of heaven. The
difference is that there the object (of the observance) is a ne-,v entrance in the shape of
ftdriftam, while here it is the annihilation of hindrances, since the undertaking is with the
desire that what has been begun may be safely completed.
tt cannot be said that the fruit of the observance is tlie mere an
nihilation of hindrances while completion will follow from its own
cause. For, the mere annihilation of obstacles is not in itself an object
of volition, whereas completion as the means of happiness is an objV.-t of
volition, and it is also uppermost in the mind. Moreover, the mere
destruction of demerits is not the fruit, for that being1 otherwise capable
of accomplishment by propitiation, singing the name of God, crossing
the river Karmanasfi, etc., there will be plurality of causes, i.e , a
violation of the rule (that only the observance of the omen will produce
the result). If it is held that the destruction of demerits is the end, as
the destruction of the particular demerits which obstruct the fulfil ment
of the undertaking, then the fulfilment itself properly becomes the end.
Here too there will be a violation of the rule, since such destruction of
particular demerits is producible by gift of gold, bathing1 ^at the con
fluence (of the GangA and Yamuna) at Prayaga (Allahabad), etc. ; and
it will be rash to speak of them as so many good omen^.
Again, the causality of the good omen consists in this that it being
observed, the completion must necessarily follow. So it has been said:
"Because of the rule that the fruit necessarily results from an act.
complete in all its parts, according to the Veda." Hence an alternative-
cause also is certainly a cause, for the idea of a cause in the Veda
refers only to the uniformity of immediateness or to the immediate-
sequence of the effect. It is perverse to suppose a difference in kind
in the effects, in the case of a plurality of causes. "Where causal it v has
to be deduced from agreement and difference, there the rule of ante
cedence to the effect should lie observed, but not in the Yeda also,
where the appearance of difference does not figure as a weighty con
sideration. Thus it is not a violation of the rule to say that the-
omen being observed in all its parts, the completion necessarily
follows.
Now, completion or fulfilment is that on the performance of which
arises the belief that this act has been completed. In the case of writings
it consists in the writing of the last sentence; in the case of a sacrifice,.,
etc., in the final oblation; in the case of a cloth, etc.. in the addition of
the last thread ; in the case' of going to a village, etc., in the final con
tact of the feet with the village : and it should be similarly undetstood
in all other cases. Therefore in the case of completion produced by an
auspicious observance-, even if we suppose a difference in kind in the-
effect, still there is no violation of the rule of agreement and diffe
rence.
KANADA SUTRAS I, 1, 2.
An auspicious observance is an act which brings about fulfilment
as its fruit by the path of the annihilation of obstacles, and that is
real I v of the form of salutation to the deity, etc. Even where obstacles
do not exist of themselves, although the commonly attributed (as above;
charactei'sitic of issuing by the path of the annihilation of obstacles is
absent there, still the idea of the auspicious observance is not too
narrow, because the salutation, etc., as such, possess the incidence of
tlie characteristic of issuing by the path of the annihilation of obstacles
This is the point. — 1.
The ]'irTt>ti adds : Others again say that the non-existence of any
hindrance having been insured by the virtue born of concentration
()V<t/a), the sage did not attend to the auspicious observance, or that if
lie did. he has not inserted that at the beginning of the book. Later
thinkers, on the other hand, say that, as in the treatise of (lautama (i.f ..
Nvaya Sutra), in the recital of the word yramana (Proof; which falls,
witliiu the group of the names of Grod, so too in this treatise, the
auspicious ceremony has been observed, in the form of reciting the
word {Ihannci, which also is a synonym of God.
It should be understood here that dliarma leads up to knowledge
by the way of the purification of the mind (chitta), thirst after know
ledge, and so on. Tor the Areda says: "They come to thirst after know
ledge by the performance of sacrifices," etc. And says the Smriti also..
•"Knowledge is produced after demerits or dark deeds have been dest
royed by good acts."
Chandrak&nta : — The classification of Ulianna is not shown by
Kan (id a, as it does not fall within the scope of his philosophy ; for, he
lias undertaken the Sdstra with the object of teaching Tattva-Jnanani,
knowledge of the essences or principles, only.
Definition of Dharma.
: ii ? I n ^ ii
W. Yatah, whence. Wfg^-fsfcSTWferfe;: Abhyudaya-nihsreyasa-
siddhih. Exaltation, Supreme (rood. Accomplishment. ST: Sah, that, gn?:
Dharmah, Piety, Religion.
2. Dharma (is) that from which (results) the accomplish
ment of Exaltation and of the Supreme Good.— 2.
Ifpashira. — Now lie describes the subject proposed :
' Abhyudaya ' means knowledge of the essences. < Nihsreyasam ' is
•final cessation of pain. That from which both of them result is (Jli.an,ia.
The compound of the two words, rendered as 'nihsreyasa' by the path
of 'abhyudaya,' belongs to that class of compounds which are formed
l>y the elision of the middle term: or it is a Tat-puriwa compound
ablatively formed.
This dliarma will be later on described as being characterised by
forbearance. If it is the effect of constant contemplation and other
practices of iogo and is the same as adrittam (the invisible, potential
after effects of actions, or Merit and Demerit), then it is producible by
positive performances.
6 VA1&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
The Vrittikara, however, says: uAbhyudaya' is happiness, and
4 nihsreyasam ' the simultaneous annihilation of all the particular attri
butes. (-i.e., modifications) of the Soul. The proof is that in the case of
dharma, the body, etc., of Devadatta are made up of eleme its s » direct
ed by the particular attributes of the enjoyer or sufferer, and as they
are products or effects, they are, as the means of his enjoyment or
experience, like a garland made by himself." Now, this explanation
has been discarded by superficial readers as being not wide enough to
apply to each and all (a). Whereas in fact "what is dharma ? and what
its characteristic ?" — the enquiry of the disciples being of such a
general nature, the answer comes, "That from which (results) the
accomplishment of Exaltation and of the Supreme (food."
Thus, that which leads to the attainment of Exaltation, and also
that which leads to the attainment of the Supreme Good, both of them
are dharma. Thus that the invariable cause of the object of volition is
dharma, being the matter to be expressed, the expression "the accom
plishment of Exaltation and of the Supreme (rood " has been used with
the object of specially introducing the two great objects of volition, r/z.,
happiness and absence of pain. Because paradise and emancipation
are the only great objects of volition, being the objects of desire which
is not dependent upon desire for ulterior objects. And it will be shown
that the absence of pain also is an object of volition. ___ 2.
[Note.— (.a) " Not wide enough to apply to each and all."— The separate characteristics
are that it produces pleasure and that it produces the Supreme (!ood. The former does nob
include the dharma of mvritti and tiie latter does not include the dharma of pravriui Tho
characteristic is that it produce., both pleasure and the .Supreme Good.' And this
does not include that which produces pleasure only, nor that which produce the Supreme
<,ood only Thus the definition of dharma as explained by the Vrittikara is in cither case too
IK, according to Upasknra, the view of superficial readers.]
Chandrakdnta :—WliereZrom does the production of the good and
the ultimate good result? The production of the good and of the
ultimate good results from Pracritti, activity or employment, that is
observed in the world, or) exertion of the speech, the mind, and the
body Therein, it is said, that a person cultivates Jjjta.-ma with the
speech, by telling agreeable a.,d wholesome truths and by studying the
sacred writings; with the mind, by showing compassion, contentment,
and faith; with the body, by practising charity and by relieving the
poor and the distressed and those who are in danger. q^ *ERq «?a
?«rKanf H*Mfor— This text of the Veda also shows that
Dharma is the designate of the word, " yajati," to perfcrm (sacrifices,
€tc.)
And this Dharma is subsidiary, because it subserves taf.tcajn:"<namf
knowledge of the principles ; which is the principal Dharma, 'because
it is the means of the supreme good.
Authority <>f tha Veda.
1 1 ? n \\ II
Tad-vachanfit, ber.ig* His Word or declaration, or its (of
dharma*) exposition. ?n*crpK9 Amnayasya, of the Veda.
manyam, authoritativeness.
KANADA SUTRAS I, 1, 3.
3. The authoritativeness of the Veda (arises from its) being
the Word of God [or being an exposition of dharma]. — 3.
Upaski'ira. — It may be objected, " Well, the Veda is the authority for this that dhurmtt
characterised by nivritti is the source of the Supreme Good by means of the knowledge of the
essence or reality. But we are doubtful about the authoritativeness of the Voda itself, ou
•account of the faults of falsity, contradiction, and repetition. Falsity is shown by the non-
production of the son, even after the sacrifice for a son has been performed. The homn
(oblation to tire) after sun-rise, etc., actually prescribed in the ordinances ' He offers oblation
unto fire after sunrise, he offers oblation unto tiro before runrise, he offers oblation unto lire
at a belated hour,' is counteracted by suen t ixts as ' oyava (a dog of Yamaj eats up the oblation
of him who oilers oblation unto fire alter sunrise, Savala (the other dog of Yama) eats up the
oblation of him who offers oblation unto fire before sunrise, $yava and savala eat up the
oblation of him who offers oblation unto fire at a belated hour,' etc. And repetition surely
appears from the mention of the thrico recital of the first and the last Stimidheni (the Rik
III. 27. 1-11. directed to kindle fire) in ' He will recite the first for three times, he will recite
the last for three times.' Beside there is nothing to establish the authoritativeness of the
Veda. Its eternality being uncertain, its eternal freedom from defect also becomes doubtful.
On the other hand, if it is the product of a human brain, then by the possibility of mistake,
oversight, uncertainty, want of skill in the author, etc., its characteristic of being the
infallible testimony of a great and good (apta) man, certainly becomes doubtful. Thus there
is no Supreme Good, nor is knowledge of reality its means, nor again is d/iarma. Thus all
this remains uncertain."
To meet this objection he says :
' Tat ' alludes to God whose existence is well-known, although the
word does not appear in the context ; as in the aphorism of Gautamar
" That is nuauthoritative on account of the faults of falsity, contradic
tion, and repetition," the Veda is alluded to by the word Hat',' althougfh-
it^does not appear in the context. Thus 'tadvachanat,' means bei;;g-
the composition of Him, Isvara ; <• amnayasya, ' of the Veda ; <pra-
manyam.' Or,' 'tat' refers to dharma only which is close by i. e., in the
context. Thus, of dharma ; i vachanat,' being the exposition ;
amnayasya, of the Veda ; 'pramanyam ;' since that statement is really
proof which establishes something which is authoritative. God and
the quality of His being an dpta (?'. e., a great and good person) will
lie established later on.
Now, with reference to what has been said, namely, " on account
of the faiilts of falsity, contradiction, and repetition," there in the case
of falsity, the explanation lies in the supposition of producing result
in another existence or the supposition of defect in the act, the agent,
and the instrument, since there is the rule that the result necessarily
follows from an act, complete in all its parts, prescribed in the Veda.
Moreover, it is not the case that the result must appear in this and
only this life, as in the case of Karlrl. (i. e., sacrifice for rain.j There
the occupation is that of one who desires a revival of crops which are
getting dry. In the case of the sacrifice for a son, the occupation is
that of one who desires a son only. This is the difference. There is
also no contradiction, because the condemnatory passages such as
" Syava eats up his oblations/' etc., have reference only to cases where
after having particularly vowTed oblations after sunrise, etc., one
perfoms such homax at other times. Nor is there the fault of repetition r
because the repetition has this justification that eleven mantras for
kindling fire having been as a matter of fact recited, fifteen such
mantras as required by the text, " By the means of the fifteen word-
thunders he opposed that enemy who is here," cannot be obtained
without reciting the first and the iast mantra for three times each. — 3.
g VALSESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
Vivriti — Or here the word ' tat ' itself denotes Isvara, on the
strength of the saying : " Om, Tat, Sat — this has been remembered to
be the three-fold reference to Brahman."
Knowledge of Predicables is the meana of attaining tJic Supreme Good.
Dharinma-visesa-prasiitat, Produced by a particular
f%^^T*T^m^f Dravya-guna-karmma-samanya-vise.<a-
samavuyanam, of Substance, Attribute, Action, Genus, Species, and Com
bination. I^T^TI*? Padarthanam, of the padarthas or predicables. tfl^WjIf-
^Trqfcqj Sadharnmiya-vaidharmmyabhyam, By means of resemblance and
difference. fl^RTTin^ Tattvajnanat, From knowledge of the essence. ft:^q^^
Nihsreyasam, The Supreme Good.
4. The Supreme Good (results) from the knowledge, pro
duced by a particular dharma, of the essence of the Predicables,
Substance, Attribute, Action, Genus, Species, and Combination,
by means of their resemblances and differences. — 4.
ra. — Having described the nature and characteristic of d/ianna in accordance
with the desire of the disciples, he lays down the following aphorism for ascertaining tho
subject-matter and the "relation". — •
Such knowledge of the essences i* dependent upon the Vaiiesika,
System ; therefore it goes without saying that it too is a source of tho
Supreme Good. If, through its derivation in an instrumental sense,
namely, that the essence is known by it, the word ' tattvajiiana ' refers
to the treatise, then it will not have apposition to the word' dharma-yisesa-
prasutat.' In ' dravya-gnna, etc., the compound is a ' copulative com
pound ' wherein all the words are prominent, because the knowledge of
the essence of all the I'redicables is the source of the Supreme Good.
Now, here the i relation ' is understood to be : between the Doctrine
and the Supreme Good, that of the means and the end or motive ; bet
ween the Doctrine and the knowledge of the essences, that of form and
matter ; between the Supreme Good and the knowledge of the essences,
that of effect and cause ; between the Predicables, Substance, etc., and
the Doctrine, that of the demostrable and that which demonstrates.
And from the knowledge of these relations, those who seek the Supreme
Good apply themselves to this Doctrine, and those who desire salvation
apply to it only when they realize that the sage is an dpta or trust
worthy person.
•; Xilisreyasam " is final cessation of pain ; and the tinality of the
cessation of pain consists in its noa-simultaneonsness with the antece
dent non-existence of pain in the same substratum, or in its simultan-
eonsness, in the same substratum, with the simultaneous annihilations
"of the special attributes of the Soul, viz., adristam and saniskara. Or,
Salvation is the antecedent lion-existence of pain upto the moment of
the annihilation, without leaving any trace, of these special attributes.
KANADA SUTRAS I, 1,4.
A7c/«s — '• Antecedent non-existenos": Non-existenoe is fourfold, viz.
(a) antecsdent, e.g. of the pot before it is produced.
(b) enasrgent, e.g. of the pot after it is destroyed.
(c) reciprocal, e.y. of the characteristic of the pjt in a picture and vice versa.
(d) absolute, e.g. of the pot in a room where there is no pot.
It will be noticed that antecedent non-existence has no beginning ; emergent non-existence
las no end ; and reciprocal non-3xistenc3 and absolute non-existence have neither be<'inriin '
ior end.
The tuing of which there is non-existence, is said to be the opposite or counter-opposite
pratiyogt) of that non-sxistence. In the abovo illustration the counter-opposite is the pot.
One kind of non-sxistence (e.g. of the pot) is differentiated from another kind of non-
jxistence (e.g. of the picture), by means of the characteristics of their counter-opposites.
fhese characteristics are therefore called determinants or differentiators (avachchhedaka).
Now, mere cessation of pain is not Salvation ; because there remains the po.ssibilitv of
aain in future and there remains also the memory of the pain that has then passed into non-
)eing. The cause of the possibility of pain is adrlstam or karma (merit and demerit) •
ind the cause of the memory of pain is samiMra, (the imprint of the experience of pain left
n the soul). Salvation will result only when there is not merely the cessation of the pain
ictually experienced, but also the neutralisation of the causes of possible pain viz, adristant
ind sainsk&ra.
Not that it is not an object of volition, being incapable of achieve
ment, because even antecedent non-existence can be brought about by
the neutralisation of the cause. Nor does it thereby lose in the charac
teristic of being antecedent non-existence, because such characteristic
remains as the characteristic of the non-existence of the producer of
the opposite (i.e., the existence of pain) ; and to be the producer is
merely its essential or general fitness to be the cause. Again, antece
dent non-existence is not the last member or element, so that, it existing,
the effect must necessarily appear ; for if it were so, then it would follow
that an effect also has no beginning. Thus, as in the absence of a
contributory cause it did not produce the effect so long, so also in future
it will not produce it without the co-operation of a contributory cause
the person operating to the eradication of the cause. Therefore this
aphorism too upholds antecedent non-existence. Hence in the second
aphorism of Gautama, " Pain, birth, activity, faults, and false notion—
on the successive removal of these in turn, there is the removal of the one
next preceding and thereafter salvation," (Nyaya Sutram, 1, i, 2), the
statement of the non-existence of the effect on the non-existence of the
cause, strengthens the idea of salvation as having the form of the antece
dent non-existence of pain. Removal of activity on the removal of faults
removal of birth on the removal of activity, of pain on the removal of
birth — here removal does not mean annihilation but non-production, and
that is nothing but antecedent non-existence. It is not that the opposite is
lot known, for the opposite is surely known in the form of pain in general.
As in the case of propitiation, there too only the non-production of pain
is expected through the annihilation of faults. In the world also it is
seen that the removal of the snake, thorn, etc. is for the purpose of the
non-production of pain. So the activity of the wise is directed only
Cowards removing the causes of pain.
Some however say : " Only the absolute non-existence of pain is.
lalvation. If it is not seated in the Soul, yet, as seated in the stone,
etc., it is connected with the Soul ; and its connection lies in the
annihilation of pain which does not accompany the prior non-existence
(or potential existence) of pain ; as it is found in connection with such
annihilation of pain, seeing that such annihilation taking place, there
arises the consciousness of the absolute non-existence of pain in that
10 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
j.Iace. This being so, such texts of the Veda as " He moves about being
absolutely relieved of pain/' also become explained." We reply that
it is not so. Absolute non-existence of pain, being incapable of accom
plishment, is not an object of voluntary activity. Nor has annihilatio i
of pain any connection to that, since this would entail a techni
cality.
tfote. — Absolute non-existence has neither beginning nor end. It does not therefore
depend upon human will or effort. Hence it cannot bo pursued as an object of desire. You
inav say that, as long as it is not accomplished in the Soul, as the connection of that which
is not connected with it, — such connection taking the form of the annihilation of pain which
does not coexist with the antecedent non-existence of pain — so long surely it is an object of
dei-ire. But to this also there is an objection ; viz., that the annihilation of pain does not
form such a connection, as it is not co-extensive with the soul. To hold otherwise, w^uld be
to i ut a new interpretation upon the word " connection " (Sambandha).
The text of the Areda " He moves about being absolutely
relieved of pain " implies that, by way of the neutralization of causes,,
prior non-existence of pain may be reduced into a condition similar t<>
that of the absolute non-existence of pain.
It may be said, " This is not an object of the will, as it is
not an object of desire which is not subject to another desire, because those
only who seek pleasure, become active in the removal of pain, seeing
that pleasure is not produced at the time oi pain." But this is not so ;
because it is equally easy to say the contrary also. Will not desire
for pleasure also be subject to the desire for the absence of pain V seeing
that men overwhelmed with grief as well as those who turn their fa?es
away from pleasure, having in view only the absence of pain, are
inclined to swallowing poison, hanging themselves, etc..
Neither can it be said, " Even if it is an object of the will, it
is so only because it is an object of cognition. But salvation as absence
of pain is not even an object of cognition. Otherwise (/.<-. if to be an
object of cognition were Lot a nece.-sary coi clition of being an object of
the will) men would be inclined to bring about the state of swoon, etc." For
that which is capable of being known from the Veda and by inference-
cannot be reasonably said to be unknowable. For there are the texts.
of the Veda: " He moves about being absolutely relieved of pain," "By
knowing Him only one transcends death/' etc. There is inference also :
The series of pain is finally or absolutely rooted out, because it is a
series like a series of lamps ; and so on. It can be known by perception
also, since final annihilation of pain for a moment becomes the subject-
matter of thought in the realization of pain in consciousness (in the
moment prior to death) and (if you do not admit this), also because the
yoyins perceive the future annihilation of pain by virtue of the power
born of concentration (i/w/a).
It cannot be said, " Still, the loss and gain being the same, it
is not the object of the will, sii ce with pain, pleasure is also removed,
the removel of both being due t. the ^ ame set of causes" ; for men
naturally dispassionate and fearful oi dark days of suffering and who
overestimate every glow-worm of j leasure, are active to that end.
]t cani.ot again be said, " Cessation of pain is still not
the object of the will; becai'se cessation of ] ain which is yet to
come, is inrj cssib.e, \ ain v^hich is j att is in the past, and pain which is
piesent will ctase even without an eifcrt of the j erson"; for the activity
of the j erson is towards the eradication of causes, as in j e^unces. Thus.r
KANADA StiTRAS I, 1, 4.
false knowledge attended with desire, is the cause of Samsdra,'i.e.f
.succession of mortal existences ; it is rooted out by the knowledge of the
truth about the Self ; and knowledge of the truth about the Self is
producible by the practice of Yoya ; he. ice activity in this direction is
justified.
It cannot be said that only the manifestation of permanent pleasure
is salvation, and not the absence of pain ; for there is no proof that
j)leasure can be permanent ; if there were such proof the i the maniies-
-tation of pleasure being constant, there would be no difference between
A worldly and an other-worldly or liberated man, aid also manifesta
tion being a product or effect, on its termination there wjll again follow
or stream of mortal existence.
It cannot be said that salvation consists in the laya or disappearance
of the Jivdtmd or embodied Self into the Brahmdtmd or un -embodied or
universal Self ; for if laya means amalgamation, then there is an
obstacle, as two do not become one. It cannot be explained that laya
means the removal of the subtle embodiment composed of the senses and
of the physical organism ; for hereby the absence of the causes of pain
being imolied, it follows that the absence of pain alone is salvation.
Hereby the doctrine of the Ekadandins (a sect who carry staffs con
sisting of single sticks) that salvation means the remaining of the pure
Self after the cessation of Nescience or false knowledge and that Self is
by nature true knowledge and happiness, is also refuted, because there
is no evidence that the Self is knowledge and happiness. The text of the
Veda u Brahman is eternal, knowledge, and bliss," is no evidence,
because it proves possession of knowledge and possession of bliss. For we
have the perceptions " I know," and " I am happy," but not the percep
tions "I am knowledge " and " I am happiness." Moreover, Brahman
being even now existent, it would follow that there is no distinc
tion between a liberated and a worldly man. The cessation of Avidya
or false knowledge is also not an object of the will. Brahman also, being
eternal, is not a xddhya or what has to be accomplished. The realization
of Brahman within the Self, having Him as the object, is not a sddhya or
what has to be accomplished. Similarly bliss also, having Him as its
essence or object, is not a sddhya. For these reasons activity directed
towards Him is not justified.
It cannot be said that salvation lies in the purity or unimpeded flow
of the stream of consciousness. For if by purity is meant the removal
of such impediments as pain, etc., then this much alone being the object
of the will, there is no reason for or proof of the survival of the stream
of consciousness. Moreover, the retention or survival of the stream of
•consciousness can be possible only by means of the body, etc., and
hence in this view the retention of samsdra or the stream of mortal
existence also would be necessary.
It is therefore proved that cessation of pain as described above is
alone the Supreme Good.
In ' knowledge of the essence ' the genitive has been used in the
place of the accusative. The third case-ending i n Sadharmmya-Vaid-
harminya-bhyam' shows the mode (of knowledge). (K these 'Sadharmmya '
means recurrent property and ' Vaidharmmya ', divergent property.
12 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
Although a property which is recurrent in one place is divergent in
another, and vice versa, still knowledge in the shape of recurrent and
divergent properties, is here intended.
Here the enumeration itself of the Predicables, Substance, etc., has.
come to be their division, which has the effect of excluding a more or
less number. Therefore it follows that as a rule Predicables are o ;1 •
sir in number. And this is not proved. If any other Predicable
which requires to be excluded is known then the rule does not stand
good ; if it is not known, then the exclusion is invalid. It cannot be-
said that this is not the exclusion of the addition of something else
but the exclusion of non-application ; in other words, that the non-
application of the characteristics of the six to all predicables or things
is excluded. For all known predicables having been included bv the
word i Predicable/ there is here then the fault of proving over a train
and also that something else is not known. Moreover, which is to be-
excluded, non-application of the characteristics jointly or their non-
application severally '? In the first alternative, joint non-application
prevails everywhere, so that there can be no exclusion. It cannot be-
said that in the £econd alternative also there can be no exclusion as
with reference to one another their individual non-application prevails
everywhere ; for the purpose of the rule is to exclude the non-applica
tion of the characteristics of the six, wThen, according to others, thev
do not apply to Energy, Number, Similarity, and other Predicables
recognised by them. Therefore the meaning of the rule that Predic
ables are only six in number .is that in all perceptible objects, there in
application of one or other of the characteristics of the six, and not
that there is non-application. Now, ' only/ if it goes with the noun, it
means exclusion of the addition of something else ; if it goes with the
adjective, it means exclusion of non-application ; and if it goes with the-
verb, it means exclusion of absolute non-application. Here according
to some " only" has all this three-fold significance; while others say
that its force lies in mere exclusion and that non-application, addition
of something else, etc., are things to be excluded, which are derived by
association.
:i Produced by a particular dhanna'' is the adjective of " knowledge
of the essence." Here " particular (Uiarma" means piety characterised
by forbearance or withdrawal from the world. If by " tattvajnuna"
explained as "by this essence is known." the treatise (i.e., the
Aphorisms of Kanada) is meant, in that case it should be said that
" particular dharma" means the grace of a.,d appointment from God,
for it is heard that the great sage Kanada composed this System by
obtaining the grace of and appointment from God. In the aphorism
by " knowledge of the essence" the realization of the truth about the
Self in the understanding is i;;to",ded. because such relization alone
is competent to root out false knowledge attended with desire. " By
knowing Him only one transcends death, no other road is known
(vidyate) for travelling," " Two Brahmans have to be known (veditavye)"
"Having no eyes He yet sees, etc."— in all these passages the word
vedana has the sense of realization in the understanding, and the use
of the fifth case-ending in the causal sense in the word l tattvajiiAnat'
indicates that such realization of the Self comes in the progressive'
KANADA SttTRAS I, 1, 4. IS
career of hearing from the Sdstras, thinking within oneself, medita
tion, etc., — 4.
Vivriti. — ' Dharmmavi&esaprasutat' means producded by a parti
cular (go )d conduct, virtue or) merit, acquired in this life or in previous-
births. It is the qualification of ' tattvajnanat' (knowledge of essence).
As pointed out by the author of Muktavali, ' Sadharmmya' means
common property, and i Vaidharmmya' means opposing (i. e.f dis
tinguishing) propei'ty. The use of the third case-ending indicates
ma:iner. The fifth case-ending in * tattvajnanat' has the sense of appli
cability. Thus the meaning is: By particular virtue knowledge of
essence is produced by means of the generic and specific properties of
the Predicables, Substance and others; thereafter is produced l intellec
tual conception' of the Self, and next comes the realization of the Self
in the understanding by constant meditation ; after this liberation
follows in the train of the removal of false knowledge, etc-, (Vide Nyaya
Sutram, I. i. 2.)
The author of the Upaskara has however said : The word 'tattva-
j liana' in the aphorism conveys the principal idea of the realization of
the Self in the understanding ; or, if it is interpreted in the instrumental
se:,se, it refers to the treatise which is the (instrument or) means of
such realization. In the first of these cases, the word ' dharmmavisesa'
will mea i that dharma the characteristic of which is forbearance
(nivfitti) ; a.id in the latter case it will mean a particular virtue or merit
in the form of the grace of and appointment from God, according to
the tradition that the great sage Kanada composed this treatise under
the grace and appointment of God. And as the causal use of the fifth
case-ending bears the sense of applicability, the realization of the Self
in the understanding will follow from the treatise through the chain of
intellection, constant meditation, and soon, for the word, knowing in such
texts of the Veda as " By knowing Him only one transcends death,"
" Two Brahmans have to be known," etc., denotes realization in the
understanding (i. e., spiritual intuition), and alone is competent to root
out false knowledge together writh desires.
This should be considered. If the word ' tattvajiiana ' in the apho
rism denotes the realization of one's Self in the understanding which
counteracts false knowledge together with desires, then it would follow
that the expression ' by means of generic and specific properties ' as well
as the term, l of the Predicables,' bearing the sense of the sixth case-
ending, have no syntactical connexion. For in the matter of the
realization of the Self in the understanding there is neither the
modality of the ge leric and specific properties, nor the materiality or
substantiveness of the six Predicables ; because they do not exist there
as they are distinct form the body, etc., whereas the realization of
the Self in the understanding is only competent to root out desires,
etc., which are not distinct from the body, etc. It cannot be said that
in the state of the representation of separateness from the other (i. e.t
the Not-Self) in the Self by the virtue born of Yoga (concentration"*'
knowledge of the six Predicables, namely Substance, etc., by means of
their generic and specific properties, is also produced through their tem
porary contiguity, inasmuch as the subject-matter of such knowledge
14 VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
(i. e. the Predicates, etc.) appears there for the time being. For
notwithstanding that such representation contains such indifferent
generic property, etc., within itaelf, since it is not necessary for the
real purpose in view, the description of it by the revered Sfge will
mean so much mad talk on his part.
the venerable author of the Upaskara has brought forward
the texts "'By knowing Him alone, etc. " as being evidence that the
realization of the Self in the understanding is the cause of liberation.
That too has been improper. For the Supreme Self alone being implied
by the text, " I know Him, the Great Person, of the colour of the Sun,
beyond the 'reach of darkness, " the word ' tat ' (that) has reference to
the Supreme Self, and therefore it cannot refer to the Jivdtmd (Subordi
nate or Embodied Self) which has not been so implied. So much for the
sake of brevity.
Here the enumeration- of six Predicables has been made under the
view of Existence or Being. In fact Non-Existence or Non -Being also
lias been intended by the sage to be another Predicable. Hence there
is no impropriety either in the aphorism " Non-existence of effect, fnuu
non-existence of cause " (I. ii. 1) of the second chapter or in sn -h
aphorisms as " From non-existence of qualification by Action and
Attribute" (IX- i- 1; of the Ninth Book. Accordingly in the j\Tyaya-
Llldvati. it has been said : " Non-existence also should be stated as con
ducive to the Supreme Good, like the modifications of Existence. This
ronduciveness is proved by the fact that the non-existence of the effect
follows from the non-existence of the cause in all cases. In the
Dravyakirandeali also, Nyaya teachers have admitted that Xoa-
Existence is the seventh Predicable, in the passage ending thus : " And
these Predicables have been mentioned as being the principal ones.
Non-Existence, however, although it possesses a ^ form of its own, has
not been mentioned, not that it is something negligible, but because its
.ascertainment is dependent upon the ascertainment of its opposite."
Thus the knowledge of the generic and specific properties of the seven
(iiiid not six only) Predicables is conducive to the Supreme Good ; and
that conduciveness, it should be observed, lies in the mode of knowledge
of marks (liiiga), etc., in the matter of the establishment of separatenesa
from the Not-Self in the Self.
The Supreme Good, according to the views of thy Nyaya, Vais^sika,
and Sankhya philosophies, consists' in the permaie.it cessation of pain,
and results as the annihilation of pain, which is not synchronous with
pain co-existent with itself. In fact, annihilation of ultimate pain is
non-synchronus with pain co-existent with itself, since no pain can at
that moment arise in the liberated Soul. With a section of the NyAya
thinkers, salvation means permanent cessation of demerit only, because,
in their view, this only can be directly accomplished by the realization
of the Self in the understanding, as the Veda says, " And his actions
wear off when he sees that High-and-Low (Mundaka 2, 2, 8)." In the
opinion of the one-staffed Vedantin, salvation lies in the cessation of
nescience, and nessience is (with him) a different Predicable. In the opi
nion of the three -staffed Veda itin, salvation means the disappearance of
the Embodied or finite Self i i the Great Self, aid results as the cessation
KANADA stTTRAS I, 1, 4.
of the Upddlii or external condition of the J-lua (Embodied Soul), and
of the causal body. Causal body again has been proved to be "the
organic combination of the five life-breaths, mind, understanding, and
ten senses, arisii'g from the elements which have not been compounded
(i. e.j redintegrated), possessing subtle limbs, and being the means of
experience (i. *., &/MM/O)". The Bhattas however say that salvation
consists in the manifestation of eternal happiness, and that eternal
happiness, though evidenced by the Veda and penetrating all living beirgs
6/iea*), is unmanifest in the state of transmigration (Samsdra*), and
becomes manifest to the sense, immediately after the realization of the
truth about the Self in the understanding. The possible defects in
these views are not shown here for fear of increasing the volume of the
book. Bnt in all the views the permanent cessation of pain in the state
of salvation remains uncontradicted. And that is our point.
Now, it may be contended, " There are additional Predicables such
as Ei.ergy, Similarity, etc. How else can it be explained that in the
vicinity of the jewel, etc., burning is not caused by that which causes
burning- an d is caused when it is not in the vicinity V Therefoieit
must be imagined that the jewel, etc., counteract the burning ei.ergy
of that which causes burns, and that the inciting removal of them
revivifies it. In like manner, Similarity also is a different Predic-
able. For it does not fall within the six forms of existence, as it equally
applies to them all, since such similarity as in "As bovine-ness is
eternal, so also is horseness," is perceived. Nor is it a non-existence,
as it appears in the form of an existence." But our reply is that
reconciliation being possible by the mere suppostion of the self-activity
of fire, etc., existing away from the jewel, etc., or the supposition of
the absence, etc., of jewel, as the cause of burning, etc., it is not proper
to imagine infinite Energy, its prior non-existence, and its annihilation.
It should not be asked again how there can be burning even in the close
presence of apowerful jewel, because that supposition has been made
only of the absence of jewels in genaral, which are powerful but remote.
In the same way, Similarity alsu is not -A, different Predicable, but
denotes that, while one thing is quite distinct from another thing, the
one possesses the majority or the chief of the attributes belonging to
the other ; as the Similarity of the moon in the face, means that the
face which is quite distinct from the moon, possesses the cheerfulness,
and other attributes belonging to the moon. This in brief.
Chandrakdnta. (1) Dharma presents two aspects, that is, under
the characteristic of Pravr-itti or wordly activity, and the characteris
tic of A'icritti or withdrawal from wordly activity. Of these, Dharma r
characterised by Xicrittl, brings forth tattva-jndna or knowledge of
truths, by means of removal of sins and other blemishes.
(2) Here the separate enumeration of Sdmdnya, etc., is unneces
sary, on account of their non-divergence; for, tidnidnya, etc., falling, as
they do, within Substance, etc., do not differ from the latter. Their
separate mention, however, is justified en the possibility of difference
in* the mode of treatment adopted by the author. Systems, differing
in their methods, are taught for the benefit of embodied souls, differing
irom one another. This is, then, the Vaisesika System, of which the
distinctive features are /Sdmdnya, etc., as are, in the other (Nydya\
VAI£ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
System, Doubt, etc., although they are included in the Proof and the
Provable, respectively. Accordingly, this System is enabled to stand
apart by mens of Sdmdnya and the other Predicables; and so it is called
the Vaiseiiika System. Otherwise it would be merely an Upanitsat
teaching Adhydtma-vidyd, Philosophy of the Embodied Self. * * * * *
4Samanyam' means possession of similarity. * * * Doubt and Error
arise from (observation of) Sdmdnyam and from non-observation of
Visesa (or distinctive) peculiarity. Observing the common properties,
altitude and extension, of a pillar and a person, and remaining ignorant
of their differentia, one feels the doubt whether it be a pillar or a
person ; error also arises in this way : observing the common property
only and in consequence of fault or imperfection, one mistakes a pillar
for a person or a mother of pearl for a piece of silver. False cognition,
again, is the root of all suffering. It is for this reason that ' Samfinyam'
has been separately mentioned, notwithstanding that it is included in
Substance, etc. ' Visesa' is that by which a thing is. reduced to itself.
False cognition which springs from (observation of only) the common
property is corrected by the observation of the distinctive property :
whence arises correct knowledge, which is called tattva-jndnam. * * *
For this reason ' Visesa' is separately mentioned, although it is included
in Substance, etc. If, again, it is a single reality that, being determined
in particuiar ways, comes to be used as ' Samanyam' and ' Visesa,'
then it falls within (the class ofj Attributes. Or, if these are mere
technical names, then they are not additional Predicables. ' Samavaya'
means complete approximation, *. e., ^identification ; as it has been
said, ' Samavaya' is inseparable existence. * * * ' Samavaya' is a:i
attribute, which is the counter-opposite of Separateness, either character
ised as pluarlity or characterised as difference in kind. It inheres in
Substance, and does not possess Attribute; nor is it a form of Action.
Now, birth means a particular conjunction (of the Self) with the body,
the senses, and the feelings. Thereafter the Jiva errs that the Self
has no separate existence from the body, etc., in consequence of which
a person transmigrates and suffers a multitude of pains, and on the
cessation of which he is liberated, the stream of his sufferings being
dried up. Hence ' Samavaya', though included in Attributes, is
separately mentioned.
(3) There are other Predicables also, viz., pramdna, Proof ;
prameya, Provable ; xamsaya, Doubt; prayojana, Purpose; dristaiita,
Instance; siddhflnta, Tenet ; avayava, Member (of a syllogism); tarka,
Confutation (or Reasoning) ; nirnaya, Ascertainment ; vdda, Discussion ;
jalpa, Wrangling; vitandd, Cavilling; hetvdbhdaa, Fallacy; c.hhala,
Equivocation ; jdti, Showing the futility of the mark of inference ; and
nigraha-sthdna, Ground of Defeat or Opponent's Error. These too come
under the Predicables of Kandda.
(4) The Supreme Good results from knowledge of truth about the
Self, etc., while knowledge of truth about the rest is auxiliary to it.
False knowledge about the Self, etc., is of various kinds, e.y., the
sense of Non-Ego in the Ego, the sense of Ego in the Non-Ego.
Enumeration of Substances,
fjpaskdra. — Because as the souljit participates in salvation and is the support of all the
KANADA SUTRAS I, 1, 5. 17
Predicablei. therefore he now says by way of giving the division and particular reference
nf the lirst mentioned Predicable, .Substance.
lit in * ii
Prithivi, earth, wq: Apas, waters. 3*1: Tejas, fire. srnj: Vuyuh,
.air. 3117131 Akasam, Ether. *I$: Kulah, time, f^ Dik, direction,
space. *JT?*Tl Atma, Self. J?H: Manas, mind, ffo Iti, only. 5»Qlfqf Dravyani,
substances.
5. Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Ether, Time, Space, Self, and
Mind (are) the only Substances. — 5.
•Iti' has tha sense of determination. Thereby the meaning is that
Substances are nine only, neither more nor less. If it is doubted that
the exclusion of a greater or less number having been secured by the
force of the division itself, there was no need for the word. ' iti/ then
it should be understood that it being possible to take the aphorism in
•A merely denotative, indicatory or enumerative sense, the word ' Iti' is
used to indicate that it has the object of division also, and that the
word is used also to indicate that gold, etc., as well as God are included
in them, a. id also that Darkness which may be apprehended to be an
additional substance is a non-being. The fact that the words have not
bee i compounded goes to show that they are all equally prominent.
And the author of the aphorisms himself will point out their definitions
•or differentia; while treating of i difference.'
It cannot be said that gold is neither Earth as it has no smell, nor
Water as it has no wetness and natural fluidity, nor Fire as it has weight
and on the last account, nor Air, nor again Time, etc. ; therefore it is
•something over and above the nine. For, in the first two cases, there
can be no comparison ; in the third case, that which has to be proved
is something imaginary (i. c., that gold is not a transformation of
Fire). After that there has been analogous argument, although there
is no doubt about that which has to be proved, and also the mark of
inference is fallacious. He will prove afterwards that gold is a trans
formation of fire — 5.
Firfiii. — It may be objected, " The writer of the Kandali and the
Samkhya teachers have held that Darkness is a Substance. And it is
right. For otherwise how can people have the perception of quality
and action in it,- viz., 'Dark Darkness moves' ? Now, being devoid of
Smell, Darkness is not Earth ; as it possess dark colour it cannot be
included in Water, etc. Therefore how is it right to say that the sub
stances are nine only ?" We reply, •' It is not so, because it is illogical
to imagine another Substance, when it can be produced by the a'bsence
of necessary Light. The perception of dark colour is, like the percep
tion of the vault of heaven, erroneous. The perception of movement
is also an error, occasioned by the departure of light, as the perception
of movement by the passengers of a boat in respect of the trees, etc.,
standing on the bank of the river, is occasioned by the movement of
the boat, etc. The supposition that Darkness is a substance will entail
ls VAlfcSlKA PHILOSOPHY.
the supposition of tlie antecedent non-existe.x-e and annihilation of a-i
infinite number of its parts. Lii the opinion of the \\riter of the Kandali
Darkness is included in Uarth. So that according To him there is no
impropriety in the exclusion of a greater nninlier."
Among these nine divisions of Substance. Kther, Time, anil Spacedo-
n ot form anv class, since they have only a single individual existence.
hut the rest form classes.
Clta-uJrakflnta. The separate mention of Time and Space is inten
ded to indicate the difference in the uses of these terms according- to
the difference of the effects. Akdsa, though it is one. still admits of a
variety of names and uses, according to the difference of effect. It is
not that Time and Space are essentially different objects from Akdsn,
Kther.
rut ion of Attributes.
I. '•iiiixk'i m . — He- gives the enumeration and division of Attributes immodiately aflei"
nub-ttinco, because Attributes as such reside in all substancos which become their Mib-Urate,
»i-e manifested by substances, and themselves also manifest substances.
*
Uiijia-rasa-gaiullia-spai-si'th. Colour. Ta>te. Smell . and
Touch. ^f^qT: Saiuklivah, Numbers. ^nnji^ Parimanatii, Measures. K.\ten-
sioiis. ^qsFr3fFr Prithaktvam, Separate, iess. ^TqtJTfear^ Samyoga-vibhagau,
Conjunction "an'd Disjunction. qc??riq<^ 1'arat vAj.arat ve. Priority and
Posteriority. f^T. Hndiihayah. Understandings. §«3J:^ Sukha-duhkhe.
Pleasure and pain. f^T^qt Lchcliha-dvesau, Desire ;i:id Aversio:i
1'raatnah, Volitions. ^ Cha. And. Jjmi: (rnuAh. Attributes.
6. Atrributes are Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, Num
bers, Measures, Separateness, Conjunction and Disjunction,
Priority and Posteriority, Understandings, Pleasure- and Pain,
Desire and Aversion, and Volitions. — 6.
The word • cha ' gathers up Weight, fluidity. Liquidity, Impression,
Virtue, Vico and Sound ; they are well-known Attributes, it is hence
that they have not been verbally stated. Their attribute;! ess, he will,
in their" proper places, explain with respect to their nature and maik.
The words Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch are compounded into a,
tim.iaxa in -order to show that they do not co-exist with contemporaneous!
Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch. But Numbers a<id Measures are not
so compounded and are stated in the plural number, to show that they
co-exist with contemporaneous Numbers and Measures. Although that
which co-exists with, unity is not another unity or that which co-exist*
with largeness or length not another largeness or length, still there is-
in fact co-existence of duality, etc.. amongst themselves and: also of
largeness, length, etc., with largeness, length, etc., of a different kind.
Although separateness is cu-existent with the separatenes of Two, etc.,
and therefore should Le specified in the plural, like numbers, still us
KANADA SUTRAS I. 1, 7- 19
specification in the singular goes to indicate its difference from
Numbers, namely, to be known or shown by its limits. Conjunction
and Disjunction are stated i u the dual number to show that both of them
are the effects of one and the same act. Priority and Posteriority are
slated in the dual number to show that they are to be known in relation
lo eacli other and tluit they are equally marks of Space and Time. The
plural i.umber in 'understandings' indicates the refutation of the theory
of one and only one understanding held by the Samkhya thinkers, ou the
ground of its division into knowledge, etc. The dual number in
Pleasure and Pain is intended to point out that both of them are causes
of one elTejt which is distinguished as experience (bhoya) and that they
are equally instrumental to the inference of adristam, and also that
•even Pleasure resolves into Pain. The dual number in Desire and
Aversion indicates that both of them are causes of Activity. The plural
in Volitions is meant to show that ten kinds of volitions which comprise
both permitted and prohibited acts, are causes of Virtue and that ten
other kinds are causes of Vice.
Or, Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch have been shown in a va-nni#<t,
form to teach that they are the means of the disposition of the elemental
senses or sense-organs or to establish the operation or changes due to
heat. Number is mentioned in the plural number to indicate a refuta
tion of this that there is a contrariety in numbers, such as dualitv,
plurality, etc. Separateness is separately mentioned to indicate that it
is aUo plural on account of the plurality of Numbers, and also that its
difference from Numbers lies in its being revealed by the knowledge of
limits. In Measures or Exteasions the plural number is meant ta
remove the contradiction of length, shortness, etc. The dual number in.
Conjunction and Disjunction points out their mutual opposition.
Priontv and Posteriority are mentioned also in the dual number lest
it might be doubted that the division of Attributes is too narrow,
because Priority and Posteriority may be four-fold by the possibility
of their being different in kind by their difference as relating to
»Spa<-e and as relating to Time-
He will give their definition as he proceeds. — (j.
Enumeration <>f Actions.
L'jtaxMra. — Actions become the object of the sense by reason of their production by
-Substances ami Attributes as well as of their Combination with Substances having colour.
Therefore, immediately after the statement of Substances and Attributes, he states the
•enumeration and division of Actions.
Utksepanam, throwing upwards, 313 qf (WTO Avaksepanam,
throwing downwards. Sllf^^ Akunchanam, coutraction.flHTOlW PrasAra-
uam, expansion. Jio^ G-amanam, going, motion, ffa Iti, namely. ^*tJM
Karrninani, action ~?
7. Throwing upwards, Throwing downwards, Contraction
Expansion, and Motion are Actions. — 7.
20 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
Throwing upwards, Throwing, downwards. Contraction, Expansion.
and Motion are Actions. 'Iti' has the force of determination, as.
.Rotation etc, are included in Motion. Here then there are five 'classes'
directly pervaded by Action-ness, namely, the quality of throwino
upwards, the quality of throwing downwards, the quality of contraction.
the quality of expansion, and the quality of motion (or throwiug-
up ward-ness ,tlir owing-down ward-ness, con tract ion -ness, expansion-ness,,
and motion-ness).
Well, Imt this is disproved by the fact that Motion is a synonym of
Action, because the consciousness of Going is experienced in all cases.
The foiir classes, throwiug-upward-ness, etc, which have the co-exten
sion or common field of the absolute non-existence of each in the others..
are not known to be co-existent; therefore the classes pervaded by
Action-ness are only four. (To this objection we reply): It is tine that
Motion is another name for Action. But it is separately mentioned with
the object of collecting under one word Rotation, Evacuation,
Percolation, Flaming upward, Bending, Uplifting, etc; which produce
different states of consciousness and are known by different names. Or
Going-ness also is really a fifth class pervaded by Action-ness. 80
that the application of Motion to Rotation, Evacuation, etc .. alone is
primary and if there is the application of Going to throwing upwards,
throwing downwards, etc., then it is secondary or analogous. The
common property of the primary and analogous instances is only this
that they are the non-combinative causes (/. /.'., conditions) of Conjunc
tion with and Disjunction from constantly changing places a .•<].
^directions, and this belongs to Rotation and others, so that by the
inclusion of Going these too have been included.
The states of egress, ingress, etc. however, are not classes ; for. in
respect of one and the same Action, c. <j., a person going from one room
to another, one observer will have the consciousness, 'he enters' ; while
another, 'he comes out' ; and thus there will result an intermixture of
classes. So also in the case of Rotation, etc., on entering one water
course after corning out by another, there will arise two states of
consciousness, ' lie comes out' and 'he enters' ; therefore these should br
resolved into relativity in general.
In the case of throwing upwards, etc., however, the action of
throwing upwards is caused in the hand by the volition produced by
the desire ' I throw up the pestle,' through the non-combiuative cause of
conjunction with the soul exercising volition ; then from the non-combi
native cause of motion in the hand thrown up, there appears the action
of throwing upwards in the pestle also ; or, these two actions take place-
simultaneously. Then through the conjunction of the soul exercising^
volition produced by the desire to throw down the hand and pestle
which have been thrown up, and also through the motion of the hand
there is produced in the hand and the pestle simultaneously the action
of throwing downwards favourable to tha fall of the pestle within the
mortar. Then towards the sudden going upwards of the pestle after
conjunction with a harder substance, neither desire nor volition is the*
cause, but the springing up of the pestle is due only to Re-action ; and
this is only going and not throwing upwards ; the application of
throwing upwards to it is only secondary. Similarly is the application
K ^NADA SftTRAS I. 1, 8 21
of the name of Throwing upwards to two bodies of Air as well as to
grass, cotton, etc., carried by them, going upwards by the force of
"the collision of two bodies of Air flowing in opposite directions. So
also iu the case of the going up of water under the collision of two
currents. Thus the usa of throwing npwrards and throwing downwards
is primary, only in the case of the body, its limbs and pestles, clubs, etc.
in contact with them ; for there are such perceptions as he throws up
the pestle, he throws up the club ; as also, he throws down.
Contraction is action which produoes flexion in cloth and other
things made up of parts and non-initial conjunctions of parts among-
themselves even while there exist the initial conjunctions of those
parts ; whence arise such perceptions as the lotus contracts, the cloth
contracts, the leather contracts. Similarly, Expansion is action
destructive of the non-initial conjunctions already produced, of parts ;
whence arise such perceptions as the cloth expands, the leather expands,
the lotus expands. Actions which are different from these four are
forms of Going. Therein Rotation is action, favorable to oblique
conjunctions, appearing in the hand, from conjunction with soul
exercising volition, and in the wheel, etc., from revolving and from
conjunction called nodana (molecular motion^ with the hand possessing
Action. Evacuation, etc., should be similarly explained. He will also
make them clear as he proceeds.
Now it should be understood that in the case of prescribed
sacrifices, baths, gifts, etc., these Actions are the products of conjunc
tion with the soul exercising volition favourable towards the production
of Virtue ; and in the case of going to a forbidden place, slaughter.
eating- tobacco, etc., they are the products of conjunction with the soul
exercising volition tending towards the production of Vice. — 7
Resemblances of Quittance, Attribute, and Action.
L' i><txkdra. — After the enumeration of Substance, etc,, he begins the topic of the Resem
blance of tl.e three. He states the Resemblance of the three even before the enumeration of
the other three Predicables, Genus, etc., inasmuch as it is expected first of all i by the disciples,
because the Resemblance of the three, Substance, etc., is favourable to the knowledge of
reality.
?Tc£ Sat, existent. ^factf Anityam, non-eternal, ^sq^ Dravyavat, con
taining substance. mtii Karyyam, effect. q>miin Kuranam. cause. 5T*n?qf7-
33^^ Sfnnunya-visesavat, being both Genus and Species. ff<r Iti, this.
jfsqcjqpfrttfUTiH Dravya-guiia-karmmanam, of Substance, Attribute, and
Action. 3rfr3r<i: Avisesah, resemblance.
8. The Resemblance of Substance, Attribute, and Action
lies in this that they are existent and non-eternal, have Substance
as their combinative cause, are effect as well as cause, and are
both Genus and Species.— 8.
In the presence of the word l visesa ' the word l avisesa ' denote*
Resemblance. 'Sat ' connotes the quality of being the object of the per-
22 V A1SKS1K A PHI LOSOPH Y
ception and r.aino in 1 he form of that which is existent, Because a]] the
three have fitness for existence. • Anityam ' connotes the qual-ty of that
which tends towards annihilation. Although it is not common to the
ultimate atoms, etc., still it is inte ided to denote the possession of the
uptldhi or condition which distinguishes predicables having the function
or nature of that which tends towards annihilation. • Dravyavat '
moiins that which contains substance as its combinative cause. This
too is not present in the ultimate atoms, etc. Therefore the intention is
to denote the possession of the /t/>d<l]it. or condition which distinguishes
predicables having the function of that which contains substance as its
combinative cause. • Karyyam ' is intended to denote the possession of
the upddhl or condition which distinguishes predicates having the
Junction of that which is the counter-opposite of antecedent non-e.xis-
tence (or potential existence). ' Karanam ' indicates the ])ossession of
the npddhi. or condition which distinguishes predicables having tlie
function of that which belongs to the class of constant (Mill's invariable
and unconditional) antecedents of all effects except knowledge. Thus
the definition is not too wide so as to include the Soul which is the
object of Self-intuition, as a cause of Self-intuition, or to extend
to the generic quality of being a cow, etc ; nor is it too narrow
so as to exclude the ultimate atoms (///, perfect spheres) which are not,
causes. ' Samanayavisesavat,' means the possession of those charac
teristics which though they are genera, still are species inasmuch as
they serve to differentiate themselves severally, <•.</., Substance, iess,
Attributeness, Actionness, etc. It cannot be said that causality is too
wide, because from " (rive a cow." " A cow should not be touched with
the feet " and other texts of the Veda it appears that class or kind
, snfa) also is a cause of virtue and vice ; for a class has the sole use of
limitation.
This aphorism is illustrative. It should be observed that the
Resemblance of the three lies also in their being capable of being
denoted by words having the meaning inherent in them.
If it is said that the characteristics of being effects and non-eternal ity
belong to those only which have causes, and that this is their Resem
blance as laid down by Professor Prasastadeva in " And causality (ap
pears) elsewhere than in the perfect spheres (ultimate atoms).'' 1 he;)
according to the aphorism it cannot be specified by the possession of the
upddhi or condition which distinguishes predicables.
The characteristics of being the causes of Attributes and also the
•effects of Attributes belong to the three except the eternal Subs-
tan ces. — 8.
Rc*<")u-ldain-<> »f Snhtttancv and Attribute.
I'p'i-fkilra. — He now points out the Resemblance of Substance and Attribute only.
: Drayya-guiiayoh, of Substance and Attribute ?HIT?riflt «
Sajatiyarainbhakatvam, the characteristic of being the originator of
•congeners. *n^**4 Sadharmmyam, Resemblance.
9. The Resemblance of Substance and Attribute is the
characteristic of being the originators of their, congeners.- 9.
KANALM SUTHAS 1. 1.11. ^
Ke ai tkes clear this very aphorism in the following- one. — '.'.
Ij.i-nlii nation <>f the foregoing apl« rixtn .
Dravyuni, Substances. 5«H?a* Dravyautarani, another Subs
tance. ^ST*"*^ Arabhante. originate. J]HJT: Cnnuli. Attributes. ^ Cha.
and. »mn?<UH Guimntaram, another Attribute.
10. Substances originate another Substance, and Attributes
another Attribute,— 10.
r»asi'«ra.— The Resemblance in respect of the characteristic of being the originators of
c-i" -cncrs should l>o understood or observed with the exclusion of universal Substances composed
of final parts, the Attributes of what are composed of final parts, and also the Attributes of
Duality, the Separateness of Duals, Priority, Posteriority, etc. Or the author means to
indicate the possession of the njM'lhi or condition which distinguishes predicables having the
function of that which originates its congener, whereby Substances and individuals which an
no'. causes, arc also included. — 10.
Actions do not originate Action*.
l~t, „.</.-,',,•„. __ But it may he asked; Why do not Actions originate other Actions ? So lit,
as :
IH Itl « II
^w| Karmma,actio... zff^N Karmmasadhyam, j.
action. ?T Na, not. f^?T^ Vidyate, is known.
11. Action, producible by Action, is not known. —11.
Here the root ' vid ' has the sense of knowledge, and not existence.
The meaning is that there is no proof of the existence of Action which
is producible by Action, as in the case of Substance and Attribute-
originated by their congeners.
Here the idea is this: If Action is to produce Action, then it will.
like Sound, produce it immediately after its own production. Therefore
Disjunction from substances in Conjunction having been completely
caused bv the first Action itself, fuoin what will the second Action cause
Disjunction? For Disjunction must be preceded by Conjunction, and
u uew Conjunction has not also been produced in the subject m question.
Hut the definition of Action suffers if there is non-production of Disjunc
tion. It cannot be said that a new Action will be produced at another
moment; because a patency cannot be delayed and because there is
nothing to- be waited for. In the case of the production (of Conjunc
tion) at the very moment of the destruction of the previous Conjunction,
the production of Disjunction (by Action) will be surely not proved.
The same also will be the result in the case of its production of the
subsequent Conjunction. And after the subsequent Conjunction there
is really destruction of Action. Therefore it has been well
Action 'producible by Action is not known. — 11.
Difference of Substance from Attribute and Act'u n.
l',..: <:•,->-:>.— He mentions the Difference of Substance from Attribute »nd Aotiou :
24 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
ll ? i ?i ? R ii
sf Na, not. £3*1 Dravyara, substance. Tl^ Karyyam, effect.
TCaranam, cause. *g Cha, and. ^% Badhati, opposes ; annihilates.
12. Substance is not annihilated either by effect or by
cause. — 12.
Substance is not destroyed either by its own effect or by its own
cause. The meaning is that the relation of the destroyer and the
destroyed does not exist between two Substances which have entered
into the relation of effect and cause, because, (and this is the purport")
Substance is destroyed only by the destruction of the support or
substratum and the destruction of the originative Conjunction.
The form ' badhati ' (instead of the correct from ' hanti) is found
in aphorisms. — 12.
Above continued.
Vpaskdra. — He says that Attributes are capable of being destroyed by eMecl ami o-mise.
^TUT w in m mi
«<?q*JT Ubhayatha, in both ways, nqjj: (Junah, attributes.
13. Attributes (are destroyed) in both ways. — 13
The meaning is (that they are) capable of being destroyed by effect
as well as by cause. The initial Sound, etc., (in a series) are destroyed
by their effects, but the last is destroyed by its cause, for the last but
one destroys the last. — 13.
: — An attribute sometimes destroys its cause (c. j/., in
chemical compounds), and sometimes does not destroy it (c. <j. in physical
•compounds or masses).
Above continued.
Upanknra.— After stating that Attributes arc opposed by (and so cannot coexist M ith>
both their effects and causes, he mentions the opposition of effect to Action.
II ? I ? I ?8 ||
Karyva-virodhi, whereof the effect is the opposite or
contradictory. «ffWj Karmina, action.
14. Action is opposed by its effect. — 14.
Karyyavirodhi ' is Bahuvrlhi or adjective compound meaning
that of which the opposite is effect, because Action is destructible by-
subsequent Conjunction produced by itself.
The non-opposition of effects and causes is uniform in the case of
Substances only. But it is not the rule in the case of Attribute and
Action. For what the author desires to say is that those Attributes
destroy, which are the opposites of the destruction due to the destruc
tion of the non-combinative cause of the destructio i of the sub
stratum — 14.
KANADA SUTRAS I. 1, 15. 2$
Characteristics of /Substance.
Upaskdra. — After describing the Resemblance of the ithroe aooording to the wish of th«
disciples, he now goes on to state their marks.
Kriyft-guna-vat, possessing Action and Attribute.
Samavayi-karanam, combinative cause. £faf Iti, such.
Dravyalaksanaia, mark of substance.
15. It possesses Action and Attribute, it is a combinative
cause — such (is) the mark of Substance.— 15.
' Kriyagunavat' means wherein Actions and Attributes exist. The
word ' laksana,' by the force of its derivation, viz. < By this it is marked
out,' denotes a mark as well as a particular differetiating mark or sign
which divides off objects of like and unlike kinds. Therein by Action
it is marked out that this is a substance. And by the possession of Attri
butes, Substance, excluded from objects of like and unlike kinds, is marked
out. Of these the like kinds, *. «., objects which resemble one another
in being existent, are five, viz., Attributes, etc. The unlike kind how
ever is Non-Existence. Therefore Substance is different from Attribute
•etc., because it possess Attribute. That which is not different from
Attribute, etc., does not possess Attribiite, e.y., Attribute, etc. Although
the possession of Attribute is not found in a substance made up of parts
at the moment of its origin, still the possession of the opposite of the
absolute non-existence of Attribute is meant to be stated, because the
antecedent and the subsequent non-existence of Attribute are also
opposites of the absolute non-existence of Attribuse. Similarly, the
being the combinative cause also, which divides the six Predicables i»
a mark of the Predicable, Substance.
Here the Sddliya, i. e., that which has to be proved, does not suffer
from the fault of being unknown, for difference from Attribute, etc. is
proved by perception in the water-pot, etc. Nor is here the fault ' of
proving that which has been already proved, for although the difference
of the water-pot as such from others has been proved, yet such difference
remains to be proved in respect of it considered as a Substance. Some
say that in the case of the difference of that which defines the paksa
{i. <>.., the object in which the existence of the Sddhya is sought to be
proved, e. y., the mountain when the existence of fire is sought to be
proved in it), there can be no proving of that which has already been
proved, as, for instance, in "Word and Mind are eternal." But this is not
so, for that which has to be proved being proved in anything whatever
determined by that 'which determines the characteristic of being a
paksa, the paksa suffers in its essential, and hence that which has to be
proved in such cases, must be proved as such, i. e., independntly.
The word ' it,' means ' others', Therefore tha possessoin of Number
the possession of Measure, the possession of Separateness, the possession*
of Conjunction, and the possession of Disjunction also are brought
together. — 15.
Bhdsya : — Although the soul is void of action, i. e. change, still it
appears to possess action by the action of the mind or internal
2>J
VAISES1KA PHILOSOPHY.
of souse, in the state of its phenomenal existence; and hence it is called
a Substance.
Characteristics of Attribute.
("paskdra. — Attributes having been enumerated after Subatancast, Be gives their mark.
1 $ i W II
n.M,v.^., Dravyasrayi,
not possessing Attribute.
Iti,
inhering in substance. ^HUnf^ Agunavan,
^ iif^*riT)!f Samyoga-vibhugesu, in Conjunc-
Akaranam, not a cause, ^p^fa: Anape-
h. nuToTfmiT ( i n Uri-laks:i,uam, mark of
suc
tions and Disjunctions.
ksah, independent. ffa
Attribute.
16. Inhering in Substance, not possessing Attribute, not an/
independent cause in Conjunctions and Disjunctions,- such is
the mark of Attribute.— 16.
' Dravyasrayi' means that of which the nut in e is 10 reside in Subs
tance. This however pervades Substance also. Therefore he says
* AgunavAn' or Attributeless. Still it over-exte.ids to Action; so he adds
* not a cause in Conjunctions and Disjunctions.' Yet it. does noi include
Conjunction, Disjunction, Merit, Demerit, knowledge of Uod, etc.; so he-
adds ' independent.' After i independent,' ' Attribute' should be supplied.
The moaning therefore is that Attribute is that which is not an indepen
dent cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions. Conjunctions and Disjunc
tions, etc., are depended upon by Conjunction and Disjunction. Attribute-
ness is the characteristic of possessing the genus pervaded by existence
and residing in the eternals with .eternal functions. The revealer of
Attributeness is the causality present in something possessing genus and
devoid of combinative causality and non-combinative causality towards-
Conjunction and Disjunction combined. Conjunction and Disjunction
are severally caused by Conjunction and Disjunction, but not jointly.
Merit, Demerit, knowledge of (rod, etc., have been included,
because they are only occasional or conditional causes of both and
are not their combinative causes or non-combinative causes. Or tlu-
revealer of Attributeness is the characteristic, co-extensive with genus..
of being devoid of combinative and non-combinative causality towards
Conjunction aifd Disjunction. Or the mark of Attribute is simply t he-
characteristic of not possessing Attribute along with the possession of
OVenus and of difference from Action. — 16.
Characteristics of Action.
( '/'cttfA'i'/w.— —He stateN the mark of Action which ha,< been mentioned after Attribute :
i n
l iikadravyam, resting or residing in one substance only.
Agunam. devoid of Attribute. ^JfTTJ^r^ lJt§ Samyoga-vibhagesu, in Conjune-
KANADA SOTRAS 1, 1,18. 27
-r.ions and Disjunctions. SHWlfNUO"* Anapeksa-karanam, independent
rause. ^ftt Tti, su^h. ^rof^r^qf Karmma-laksanam, Mark of Action.
17. Residing in one Substance only, not possessing Attribute,
an independent cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions- -such
Ji> 4-Vi£» t-rri t-1.- /~4T A/'.J'H'^n
is the mark of Action. — 17.
{ Ekadravyam ' means that of which only one Substance is the subs
tratum. * Agunam ' is that in which no Attribute exists. ' Samyoga
etc/ means independent of something in the form of positive existence
which comes to appear after its own production; so that it is not unesta-
blished where there is necessity for or dependence upon the combinative
cause and also where there is dependence upon absence of antecedent
conjunction. Or independence of that which has its production after
the production of Action itself, is meant, because the annihilation of
the antecedent conjunction also has its production after the production
of Action itself, and because as a non-existence it does not bear relation
to its first moment.
Action-ness is the possession of the genus directly pervaded by
existence other than that residing in the eternals, or the possession of
the genus determinative of the uncommon or specific causality which
produces the perception that someting moves, or the possession of the
genus residing only in what is devoid of Attribute and not being an
Attribute, or the possession of the genus determinative of the causality
towards Disjunction present at the moment immediately subsequent to
the production of Action itself.
And this again is a Predicable evidenced by the perception that
something moves, which cannot be demonstrated by its production, etc.,
at places having no interval between each other, because the breaking
up of a moment will be refuted later on.
The manner in which the mark serves to distinguish it from others
is the same as has been already described — 17.
Resemblance of Substance, Attribute, and Action.
Upaakdra. — Now he begins the topio of the Resemblance of the three only by way of
their cause :
3«l«mr^**iqrf Dravya-gun.a-karmman.am, Of Substance, Attribute, and
Action, jfni Dravyam, Substance, wraf Karanam, cause. 3wi?*i Saman-
yam, Common, Uniform.
18. Substance is the one and the same cause of Substance,
Attribute, and Action. — 18.
' Samanyam ' (common) means the same one, as in - These two have
H common mother.' The meaning is that Substance, Attribute and
Action exist in one and the same Substance which is their combinative
cause.
28 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY
The Resemblance of the three lies in the possession of the genus
having the function of that which lias Substance as its combinapiv':
cause — -18.
Above .continued.
L'pasktira. — He states the Resemblance of the three a.s having Attribute a* their m»vi~
oombi native cause :
ii t m *«. u
Tatha, Similarly, gq[: Grunah, Attribute.
19. Similarly Attribute (is the common cause of Substance,.
Attribute, and Action). — 19
The Resemblance of the three lies in the possession of the genus-
residing in that which has Attribute as its non-combinative cause.
Conjunction is the non-combinative cause of substance. The possession.
as their non-combinative cause, of Attributes which are the causes of
their congeners, belongs to the Attributes of effects, ev/., Colour, Taste.
Smell, Touch, Number, Extension or Magnitude, Separateness, etc.
The Attributes oi' the ulimate atoms of Earth have Conjunction with
Fire as their non-combinative cause. The non-combinative cause of
Actions, however, are Fire etc., internal vibration, impact, weight.
fluidity, impression, conjunction with soul possessing invisible conse
quences of Actions (adristam), conjunction with Soul exercising Volition.
etc. These should be respectively understood by the reader. Sometimes-
even one Attribute gives rise to all the three Substance, Attribute
and Action ; for instance. Conjunction with a ball of cotton possessed
of Impetus, produces Action in another ball of cotton, originates a
Substance, viz., an aggregate of two balls of cotton, and the Exten
sion of that aggregate also. Sometimes a single Attribute originates
a Substance and an Attribute ; <>. [/., Conjunction which may be-
described as an aggregation independent of Impetus, with a ball
of cotton as well as its Extension. — 19-
Ithdsya : rcada I. i. 19, as Ubhayathd ytindh and, inttrpretn it to
mean that Attributes sometimes become the cause of Substance, Attri
bute, and Action, and sometimes do not.
Effects of Action.
Upaxkara. — He bays that sometimes a single Action is productive of a multitude of effects :
I ? | Ro II
SaEayoga-vibuga-veganam, Ot" Conjunction, Disjunc
tion, and Impetus. tf **l Karmma, Action. 53"*?!^ Saman am, Common.
20. Action is the common cause of Conjunction, Disjunction^
and Impetus. — 20.
The word ' karanam ' should be supplied. Producing as many Dis
junctions as the number of Substances in conjunction with the Subs-
KANADA stTTRAS I, 1,22. 29
stance in which Action is produced, it (Action) also produces an equal
number of Conjunctions elsewhere. And the same Action again produce,*
impetus in its own substratum.
The word Impetus indicates Elasticity also — 20.
Difference beticeen Substance and Action.
Upaikdra. — But it may be argued that originative Conjunction having bean brought about
by substance possessed of Action ; the substance which is originated thereby, is surely-
produced by Action since Action has been ita antecedent as a rule,( Hence he says :
im * i ** n
JT Na, not. a[5*nnjt Dravyanam, Of Substances. ^*4 Karmma
Action.
21. Action is not the cause of Substances. — 21.
The meaning is that Action is not the cause of substances. — 21.
Above continued.
ara. — He points out why it is so :
n ? m RR n
Vyatirekat, because of cessation.
22. (Action is not the cause of Substance) because of its
cessation. — 22.
' Vyatirekfit ' means on account of cessation. Substance is produc
ed, on the cessation of Action by the ultimate Conjunction ; therefore
Action is not the cause of Substance. Neither is Action which has ceased
to exist, a cause of Substance. Moreover if Action be such a cause, it must
be either the non-combinative cause of Substance or its conditional cause.
It cannot be the first, because then it will follow that Substance will be
destroyed, even on the destruction of the Action of the parts, inasmuch
as Substance is capable of being destroyed by the destruction of the non-
combinative cause. Nor can it be the second, for in that case there will
be a violation of the rule, since small pieces of cloth being produced just
from the Conjunctions still existinig after the destruction of a large
piece of cloth, it is seen that even parts which are devoid of Action,
originate Substance. — 22.
fihdsya reads I, i. 21 and 22 as one aphorism, and interprets it
thus : Action does not become the immediate cause of substances.
"Why V In consequence of its cessation. For, when a Substance be
comes what it is, at that moment cessation of Action takes place. Action
in the constituent parts of a Substance ceases on conjunction, and
the Substance becomes what it is. Action, therefore, is not an
immediate cause in the production of Substances. What the author
means to say is, as the expression shows, that the mediate causalitv
of Action in the production of Substance is not refuted.
Difference between Substance and Action.
Upaskura. — ;HaA ing stated that one may be the originator of many, he .now atates th»t
of or.e effect there may be many originators :
80 V A l&SSIK A PHILOSOPHY.
%&* ^r^r ^nrpj (in ? i ^ 11
j Dravyanam, of many substances. Jfwf, Dray jam, a single
aubstance. VP'I, karyyam, effect. JTJRT'tf, Samanyamjcommon.
23. A single Substance may be the common effect of more
than one Substance. — 23.
Of Substances, i.e.. of two Substances as well as of more than two
Substances. Thus by two threads a piece of cloth consisting of two
threads is originated, so also by many threads one piece of cloth is
originated . It cannot be ;said;that a piece of cloth consisting of one
thread is seen where the warp and woof are supplied by one and the
same thread, for owing to the mtn-exi stance of the Conjunction of a
single object there is no non-combinative cause here. Nor again can it,
be said that the Conjunction ot the thread and the iibres is the
non-combinative cause, because the relation of such parts and whole
being naturally established there can be no Conjunction between them, also
because the relation of that which is to be originated aad the originated
is not perceived, and also because of the impenetrability of condensed
bodies. It cannot be said that this is commonly observed. For here, as
a matter of fact, cloth is produced by the mutual conjunction of many
small pieces of thread, produced on the destruction of a long thread by
the impact of the loom, etc., whereas from the nature of things there
arises the false notion of unity in respect of threads which are really
many in number. — 23.
Abocn continued
Upaskdra. — -Well, it may be asked, ae a single Substance is the effect of many Substances,
«a also a single Attribute of many Attributes, BO is a single Action the effect of many Actions ?
Henoe he says :
«M-*i<uf ^**T II t I f I
Ghina-vaidharmmyat, on account of the difference of
Attributes, f Na, Not. qrofan, Karrnmanam, of Actions. IF»I? Karmma,
Action.
24. Action is not the joint effect of many Actions, on account
of the difference of their Attributes. — 24.
4 Karyyam ' is the complement. It has been already stated that
the resemblance of Substance and Attribute is that they originate their
congeners-. Also it has been already denied that Actions are productive
of Action, in the aphorism " Action producible by Action is not known"
«(I. i. 11). This is here repeated. This is the idea.— 24.
Difference between Attribute and Action.
Upaakdra. — Now, pointing out that Attributes which reside in aggregation are originated
h\ many Substances, he says :
i n 3 ^ ii
Dvit-va-prabhritayah, Duality, etc. q^qi: SaEtkhyAhT
KANADA StTTRAS I, 1,26.
Numbers. S4^sqtnfa<*nm: 1'mhaktva-samyoga-vibhagah, Separateces*.
Conjunction, and Disjunction. ^ Cha, And.
25. Duality and other Numbers, Separateness, Conjunction,
and Disjunction (are originated by more than one Substance).- -25.
" Originated by more than one substance " —This is the complement.
The word Separateness appearing together with Duality, etc., also
denotes Separateness of two, etc. Thus Numbers beginning with Duality
and ending with the highest arithmetical figure, Separateness of two,
etc.. Conjunctions, and Disjunctions are originated by two as well as by
mure than two Substances. So that the characteristic of residing in
more Substances than one belongs to them. And this characteristic-
again is the same as co-extension with the mutual non-existence of
combinative causes. — 25.
Above continued.
I'uaxhii'u. — Well, it may ba asked, as Substances which are made up of parts, as welf
»B Attributes already mentioned, have the characteristic of aggregation, so does not that
characteristic belong to Ac' ions a]«o ? So he says :
Asamavfxyat, on account of non-combination.
S;Aunanya-karyyam, common effect, ^ffl, Karmma, action, f, Na,
"Vidyate, is known.
2(j. Action which is the joint result (of an aggregate of two
or more substances,) is not known, as it is not found in combina
tion with them. — 26.
' On account of non-combination ' should be joined with ' in two-
substances/ and ' in more than two substances/ Thus a single Action
does not combine in two substances; nor does a single Action combine-
in more than two substances ; so that Action which is the effect of an
aggregate, is not known. Here too the root ' vid ' in ' vidyate ' has the
sense of knowledge and does not denote existence. If Action resided in
aggregation, then one substance moving, there would arise the consci
ousness ' It moves/ in respect oi' twro substances and more than tw<»
substances ; but it is not so ; therefore Action does not reside in aggre
gation. This is the meaning.
It cannot be argued, '' The Action of the body and its parts art-
certainly originated by many substances, namely, the body and its parts ;
otherwise, the body moving, how can there be the consciousness, ' It
moves', in respect of the hands, feet, etc.? Similarly in the case of other
objects made up of parts." For such consciousness is due to the fact
that the quantity of the Action of the parts is pervaded by the quantity
of the Action of the whole made up of these parts. The contrary is not
the case, because the part moving there does not arise the consciousness.
4 It moves,' in respect of the entire whole made up of the parts. Other
wise from the conjunction of cause and not-cause, the conjunction of
effect and not-effect also will not follow, since there can be conjunction
of an effect also, only with the Action of the cause.— 26
32 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
Resemblance of Substance, Attribute and Action.
UpasMra, — He again mentions a single effect of many (causes) :
f, SaAyoganam, of Conjunctions. ?sqq, Dravyam, substance.
27. Substance is the joint effect of many Conjunctions. --27.
The meaning is that substance is the single effect of many Conjunc
tions. It should be observed that here ' Conjunctions' should be taken
to the exclusion of the conjunctions of touch-less substances, substances
made up of final parts or ultimate formations, and heterogeneous sub
stances. — 27.
Above continued.
Cpaskdra. _ Now he says that many Attributes produce one Attribute as their effect :
ri, Rupanam, Of colours. ^<T, Rupam, colour.
28. Colour (is the joint effect) of many colours.— 28.
* Colour is the single effect ' — this is the con: ection. The w >rd
< colour ' in both the instances are indicatory, and its indicative power
is such that it does not abandon its own meaning. And die common
property of the intrinsic and the indicatory significance is dependence
upon the relation of the product and producer by means of the proximity
known as combination with an object which is one and the same as the
cause. Hence Colour, Taste, Smell, Touch, Liquidity, Natural Fluidity,
Unity, and Separateness of one are brought together. For these, being
present in the cause, originate in the effects only one Attribute of the
same kind. In fact the operation of non-combinative causes is two-fold-
Some produce their effects by pioximity to the object which is one and
the same as the cause. Here the cause is the combiaative cause and it
is the cause of the effect, namely colour, etc., which have to be produced.
Thus Colour which is present in the potsherd originates the Colour of the
pot by means of the combination, known as combination with the object
which is one and the same as the cause, with the combinative cause,
namely pot, etc., of the effect such as Colour, etc. Similarly Taste, etc.
In some places, however, there is an operation of non-combinative causa
lity by means of proximity to the object which is one and the same as
the effect. For instance, Sound, although it is a cause, originates in the
skv another Sound, although it is an effect. In the sky itself Colour,
etc., also are produced by Conjunction of Fire with the ultimate atoms
of Earth by means of the proximity in the form of combination with the
object which is one and the same as the effect. — 28.
Above continued.
Lrpaskdra.—H.e says that a eiogle Action may be the effect of many oauses :
n 3 1 3 1
KANADA SOTRS 1,2, 1. 33
Gurutva-prayatna-samyoganA,m, of Gravity, Voli
tion, and Conduction, ?^7«lf UtkSepanain, Throwig upwards.
29. Throwing upwards (is the joint product) of Gravity,
Volition, and Conjunction. — 29.
The meaning is that Throwing- upwards is their single effect. Here
Weight residing in the hand, stone, etc., is the conditional cause and
Conjunction of the Soul exercising Volition is the non-combinative cause,
of the Throwing upwards seated in the hand, whereas the non-coinbina-
ive cause of the Throwing upwards seatel in the stone is the internal
movement or vibration of the hand.
Here also the term Throwing upwards is indicatory of Throwing
downwards, etc. — 20.
Causality of Action upheld.
Upask'.ira. — But it lias been said that Attributes which have taken a shape, (i.e., by
appearing in some Substance) are, as effects, preceded (and so caused) by the Attributes of
the causes ; it has also boen .said tnat they are preceded by the Attributes of that in which
they reside ; therefore it follows that Action produces no effect >vhatever. That being so,
even the inference of ultrasensual phenomena such as the movements of the Sun, etc., becomes
impossible in the absence of any mark of inference. For this reason, merely reminding the
reader of what has already been said in the aphorism " Action iw the common cause of Con
junction, Disjunction, and Impetus," he says :
<nui: Samyoga-vibhagah, Conjunctions and Disjunction*.
Cha, and. ^ijjqj'f Karmmanam, of Actions.
30. Conjunctions and Disjunctions also (are individually
the products) of Actions. — 30.
* Products' is the complement. The plural number is for the
purpose of individual reference. ' Imprerssion* also should be taken at
indicated —
Vivriti. — The word ' cha ' implies Impetus and Elasticity in addi
tion (to Conjunctions and Disjunctions).
Above continued.
Upashira. — But it has been already said that Substance and Action are not the effsoti
of Action. Conjunction and Disjunction again are the effects of Conjunction and Disjunc
tion alone. So that the i affirmation of the Causality of Action here seems to bo self-con
tradictory. So he sas :
in i \ I \\\\
Karana-samanye, under the topic of causes in general.
f Dravya-karmmanam, of Substances and Action. V'R Karrnma,
Action. Wfnw Akaranam, not cause. 8rK Uktam, said.
31. Under the topic of causes in general, Action has been
stated to be not a cause of Substances and Actions. — 31.
34 YAISL-SIKA PHILOSOPHY
The word • Karanasamanya ' denotes the topic of causes in ge.ieral.
Thus in the topic of the statement cf causes in general. Action has beea
• aid to be not a cause of Substance arid Action, and not that it is alto
gether a not-cause only, whereby ihe aphorism " Conjunctions and Dis-
junctioi.s also are individually the products of Act in: s " might be
destroyed. — M
Here ends the lirst chapter lesso;i of the Kirsi Book in ihe Co
tarv of Srtnkara (»;i the VaiAesika aphorisms.
KANADA SUTRAS I, 2, 1.
HOOK FIRST, CHAPTER SECOND.
L'jia*kiii'U. — Well, in the previous section the Resemblance of the three 1'rediuable.s has been
stated as constituted by the identity oi1 sameness of their efl'euts and causes. Rut this is riot
OHtablished as tho relation of effect and cause itself lias not been proved. Therefore the
author says :
M I * I ? M
Karanabhavat, from the uon-.existeuce of cause VT33WT7:
Karyyabhavah, non-existence of effect.
1. Non-existence o>f effect (follows) from the non-existence
of cause.— 32.
Whereas it is seen that in spite of earth, wheel, water, putter,
thread, etc., being brought together, there is non-existence of the pot,
if there is non-existence of the; potter's staff, and that in spite of earth,
water. etc.. being brought together, there is non-existence of the shoot
if there is non-existence of the seed : it (/'. e., non-existence) cannot be
explained without the relation of effect and cause between the potter's
staff and the pot or between the seed and the shoot. Otherwise there
will be non-existence of the pot even on the non-existence of the loom,
etc., and there will be non-existence of the shoot even on the 110.1 exis
tence of pieces of stone, etc. Moreover it is seen that the pot, a piece
of cloth, etc, exist for a time only. That even cannot be explained
without the relation of cause and effect. For they being non-existent
at one time, their temporariness in the form of existence at another
time is not possible but by the dependence of existences upon causes.
For if there were no dependence upon causes, then a thing could only
be or not be; but could not be for a time only; since an existing thing
cannot be non-existent, nor can it come into existence from that which
is not its cause, nor ca i it come into existence from one knows not
what, nor can it come into existence from unreal things such as tho
horn of a hare, etc., but from a really existing limit or beginning like
the potter's staff, the loom, etc., as is seen in such effects as a pot, a
piece of cloth, etc. Now the limit or beginning is nothing but the cause.
Thus if the relation of effect and cause did not exist, there would
be no inclination or disinclination to activity. Then the world would
become desireless, inert. For there can be no activity without, the
knowledge that this is the means of attaining that which is desired ;
nor can there be forbearance without the knowledge that this is th«
means of avoiding that which is not desired. — 1.
Vii-riti _ Tho Sankhya thinkers argue as follows : '' A water-jar,
etc., existing in an enveloped state in earth, etc., from before, develop
into visible existence, and again by being struck with a cudgel, etc-, are
enveloped therein and exist. So that production and destruction are
not real, but merely development and envelopment. This being so. why
should not a water-jar be produced fruin yarns ? It cannot be said that
the existence of eft'tct in causes prior to their production is without evi-
36 VA1SESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
dence, for the proof is supplied by such texts of Veda as < Only the
existent, 0 Dear One, was at the beginning/ (ChandogyaG, 2, ],) etc."
This view should be considered. The admission of the development
b'f development will entail non-finality. If on the other hand, develop
ment be previously non-existent, then it will be necessary to admit pro
duction from the non-existent, and hence the supposition of the prior
existence of the water-pot, etc., will become groundless. Thus causality
is the belonging to the class of invariable and unconditional antece
dents which cannot be otherwise accounted for, or the quality of that
which fails to produce an effect on account of defect in the eontribu-
tories, or an additional Predicable, being a particular relation arisino-
out of its own nature.
JBhdtya. — Predicables called Substance, Attribute, and Action have
been mentioned. Their tidmdnya or common characteristic has been
stated. Their Visesa or distinctive characteristic, again, follows from
its contrariety to the common characteristic. All this is sufficient for
the production of tattva-jndna. The Supremo Grood results from tattva-
jfidna. This is apavarga, Salvation. But what is its characteristic
form ? How does it appear ? — All this is no\v here described.
Non-existence of the effect, e.. y.. the faults (namely, desire, aversion,
and infatuation), etc., (results) from non-existence of the cause, e.j/.,
false knowledge (?.. «/., the idea of the Self iu the Not-Self), etc. li Thus,
Pain, birth, activity, faults, and false knowledge, — on the successive
annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next
before the other/' (Xydya ti&tram, I. i. 2), the ultimate consequence
being Emancipation, the return of the Self into its own nature.
Above continued.
Upatkdra. — II may bo objected that only the existent is produced, and not the
non-existent, according to the authority of the Veda, e. g., " Verily the existent was at the
beginning, 0 calm one!," etc. Otherwise in the case of undifferentiated non-existence there
will be no such uniformity that a piece of cloth is produced front t breads only and not from
potsherds. If it is so then, we reply, this uniformity must be accepted by the advocates of
the doctrine of transformation (*?f^IJT*T3Tiv) who admit the theory of causes ; otherwise
how it happens that the manifestation of the pot is only in the potsherds, ai.-d not in
thread ? Moreover if the manifestation or development also really existed from before, then
that too being eternal, it comes to this that production and destruction are merely develop
ment and envelopment. Now, development and envelopment depend upon causes. There
fore it results that a pot, a piece of cloth, etc., also surely depend upon causes arid also that
there is production ol that which was not before. The objection that there is no proof of
the uniformity towards the cause is answered by the uniformity of the nature of the cause,
and this uniformity of the nature of the cause (to produce the effect) becomes known by
the method of agreement arid difference. For it if> a universal experience that no pot is
produced without a potter's staff and tnat a pot is produced when there is the potter's staff.
Thus causality is the quality of that which belongs to the class of invariable and uncondi
tional antecedents, which cannot be otherwise established or explained, or the characteristic
of being attended with the non-production of the effect due to defect in some contributory
oause. Although there is no invariable antecedence in such places as " one should perform
sacrifice with barley or with paddy," etc., because the sacrifice with paddy is not an
antecedent of the result producible by the sacrifice with barley, still a oause ordained in the
alternative is truly a oause, as causality is proved in the case of both even though th«
results are similar in kind. Tiius the characteristic of being attended with the non-produc
tion of the effect due to defect in some contributory cause, forms the causality which is
•common to both secular and scriptural practices ; whereas invariable antecedence known by
the method tf agreement and difference is (he causality which 1* secular onlv. For in such
KAN AD A SUTK AS 1, 2, o.
cases as " He who desires heaven should perform sacrifice," etc;., the difference or negative
side is not required, because knowledge of the agreement or positive side alone is sufficient
to induce activity. For this reason also, if the alternative is assumed, then both lo.se their
significance in the code, for the result of the same kind being secured by one alone, the
performance of the other becomes futile. Hence also it has been rightly said : " The result
ncceBsarilyAfollows from practices taught in the Veda, if performed in all their parts."
When the Acharyya (preceptor) says " And this object proceeding from the Veda, breach of
uniformity is no fault," he only means to refer to ordinary objects. In the case of grass,
igniting wood, and jewel, however, heterogeneity of effect is necessary ; because there
causality being inferred by agreement and difference, non-existence of the effect is necessary
from non-existence of the cause. If heterogeneity of effect is supposed in alternative oases,
causality will be in the alternative in Rajasuya, Vajapeya, and other sacrifices. For these
reasons he goes on establishing the same law of the relation of effect and cause.
. n \ I * I * u
* Na, not. g Tu, but. qntrfWffit Kuryyubhuvat, from non-existence
of effect. qWQWI?: Karanabhavah, non-existence of causes.
2. But non-existence of cause (does) not (follow) from the
non-existence of the effect. — 33.
If the la«.v of the relation of effect and cause do not exist, the non-
existence of cause will follow also from non-existence of effect. Non-
existence of effect is not instrumental towards the nou-existeuce of
cause ; but non-existence of cause instrumental towards non-existence
of effect. Thus the application of this introductory section of two
aphorisms is that persons desirous of nwksa, (salvation) are concerned
in non-existence of birth for the sake of non-existence of pain, m non-
existence of activity for the sake of non-existence of birth in, non-
existence of faults for the sake of non-existence of activity, in preven
tion of false knowledge for the sake of non-existence of faults, and in
spiritual intuition of tho Self for the sake of prevention of false
knowledge. — 2.
Dlulsya : The aphorism is meant for them who think that apacuryii
is mere absence of pain.
Non-existence of the cause, viz., birth, etc., does not follow from
non-existence of the effect, viz., pain. Birth, etc., therefore, may still
take place even when no pain exists. If birth, etc., are thus possible, then
there is possibility of pain also, in consequence of the appearance of
the causes of pain. Apavarga, accordingly, does not lie in the mere
absence of pain, but in the permanent impossibility of pain, resulting
in the order of the successive non-existence of false knowledge, etc.
Genus and Species relative to understanding.
Upaskdra.— After the irarks of the three Predicates in the order of their enumeration,
h« now states the mark of the Predi cables, Genus, which has also boon mentioned
in I * H n
Samanyam, Genus, fe^H: Visesah, Species- fft Iti, th«se.
Buddhyapeksam, relative to understanding.
VAISJ^IKA PHILOSOPHY.
3. The notions, Genus and Species, are relative to the
Understanding.— 34.
Genus is two-fold, high and low, of which the first is Existence
and the second is Substanceness, etc., pervaded by Existence. The
Understanding itself is the mark of Genus and its Species : the cogni
tion of re-appearance or recurrence, of Genus, and the cognition of
disappearance ur reversion, of species. The word • ill ' takes thorn
singly, and hence the word < buddhyapeksam ' has been used in tho
neuter gender. The writer of the -vrltti 'however applies it to species
only and explains its use in the singular number and neuter gender
the rule. < A word in the neuter gender used with a word not in
the neuter gender optionally entails neuter gender and singlar num-
Buddhyapeksam ' means that, of which the understanding or
cognition is the mark or the definition. < Genus ' in ' the aphorism
means that which is external and resides in more individuals than one.
enus, whether high or low, is, while it is eternal, co-existent in
a me substratum with the mutual non-existence of its own situation
Moreover Genus also takes the name of Spe-ies, as for
example, at the same time that there is the cognition of re-appearance
or recurrance, namely, < This is Substance,' < This is Substance/ and
s > on, there is the particular cognition that it is not Attribute, that it
t Action, etc. So that the nature of species belongs to the genera
themselves, c. <j.. substanceness, etc.
It may be objected, " Genus (/. t., the Universal), as an objective
reality, is a non-entity, since the consciousness of recognition can be
explained (without it) by the absence of reversion or divergence. For
the object of the cognition. « It is a cow," is that it is not different
from a cow. Even the advocate of the doctrine of kinds (jAti} admits
that this is the'subject-matter of the concrete cognitions of bovineness,
et;- ; for coiicreteness or particularity is not "something other than
absence of difference from itself ; it is the absence of divergence from a
«-ow, etc., which is also the occasion of the use of the words cow. etc.
Moreover, where does the Genus of bovineness reside V Not surely in
the bovine animal, because the animal is non-existent prior to the
appearance of bovineness. Nor in anon-bovine animal, because there
will be then contradiction. Whence does bovineness come to reside in
the body of a bovine animal when such a body is produced? It did
not surely remain in that locality, for that place also will then possess
bovineness. Nor is bovineness even produced then and there, for it (a
Genus) has been observed to be eternal. Xor can it come from else
where, for it (a Genus) possesses m> activity. Nor again does one eternal
possess the characteristic of appearing in'many individuals, for there
is no proof that it (a Genus) optionally appears in part and as a whole.
For the whole does not appear in a single place, siuco then it would
follow that there would be no concrete cognition of it in other places.
Nor does it appear in part for a > class' is not confined to one part.
So it has been said. ;< It does not move, nor was it there. Nor is
it produced, nor has it parts. Nor does it leave its former residence.
Alas! the succession of difficulties." Genus exists and that is manifested
by situation or organisation only like bovineness. potriess, etc, But it
KAXAOA SftTRAS T, 2.
does not belong to Attribute and Action also." Such is the quarrel of
kind rod thinkers.
To this ft is said, "Genus is eternal a:id pervasive ; and pervasive
ness consists in lieing1 related to all place by its own form. It does not
arise that places should be treated in. the terms of bovineness, for the
use of bovineness is obtained by the relation known as combination; as
^Time possesses form or clour' — such cognition and use do not arise,
because Time does not possesses form or colour, etc. Xor can it be said
pervades !a parl
cular spot, combines with the organism which is produced in that verv
place, as it is found that • it is produced' and •• it is combined (with
bovineness)," refer to the same moment of Time. Hereby " where does
it reside ? " is answered by •• where it is perceived ; " "where is it
perceived ?" by •' where it resides ;" and •• what sort of a body it was
prior to the appearance of bovineness ?" by u It did not exist at all."
Similarly •' It does not move, nor was it there, etc.," is so much .cry of
despair. The Genus of bovineness is nothing but non-divergence of
cognition from what it has been, — this is obstructed or contradicted bv
the real or positive cognition •• It is a cow or ox." For the cognition
also is not explained, as it has been said that the cognition of a real
existence does not help the understanding of negation, nor does diver
gence from a cow or ox come to light in the cognition " It is a cow or
ox." The option of whole and part can arise only if a single Genus
appear as a whole or as a part. Wholeness means multitude and infini
ty, and it is not proved in an individual. •• ' This is a cow or ox' — such
cognitions arise in respect of n on -entities and are not capable of esta
blishing entities "—to this the reply will be given afterwards.
The followers of PraltJirtkam (a thinker of the Mimarasa School)
however say that Genus is manifested by its situation (?!. c.,the organism
where it resides). If it is evidenced by reeognitive understanding, then
what offence has been committed by Genera belonging to Attibute and
Action ? For there arises consciousness of recognition or knowing
again in respect of Colour.. Taste, etc. ; and this consciousness surely
establishes a ' class ' (jV'W)- si'^e there is no obstruction. As it is in the
case of Ether-ness, identity of the individual is not the obstruction in the
class attributes of Colour, etc. Nor is co-extension the obstniction
here as it is in the case of Understanding and Knowledge or in the case
of the classes of water-pots and water-jars, because of the multiplicity
of individual Colours, Tastes, etc. For co-extension is denotation of
neither more nor less individuals : and the class attributes of colour,
etc., have a narrower denotation than Attribute-ness, and have a wider
denotation than blue-ness, etc. For this reason also, there is no over
lapping or intermixture (which is also an obstruction to the existence
of Genus), as there is in the case of the characteristics of being
material and ponderable substances, because although their mutual
absolute non-existences co-exist in the same substratum, yet there is no
co-existence with any other class. Xor is here instability or infinite
regression, because other Genera included in Colourness. etc., are not
40 vAisEsriwv PHILOSOPH
recognised. Xor is here loss of form or transformation as in the case
of species. If species, while residing in substances, possess classes or
jdti then they will become either Attributes or Action ; if while appear
ing in Universals(V. </., Time, Spaca, Ether, and Son!) they possess classes
or jdti, then they will become Attributes. The transformation which
thus takes place in the case of the Predicable, Species, is absent in the
case of the subject under enquiry. Xor is here non-relation, as in the
case of Combination. Let there be non-relation in the case of Combina
tion, seeing that the supposition of Combination of Combination will
entail infinite regression ; but in the case of the subject under enquiry
the relation of Combination itself is recognised. Although identity of
the individual itself is an obstruction to Combination being a Genus
yet the view of those also should be considered, who hold that Combina
tions are many in number and undergo production and destruction.
Or it (absence of combination or identity of the individual" is the
obstruction to Xon-existe.ice, etc.. being (ienera.
The learned writer of the 'Yt'ltti has said : li The point in dispute,
namely, recognitive understanding, because it is an unobstructed,
recurrent consciousness, is explained by a recurrent property, as the
consciousness, • garland-flowers ' (covers all the flowers making up a
particular garland and is explained by the common property of lulojio--
ing to that garland, whieh recuis in eyery one of those J|o\y<>rsV This
requires consideration. — •"">.
]'irriti : — The Xyaya teachers have recited the obstructions to
Genus : " Identity of the Individual, Similarity or Co-extension, Over
lapping or Intermixture, Instability or Infinite Regression. Transfor
mation, and Non-relation, — this is the collection of the obstructions to
Genus. '' Xow, Ether-ness is not a Genus, as it denotes only one individual.
Pot-ness and Jar-ness are not two genera, because* the individuals
denoted by the one are neither more nor less than by the other.
Material-ness and ponderableness are not genera, because, by appearing
in the same individual, the substrata of their respective absolute non-
existence would then intermix. Genus-ness is not a Genus, on account
of infinite regression. The transformation of Species which is by nature
exclusive, is an obstruction to its being a Genus. If Particularity be a
Genus, then, itself possessing Genus, it will not be possible for it to distin
guish itself and therefore its special property of self-distinction will
suffer. Therefore Particularity or Species is not a Genus. Or trans-
formation may mean change of nature. So that if Species, while appear-
ing in ponderable things, possess Genera, then they would be either
Attributes or Actions. If while appearing in the universals (e. #., Ether,
Space, Time, and Soul) they possess Genera, then they would be Attri
butes. In this way change of nature of the Species is the obstruction
to Species possessing the characteristic of Genus. Combination or
Co-inherence is not a Genus, as the relation of combination does not
exist in it, since the admission of combination into combination would
entail infinite regression. This applies to the view that combinations are
many in number and undergo production and destruction. Otherwise
from the identity of the individual also Combination cannot be a Genus.
Similarly the absence of the relation of Combination is an obstruction
KANADA StTRAS I, 2, 5.
41
to Non -existence being a Genus ; and other instances should be
understood.
Existence is Genus only.
Upaskdra. — Proving the two-foldness which has boou stated above of Genus and Specios,
lie says :
n \ \
n
I^: Bhavah, existence, being. 1133^: Anuvritteh, of recurrence,
assimilation or extensive denotation. ^ Eva, only, t^f^ Hetutvat,
being the cause. flT*r ?4 Sfimanyam, Genus. ^ Eva, only.
4. Existence, being the cause of assimilation only, is only
a Genus. — 35.
'Bhavah,' i.e., existence, is the cause of assimilation only, and not
of differentiation also. Therefore it does not take the name Species. — 4,
Genera-Species.
UpasMra. — What Genera take the name of Species ? To meet this expectancy he say» j
\
Dravyatvam, substance-ness. »J*ir?3 Gunatvam, attributeness.
Karmmatvam, action-ness. ^ Cha, and. ^W^l^T Samanyjini,
Genera. f?nfr<?T: Visesah, species. =g Cha, also.
5. Substance-ness, and Attribute-ness and Action-ness are
both Genera and Species. — 36.
The word ' cha ' collects Earth-ness, and other genera belonging to
Substance, Colour-ness, and other genera belonging to Attribute, Throw-
ing-up-ness, and other genera belonging to Action. * Substance-ness,
etc./ have been left uncompounded in order to indicate the absence of
the relation of that which pervades and that which is pervaded,
from amongst them. ' Genera and Species have not been compounded
so that it may be understood that these are Species also even while they
possess the characterises of Genera. Otherwise (if the words were
compounded) there might be a mistake that the compound was a genitive
one and then the being Species would not have been perceived in the
presence of Genus-ness.
It might be objected, " Substance-ness cannot be something which
penetrates into or inheres in the forms of substance and is beyond the
cognizance of the senses, because if it somehow exists in Earth, etc., it*
existence is impossible in the case of Ari, Ether, etc. It cannot be estab
lished as something which constitues the combinative cause of an effect
42 VAT&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
determined by Attribute-ness, because Attribute-ness, as it appears in
eternal and non-eternal objects, is not the determinant of being an
effect. The rejoinder that it is required for the sake of Attribute-ness
does not improve the situation." The objection however does not arise,
for Substance-ness is established by the way of constituting the combi
native causlity of an effect determined by the characteristic of Con
junction. This causality cannot be constituted by the class attribute
of Earth-ness, which is of a narrower comprehension, nor by Existence
which has a wider denotation; and there must be something to constitute
or define it, as otherwise suddenness or chance would bo the result.
Now Conjunction must necessarily be recognized in the case of ultimate
atoms, as supplying the non-combinative cause of a molecule of two
atoms ; in the case of molecules of two atoms each, as supplying the non-
combinative cause uf a molecule of three atoms ; in the case of the four
universals (''.</., Time, Space, Ether, and Soul), through their being its con
junction with all ponderable things ; in the case of Mind; as the ground
for the conjunction of Mind and the Senses ; in the case of Air, as the
support fur the movement of grass, etc. ; in the case of perceptible
Substances, through their very perceptibility. On the other hand,
there is no un-uriginated Conjunction so that it could be said
that the quality of Conjunction even, appearing in effects and
not-effects, could not be the determinant of being an effect. Li
like manner, it is easily demonstrable that substance-ness is
established also by the way of constituting the combinative
causality of Disjunction also. Attribute-ness again, it lias been
already said, is proved by its being the deterininat of the causality
which exists in a thing possessing Genus and not containing the non-
combinative causality of the combinative causality of Conjunction and
Disjunction. The class attribute of Actions also, is, in the case of
perceptible Substances, cognizable by the cognition, ' It moves,' but
in other places can be inferred from Conjunction and Disjunction, for
Action-ness is required to be established also by its being the deter
minant of the non-combinative causality of both Conjunction and
Disjunction. For this reason also it is possible to infer the movement
(»f the sun from its reaching another place. Here although the other
place, P.<J., of Sky. etc., is beyond the reach of the senses, yet the Con
junction and Disjunction of the solar rays are perceptible by the solar
zone, and it is from these Conjunctions and Disjunctions that the
inference of the movement of the sun can be drawn. The learned
Uddyotaliura has said : " The inference of the movement of the sun is
by its reaching a different place, which again is also a matter of
inference in the following way : The sun which is perceived by a man
when facing eastwards, is also perceived by him when facing the west,
and is recognised by him. This fact together with the fact that the
sun is a substance and is not destroyed and produced again at every
moment, is proof that the sun has reached a different place from where
it was before." — 5.
Final Species excluded.
Upa*k<"n-a.— -But is it the same Species which has been enumerated as a Predicable,
which IK here described as both Garni B and Species ? Removing this curiosity of the disciples
he says :
KANADA SUTRAS I, 2,8.
Auyatra, elsewhere. 3J'?3*q: Antyebhyah, iiiial.
Viiesebhyh, than species.
6. (The statement of Genus and Species has been made)
with the exception of the final Species. — 37.
The meaning is that the statement of Genus and Species is to the ex
clusion of those final Species* residing in eternal substances, which have
been mentioned above. l Antyah/ i. e. < final/ means those which exist
or appear at the end (of the division or dissolution of compounds.) The
teachers say that they are ' final/ because after them there is no
other principle of differentiation. According to the Vrittikdra they are
' final Species/ because they exist in enternal Substances, t. e. Sub
stances which exist at the end of production and destruction. They
are really Species only, the causes of the consciousness of differentia
tion, and not of the form of Genus also. — 6.
]£x tsti'iicc dcji
. — -A j^ood many men doubt that Existence it a (.ronus.. So lie ^'ives its proof :
R i vs n
g-^ Sat, existent. ffa Iti, thus. q?T: Yatuh, whence.
Dravyaguna-karniasu, in respect of Substance, Attribute, and
Action. 5ETT Sa, that. ^(^\ Satta, existence.
7, Existence is that to which are due the belief and usage,
namely '(It is) existent/ in respect of Substance, Attribute, and
Action.— 38.
By the word ' iti ' he teaches the mode of belief and usage. Thus
Existence is that which causes the belief in this way that this is
existent, that that is existent, in the case of the triad of Substance, etc.,
or on which depends the application of the words in the from of ' it is
existent/ ' it is existent/ — 7.
Existence not identical with Substance, Attribute, or Action.
Upaskdra. — But Existence is not perceived as being separate from Substance, Attri
bute, and Action. Therefore Existence is nothing else than one or other of Substance, etc,
Because that which is different from something else is perceived by means of its difference
from that, as a water-pot from a piece of cloth. But Existence is not perceived by mean*
of its difference from them. Therefore it is identical with them. To meet this objection
he says :
Dravya-guna-karmmabhyah, from Substance
Attribute, and Action. «ft|!?a< Arthantaram, a different object. *r
Satta, existence.
* It is th« introduction of these " final species," which is the reason why the
of Kunad* i.« called th« Vai&ttta philosophy of final species.
VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
8. Existence is a different object from Substance. Attribute,
and Action. — 39.
Substance, etc., are non-assimilative but Existence is assimilative.
Thus ' Existence is a different, etc.,' because its difference from them is
established by the consideration of the opposite properties charac
terised by assimilativeness and non-assimilativeness. That, however,
it is not perceived elsewhere than in them, is due to the virtue of their
primary or natural inter-relation, whereas the relation of a pot and
a piece of cloth is derivative or artificial.
The intrinsic form of the individual is not Existence, for in
dividuals do not assimilate themselves or form themselves into classes.
If the inner nature be assimilative, then the same is nothing but
Existence. If non-assimilative inner natures or essences be the means
of classification, then the class attributes of bovineness, etc., are also
gone. This consideration also dismisses the objection, "When the
practice of classification is established by those very objects in which
as substrata Existence inheres, then what is the use of Existence ?"
For the same reason also it is not valid to hold that Existence is the
property which makes an object and its action possible, or that Ex
istence is reasonableness or reliability ; for the cognition l It is
existent/ arises even in the absence of any enquiry in those res
pects. — 8.
Bhasya: — Existence is a difierent 'object' from Substance, Attri
bute, anb Action Substance, Attribute, and Action are called objects
(VIII. ii. 3). Existence is, therefore, included amongst them. But it
is not contained in the ascertained classes of Substance, Attribute, aad
Action. Hence it is said to bo a different object from them known
classes).
Above continued.
U'paskdra.—'K.c points out another differentia:
Guna-karmmasu, in Attributes and Actions =g Cha,
and. WI=Uqf, .Bhavat, from Existence, sf Na, not ^4 Karmma, Action.
*r Na, not gqp Gunah Attribute.
9. And as it exists in Attributes and Actions, therefore it is
neither Attribute nor Action.— 40.
" Neither Attribute nor Action" — this being the matter to be ex
pressed, their individual mention (i. e.} the words being not compound
ed) indicates that Existence is not Substance also. For an
Action does not exist in Actions, nor an Attribute in Attributes, nor
does Substance exist in an Attribute or Action. Existence however
resides in Attribute and Action. Therefore on account of its Difference
from Substance, Attribute, and Action, Existence is really different
from them. — 9.
Above continued.
lTpet,sk6r*. — H* mentions »noth«r cliflfartnti*:
KANADA SUTRAS I, 2, 12. 45
=3 ii ? i R i ?o n
Samanya-visesabhavena, by reason of the absence
of Genus-Species ^ Cha, and.
10. (Existence is different fom Substance, Attribute, and
Action), also by reason of the absence of Genus-Species in it. — 41.
If Existence be Substance, Attribute, or Action, then it would
contain in it Genera which are Species also. But in Existence these
Genera-Species, namely, Substance-ness, etc., are not perceived. For
nobody ever has the perception that Existence is Substance, Attribute,
or Action. — 10.
Substance-ness not identical with Substance, Attribute or Action.
Upask'lra.— Having thus stated the distinction of Existence from Substance, Attribute,
and Action, he states the distinction of Substance-ness from them.
in i R ! ?? II
Aneka-dravya-vattvena, by means of its containing
more than one Substance. ?^^ Dravyatvam, Substance-ness. 3tfi
Uktam, explained.
11. Substance-ness has been explained by means of its
containin more than one Substance. — 42.
' Anekadravyavat ' means that to which belong more than one
Substance as its combinative causes. The term ' more than one ' here
denotes all. Hence it is distinguished from Earth-ness, etc. Its ' eter-
nality ' is obtained simply from its being a Genus ; hence its distinc
tion from wholes made up of parts. And ' anekdravyavattvam ' means
the being combined with more than one Substance in general ; hence
its distinction from Existence. Therefore Substance-ness is eternal and
combined with more than one Substance in general, Hence it is
implied that conjunction is not desired. And Substance-ness also has
been verily establshed. 'Substance-ness explained', means that Subs
tance-ness also has been explained in the very same way as Ex
istence. — 11.
Above continued-
Vpaskdra.— But Substance-ness is also a ' class,' and can bo quite non-distinct from it«
own ground. What is the fault here ? So ho says.
II ?
N Samanya-visesbhavena, by reason of the absence of
Genera-Species. ^ Cha, and.
12. (Substance-ness is distinct fyom Substance, Attribute,
and Action) also by reason of the absence of Genera-Species
in it.— 43.
If the ' cl»&» ' of Substance-ness be really identical with Substance,
46 VAJ8ES1KA PHILOSOPHY.
etc., then iu it will exist Earthness, AVaterness, Firenesa, and other
Genera which arc also Species. The sense is that nobody has th«
perception that Substance-ness is Earth, Water, or Fire. Hence it is
distinct, etc — 12.
Attribute-ness not identical icitli tiubstancc, Attribute or Action.
kdra.' — He states Attributonos.s.
I n R i s\ \
Tatha, in like manner, fjnrg Gnnesu, in Attributes.
Bhavat, from its existence. 3m?3f (Junatvam, Attribute-ness.
Uktam, explained.
13. (That Attribute-ness is distinct from Substance, Attri
bute, and Action is) explained from its existence in Attributes __ 44.
The meaning1 is that in the very sumo way as Existence, Attribute-
ness is explained to be distinct front Substance. Attribute, and Action
from its existence in '/. p., combination with) Attributes onlv. ___ 13.
Upaskdra. — He points out another <lill'urontiu :
^ n
Sumanya-viseHAbhAvena, by reason of the absence of
benera-bpecies. ^ Clia, and.
14. (Attribute-ness is distinct from Substance, Attribute, and
Action) also by reason of the absence of Genera-Species in it.— 45.
If Attributeness be n«.»t something over and above Substance, Attri
bute, and Action, then it, should be perceived as containing Substance-
ness, Attributeness, and Action-ness, and their sub-classes. This is the
meaning. — 14.
Action-ness not identical icith tiubatanre, Attribute, or Action.
Upask&ra. — He points out that which distinguishes Action-ness from Substance, Attributt
and Action :
swfsj *Rng; ^wf<ggrB^ n \ i R ni n
S»Ti?g Karmmasu, in Actions. -*TT^Tc^ Bhavat, from its existence. «p*tfc«f
Karmmatvam, action-ness. grE Uktam, explained.
15. (That) Action-ness (is distinct from Substance, Attri
bute, and Action is) explained from its existence in Actions. — 46.
Like Existence, Action-ness also, which is another ' class/ is ex
plained as distinct from Substance, Attribute, and Action from iti
•xistence in (i. e., combination with) Action only. — 15-
KANADA SIJTTUST, 2, 17, 47
AliM? f-ontinued,
fTj>asl'irc(, — He mentions another differentia :
^ II? I
SfunAnya-visesabhuvena, by reason of the absence of
Genera-Species. =* Clia, and.
16. (Action-ness is distinct from Substance, Attribute, and
Action) also by reason of the absence of Genera-Species in it.— 47.
The meaning is that if Action-ness be identical with Substance, et~.,
then the Genus-Species of Substanceness, etc., will combine in it.
It should be noted that these four aphorisms identical in form, are,
stated so as to form one section for explaining the distiction from
Substance, Attribute, and Action, of the four classes Existence, Subs
tance-ness, Attributeness, and Action-ness. — 16.
Exitence is one.
Upasb'ira. — But why should not Existence which ia present in substance, Attribute and
Action, be rendered different by the difference of the determinants of Substance-ness, etc. ?
So he says :
^ Sat, existent. ?f?l Iti, this. fagnfMhl^ Lingavisesat, from the
non-particularity or uniformity of the mark. fsreNf^Wm^ Visesa-
lingSbhavat, from the absence of a particular or distinctive mark. ^
Cha, and. w Ekah, One. *n«T: Bhavah, Existence.
17. Existence is one, because of the uniformity of the mark
viz., that it is existent and because of the absence of any distin
guishing mark.— 48.
The knowledge or the use of words in this form that it is existent,
ie the mark of Existence. And it is the same, i.e., non-particularized,
in respect of Substance, Attribute, and Action. Therefore one and the
same Existence resides in them. Otherwise, Existence having the same
denotation or manifestation as Substance-ness, etc, either it whould not
exist or they would not exist. 'Visesaliiigabhavat Cha/ — means that there
is no diference, as inference which is the mark of visesa,i. e. difference,
does not here exist. As in the judgment, 'This lamp ia verily that,'
the mark of distinction ia the difference of measure such as length,
shortness, etc., so here there is no such mark of distinction. This is
the idea. — 17.
. Bhdsya. — read* T, ii, 17, with the omission of the word linga in vijteso,-
Ifnyd-abhdvflt.
Here ends the second chapter of the First Book in the Commentary
by Saiikara. on the VaiseBika Aphorisms of KanAda of great powers
48 VAI&K8IKA PHILOSOPHY.
BOOK SECOND— CHAPTER FIRST.
Characteristics of Earth.
Upaakdra. — The subject-mabtor of the Fir,st chapter of the Second Book is the description
of the nine Substances. Herein there are three sections : description of Earth, Water, and
Fire ; proof of God ,- and inference of Ether. Of these the anther states the characteristic of
Karth which hag been mentioned first of all.
Rupa-rasa-gandha-spai sivati, Possessed of Colour,
Taste, Smell, and Touch. sM* Prithivi, Earth.
1. Earth possesses Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch. — 49.
Manifold Colour such as blue, yellow, etc., belongs to Earth alone.
Thus the characteristic is the possession of the 'class' pervaded by Subs
tance-ness and co-extensive with blue colour. Similarly manifold Taste
such as bitter, sour, etc., resides in Earth alone. Thus the (second)
characteristic is the possession of the <• class ' pervaded by Substance-
ness and co-extensive with bitter Taste. In like manner other charac
teristics should be understood by the substitution or interpolation of
the words l sour,' etc. Smell is of two kinds, fragrant and non-fragrant.
Thus the (third) characteristic is the possession of the ' class ' pervad
ed by Substance-ness and co-extensive with Smell. It will be therefore
seen that Earth is a Substance which is the substratum or location of
' class ' which is co-extensive with Smell but not co-extensive with
£n Attribute which is not co-extensive with Smell. It must not be
objected that as Smell and Taste are not perceived in a stone, etc.,
therefore both of them fall short of being universal here. For, though
Smell and Taste are not perceived there in the first instance, still
they are found to be present in their ashes ; and the very same parts
which originate the stone do also originate its ashes. Hence there is
no want of universality. How then is there such perception as " The
air is fragrant," " Water mixed with ' Kdravella ' (Momardica
Charantia, Hairy Mordica) is bitter V" The question does not arise, be
cause that Smell and Taste are due to the external condition formed by
(particles of) Earth. Touch also which is neither hot nor cold and which
is produced by the action of heat, belongs to Earth only. Thus the
(fourth) characteristic is the possession of the 'class' pervaded by Sub
stance-ness and co-extensive with Touch produced by the action of heat.
And the quality of being produced by the action of heat, which is reveal
ed by a distinctive peculiarity, belongs to the Touch of Earth alone ;
and 'a distinctive peculiarity' is very manifest in the peculiar Touch of
the flowers of Sirtsa (Acacia Lebbec) and Lavanyi (clove-creeper) ; but
it is not so in the Touch of Water, etc. Although in a whole made
up of parts Touch, etc., are not produced directly through the con
junction of Fire, from heating, yet there too a particular heterogeneity
•hould be recognised by the way of its being the product of a series
of parts and wholes.
" But," it may be objected, " this mark or characteristic is what
is called a mark of disagreement or a negative mark which is the
proof of its difference from others or of the mode of its treatment. Now,
Earth is distinguished from othersbecause it has Smell. That which is not
KANADA &OTKAS n. i. i. 40
different from others, does not possess Smell, e. </., Water, etc. And
Earth is what has Smell which is the counter-opposite of the non-
existence of the porvader of the non-existence of the difference from
others than itself. Therefore it is different from others than itself.
Hero supposing that the major term, the quaasitum, namely, difference
from others, is a well known object, if the mark of inference disagree
with it, then the inference will have the fault of incommensurability, as
the minor term will in that case fall outside the class of ascertained
similar objects and of un-uscertained objects ; and if it does not
disagree, then the mark will be what is called a mark of agreement
or a positive mark. On the other hand, if the major term is not
well known, then the minor term will contain an -unknown major term.
In that case there can be no expectation, nor any desire for inference,
nor again any inference in the shape of knowledge in particular about
it. Moreover, absence of the mark or the middle term and absence
of the quEesitum or major term are universally related by agreement.
Thus there will arise the contradiction that the absence of the major
term will not have the characteristic of being the mark nor will the
mark have the characteristic of being the absence of the major term.
By this alone the futility of the minor premiss is explained, but not the
object, the universal relation of which has not been obtained. So it
has been said : " The faults of an inference by disagreement or by the
method of difference, are ignorance of the major term, contradiction,
futility of the minor premiss, and proof by the method of agreement."
So also if the mark is intended to establish usage. Here the usage
consists in being the object of reference of the word Earth, and that
belongs also to the class of Earth-neas and therein the mark Earthness does
not exist. Although therefore incommensurability may appear to exist
here, yet there is no incommensurability, the quantum or major term
being the characteristic of being the object of reference of the word
Earth, which is the occasion of the significance of Earth-ness.
Or again Earth-ness being, as a class. proved in a general
way, like pot-ness, to be the occasion of the significance of an
accidental word, the word Earth contains the occasion of the signi
ficance of Earthness. If it contains the occasion of not signifying
others — not-Earth-ness, — then as it appears together with that which
is the occasion of the significance, it should be proved in the way, vix.}
4 That which is not so, is not so.' Thus here too there is surely the fault
of ignorance of the qusesitum, etc."
It is not so, the author replies, difference of others such as Water,
etc., being manifest in the pot itself, because the difference, i. e., the
mutual non-existence of Air, and other super-sensuous objects also i*
proved by sense-perception itself in the pot, etc., in as much as only the
fitness for the location or ground or substratum governs the apprehen
sion of mutual non-existence, as is seen in cases like "The column is not
a piid'-Jia (a ghost-like being)."
It should not be said, •< This i" not the case. Let then the pot
only be the analogue or example. What is the use of a negative mark ?
Who will prove in a roundabout fashion a conclusion arrived at in
a itraight way ? " If the non-negative mark be not a mere simulacrum.
VAI£E$IKA PHILOSOPHY.
then this path too is unobstructed to him who is described as arguing
in a round-about way ; because with the removal of the fault of
ignorance of the queesitum, all other faults which arise out of it, are
also removed. There is no contradiction, because the positive
pervasion or the relation in agreement is apprehended along with
the negative relation ur because the positive pervasion is
inferred by the negative pervasion. Nor is there futility of tho
minor premiss, because the very mark of which the pervasion* has boon
_ obtained, is proved in tho minor term ; as has been said : '< Whatever
" relation of the determinate and the determinant subsists between
two existences, just the reverse of it is to be understood in the case of
the corresponding non-existences." Usage again follows from tho
teaching Earth possesses Smell, " in the same wav as what
possesses a^ narrow, twisted neck, etc., is the object of reference of the
word < pot.' Thus that by which, anywhere and everywhere, in the case
of clarified butter, etc., clay, etc., the being the occasion of the force
of the word Earth is derived, from the above teaching, in Earth-ness by
means of the indication, namely, the possession of Smell, also operates
as a negative mark in this way that that which is not this, is not this,
because everything which possessess Smell is the object of reference of
the word Earth, through its possession of Sinoll, by means of Earth-
ness which is the occasion of the force of the word. "
The objector cannot say " In the case of the negative mark or per
vasion which will prove difference, the difference must be either diffe
rence in property, or difference in nature, i. e., otherness, or mutual
non-existence. Now it cannot be the first two, because they are known
by sense perception itself. Nor can it be the third, because when tho
difference of non-existence also comes to bo the quajsitum, its mutual
non-existence is not present there, and therefore the difference of that
which is other than non-existence coining to be the quantum the
qunesitum is not found/' For mutual non-existence, of which the
counter-opposite is non-existence, is also a quantum. So that if it is
something additional then it verily exists ; if not then being reduced to
itself, it is in reality something different, because its difference in
property is pervaded by its mutual non-existence. And here there is
unsteadiness or want of no finality, because the non-iinality remains
only so long as there is perception or cognition, whereas in other cases
iinality is obtained by perception.
It is also said that thirteen kinds of mutual non-existence well
known in thirteen cases are jointly proved in Earth. This is nonsense
because the knowledge of every one of them being not in point the
knowledge of them jointly disappears. Whereas mutual non-existence
With counter-opposition determined by non-odorousness should be
proved, because the difference of non-existence by means of the
difference of that which determines counter-opposition is necessary and
bec.ause it has been already said that this difference of non-existence is
proved by sense-perception in the pot etc., also.
If it is asked " What is the solution in the case of Ether, etc ?" the
author replies that Ether is difierent from others than itself, by being
KANADA SflTTBAS II, 1, 2.
tlie seat of Sound. Although in " That which is not thus, is not thus,"
and cases like this, where the minor term is one-sided, the qusesitum,
i. e.} the major term, is not well known, still that which possesses differ
ence iu property from something else, possesses the mutual non-existence
of which that something is the counter-opposite. So that by virtue of the
pervasion brought into play in this general way, the mutual non-existence
the counter-opposite of which possesses the absolute non-existence of being
the seat of Sound, having- been already proved, hero it is only shown
as being connected with the minor term, like fire being connected with the
mountain. This is our other conclusion, its difference in quality being
pervaded by its mutual non-existence. If it is said that only the pos
session of the absolute non-existence of being the seat of Sound is not
found in objects of the unascertained class, then the being the seat of
Sound is neither the definition nor the description, because it is attacked
with the fear of belonging to unascertained objects.— I.
Viv-rtf __ The revered Sankara Misra himself knovis what the
necessity was of carrying the investigation here, leaving aside the
possession of Smell, up to the possession of the < class ' pervaded by
Substance-ness co-extensive with Smell.
Characteristics of Water.
Ho states the characteristic of Water mentioned after Earth :
: Rupa-rasa sparftavatyalj, possessed of Colour, Taste,
and Touch, sntf: Apafo, Waters. %*\: Dravah, Fluid. fa**!: Snigdhah,
Liquid, viscid.
2. Waters possess Colour, Taste, and Touch, and are fluid
and viscid. — 50.
The Colour, Taste, and Touch are respectively White, Sweet, and
Cool only. Fluuiness is constitutional bat Viscidity is by nature or
essential.
Objection. But it is no I.- correct to say that the Colour of Water is
only White, because blueness is observed in the water of the river
Yamund, etc. That the Taste is only the sweet is also not correct,
because acidness, bitterness, etc., are observed in the juice of the
blackberry, karavlra, etc.. That the Touch is only the Cool one
is also not proved, because at mid-day hotness also is observed. Con-
stiutional Fluidity again is too limited, as it is absent in ice, hail-stone,
etc. Viscidity also is not proved as essential and is too wide, as it is
not perc^ved in Water, and is perceived in clarified butter and other
terrene objects. Moreover Water-ness is not a class even, which may
be the characteristic of Water, because it is not proved on account of
the non-existence of that which will establish it. Nor is it proved by
the characteristic of the determinant of its being the combinative
cause. of Viscidity, because the nature of Viscidity, appearing in both
the effect and what is not the effect, is not the determinant of the state
52 VAI&E8IKA PHILOSOPHY.
of the river .1 around, etc, is due to the condition or enviro
ment formed by the receptacle, and whiteness is observed in ^he Water"
W 6n thrU in th
however the observation of the canvas itself is the proof. The oria
8'1?"^ aUd noi;-fra^ant Parts » rem4d ^7 the conflfct o
;> Inthefcase°1fm1ai?lfold Smell, there is absence of proof
the sveetness nch 1S obsr
Prn f11
ere ore te svyeetness ^nch 1S observed in Water immediately after
the eating of yellow myrobalan, belongs to Water only. Its manifeta
M^m^fwT^8^01; the ?r°ximity °f S°me P^Ucular Substance
sand.l wood Th«°lll-H °° "tf " ™ter Brises fpom its "Bociation with
mdalwood. The bitterness that is perceived immediately after the
b±!g, 1 >; ^ (a .cucrbei-]ike frui*) bclo^s to the JrfcaW alone!
because bitterness is observed in its parts even without the drinking
~\Tt tLnS^ ^ ^ 1bi"~ of the bilious Substancf
at the tip of the tongue is felt there. Hence the second charac-
bv Snb,?a "" ^ °i PT6?1011 °f the claSS Wlucl1 iB dll*ect1^ P^ded
b.> Substance-ness and which is co-existent with Taste which is not
" °* ier ^' Taste' ^ Hke manner the thirl
claacristi f . ' ner e r
Jiai actei istic of water is the possession of the class which is pervaded
by Substance-ness and which is co-existent with cool Touch The
co-exsen w coo Touch The
hotness that appears at mid-day is really of Fire, as it depends upon its
ourtTcliar1, T ST-CC- • ^^ """titntional Fluidity ?8 bv itsdf the
fourth characteristic ; in other words, Water-ness is the possession of
the class wh]ch ls pervaded b Substance-ness and which ii present in
what possesses constitutional Fluidity. Liquidity or ViscidityP however
-10 ^"^^ not * Genus whi
Genus which is
-ness; because the distinction of iscid
nooaa«n TC'1' iS observed, but such distinction
A? bt ^6ne ? a I1*88' Jt Cannot be said " Let Viscidity
for it it in1«±i f 11 1S th° evide^ce that ^ is Present in water ?''
inferred from the mixing or compounding of barley, sand, etc.,
A compound is a particular combination or conjunction
KANiDA SUTRAS II, 1, 3. 53
caused by Viscidity and Fluidity. It is not due to Fluidity alone, "be
cause no compounding is established by the Fluidity of glass or gold ;
nor is it due to Viscidity alone, because no compounding is established
by condensed clarified butter, etc. Therefore by the method of agree
ment and difference it is proved to be caused by ATiscidity and
Fluidity. And this compounding, being seen to take place in barley,
sand, etc., by water, confirms Viscidity in Water. This argument is
based upon wide experience itself, as Viscidity is an object of sense-
perception. Viscidity which however is found in clarified butter, etc.,
is of the Water which is the occasional cause of that clarified butter,
and it appears as though belonging to the clarified butter through
combination with the conjoint. So also in the case of oil, juice, etc.
And Water which is the occasional cause of clarified butter, contains
a preponderance of Viscidity ; therefore owing to this very prepon
derance of Viscidity, this Water does not counteract Fire. If Viscidity
were a particular Attribute of Earth, then, like Smell, it would have
been present in all terrene objects, hastly, Water-ness is a class
which is directly pervaded by Substanco-ness, because it has been
proved that a class which determines the being the combinative cause
of the conjunction present only in objects possessing Viscidity, is
common to the ultimate atoms. — 2.
Characteristics of Pire.
a. — Following the order o{ enumeration, he states the character istic of Fire :
&W: Tejas, fire. ^T^sjfcj llupa-sparsavat, possessed of Colour and
Touch.
3. Fire possesses colour and Touch.— 51.
The meaning is that Fire possesses Colour which is luminous, and
Touch which is hot. If it be objected, "Luminousness is the being the
illuminator of other bodies, and such Colour is not found in heat or in
Fire as it exists in gold, in a frying-pan, or in Water. White Colour
also is found nowhere in these, nor is hot Touch found in moonlight or
in gold. How then is this so ?" We reply that ther can be no such
objection, because luminous Colour may be inferred in hotness, etc.,
by means of Fire-ness. If it be objected that Fire-ness itself is not
proved there as such, we reply that it is inferred in them by their
possessing hpt Touch. If it be asked, "How is it proved in gold ?",
our reply is that the author desires to say that it is moved because,
even in tho absence of luminous Colour in it, Fire-ness is inferred by
the negative., mark, viz., the characteristic of being the substratum or
ground of Fluidity which is produced but not destroyed by the closest
Conjunction of fire. And in the case of Fire as existing in the frying-
pan, etc., Fire-ness is inferred from their possession of hot Touch.
Fire is four-fold : that in which both Colour and Touch are partly
developed, as the solar, etc.; that in which Colour is partly developed
but Touch is undeveloped, as the lunar; that in which both Colour and
Touch are altogether undeveloped, as the ocular ; and that in whioh
54 VAL§ESIKA PHILOSOPHY
Colour is undeveloped and Touch is developed, as of the summer season
and also lire present in Water, frying-pan, etc. He will prove the
ocular Fire later on. — 3.
Characteristic of Air.
UpntUra.— He states the characteristic of Air which is the next in oH.r:
nfar^ Sparsavcan, possessed of Touch. ?rn: VAyuh, air.
4. Air possesses Touch. — 52.
The characteristic of Air is the possession of tlio -r-UcV
with Touch which, does not co exist \vith O.lonr, o, tl e pos^'ion o
the ' cl»M , oo-eXi.to.t with Touch wh,ch is neither hot /or To d and
cw£2±; & T^hS'i, n± ? hHo °Sd9t ofii ;fl
not co-exist with Smell, or the > •
The above characirrixtic* do not belong to Ether.
" I)osse'9i'"' of c
I ? I V, II
5. These (characteristics) arc not in Ether.— 53.
Hero the root < -yid, in vidyante ' means to perceive. The meaniu*
hen » that because they are not perceived therefore they do not exist
in Ether, and other substances, either uniformly or by nature, or ooUeo-
ively or accidentally. If it bo asked,- How does the perce, lion arise
that Ether is as white as curd ?" we reply that it is due to the impression
created by the perception of the white colours of the ravs of the sun If
it be asked, " How then does the perception arise that Ether is blue'?"
we reply that it is duo to the impression created in the niinds of the
observers who are looking at the radiance of the emerald rfcak lyinff
largely extended over the south side of Sumeru mountain. If has beer
opined that it is due tt the impression created by the eye when after
travelling to a long distance it turns back and reaches its own puiul
inis is not a sound opinion, because those who possess jaundiced eves
also have such impressions. J
From the perception, • Here now there are Colour, etc.," it cannot
be argued that Colour and the three other Attributes belong to Space
ime also, because they have been already stated to be the charac
teristics of Earth, etc., only by the relation of combination and not bv
any other relation also. « Here now there is absolute non-existence of
KANiDA SUTK AS II, 1,7. 55
Colour" — from this perception again it follows that Space and Time are
the substrata or grounds or foundations of all things. — 5.
Objection t'j Fluidity beinij a characteristic <>f Wntcr, answurud.
Ui>askv.i-ut — If it be argued tliat it is not correct to say that Fluidity i.s thf character
istic of Water, because Fluidity is observed oven in Earth ; so he replies :
i^T Sarpir-jjatu-madliuchchhistanani, of clarified butter,
lac, and wax. *jfi«TwffTl^ Agni-saEiyogat, through conjunction of Fire.
•&&C Dravatvam, Fluidity. «ffe: Advih, with Waters. SW^T Samunyara,
similarity, Commonness.
6. The Fluidity of clarified butter, lac, and wax, through
conjunction with Light is similar to that of Water.— 54.
The Fluidity which belongs to clarified butter, etc., results from
conjunction of Fire which is its occasion, and is not constitutional;
whereas constitutional Fluidity is the characteristic of Water. There
fore the similarity of Earth to Water is in respect of mere Fluidity,
and not in respect of constitutional Fluidity also. Hence the charac
teristic or the definition is not too wide. This is the meaning. — 6.
Above continued.
Upaskdra. — But still, because that condition, t. e., Fluidity, appears in tin, lead, iron,
and other modifications of Firo, therefore that condition itself is an instance that tho d«-
finition is too wide. To this objection he replies :
n * i n v$
!n*T Trapu-sisa-loha-rajata-suvarnamim, of tin, lead,
iron, silver, and gold. SffrwtiTi^ Agnisamyogat, through Conjunction
of Fire. ^?3 Dravatvam, Fluidity. *lf??: Advih, with Waters. 8WI*W
Samanyam, similarity.
7. The Fluidity of tin, lead, iron, Silver, and gold, through
conjunction with Fire, constitutes their similarity to Water, — 55.
This is an indication ; bell-metal, copper, brass, etc., are also im
plied. The characteristic which is common to those which have been
mentioned and those which are implied, is that they are the foundation
of the Fluidity which is produced but is not destroyed by tne closest
Conjunction of Fire. Thus the Fluidity of gold, etc., also is only occa
sional, the occasion which is the Conjunction of Fire, being proved by
the method of agreement and difference. Moreover there is this
distinction ; in the last aphorism the word ' agni ' denotes Light
— tejas — possessing an excess or abundance of heat, but here it
denotes fire.
If it be objected, " Gold, etc., also must be either modifications of
Earth or different Substances; because yellowness, weight, etc., establish
PHILOSOPHY-.
terreneness, and because the non-annihilation of Fluidity which
constitutes their difference from Earth, is perceived in them, and be
cause this h capable of establishing of Substance. r Wo reply that
gold is a modification of Fire, and its fieri ness is proved in the negative
way, namely, " That which is not thus, is not thus, as Earth, " by the
characteristic of its being the foundation of Fluidity which is not
annihilated oven at the closest Conjunction of Fire.
Again there is no contradiction in the ultimate atoms of Water,
because Fluidity should bo qualified as being1 non-eternal. Nor is there
incommensurability, as the mark does not appear in the lamp and other
objects of the ascertained class, because the fact which is to be proved
is that gold is not a modification of Earth. Nor is there any obstacle to
the receptacle of weight becoming the minor term hero; the foundation
or substratum will not be proved if something else were the minor term,
as the minor term must be foundation of Fluidity. Nor is it hard to
ascribe ultra-finality or absoluteness, because it is desired to be said that
it is tho foundation of temporary Fluidity which is not annihilated even
at the closest Conjunction of Fire for three hours. If it be objected that
the annihilation of Fluidity must be concluded from the destruction of
the foundation and the perception of more and less; we reply that it is
not so, because the mark of inference is the possession of the Fluidity
containing the Genus of Fluidity which does not appear in the countei-
opposite of the annihilation produced by that Conjunction of Fire which
is not combined with the totality of non-existent Fluidity. Or the
foundation of yellowness and weight, conjoined as it is with Fluid
Substance which excludes all Colour different from yellow Colour, does
not therefore become fhe foundation of any Colour different from yellow
Colour even at the Conjunction of Fire for three hours, like a piece of
yellow cloth placed inside Wider which is conjoined with Fire. If it be
objected, ''The Colour of gold will then be visible in darkness as
there will be nothing to cloud or overpower its Colour, because,
overpowering means the non-apprehension caused by the apprehension
of a more powerful like object," we reply that overpowering denotes
the mere relation with a like object which is more powerful by the
power of the effect produced by it. 80 it has been said, u Other Colour
does not at all shine under the influence of the association of the earth.'*
This is our view. — 7.
Use of Inference.
Upaskara. — Having thus finished the section on the characteristic of the four Sub
stances which possess Touch, the author, seeing that the characteristic of Air is net
proved by its foundation or with a view to avoid this, at the outset introduces the method
of ] roof by inference, and then first of ull establishes tho probative force or value of
inference itself, according to experience, and thereby begins the section of demonstration
• >f Air :
l * I \ I c II
Visani, possessing horns. VJsH'H Kakudvan, possessing a hump.
Prftnte-valadhih, with a tail hairy at the extremity,
KANADA SftTRAS II, 1, 9- 57
Sasuavan, possessing a dewlap. ?fa Iti, such, nt?^ G-otve, in cow-ness,
of being a CUNY, ^f Dristam, observed admitted, fajpn Lingam, mark.
8. That it has horns, a hump, a tail hairy at the extremity,
and a dewlap— such is the admitted mark of being a cow. — 56.
The import is that as horns, etc. are the marks, the pervasion, or
universal or invariable relation of which is well-known or recognised,
towards the proof of cow-ness, so also the commonly-observed marks of
the five super-sensuous Substances,, Air, etc., assume the form of proof.
Here although the mere possession of horns is not the mark of cow-
ness, since it is also found in the buffalo, etc. ; nor is the possession of
the dew-lap, etc., the distinction or differentia, since in that case the
name will become senseless ; still with them who can discern in the
horn of the cow difference in characteristic in comparison with the
horns of the buffalo, the sheep, etc., all those distinctions truly assume
the nature of marks. And all those distinctions such as straightness,
crookedness, hardness, softness, shortness, length, etc., which are
capable of being known by observers of superior skill, do really exist
in horns also. Thus in respect of the body of a cow at a distance
standing by itself, the inference is altogether unobstructed that it is a
cow because like the body of a cow which has been previously perceiv
ed, it possesses peculiar horns. Similarly, the possession of a hump
also is a mark of being a cow. The possession of a tail hairy at the
extremity, is also a truly independent mark of being a cow. ' Prante-
valadhib' means that in which hair are placed at the extremity, that
is, a particular tail. From the use of the aluk compound (i. c., that form
of compound words in which the inflection of the first word is not
elided), the tail of the cow only is denoted by the word ' Antevaladhi^-'
For the charaeteristic of the tail hairy at the extremity, which is found
in the tails of cows, does not belong to the tails of the horse, sheep, etc.,
as these tails are covered with hair all over. In the tail of the buffalo,
etc., there is not so much prolongation. From this difference in charac
teristic, the possession of a tail hairy at the extremity is also a mark
of being a cow. The dropping of the inflection conveying the sense of
possession (i. e., the use of the word tail only instead of tail-bearing)
shows that only the body of the cow has been in view. Thus (the
inference) " It is a cow" because, like the body of the cow which has
been previously perceived, it possesses a tail which is hairy at tho
extremity. The possession of a dew-lap, again, is simply a well-known
mark of being a cow. — 8.
Touch infers Air.
Upaskdra.' — 'Having thus pointed out, according to observation, the probative value of
Infereiioo by which all human affairs are carried on, ho, intending to begin tie Heotion of
proof of Air, says:
: Sparsah, Touch. ^ Oha, and *T*ft: Vayob, of air,
9. And Touch (is a mark) of Air.— 57.
58 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
' Lirigam,' mark, is the complement of the aphorism. By the word
'cha ' Sound, upholding, and quivering are brought forward.
It cannot be said, " The Touch which is being perceived must be
of Earth itself of which the Colour is not yet developed," because the
developed Touch of Earth cannot be separated from developed Colour.
Henco the Touch which is perceived, being Touch, must reside somewhere,
like the Touch of Earth, etc. Some foundation of Touch being thus proved
by inference, by analogy, (Samanyato dristam), the foundation of Touch
is not identical with the triad of Earth, etc., because it does not possess
Colour, nor is it identical with the pentad of Ether, etc., as it possesses
Touch. Therefore by the inference together with the exclusion of others
a Substance over and above the eight Substances is proved. In like
manner a particular Sound also is a mark of Air. Thus in the absence
of the impact of Substances possessing Colour, the series of Sounds
(arising in loaves, etc.) which is heard amongst leaves, etc., must be
occasioned by the impact of substances possessing Touch and Impetus,
like the series of sounds produced in a drum by the percussion of the
drumstick, because it is a series of sounds which is in relation to a subs
tance the parts of which are indivisible. The absence of the impact of
Substances possessing Colour, is, again, known by the non-perception
of what might be expected or the co-relative. And from exhaustion that
Substance possessing Touch and Impetus is verily an addition to the
group of the eight substances. Similarly, a particular upholding also
is a mark of Air. Thus the steadiness or flotation of grass, cotton,
cloud, and air-ship in the sky, is due to the conjunction of some subs
tance possessing Touch and Impetus, since it is the flotation of substance
which are not presided over by a conscious being, like the flotation of
grass, wood, boat, etc., on a stream ; whereas in the flotation of poison,
etc., caused by thought directed towards it, human and other influence
is without doubt present. So also in the upholding of the bird, the
branch of a tree, etc. Nor is the distinctive mark not proved on account
of its being influenced by God, because by the word ' conscious ' all else
except (rod is meant. Similarly, quivering too is a mark of the exis
tence of Air. Thus this Action in grass, etc., without the impact of
Substances possessing Colour, is due to the impact of some Substance
possessing Touch and Impetus, because it is an Action which is not
produced by Weight and Conjunction of Soul exercising Volition, like
the Action of a cane-bush when struck by the waves of a river. The
word l weight ' implies Conjunction of Soul attended with adristam
(invisible after-effects of past acts), Fluidity and Impression ; hence the
being an action not produced by them is the mark.
r It cannot be said, " Air is only an object of sense-perception and
that therefore there is no need of the investigation of its marks ;" for,
Aic is not perceptible ; only its supersenusousness is proved by theinfer-
enne : " Being a colourless external Substance, it is like Ether." It
canot be replied " Its perceptibility is inferred in this way that being
the seat of Touch Air is perceptible like the water-pot ; " for the posses
sion of developed Colour is here the condition, upddhi. If it be objected,
" In the case of Colour, etc., as well as Soul, it is not pervasive of the
major term, since it pervades the major term when the latter is deter
mined by the being the external substance which is the minor term
KANiDA StiTRAS II, 1-10 59
containing the middle term, or is determined by the middle term which
is the moans of inference. Nor does it govern a body's being an object
of visual perception, because it is there that its presence and absence
are observed as a rule. On the other hand, a body's being an object of
tactual perception is governed by the mere possession of an adequate
Touch." We reply, that both the presence and absence of Colour govern
here; for perceptibility only by means of Touch proved by both posi
tive and negative marks, has not been observed without the perception
of Colour. Moreover, if Air were an object of sense-perception, then it
would govern also the apprehension of general Attributes, e.y., Number,
etc. If it be objected, u Perceptibility does belong to Number in
blowing by the mouth, etc., to Measure or Extension, e. y., cubit, span,
etc., and to Separateness as well as to Priority and Posteriority of two
Airs existing on both sides. On the other hand, it is not the rule accor
ding to you also that they are perceptible by means of there being
individual masses of Air, because they are not observed in the cloth,
etc., lying on the back." We reply, that it is the rule that they are
perceived by means of there being individual masses of Air. Number,
etc., are obtained in the cloth, etc., fixed upon the back, if they lie
straight ; if they are not obtained, it is because of the defect that the
latter do not lie straight. " Developed Colour and Touch govern the
perceptibility of external substances, only when they operate jointly.
Light, the yellow substance within the eye, and the radiation or heat
of the moon are not perceptible because their Touch is undeveloped.
Hotness as in summer, heat and Watery Substances the parts of which
havo been dispersed (steam.) are not perceptible, because Colour is un
developed there." This is the view of the commentator of Nyaya-Vartikaa.
" But light, etc., are really perceptible although Touch is undeveloped.
Therefore the Conjunction and Disjunction of the bird and the branch
of the tree are really perceptible in the sky under moonlight." So say
those who know the traditions of the system. Nor can it be said that
the possession of developed Touch (universally) excites to the percepti
bility of universally external Substances, for then the light of the
emerald would be non-perceptible. Nor is only the possession of the
developed distinctive Attribute the governing condition, for then Ether
too would become perceptible. Nor again is the possession of the deve
loped distinctive Attribute co-existent with the ensuant or resulting
magnitude, such condition, for the bilious substance existing at the tip
of the tongue is imperceptible in spite of the development or manifesta
tion of bitterness. Therefore only the possession of developed or
manifested Colour governs the perceptibility of all Substances except
Soul. And this is not present in Air. Hence Air is not an object of
tense-perception — 9.
Touch which infers Air, cannot be explained by visible objects.
Upatkdra.— It may be objected, " Here there ii no mark which can be known by senee-
peroeption. For here the pervasion or universal relation is not obtained by sense perception
like that of fire and smoke. Moreover thia will be also the Touch of one or other only f
Earth etc." Therefore he says.
II ^ I t i *<» u
•r Na, not. «5| Cha, and. ref^t Drigtanam, of the observed or visibl*
60 VAU§E§IKA PHILOSOPHY.
or seen, W$: Sparsah, touch. ||?l Iti, hence. Siseftn?: A-dri$ta-lingah,
not-containing-the-mark-of-the-visible sfl^: Viiyuh, air.
10. And it is not the Touch of the visible (Substances) ;
hence the mark (of the inference) of Air is not the mark of the
visible (Substances). — 58.
The Touch which is made the subject of enquiry does not belong to
visible Substances, viz., Earth, Water, and .Fire, because it ig not
accompanied by Colour. Therefore the inference is that this Touch
resides somewhere. Hence in virtue of the middle-term, i. <\, the mark
of inference, being contained somewhere, we get Air although the mark
is not the mark of the visible Substances, i. e., although the mark is
observed in analogous Substances. This is the meaning. Although
only the quartet of observed Touch, etc., are the mark, yet because
their relation with Air is not apprehended, therefore it is said that the
mark of Air is 7iot the mark of the visible Substances. For it is not
possible to prove Air after first proposing that this which possesses this
or that property is Air. Therefore the import is that the proof of Air is
by inference from analogy together with the exclusion of (possible)
others (i. e.,by hypothesis^). — 10.
Air is a Substance.
Upaskdra.—H&ving proved Air as a whole made up of parts, which is the foundation
of Touoh capable of being perceived, he says, with a view to prove Air oharauterised a«
ultimate atoms :
R i n ?m
A-dravya-vattvena, by not containing Substance (as iti
support). jf«i Dravyam, Substance.
11. Air is a Substance, because it does not contain or reside in
Substance. — 59.
' Dravyavat ' means that which has Substance as its support.
' Adravyat/ i. e., net i dravyavat,' means not resident in or suported
by Substance. Thus like Ether, Air characterised as ultimate atom is
a Substance, because the other Predicables reside in substances;
because it has been stated that the being resident, i. p.. 'dependence,
applies elsewhere than in eternal Substances, and because the origina
tion of a large whole made up of parts is capable of being demonstrated
by the evolution of dyads, etc., from the formation of a dyad by two
ultimate atoms, and so on. — 11.
Air in a Substance. — continued.
Upatkdra. — Bringing forward two (more) marks or grounds of establishing tha Substnuoo-
ne«8 of the ultimate atoms of Air, he says :
II R i ? i ?^ II
Kriya-vattvat, because of possession of Action.
Gunavattvat, because of possession of Attribute, ^r Cha, and.
12. (Air is a substance), also because it possesses Action
and Attribute.— 60,
KAN AD A StiTllAS II, 1, 13. 6l
' The ultimate atom of Air is a Substance' — this is the complement
of the aphorism. Although there is this mutual dependence or correla
tion that Substance-ness being proved, the possession of Action and the
possession of Attribute are also proved and in their proof the proof of
Substanceness lies, yet the possession of Action is proved by this that
the ultimate atom which is the constituent element of the composite
whole which is the foundation of the Touch which is being perceived,
cannot be established otherwise than by the Conjunction of the non-
combinative cause ; and the possession of Attribute is proved by the
rule that the Touch, Colour, etc., of the composite whole are preceded by
like Attributes in its cause ; and by these two Substance-ness also is
proved ; so that here there is no fault, namely repetition or vicious
circle. Of these the possession of Action extends to a portion of the
objects of the same ascertained class, while the possession of Attribute
pervades all the objects of the same ascertained class, which the posses
sion of Attribute pervades all the objects of the same ascertained class.
The word ' cha ' brings forward the characteristic of being
combinative cause, which proves Substance-ness.
If it be objected, " There is no proof (of the existence) of the
ultimate atoms themselves. Then the Substance-ness of which is being
proved ?," we reply that by the maxim of the division, etc., of the
action of dense effects, a body which is being divided and sub-divided
becoming smaller, smallest, etc., that than which no smaller unit can be
obtained, the same is the ultimate atom. If the relation of part and whole
wrere unlimited, then it would follow that the mountain Suineru and
a mustard seed, etc., will have the same Measure or Mass, because in
that case they would resemble one another in possessing infinite parts,
and because without the distinction of the number of causes (i. e.,
constituent elements), measure and magnitude, mass and volume, do
not rule the difference of Measure. It cannot be said that this relation
of part and whole continues only up to the limit of destruction for that
which remains at the end having no parts, its destruction is not
possible ; and if it contains parts, then non-finality will be the result,
and its defect has been already pointed out. If it is said, " Truti
(i. e., a minute part) is the limit, because it is visible and there is no
reason for the supposition of something invisible," we re-join that as
it is a visible Substance it must possess extension or largeness and
many Substances.
Hence as in the case of Earth, etc., so also in the case of Air, the
part of the part of a combination of three atoms, is really the ultimate
atom. Thus the ultimate atom of Air is proved. — 12.
Air is eternal.
Upaakdra. — It may be said that because Air possesses Action and Attribute, therefore,
like the water-pot, etc., it should be inferred to be non-oternal. Hence he says :
i R i \ i \\ i)
Adravyatvena, by not residing in or combininig with other
Substances. fr?q?^ Nityatvam, oternality. ¥*E^ Uktam, said.
13. The etemality (of Air) is evident from its not combin
ing with other Substances,— 61,
62 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
" Of Air characterised as ultimate atom " this is the complement
of the aphorism. A Substance is destroyed by the destruction of the
one or the other of its combinative and non-combinative causes. But
the ultimate atom containing no parts, both of these causes do not
belong to it. Therefore there being nothing to destroy it, it is not
liable to destruction. Where the possession of Action and Attribute
is the cause of non-eternality, there the possession of parts is the
condition, upddJii, and this condition pervades the major term which
is determined by the Substanceness of the minor term ; whereas the
condition which is pervasive of the major term as such, is the charac
teristic of being the counter-opposite of prior non-existence. — 13.
Vivriti — Some read the first word of the aphorism as 'adravyadravy-
atvena' (instead of l adravyatvena '), (meaning " by its being a Sub
stance which does not contain any other Substance)."
Air is manifold.
Upatkdra. — In order to prove, in a different manner also, the plurality of Air which
has been already proved in the proof of its origination by the course of dyas etc., h«
says :
H
l: Vflyoh, of Air. su^ix^sf Vayusainmurchchhanam, concur
rence or collision with Air. iri«n?4f3r3F Nanatva-lingam, mark of diversity
or plurality.
14. The collision of Air with Air is the mark of its
plurality. — 62.
' VAyusaiiimurrhchanam ' means the collision, /. e.t a mode of con
junction, of two or more Airs. It is the co-incidence, the falling in
together, of two Airs of equal Impetus, flowing in opposite directions
and producing contrary Actions. And it is inferred from the flying
upwards of grass, cotton, etc., because the flowing upwards and also
the falling in together of two Airs, are beyond the reach of the senses,
whereas the perceptible Action characterised as flying upwards of
grass, etc., which are perceptible, is inferred to be produced either by
the impact or the vibration (i. e., the molar or the molecular movement)
of Substances possessing Touch, and Impetus. Thus the flowing up
wards of Air the nature of which is to flow obliquely, not being capable
of proof or possible without mutual collision, proves the mutual colli
sion, the same being observed in the case of the water and the wave of
the river. Their going upwards also is to be inferred by the going
upwards of grass, etc. For the going upwards of grass, etc., is not
possible without either the collision or the internal vibration of
Substances possessing Touch and Impetus. — 14.
No visible mark of Air.
mar
says
£5
Up&skara. — It has been stated that the mark of Air is not like the mark of the visible
Substances. But how is it so ? Hence he says :
KAN AD A StiTRAS II, 1, 16. 63
Vayu-sannikarse, in contact or association with Air.
Pratyaksabhftvat, from the absence of perception, re Dristam*
visible, fa^ Lingam, mark. ^ Na, not. ft«I^ Vidyate, exists.
15, There being no preception of the association (i. e.,
universal relation) with Air, there is no visible mark (of the exis
tence of Air). — 63.
There the mark is said to be visible where the universal relation is
grasped by perception, as smoke is of fire. But in the case of associa
tion with Air, there is no perception of the appearance of the mark in
accompaniment with Air. For Air itself not being an object of eense-
perception, nobody can have the perception. " Things which give
Touch, quivering, etc., are Air." Therefore the meaning is that no such
mark exists the pervasion of which can be grasped by perception. — 15.
Air is inferred not as such but as a Substance in general.
UpasMra. — How then can there be any infernoo at all of Air ? Henoe to strengthen
what lias been already stated, he says :
II R H I W II
Samanyato-driftat, from the method of inference known
as general inference or inference by analogy, •g Cha, and wf^K: Avi-
desah not in particular, General.
16. And, by inference by analogy, (Air is proved) not a§ a
particular substance, (but as Substance only). — 64.
Inference is three-fold : from cause to effect, from effect to cause, and
from the commonly observed to the unobserved, or from analogy. Thus
this Touch which is being felt, must reside somewhere, because it is a
Touch or because it is an Attribute. From this analogy or common
observation or experience, accompanied by the exclusion of other possi
bilities, its residence in a Substance in addition to the eight Substances,
is proved. This is the meaning.
It cannot be said that the inference from effect to cause is then
gone. For after the exclusion- of other possibilities, where analogy
prevails, there proceeding upon the proved qualification of the minor
term that it does not reside in the eight Substances, the proposition that
this) Touch which does not reside in the eight Substances must reside
somewhere, does not result except 011 the assumption of its being resident
in a Substance in addition to the eight Substances. There'fore the pro
posed object being not explained otherwise, it is proved by inference
from cause to effect alone. But where analogy arises from the appea
rance of exclusion at the very beginning, there the proposed object
results at last and the mode of inference is found to be inference from
effect to cause. It is not sound to hold that inference from effect to
cause only shows the manner, for in the case of being accompanied by
the exclusion of other possibilities, inference from cause to effect itself
comes to show the manner. The rule also that inference merely shows
the manner which determines the pervasiveness, is not valid, for the
appearance of a different manner is possible from the association of
particular materials. — 16.
VIA&2§IKA PHILOSOPHY.
The name Air is derived from Scripture.
nnJv°'r?Ut if Jt- lH init'I1<lc(l to bo 'Sftid that according to '• not aa a particular Sub*.
the last aphorism there is no inference in the form, « This i,s Air," but that Air is
1 by way cf the mark being resident in a Substance in addition to the eight Substance*,
ien what is the evulenco of that Substance being called by the name of Air ? So ho eayfi ;
.
e., the Veda.
) R \ \
herefore intf** Agamikam, proved by revelation,
17. Therefore the name, Air, is proved by the Veda.— 65.
Because there is no inference in the particular form, therefore the
name Air is proved by dyama, i. c., the Veda. This is the meaning.
Air is the moving deity," " One should offer a white goat to Air,"
' And this Air is all colour, the carrier of all smells, and pure/'— from these
and other recommendation, which have acquired the force of regulations,
the name, Air, is obtained. As the name, heaven, is obtained from
the recommendation < That which is not pierced with pain nor is
clouded afterwards ;" the name, barley, from the recommendation,
Ine leaves of all crop-plants fall off in spring. But the barley plants
possessing ears of corn thrive in it as if with joy ;" the name, cane,
from the recommendation, " cane is born in water ;" and the name,
bear, from the recommendation, " cows run after the bear/' Otherwies,
in the case of such instructions as "He who desires heaven should
perform sanfice," etc., in the non-appearance of the particular
happiness for the time being, men desiring heaven will not be inclined
towards the performance of sacrifice, etc. Nor will there be any
arrest of activity according to the usage of the Mlechchhas, i. e. the
impure, in respect of « His becomes a mess of barley." " He kindles
v?f °re**ive tire °n a oane mat'" " Shce of bear-skin," etc., for the
Mlechchhas apply the words barley, bear, and cane, to yellow paddy,
crow, and black-berry (of jackal,) respectively. Thus there will be room
for doubt without those recommendations. Therefore their respective
meanings are known from the Veda only. This is the import. Only
the name is proved by the Veda ; the proof of the Substance, however,
is really by analogy. — 17.
Existence of God.
».UH^?;r*ftTi^gthu8?niril!dihesecti011 °" Air, he establishes that the Veda Is th«
by the All-knower, in order to answer the objection, « Is then the name, Air, also,
e the names dtttha and davtttha (i. c., the gibberish or abracadabra), uttered by a mad
? , and with a view to open the section on Igvara or God, he says,
* I? I te n
T SaAjfla-karmma, name and effect, g Tit, on the other hand.
But. «wf|[tiiei;rf Asmad-visistanam, beings distinguished from, other
than, or superior to ourselves, f^r^ Lingam, mark.
18. But name and effect are the mark (of tho existence) of
beings distinguished from ourselves. — 66.
KANADA StiTHAS IT, 1, 19- 05
The word ' tu ' has the sense of differentiating from such other
marks as Touch, etc. i Smjfia ' i. ., name, ' ; karmma' effect, c. </., Earth,
etc. — -both of tliem aro the mark^ of the existence also of being-;-; dis
tinguished from ourselves, namely, Isvara and great ^ages. — 18.
Etviatoncn of God. — continued.
Ho explains how it i« wo :
: II R I ?l U II
Pratyaksa-pravrittvat because they follow from \ orcop-
tioii, STITI'flSRm:'. Samjna-karnunanali, of name and effect.
19. Because name and effect follow from perception.— 67.
Here also tho singular form or the resolution into one, of • name
and ' effect/ from the copulative compound meaning collection, is
intended to indicate the indentity of the author of the name and the
author of the universe. Thus he only is competent to give the names
'heaven,' opjU'ya ' (i- <\> that which was not before, that is to say,
adrstam*), etc., with whom '• heaven/ i fii>0.i'ca^ etc., are objects of sensu-
peioeption, as in the giving tho names, 'Chaitra.' ' Maitra,' etc., 1«> the
bodies of Chaitra, Maitra, etc., which are perceptible, by their lather
imd others. >Srmlarly, the application of the names, pot.' cloth/
etc., is only midei tho direction of Isvara. The word which has been
directed by tsvara in a particular place, the same is appropriate there ;
c. #., ' all those herbs' which have been touched by the edge of the mon
goose's tooth, counteract the venom of the snake.'' Such direction is the
mark. 1. e., the means of inference, of beings distinguished from our
selves. And tho name, -Alaitra/ etc., which the father gives to the son,
that also is surely directed by Isvara by such rules as vi The father
should give a name (lo the son) on the twelfth d;iy.'J
Thus it is proved that naming is a mark of tho existence of Isvara.
In like manner action, /. u., effect, also is a mark of the existence of
tsvara ; for, thus, Earth, etc., must have a creator, because the} aro
effects like a pot, etc.
, Here Earth, etc., do not m^an a product producible by the body,
nor a product producible by the volition of another product, nor a pro
duct which has become tho subject-matter of dispute as to whether il,
has been produced by an agent or not, nor a product the production of
which by an agent has been the subject of doubt, because Earth, etc.,
also are producible by the volition of another product by means of
adfista (i. e., invisible after-effects of voluntary acts), and because
dispu'te and doubt, being too wide, do not determine the minor term.
.Moreover, if by the expression that they have a creator, it is meant,
that they are the products of an active principle, then production
in question may be explained by reference to ourselves, etc., for tho
causality of ourselves also is productive of Earth, etc., by means of
adrisf-a (the invisible aftcr-olTocts of past acts). It is the same al.,o if
the product be producible by an active principle operating upon given
materials, for the acts or ourselves, etc., also are relative to some given
VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
•in < _r
material. Then if the being effect, on the other hand, means the ben."
the counter-opposite of prior non-existence (or potential existence)!
then it will include annihilation also. I5ut notwithstanding all this
earth must have a creator because it is an effect, Here tlie havin «•• a
creator means the being the product <>f an active principle indepSn-
tlc"ll.v m •'"'•''?/"• !llul heing an effect means the being the CM. unter-
"pposite of existence determined by prior non-existence. In the case
of sprouts, etc., there is no fault of doubtfulness or multifariousness,
For these faults arise where there is doubi as to the existence or non-
existence of the middle term whe-i the non-existence of the major teim
to be ascertained ; for otherwise ail inference will have to be
Nor should it be said that this is the fault beyond tho
t \\ill entail the command of the king : f,,r it is not the
glory or a fault that it does not attack the minor term. Therefore at
itago of sprouting, the proof of the existence of) the major term (in
nior term) by the mark or middle term the universal relation ,,f
ascertained, being unobstructed, wheie is the doubtful*
ness or multifariousness ^ And a fortiori at the stage of non-sprouting,
those faults verily do nut exist. Thus in brief. 10.
Xi^kramauam. egress. SI^H Pravesanam, ingress, ffa III,
'h. UTITflW Akasasya, of Kther fy$ Lingam, mark.
20. Egress and Ingress— such is the mark (of the existence)
of Ether.— 68.
The word - it' signifies manner and brings forward Actions,
,
namely, Throwing upwards, etc., also. Egress and Ingress are tho
movement of Substances possessing Touch. Tha
t is t he mark of tho
not an effect. This
I In u.lmr, n IT mi
ossessng ouc. a s t e mark of tho
existence of Ether, which is not an effect. This is the view of the
feankhy n philosophers — 20.
i ? i ^? n
(as ico
iln.r^ombn,^^ canTT il}8™»> **<>'> ^ »ot at all infer Ether as
••lliLrvvoid 1, 7U80> l'^"»u Action < has but one Substance/
>*™*™\y corporal Substance a, its oombiualivt o
KANADA StJTRAS II, 1, 23. 07
Adion also, it has bean already stated, duos not simultaneously appear
in more than one place, nor Joes it appear in non-corporal Sul-s-
t ances. — 21.
Alini'i' continual.
r'ptxbira.— Lost it mitfht he said that ogress, ingress, etc., will i
iion-romhinat ive cause, so he says :
KAranA:ita^m.-klnptivaidli:n-niyAt. on account
f difference from the characteristic or sign of .another cause. ^
an (1.
22. And also because they differ in property from Un
characteristic of another (i.e., the non-combinative) cause. — 70.
' Anuklripti ' means characteristic or sign, by the etymology 'that
by which a thing is made known/ The meaning is : on account of
difference from that which is the characteristic of another cause, •/. P.,
the non-combinative cause.
Substance does not surely at all become a non-combinative cause.
Now non-combinative causality arises by proximity in the same object
with the cause, or by proximity in the same object with the effect. The
first is illustrated in the case of the colours of the yarns towards the
colour of the cloth. And this non-combinative causality is calletl 'great/
as it. produces a larger effect. The second is as that of the conjunction
of $<m"l and Mind towards knowledge, or cognition, etc. And this
non-combinative causality is called ' small.' as it produces a smaller
effect. But Ether is neither the combinative cause nor, again, the
non-combinative cause of egress, ingress, and other Actions. Hence
Action is not a mark of the existence of Ether. — 22.
}'i,vrltl. _ He says that Action does not infer Ether even as iis
n on -combinative cause.
On the maxim that a verbal affix signifies an object, i annklnpti
(agroament) means ' anuklripta/ 1. <-., that which is agreed to by i he
opposite disputants ; and such a different caused is the non-combina
tive cause, ri".. Attribute and Action. Therefore the meaning is Iliat
oo-ress, etc., do not warrant the inference of Ether as Iheir non-coni-
bTnative cause, because difference from Attribute and Action ( which
are non-combinative causes), in the form of Substance-ness, exists
in Ether.
77/o (tltorr art' v» marl's— continue d.
?>" .-,•/.:<;/•« .—It may be said, " Let Ether he the occasional cause of Action, for the move-
its tit' birds and arrows, etc.. are seen in Elhciv' So In- s-ivs :
H
R
23. Action is not produced on account of Conjunction. -71,
Samyogat, on account of Conjunction. *R!f: AbhAvah,
non-roduction. ^TRflJ: Karmmanah of .Action.
VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
The uou-produotion of Action is due to the obstruction of Impetus
Gravity, etc., which are the causes of Action, by Conjunction with
jorporal substances, and is not due to the non-existence of Ether
which is all-pervasive. Therefore the meaning is that the presence
of or agruemo.it with Sky which should be really explained otherwise
does not prove that Ether is the occasional cause of Action __ 23.
Inference of Etlu-r ly tiounfl.
UpntMyt,— Having thus discredited the Saiikhya view, and going to prove Sound w
the mark of hther lie prepares OH; ground for inference by exhaustion, l.y saying :
^KArana-giimVpflrvvakah, preceded by the Attributes
of the cause, vicqgq: KAryya-gunah, Attribute of the effect. & : Dristali,
is seen or observed.
Tho Attribute of the offoct is soon to ho proccdod by
the Attribute of the cruiso. — 72.
Tho particular Attributes such n.i colour, etc., which exist in the
effect characterised as Earth, etc.. are found to be preceded by like
Attributes in their causes. Sound also is a particular or distinctive
Attribute, for in spite of its being a ' class,' it is, like colour, etc..
apprehended by only one of the external senses. Thus the meaning ia
that such" effect is not observed in which sound preceded by a like
Attribute in the couse thereof may appear. ____ 21.
Sound not an. Attribute of tamjll>l>: tliinya,
Upashira. — It might bo said that Sound is observed in a lute, flute, tobonr, conchsh'-ll
d.sum. etc., which are elleets and that consequently it is precod by a like Attribute in their
"
u * i \ \ ^ n
^^ c^ KAryyantarapradiirbhAvAt, because of the non-
appearance of another or a different effect. ^ ('ha, and. JQS^: $abduh
sound, ^isnflnq; SparflavatAra, of thing possessing Touch. 1T^:, Aguunh,
not attribute.
25. Sound is not an Attribute of things possessing Touch,
because of the non-appearance of (similar) other effects. — 73.
It would have bean so, if, as when Colour, Taste, etc., are observed
in yarns, potsherd, etc., other Colour, Taste, etc., homogeneous with the
former, are also observed in a cloth, pot, etc., so the congener of the
sound which is observed in the constituent parts of a lute, flute, tabour,
etc., were also observed in the wholes made up of those, •/. P., Into,
11 nte, tabour, etc. But this is not the case ; for, in fact, it is seen that
a lute, etc., are originated by constituent parts which are destitute of
all Sound, whereas it is not seen that a cloth, a pot, etc., have their
origin in yarns, potsherds, etc., which are destitute of Colour. More
over if Sound were a particular Attribute of tangible things, then the
relation of high and low and lower tones, etc., would not be observed
KAN AD A StiTPvS IT, 1, 27.
in it. For Colour, etc., which appear in a single composite whole are
not observed to be varying in degree. Therefore Sound is not a dis
tinctive Attribute of tangible tilings.— -25.
Bhasua.— reads II. I. 25 as two aphorisms, t>«., Also because of the
non-appearance of different effects (Kdrya-anto.ra'aprddurbhdvdt
and Sound (is) not an attribute of tangible tilings tfabda* sliartawtfin
rt/0,— the meaning, however, remaining the sai
Xo>' of tfoid, nor of ]\[lii(l.
^a.Wra.-But, it might be ,aicl, S«mn,l will he cither an Attribute of Sou! or an Attri-
f Mind. So ho says :
: n * I
Paratra, elsewhere, with other objects. aTOUI* Samavayat be-
combination. ^^^ I'ratynk.atvAt, because it is an object of
-perception. ^ Oha and ; al8o. -f Na not. *W*\n<\^? f
an Attribute of Soul. ^ \a. not. ^: N[ano-miah, an Atl
Mind.
95 Because it combines with other objects, and
is an~ object of sense-perception, therefore jiound is neither an
Attribute of Soul nor an Attribute of Mind.
If sound were an Attribute of Soul, then there would be such staten
of oonSsuWB as « I am filled (with Air),-; T am sounded/' I give
out Sound " etc., as there are such state as « 1 am happy,
1 ow " - I desire " etc. But it is not the case ; on the contrary, the
exnei-ieuce of a 1 men is that a conch-shell is filled with Air a lute is
Tl.o f-ict that the words iHr.niu and manas have not
The r ft ore oj ^tlier.
n)ff,/,(;/,,,._Ho states why this mothod of exhaustion has been appli-
H
Parisesat, from exhaustion, ft* Lingam, mark.
Akasasva, of Ether.
27/ By the method of exhaustion (Sound) is the mark of
70 V AI&ES1K A PHILOSOPHY.
in tins way that, being an Attribute, Sound, like Colour, etc., must
reside somewhere. And it is an Attribute, because, like Colour,™
^te±lg'So1')!l',> •SS'<'!M>ilMC "' ll.eill« "JM-ehended by only one
external sense. Being non-eternal, it resembles knowledge, etcs both
of which are combined with 'Universal Substances.' And its no
oternalny will he shown later on. The Substance, proved by exhaustSon
•nal,as there ,s no reason for the supposition of constituent parts
s also universal, because Sound is observed in a,l! places 27.
'/^/"-. The idea ,-f Knnfrln is that Time as well ns S.-ac
.
really identical with Kther.
K.i./.'ct;^^
\^^ n 3 | ^ i ^ n
Dravyatva-nityatve, Substance-ness and eternalitv
.-lyiiiui. by Air s^nq^ VyAkhyate, explained.
28. The Substance-ness and eternalitv of Ether have been
explained by (the explanation of the Substance. ness and eter
nality of) Air. —76.
As Air is eternal because it duos not possess any other Siibst-inc
as its combinative cause, so also is Kthor. As Air is a Substance
[^possesses Attributes, so also isEthor. This 'is the
l']l In ]• /N rnir,.
r ,»<,].,>,, •„.—]* i iH.n, ,],,.„ ulu. ].:,h(M. ,„. ftro (horo nian Rlhoi.s ,rii ]i .
n
Ki Tatt.yain,tliat-iiPHS. O e-ness. rniiy.^^ BliAvona, liy exists
Hie unity (of lUhcr is explained) by (the explanation of
the unity oij Existence.-— 77.
The agreemont of tho words in tlio aphon'sn, is with < vyakhyatam '
(or explained ),/.,, the same word as in the last aphorism, with ,|«
inflection changed. Tho meaning- is that as - lU.Aval, ' / a Exis L
is one. so also Kthor is only one and not man v.— 29.
I R I ? I ^o n
«a^%Irr^q^ Sabdaling-Avisesat, because there is !10 difference
Sound which ia the mark- fwftawmi VisefalingAbhivat, beea
there exists no distinguishing mark. ^ CLa, and.
KAN ADA SUTRAS II, 1, :31. 71
30, (Kther is one), because there is no difference in Sound
\vliich is its mark, and because there exists no other distinguishing
mark. ---78.
Tho sense is that i.lio unity of Ether is proved. Fthei being
ubiquitous oi- uui versal, all founds are explained by their having that
one and the same foundation or seat. Therefore to suppose a different
basis will lie shewing ;in exuberance of: imagination. Besides the very
same Sound must be the mark of the different I'.lther which is to be
supposed. ;ind thai, /'. - .. Sound, is tin differentiated ; nor is there any
other mark which can prove the differentia or the difference or
division. It will be stated after-wards (III. ii-20 ) that ;il though the
mark. <-.'/•• knowledge, etc., of Souls is really non-differentiated, still
the plnralitv of Souls is proved l»y other marks, according to
' difference o[ conditions ' or circumstances. — oO.
I'iiTitL- Plurality of Souls is proved by the differences of Lite
products "f the Soul, r/.v.. pleasure and pain, seeing that at one and (lie
same time an ofl'ect in the form of pleasure is produced in one Soul,
while in another Soul an effect in the form of pain is produced. Bui,
in the case of Fther there is no d ifferenciation of Sound which is its
mark, whereby a multiplicity of Ether might be established. Nor is
there any other mark which can establish a plurality of hither. So
that no account of the alisence of proof, and no account of simplicity,
Ether is one and not many.
Individuality of Ether.
I-.H^I-U'H. —It 1'iuv hi' *;u<l. " L'A unity l>y all iuc;ms Vlcm;,' to Klher, LuL. it ,-,1,-u h;m;
xtreme largencBS as it is imiver«al. Let Conjunction aud Disjunction also belong to it as
t is the non-ooinbinativo cause of Sound, JJut how oau individuality belong l«
extr
it
'lad-jniii-bidhaiiMt. because it follows or accompanies
t i y. q«s<Jf V~3 Eka-prithaktvani, separafeness of one
individuality. =4 (Mia, aiid. ffa Iti. finished
31. And individuality uiso belongs to Ether, since indivi
duality follows unity. — 79.
Individual'! v is proved by this that individuality regularly gu'o
together with unity. - 'Hi ' indicates the end of the chapter.
The subject-matter of ihe chapter is the definition or statement,
of the characteristics possessing particular Al tributes and which are
not the objocts of mental perception or perception by the internal
organ. Hence the characteristics of ICarth, "Water, Fire, Air, and
Ether and. in passing, of the divine Soul also, are stated in this
chapter. Thus Earth possesses fourt on Attributes, and these Attribu
tes are Colour. Taste, Smell, Touch. Number. Measure. Separateness,
Conjunction, Disjunction. Priority, Posteriority, Gravity, Fluidity, and
.Impression. Faa-Ml y I lie same number of Attributes, with tho^exception
of vSmell and addition of Viscidity, belong to Y\ ater. These sauio
Attributes, with the exception of Taste, Smell , Viscidity, and Gravity
VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY,
belong to Fire, and with the exception of Smell, Taste, Colour, Gravity,
Viscidity, and Fluidity, belong1 to Air. With tlio addition of Sound,
the five Attributes beginning with Number, belong to Ether. Only
the five Attributes beginning with Xumber belong to Space and Time.
The live Attributes beginning with Number, together with Priority,
Posteriority, and Impetus, belong to Mind. The live Attributes
beginning with Xumber, and Cognition, Desire, and Volition belong to
fsvara. — 31,
Here e ids the iirst chapter of the second book in the Commentary
given by Sankara to the Vaisesika aphorisms of Kanada of great
powers.
Vlci'Ui.—Tlie subject-matter <>f this chapter is the delinition of
Substances possessing particular Attributes which do not appear in
that which possesses - bhavana.' i. e., impression or meditative tinder-
standing. Substances are the live elements and (Jod.
KANiDA SftTRAS II, 2, 1. 73
BOOK SECOND— CHAPTER SECOND.
Smell may be essential or accidental,
Upaskdra.— Now the author dosi res to examine the characteristics, such as Small, etc.,
of the " elements "< bhuta). Therefore, byway of establishing that Small, eto., may be
essential or natural as well as accidental or conditional, he saya :
Puspa-vastrayoh, of a flower and a cloth, tffa Sati,
-existing. Qfotq* Sannikarse, contact. JJUn^WJHfa: Gunantarapra-
•durbhavah, non-appearance from another Attribute. fj& Vastre, in the
cloth. iTOMmfaiF!; Gandhfibhava-lingam, mark of the non-existence of
•Smell.
1. The non-production (of the smell which is perceived in
the cloth), after or during its contact with a flower, from the At-
tribnte (of the constitutive cause of the cloth), is the mark of the
non-existence of smell in the cloth. — 80.
Where Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch are produced from the
corresponding Attributes in the cause, there they become essential and
so acquire the nature of being characteristic marks, and not otherwise.
For, the fragrance which is perceived in the breeze, or the cold which
is perceived in a tablet of stone, or the warmth which is perceived in
water, does not become a characteristic. Therefore he says. 4 Of a
flower arid a cloth.' For the fragrance of the golden ketaki (Pandanus
Odoratissimus), which is perceived in the cloth when the cloth has been*
brought into contact with the golden ketaM flower, does not belong to
the cloth, because it is not produced according to the ( corresponding )
Attribute of the cause ( i. e., yarns ). What, then ? It is accidental or
conditional, because due to the proximity of the golden ketaki ; for the
non-existence of Smell in the ketaki is not the mark of the non-existence
of Smell in the cloth. What is the mark ? So it has been said, " Non-
appearance from another Attribute," i. e.} non-production from the
Attribute of the cause. For, if the Smell, which is perceived in the
cloth, were essential to it, then it would be percieved in the cloth also
before the constituent parts, i. e., the yarns of the cloth, are brought
into contact with the ketaki • but it is not so. This is the meaning .
'Thus the Smell in question is not inherent in the cloth, because, like
•cold and hot Touch, etc., it is a particular Attribute which is not
produced by the Attribute of the constituent parts. — 1.
Vivfiti. — It has been already stated that the possession of Smell,
-etc., are the marks of Earth, etc. But this would not be proper. For
Smell being perceived of Air, etc., combined with fragrant parts, the
mark becomes too wide. For this reason he shows that the perception.
^of Smell, etc., in Air, etc., is accidental.
74 VAI£ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
Smell is essential in Earlh.
UpatkAra. — He Bays that essential Small is tho mark of Earth
Vyavasthitah, established. ?fqcji Prithivyam, in EarLh.
: Gandhah, Smell.
2. Smell is established in Earth. — 31.
• Established in the Earth' — i. c., determined by absence of connec
tion as well as connection with other objects. * The meaning is that
Smell is the mark, because it serves t > differentiate Earth from objects
of similar and dissimilar classes. For Earth has Sme'.l only and only-
Earth has Smell. It is therefore established that Smell which differen
tiates Earth from the eight similars beginning with Water, and th»
five dissimilars beginning with Attribute, is essential to Earth __ 2.
Vivriti. — ' Established/ i. e., ascertains 1 or undoubted, as there i*
nothing to oppose it.
Heat may be essntial or accidental.
Upaiklra.— Extending the mode of establishing Smell IBS an ewswntial Attribute, to-
Hotnesg also, which is the characteristic of Firo, lie says :
^?U Etena, by this. i«UHl UsnatA, Hotness. Warmth,
VyakhyatA, explained.
3. By this hontness is explained. — 82.
This extension or analogy should be understood also in the case-
of coldness, etc., which are the characteristics of Water, etc. — 3.
Heat in essential in Fire.
— He examines tho characteristic of Firo :
II R I R I tf II
: Tejasah of Fire. f«:nM! UsnatA, Hotness.
4. Hotness (is the charateristic) of Fire. — 83.
^The meaning is that natural or essential Hotness is the characte
ristic of Fire. Colour, white and luminous, is also implied. _ 4.
Coldness is essential in Water.
UpatlcAra. — He examines the characterise of Water :
1 ^ !tfTrTrlT II \ \ R { * II
Apsu, in Waters, jftnrni &itata, Coldness.
" Absence of connection as well'as connection with other objects." i. e., Smell is always-
found in essential agretment with Earth and in essential di/erenct from Non-Earth.
KANADA SftTRAS II, 2, 6. 75
5. Coldness (is the characteristic) of Water. — 84.
The meaning is that natural or essential coldness is the character
istic of water ; s> that it is not too wide, by over-extending to a stone-
tablet, sandal-wood, etc. Colour and Taste also are said to be the
characteristics of Water in the same way as coldness which also implies
Viscidity and constitutional Fluidity.
It cannot be asked, " Why is there this breach in the order of the
characteristics according to the enumeration of Earth, etc ? " Because
it is intended to indicate that the Touch of Fire overcomes or over
whelms the Touch of Earth and the Touch of Water, and so the exami
nation of Fire should of course come in between them. Or, the order has
not been observed in order to introduce the examination of Air. Thus it
should be inferred that Touch, which is neither hot nor cold and is not
due to be the action of fire or heat, is essential to Air, and, as such, is
its characteristic This is the import.- — 5.
VLvritl. — The order of enumeration has been abandoned with the
object of indicating that the mark of Air, i. e., the possession of a
heterogeneous Touch, should be investigated in the same way. The
explanation, given by the learned writer of the Upaskara, namely that
the violation of tha order is intended to show that the Touch of Fire
overcomes the Touches of Earth and Water, is not satisfactory. For it
is known to all that in gold as well as in moon-light, etc., the Touches of
Earth and Water overcome the Touch of Fire.
Marks of Time.
Upaskdra. — Thus it has boon stated that particular Attributes suoh as small, etc., of
tangible things, which are preceded by like Attributes in their causes, are the oharaohteris-
tios of Earth, etc., Now he bogini the suction on the characteristics of Time, brought in by
the order of enumeration, by sayii-g :
R R K u
Aparasmin, in respect of that which is posterior,
Aparam, posterior. ^ITT^. Yugapat, simultaneous, f^i Chiram, slow.
f%si Ksipram, quick, ifi Iti, such, ^l^i^^i'l^ Kala-lingani, marks of
Time.
6. 'Posterior' in respect of that which is posterior, 'simul
taneous', 'slow,' 'quick,' _ Such (cognitions) are the marks of
Time.— 85.
The word ' iti ' which shows the nude of cognition, relates to each.
individual word ; so that the meaning is that the cognition ' it is pos
terior' the cognition l it is simultaneous, ' the cognition 'it is slow or
late,' the cognition i it is quick or early,'— are the marks of Time. By
•' posterior in respect of that which is posterior,' we are also to uuder
•stand l prior, in respect of that which is proir.' Therefore the sense is
this : If we make a youth our point of view of starting point, then the
oog.iition of Priority is produced in a:i old man, whosa birth has been
^distanced by a large number of the revolutions of the sun ; and thia
76 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
Priority depends upon some non-combinative cause. Now. Colour, etc.,
cannot be the non-combinative cause, owing to their variable presence.
The three, beginning with Smell, do not produce Priority in respect of
Air. Touch also, rendered different by the difference of hot, etc., is in
•ach case variable in its presence. Nor is a fixed Measure the non-
combinative cause, for it does not originate a heterogeneous object.
Therefore it remains at last that, the revolutions of the sun being
connected with a different substratum, conjunction with a Substance
determined by those revolutions is really the required non -combinative-
cause. And that Substance, being conjoint both with the lump of matter
on earth (e. g., the body of a youth) as well as the sun, must be-
universal. If the characteristic of that Substance be supposed to be-
belonging to Ether, then it would follow that the beating of a drum
at any place will produce Sound in all drums everywhere. Thus
the Conjunction of Time alone, which is conjoint with the sun,
with the lump of matter in question, is the non-combinative cause of
Priority. It is Time which demonstrates the action of the sun, because,
for the purpose of the determination of a different Substance in the case
of the properties of a different Substance, the Soul is dependent upon
an affinity in addition to its own propinquity, otherwise the redness of
a kusumbha flower at Varan asi (Benares) would entail redness in a
crystal at Patna also. But Time being supposed to be of that very
nature, this (i. e., dependence upon another affinity) is no fault here.
If it be asked, why Time also would not transmit colour, we reply, it
ia because Time has been established only as that which always
demonstrates action.
In the same way, the production of Posteriority should be ascer
tained in a youth, with an old man as tl e starting point. ' Simultane
ous' : ' They are born simultaneously,' They exist simultaneously,'
1 They act simultaneously/ — in such cognitions, 'simultaiieously' means
at the same time, during the same movement of the sun, in other words,
at the same time as determined by the movement of the sun. It is not
unconnected movements of the sun, which undergo the qualifications,
e. g., l simultaneously born,' etc. ; nor are these connected by their
own nature. Therefore, these specific cognitions being incapable of a
different proof, the Substance which establishes the specification,.
is Time— 6.
Like Air, Time is a substance, and is eternal.
UpatkAra. — It may be said, " Let Time bo proved. But there is no proof that it is
a Substance, nor that it is eternal." So he says :
II ^ I R I V3 II
Dravyatva-nityatve, substanceness arid eternality.
VAyuna, by Air. «qitqi?T Yyakhyate, explained.
7. The Substance-ness and eternality (of Time) are explained
by (the explanation of the Substance-ness and eternality of)
Air.— 86.
The meaning is that, as the ultimate atom of Air is a Substance,,
KANADA SfrTRAS II, 2,8. 77
1 ecause it possesses Attributes, and is eternal, because it is a Sub
stance which does not contain any other Substance, so also is Time. — 7.
Like Existence, Time is one.
UpaskAra. — " Even then," it may be said, " there may bo a plurality of Times." So h*
nays :
II R i ^ i s 11
Tattvam, unity. «Tl^«f Bhtivena, by Existence.
8. The unity (of Time is explained), by (the explanation of
the unity of) Existence. — 87.
The aphorism has grammatical connection with the word
* vyakhyfite ' in the last aphorism, reduced to the form ' vyakhyatam/
The meaning is : Time, like Existence, is one, because, in spite of
their multiplicity, the marks of Time, viz., the cognition ' it is slow or
late,' etc., are the same in all places, and because no distinguishing-
mark, like those of Souls, exists.
It may be objected, " Time is manifold according to the difference
of moments, two-moments, hours, three-hours, days, days-and-nights^
fortnights, months, seasons, half-years, years, etc. How then can it be
one '?" We reply that ii is not so, because the appearance of difference
is due to upddhi or an external condition. For, it is found, that as the
self-same crystal appears to be different according to the reflection
thrown upon it by the external condition or upddhi of a China rose,
tdpinja (Xanthochymus Pictorius), etc., so also does the one
and indivisible Time appear to be different according to the limit set
by the movement of the Sun, etc., as well as according to the limit
imposed by their respective effects. Thus moment (ksana) is the-
external condition of Time, which does not pervade or cover another
external condition of Time, or it is Time which is not the receptacle of
the counter-opposite of the prior as well as posterior non-existence of
what is placed or contained in it ; and this should be understood from.
the production of something and the destruction of something at every
moment. It is proved by the Veda that a i lava/ is an aggregate of
two moments, and so on.
" Yet," it may be objected," " Time must be at least three-fold,
according to the difference of the past, the future, and the present ; for
it is heard, ' The three times return,' < The three Times are not accom
plished or proved,' etc." We reply, it is not, for the use of three-fold
Time is due to the limits of (the existence of) a thing, its prior non-exis
tence, and its total destruction. The Time which is determined or deli
mited by a thing, is its present ; the Time which is delimited by they
prior non-existonce of a thing, is its future ; and the Time which ia
delimited by the total destruction of a thing, is its past. Thus the use
of the threefoldness of Time depends upon thethreefoldness of tho deter
minant or that which delimits. — 8.
Time, a cause of non-eternal Substances.
a.—'H.fire he says that Time is the oaue* of all that is produced.
VAT£ES..:A PHILOSOPHY.
n * R mi
Nityogu, in eternal Substances. SHT^ Abhavat, because it does
not exist. *f<?4!J Anityesu, in non-eternal Substances, u sr q; Bhfivat
Because it exists. «cir$ Orane, in tho cause. *i«il*<n KalnkhyA, the
name of Timo. ffa Iti, he:ice.
9. The name Time is applicable to a cause, inasmuch as it
does not exist in eternal substances and exists in non-eternal
substances.— 88.
The word ' iti ' is used in the sense of ' be.-auso.' For this roaso-i
the name Tim9 is applicable to < cause,' i. e., tho cause of all that i*
produced. He states the reason :— " Because it does not exist i-i eter
nals, aid because it exists in non-eternals." The meaning is this :
cause in tho case of the eternals such as Ether, etc., there do not
arise the cognition, " produced simultaneously," « produced slowly or
ate/' "produced quickly or early," "produced now," "produced during
the day, ' *• produced at night," etc., whereas cognitions of simultaneity
etc., do arise in the case of tho non-eternals such as the pot, cloth etc
therefore, by the methods of agreement as well as difference, Time is
proved to be a cause. It is to be understood that Timo is tho occasional
or efficient cause of all that is produced, not only in virtue of the cogni
tions of simultaneity, etc., but also in virtue of the application of the
terms, hibernal, vernal, pluvial, etc., to flowers, fruits, etc.— 9.
i.—In fact, scriptural texts such as " All is produced from
Time," etc., are proof that Time is the cause of every thing that is
an effect.
Mark of /Space.
Upaskdra.— Having finished the section on the mark of Time, ami goin,- to ba 'in the
-aeotion on the mark of Spaoo, he says :
f <T
HO ||
in: Itah, from this, j^ Idam, this, ifr Iti, such. q<: Yatali, whence
If q; Tat, that. ft*q" Disyam, relating to Space. ftf^flC Lifigam, mark.
10, That which gives rise to such (cognition and usage) as
"This (is remote, etc.) from this," — (the same is) the mark of
Space. — 89.
1 Disyam' — that which belongs to Space, i. e., is the mark of the in
ference of Space. The meaning is this : ' Space ' is that substance
4 from which/ in respect of two simulaneously existing bodies which are
also fixed in (direction) and place, ' such ' ..cognition and usage arise
that ' this/ i- e., the ground or substratum of the conjunctions of a com-
partively large number of conjoint things, is prior ' to/ (other than or
distinct from) this i. e., the substratum of the conjunctions of a com
paratively small number of conjoint -things, and also that ' this/ i.e.,
the substratum of the comparative smallness in number of the conjunc
tions of the conjoint, is 'posterior ' to ' this'/ iS-to, the substratum of the
KANADA StiTRAS II, 2, 10. 70
comparative largeness in number of the conjunctions of the conjoint^
For, without the existence of such a substance, there is no other means-
of establishing a comparatively large or small number of the conjunc
tions of the conjoint in the two bodies ; nor, without such establishment,,
can there be any particular or concrete understanding about them res
pectively ; nor, without such understanding, can Priority and Posteri
ority arise ; nor, without their appearance, can. there be concrete
cognition and usage about them.
It cannot be said, " Let Time be the means also of establishing the
conjunctions. What is the use of another Substance?" For Time is
proved only as the means of establishing constant or unchaiigeable
actions. If, on the contrary, it is supposed to be the means of establish
ing the inconstant or changing property of Remoteness, then it would
establish the colouring of the paste of the saffron of Kasmira (Cashmere)
on the breasts of the women of Karnata (the Carnatic). The same will
be the implication if Ether and Soul also are similarly made to be the
means of communicating the prcperty of Remoteness. Whereas Space
being proved only as the invariable means of communicating the pro
perty ( f Remoteness, there is no such absurd implication. In this way
Space, which establishes conjunctions, is really separate from Time,,
which establishes actions.
Moreover, these cognitions, namely " This is east of that/' " This-
is south of that," " This is west of that," " This is north of that/'
" This is soufh-east of that/' This is south-west of that/' " This is north
west of that," " This is north-east of that," " This is below that/' "This,
is above that," — are brought together by the statement " This from
this," because it is not possible for these cognitions to have another
occasional or efficient cause. Further, Time establishes external con-
ditiors or upddhis which are constant, while Space establishes external
conditions or upddhis which are not constant. For, when one thing
is ' present ' (in Time) with reference to another thing, that other
thing also is l present ' with reference to the former : but in the case
of the external condition OP upddhi of Space, there is no such rule or
fixity, because that which is east in relation to a person, the very
name sometime becomes west in relation to the same person. The same
is to be observed with regard to north, ete., also. The direction or
quarter which is nearer to the mountain whereon the sun rises, with
reference to another direction, is east in relation to the latter ; the
direction which is nearer to the mountain whereon the sun
sets, with reference to another direction, is west in relation to th»
latter. Nearness, again, is the fewness of the conjunctions of the
conjoint ; and these conjunctions with the sun, whether they be a few
or many, are to be established by Space. In like manner, the direc
tion, which is determined by the portion of Space falling on the left
of a person facing towards east, is north ; the direction determined by
the right division of such a person, is south ; while Tightness and left-
ness are particular < classes ' residing in the constituent parts of the
body. The direction, which is the support of the conjunction which is
produced by an act of which Weight is the nou-combinative cause, is
below ; and the direction, which is the support of the con junction which
ia produced by the conjunction of Soul possessing adrigtam (invisblfr
VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
consequences of conduct) or by the action of fire, is above. In this
way, from their reference as east, etc., they are also otherwise referred
to, as m the statement, " Directions are ten in number, as marked out
by their being presided over by Indra, Agni, Yama, Nirrita, Varuna
Vayu, boma, iSina, Naga, and Brahma." _ 10.
Like Air, Space is a Substance, and is eternal.
1 also eternality b3long to Sijac° in thc
n R i ?? n
Dravyatva-nityatve, Substance-ness and eternality.
Vayuna, by Air. sq^gi^f Vyakhayute, explained.
11. The substanceness and eternality (of Space are) explained
by (the explanation of the Substance-ness and eternality of)
Air.— 90.
The meaning is that it possesses Substance-ness, because it posses
ses Attributes, and eternality, because it is independent of or non
resident in any other substance. — 11.
Like Existence, Space is one.
Upaskdra. — Extending or attributing unity (to Space), he says :
n ^ \ \ i n n
Tattvam, unity. *Tl«fr Bhavena, by Existence.
12. The unity (of space is explained) by (the explanation of
the unity of) Existence. — 91.
Unity is proved in Space, as in Existence, by the absence of differ
ence in the marks of Space together with the non-existence of any
•differentiating mark. Separateness. of one, i. e., individuality, also
belongs to Space, because individuality constantly follows unity. — 12.
Bhdsya. — According to Kandda, it appears, there is but one Subs
tance, variously called as Ether, Time, and Space. For, he has take:i
much pain to establish the difference of Ether from tangible things,
Self, and Mind, but he has made no attempt to prove the difference of
Ether from Time and Space as well. Nor has he attempted to prove the
difference of Time and Space themselves from any other Substance. It
may be, therefore, considered that with the difference of Ether, the
difference of Time and Space also has been established. But it may be
asked, if there be one Substance only, how does it come to be variously
called as Ether, Time, and Space ? He replies that this is due to the
variety of effects produced by it (II ii. 13) and also to the variety ol
external conditions attending it (II, ii, 14, 15, and 16.)
Above continued.
Upasklra.—It may be asked, " If Space is only one, how then can there b3 its cognition
use as ten quartern or directions ?, So ho sayj :— •
KANiDA StTTRAS II, 1, 15. 81
II
Kuryya-visosena, owing to difference or distinction of
effects, 'Tilled Nanatvain, multiplicity or diversity.
13. The diversity (of Space) is due to the difference of
effect— 92.
The meaning is that the attribution of multiplicity is due to the
divergence of effects. — 13.
Directions explained.
Vpaskdra. — Showing the aforesaid divergence of effects, he says : .
Aditya-sa£ayogut, from the conjunction of th.3 sun.
^ Bhuta-purvvat, past and gone, vffsfsqff: Bhayisyatah, future.
Bhutfit, what has taken place or come into existence ; present. ^
Cha, and. Ri^ft, Prachi, east (lit. Orient).
14. (The direction comes to be regarded as) the east, from
the past, future, or present conjunction of the sun — 93.
The east (prfichi) is so called, because the sun first (prak) moves
(anchati) there. Thus that direction is called the east, wherein the first
conjunction of the sun took place, or will take place, or is taking place
in the course of its circulation round Mount Meru.
Here the reference to the three times rests upon the difference, of
the conceptions of the present (i. e., the observer). For with some one
on the morning of the previous day, the conjunction of the sun first
took place in this direction ; therefore it is the east ; so the use of the
word, east. With some other, the next day, the conjunction of the sun
will first take place in this direction ; so, in view of this, the use of the
word, east. With some other, again, at this moment, the conjunction
of the sun is taking place in this direction ; so, in view of this, the use
of the wcrd, east. In the word, l bhutat,' the affix, l kta/ is used in the
sense of incipient action. Therefore, no fixed point being invariably
necessary, the repetition of the use of the word, east, is proved also in
those cases, even where tbere is no conjunction of the sun, as at night,
or at mid-day, etc. This is the import. — 14.
Above continued.
Upaskdra.— Extending the same method to the use of the other directions also;
he says :
?T»-11 Tatha, similarly. ^f%UTl Daksina, south. R?fH), Pratichi, west.
Udichi, north. ^ Cha, also.
15. South, West, and North also are similarly (dis-tin-
guished).— 94.
82 VA1§ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
In the very same way, the use of the term, South, arises from the
past, or future, or present conjunction of the sun with the mountain
situated in the south direction. The use of the \Yest and North also
is to be similarly understood. Kightness and leftness (have their
technical or recognised meanings, or) have been explained above. — 15.
Aliovr continued.
Vpask'tra. — Extending the very same method to the intervals of direction also,
he lays :
Etena, by this. f;Ji?f'l?nf*, Digantaralani, intervals of Space or
Direction. *tff??Jl?Tlfr, N^yakhyatani, explained.
16. By this, the intervals of direction are explained.— 95.
The use of South-East arises from the intermixture of the mark
of the East and. the South direction. Suuth-West, West-North, and
North-East are to be similarly understood.
It has been explained at length in Kantida-Raliasyam (lit-, the
secret of Kauada) that Space or Direction is that universal Substance
by which the above conjunctions of the sun are established. — 16.
Cause* of .Doubt or Disbelief.
UpatMra. — It has been already established that the characteristics, e. g. Colour, etc.,
of the four ' elements ' are essential, if they are preceded by like Attributes in their causes,
and if not, then they are conditional or accidental. The marks of the ' universal substances*'
which are devoid of any distinctive Attribute, have also been stated. Now, the mark of
Ether, »'. e.y Sound, should bo examined. And hero wo meet with the contradictory conclu
sions of the Tantrikas. Some say that Sound is a Substance, and some call it an Attribute.
Even when they call it an Attribute, it is eternal according to soive, while according to others
it is non-eternal. Others, again, distinguish even in Sound another Sound, which they call
by the name, ">9?>&ota." Accordingly, to begin the examination of Sound, he first of all
establishes Doubt itself, which is the first element or momb«r of an examination, by its
characteristic and cause, and says :
IR R I
Samanya-pratyaksat, from the perception of the Genus
or g* 3ral property. fejfaltWsncT Visesapratyaksat, from the non-precep-
tion of the Species or special property or differentia, fsra^pj^:, ViSesa-
smriteh, from the recollection of particulars, i. e,., alternatives. "9, Cha,
and. ^1: Samsayah, doubt.
17. Doubt arises from the perception of (the object contain
ing) the general property, the non-perception of the differentia, and
the recollection of the alternatives, all at once or in one act of
thought. — 96.
' Samanyapratyaksat ' means from the perception, i. e., apprehen
sion, of the object which possesses the general property, the affix
* matup,' signifying possession, having been elided. 'Visesapratyaksat'
means from the non-perception or non-apprehension of the property
which is the means of mutual differentiation, e. g., crooked, hollow, etc.,
KANADA SUTRAS II, 1, 17. 83
and also head, hand, etc. ' Visesasmriteh ' means from tlie recollec
tion of the particulars, i. t>,., the alternatives characterised as a trunk
and as a person. Recollection also includes apprehension by sense,
because, in some instances, bodies which are being perceived also
become the alternatives. The word l cha ' brings together adfiatam
(invisible consequences of voluntary conduct) etc., which are also the
causes of Doubt.
It has not been said that an individual or particular property is the
source of uncertain knowledge. Nor has it been said that a particular or
special property, being the means of discrimination, is such a cause,
and that this differenciation from similar and dissimilar objects is
really the common property. Contradiction, again, consists of two
propositions arising from two opposite conclusions ; one being ' Sound
is eternal/ and the other being 'Sound is non-eternal.' Both of them as
well as both the forms of knowledge produced by them, do not together
become the source of Doubt, since they do not exist simultaneously.
Hence it has not been separately stated that there the cause of Doubt
is either the non-common property, such as Soundness, or the
common property, such as the being existent, the being the subject of
proof, etc.
Uncertain knowledge finds no place in the kindred system of
Gautama (i. e., Nyaya Philosophy), and so a non-common property
has been mentioned there as a cause of Doubt. Contradiction, i. e.,
two opposite propositions, containing as a rule a positive and a
negative statement, has been'mentioned as a cause of Doubt. In the
commentary on Nyaya, Doubt has been described as five-fold, accord
ing ay the fact that something is being perceived, or the fact that
something is not being perceived, is the cause of Doubt. Thua
Doubts may arise whether what is being perceived be existent,
whether what is being perceived be non-existent, whether this
thing which is being perceived be existent or non-existent, whether
what is not being perceived be existent, such as a radish, a latch,
etc., and whether what is not being perceived be non-existent, at
a lotus in the air. But all these are really of the same kind, being
explained in the very same way by the expression ' from the perception
of the common property.' Again, the three-foldness of Doubt, according
to differences in its cause, as taught in the Nyaya-Yarttika, is also not
possible, as tbe three, viz., common property, etc., themselves cannot be
causes on. account of their variability. For heterogeneity should not
be supposed here, like heterogeneity in fire produced from grass ; a
strike-stick (arani) (i. e., where fire is kindled by striking two sticks
against each other), and a gem, because ex hypothesi the causality
consists of the common property of producing an effect defined by the
characteristic of Doubt. The heterogeneity which is said to appear in
the form of referring primarily to the positive alternative, or primarily
to the negative alternative, etc., does not serve the purpose of a diffe
rentia, as it is not sufficiently extensive, or wide.
Thus Doubt is neither three-fold nor five-fold, but is of one kind
only. The writer of the aphorisms, however, will himself explain its
two-foldness in another respect.
'Universal Substances ' arc Ether, fcjpaue, Time, and Soul.
VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
It may be objected, ' Doubt is knowledge which produces the desire
to know.' — This is not the definition, as it overlaps uncertainty. Doubt
is knowledge which does not produce impression (samskara).' — This too
is common to unmodified or undiliereritiated knowled'ge or state of cons
ciousness ; for, if it is a concrete knowledge, then Doubt also produces
an impression. Again though it is a 'class/ yet the quality of Doubt is
not a characteristic, for as the quality of Doubt does not reside in the
object containing the property (the perception of which is the occasion
of the Doubtj, the 'class' also does not appear there, since it is not found
that a, ' class ' appears elsewhere than in what it classifies." To this our
reply is that from the definition of Doubt it follows that Doubt is know
ledge of diverse and contradictory forms in respect of one and the same
object — 17.
Cause* of Doubt or Disbelief— continued.
Upashira.— Doubt is two-fold : that which relates to external objects, and that which
relates to internal objects. And that which relates to external objects, is also tow fold :
where the object is visible, and where the object is not visible. Of these, Doubt, in which
the object is visible, may be illustrated as the uncertainty whether it be a post or a person,
which arises on seeing some object distinguished by height ; and Doubt, in which the object
is not visible, is such as when on seeing the horns only in the body of a cow or a gayal (Bos
gavseus), etc., which is concealed by the intervention of a bush, etc., the uncertainty arises,
"whether it bo a cow or a gayal." In fact, in the latter case also the Doubt really relates
to the property of the horn, i. e., whether the horns are the horns of a cow or of a gayal. The
statement of the two-foldness of Doubt is however, a figure of .speech. Now, the (ieiius (». e.,
Common property) which is the source of Doubt, raises Doubt by being observed either in
more than one object or one object. He explains the first kind : f-
fg Dristam, that which is seen. <g Cha, and sg^ drista-vat, Like
that which was seen.
18. And that which is seen, resembles that which was seen —
(this also is the source of Doubt.) — 97.
Height, which is seen, is the source of Doubt. ' Dristavat ' is formed
by ' yati/ i. e., the affix of similarity. Thus, something similar to the
previously seen post and person, lies before. The meaning is that the
height, which is observed in what lies before, is a source of Doubt, be
cause it has been previously observed (in more than one object).— 18.
Causes of Doubt or Disbelief. — continued.
Vpaskdra, — Ho illustrates the observed common property which relates to one object : '
Yathu-dristam, that which has been seen in a certain form
t A-yatha-dristatvat, because it is not seen in that form, g
Cha, and.
19. (Doubt also arises), where that which has been seen in
one form, is seen in a different form. — 98.
" The source of Doubt"— this completes the aphorism. The word
1 cha ' understands what has been said before. The meaning is that
KAN AD A StiTRAS II, 1, 20. 85
because an object is seen in a different form, therefore that which was
seen in a certain form, also gives rise to Doubt, as Chaitra who was seen
in a certain form, *'. e., with hair on his head, is at another time seen not
in that form, i. e., with the hair removed. Then afterwards when the
very same Chaitra is seen with his head covered with a piece of cloth,
Doubt arises whether this Chaitra has hair or not. Here the identity
of Chaitra is the common property which gives rise to Doubt, and it is
seen in one object only. Therefore what is here the source of Doubt is
seen in one, undifferentiated object. — 19.
Above continued.
Upaskdra. — He says that the very common property of being (cognised or) the object of
thought is the cause of Doubt :
n
Vidyu-a-vidyata, from science and uescienc. «g Cha,
and. ?j<m: Sarksayali, Doubt.
20. Doubt (arises) also from science and nescience. — 99.
Internal Doubt really springs from science and nescience. For
instance, an astronomer predicts correctly, and predicts incorrectly
eclipses of the moon, etc. Accordingly Doubt arises in his mind as to
his knowledge, whether it be accurate or not. Or knowledge is some-
- times science, and sometimes nescience, f. e., wanting in proof ; and
consequently, Doubt arises with respect to something, whether, ivas-
tnuch as it is known, it be existent or non-existent.
The retention of the word, 'Doubt,' in the aphorism, indicates that
here, too, Doubt arises only from the perception of the common property,
and not from any other source. Thus the opinion held by some that
he uncertainty or inconstancy of cognition and non-cognition alluded
to in the definition of Gautama, "Doubt is deliberation in expectation
of a differentia, due to the proof of the common properties as well as
of the properties of similar and dissimilar objects, the non-proof of,
or uncertainty as to, these properties, and also the uncertainty or in
constancy of cognition and non-cognition, " (Nyaya-Sutras I. I. 22), is
a different source of Doubt, is hereby refuted. — 20.
Vivfiti. — Here the affix 'tasi' in 'vidya-avidyatas' is used in the
genitive sense. Therefore the expression means "of true knowledge and
false knowledge." And the doubt is whether it be true knowledge or
false knowledge. From the word 'cha/ 'and,' it follows that Doubt
as regards the object of knowledge also arises from the perception of
the common property. Thus, 'The mountain contains fire/ 'The lake con
tains fire/ in these and other causes of true or false knowledge, the
Doubt, whether such knowledge be true or false, arises from the know
ledge of the common property of their both being knowledge. In like
manner, after such Doubt, Doubt also arises whether the mountain con
tains fire or not, whether the lake contains fire or. not, etc., from the
knowledge of the common property of their being objects of knowledge.
Now, .a contrary certainly, the proof of which has not been obtained, is
opposed to Doubt, and the Doubt whether it be true knowledge or false
86 VA1SESIKA PHILOSOPHY
knowledge operates to dispel such contrary certainty. And not that
such Doubt of itself gives rise to Doubt about the object of knowledge.
Sound — wliat ?
Upajkdra. — Having thus elucidated the nature and characteristic of Doubt v.-hioh is the
first member of an examination, he now explains the object Sound which is the subject matter
of examination, and says :
*fts*f: *T J?JS3[: II R I R I R? II
: Srotra-grahanah, of which ear is the organ of apprehension.
Ij: Yah, which, ?J«J: Arthah, object, tf: Sah, that. qs»: Sabdah, sound.
21. Sound is that object of which the organ of apprehen
sion is the Ear. — 100.
'Srotragrahanah' means that of which ear is the organ or instru
ment of apprehension. 'Arthah' means that which contains properties.
So that the definition has not the defect of over-extending to Sound
ness, loudr.ess, etc., Attribute-ness, Existence, and other properties
residing in Sound and capable of being perceived by the ear. By the
word 'arthah' meaning that which contains properties, the possession of
a class property is intended ; hereby it is indicated that Sound called
'/Sphota' (i. e., by which the words of a sentence can convey a complete
sense), inherent in Sound, does not exist.
It may be argued as follows ; Sphota must be postulated on the
Strength of the intuitions, 'ore word/ 'one sentence.' for the intuition,
of unity does not arise in a word composed of several letters, nor in a
sentence composed of several letters. And the word spliota forms a
name or nominal on which the elucidation of the sense depends. The
letters individually do not at all produce the intuition of the meaning
of the whole sentence; their combination again is impossible, because
they speedily disappear, being uttered by one speaker ; therefore the
intuition of the sense of the whole arises from sphota only, because
elucidation of the sense does not take place without the knowledge of
it. And this sphota,, although it is present in one and all the letters
standing as words, yet becomes manifest in the last letter. " We reply
that it is not so. Conventional letters form words. Thus the sense
being intuited from the word in virtue of convention alone, what is the
use of sphota? The use of the expression 'one word' is a pretence, inten
ded to denote the one property of making up one sense, possessed by a
large number of letters. So also in the case of a sentence. If some
inner meaning of the word, beyond that of its component letters, could
be apprehended by perception, then the same might have been admitted
to be sphota. Therefore the author of the aphorisms has overlooked this
doctrine of sphota as being of no consideration — 21.
Causes of Doubt with respect to Sound.
Upaskura. — Sound having thus appeared as an object which,contains properties, its being
the mark or Ether depends so-lely on its being an Attribute. Therefore to establish its Attri
bute-ness, he brings out the trilateral Doubt, and says :
RR I « II
KANADA SUTRAS II. 2. 23. ' 87
Tulya-jatiyesu, in homogeneous tilings. 3p4!?fTJ ^f Arthan-
t&rabhiites'ii, in heterogeneous things ff^R^ ViSosasya, of the par
ticular, i. e., the difference, or differentia. 3^-11 Ubhayathu, in both.
CEW^ Dristatv&t, the being observed ; because it is observed.
22. (Doubt arises in respect of Sound), because its dif
ference is observed both in (from) homogeneous objects and in
(from) heterogeneous objects. — 101.
" Doubt arises in respect of sound/' — is the complement of the
aphorism. Sound-ness and perceptibility by the ear are observed in
Sound. And this gives rise to Doubt whether Sound be an Attribute,
or a Substance, or an Action, because ihe ' partcular/ i. e., difference
or divergence is observed both in homogeneoiis objects, namely the
twenty-three Attributes, and in heterogeneous objects, namely Subs
tances, and Actions. But Doubt, whether it be a Genus, or a Species,
or a Combination, does not arise, inasmuch as difference in point of
being existent, being produced by a cause, etc., is observed.
It may be said, " A non-common property cannot be the cause of
Doubt by being the cause of indecision or uncertainty. And Sound
ness as well as perceptibility by the ear is really a non-commou pro
perty." We say : Truly its difference or divergence is common to homo
geneous and hetrogeneous things, and so only this common difference
or divergence has been stated to be the cause of Doubt. Difference or
divergence, which is the counter-opposite of Sound-ness, is tho common
property ; and the characteristic of being the counter-opposite of the
difference or divergence belonging to both, in other words, Sound-ness,
is the non-common property. Therefore it has been said : " From the
observation of the difference in both.'' Here the observation of parti
cular, i. e.j the difference, in both, i. e., in homogeneous and heterogene
ous things, constituting tho cause of Doubt, it becomes really the
common property. — 22.
Sound not a Substance.
Vpaskdra. — -Showing Doubt in this way, he says, in order to eliminate the alternative
of Substanoe-ness :
H
Eka-dravyatvat, because it resides in one Substance. *T
Na, not. 3*tf Dravyam, Substance.
23. (Sound) is not a Substance, since it resides in one Subs
tance only. — 102.
'Ekadravyam J'is that which has one Substance ouly as its combi
native cause. And no Substance whatever contains a single Substace
as its combinative cause. Therefore, owing to this difference in property
from Substances, this Sound is not a Substance. This is the meaning.
—23.
88 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
Nor an Action.
Upaskdrct.—T.t may be said, !: Action is surely uni-.sub^tantial. Therefore Sound may
be an Action," So he says :
* i R i w u
f Na, not. nf( A pi, also ^r«T Karmma, action, sl^f^JTOiq; Acluiksu-
satvut, not being visible*.
24. Nor (is Sound) an Action, because it is not an object of
visual perception. — 103.
Because the intuition of perception of Sou, id is not visual, i. ^., is
produced by an external so.iso-organ other than the eye. So that the
import is that, like the quality of Taste, etc., Sound-ness also does not
reside in Actions, because it is a l class ' wbich does not reside in the
objects of visual perception. — 24.
Round iy tranxittn!, and not eternal.
"Upasltdra. — If it is said that, as it speedily disappears, liko Turowing upwards, etc ,
therefc.ro Sound is an Action ; so ho sayo :
Gunasya, of Attribute. ^T^: Satah, being. 3JTW i': Aj)avargah,
speedy destruction, frwffa; Karmmabhih, with Actions. tfN^q Sadharm-
myara, resemblance.
25. The resemblance (of Sound), although it is an Attribute,
with Actions, consists in its speedy destruction. — 104.
' Apavargah ' means speedy destruction. And this, eveu in the case
of Attribute-ness, is dependent upon the incidence of a rapidly appearing
destroyer, in the same way as duality, etc., are. This constitutes only
its resemblance to Actions, and not its Action-ness. The quality of
undergoing rapid destruction which you (i. e., the objector) advance as
as an argument, is not one-pointed i. e., multifarious, because it is found
in Duality, Knowledge, Pleasure, Pain, etc., as well. This is the
import. — 25.
Above continued.
Upaskdra. — It may bo said, " Lst Sound be proved as an Attribute. Still it cannot be
the mark of the existence of Ether. For it would justify the inference of Ether, if it were
an effect of it. But it is eternal instead Its occasional non-cognition, however, is duo to
the absence of something which could reveal it." With this apprehension, he says :
n * i R
fl-fl : Satah, of (Sound as) existent. fir^PTWi; Lingabhavat, from the
absence of mark.
26. (Sound does not exist before utterance), because there is
no mark of (Sound as) evistent (before utterance), — 105,
KANADA SftTRAS II, 2, 29. 8fr
For, if Sound were existent (before and after utterance), then there
would be found some ' mark,' i. e., additional proof, of it as existent.
But in the state of non-hearing, there is no proof that Sound exists.
Therefore it is only an effect, and not something which requires to-
be revealed only. — 26-
Above continued.
Upaskdra. — He says that for this reason also, it (Sound) Is not something which only
requires to be made known :
Nitya-vaiadharmmyat, owing to difference in property
from what is eternal.
27. (Sound is not something which only requires to be
brought to light), because it differs in property from what is
eternal. — 106.
The difference of Sound from what is eternal, is observed. Where
as, as in " Chaitra speaks/' the existence of Chaitra, Maitra, etc., even
though they are covered from view, may be inferred from their voice ;.
and whereas that which reveals, e. g., the lap, etc., is never inferred
by that which is revealed, e. y.. the water-pot, etc. ; therefore Sound
is only a product, and not something which requires to be brought to
light. This is the sense.- — 27-
Above continued.
Upaskdra — Pointing out, the objections to |itB being something to be revealed only he
now states the ground of its being non-eternal :
: II R I R I
vf^3l: Anityah, non-eternal. ^ Cha, and. ?nq Ayaru, it. qswiTft: Kara-
natah, from its having a cause.
28. And Sound is non-eternal, (because it is observed to be
produced) by a cause. — 107.
" Because its production is observed," — this is the complement.
For Sound is observed as issuing out of the (temporary) conjunction
of the drum and the drum-stick, etc. So that it is non-eternal, because
it has a production (or beginning). Or " From a cause " may imply
the reason that it has a cause. — 28.
Above continued.
Upaskdra. — Lest it might be said that the possession of a cause is disproved in Sound by
its very nature, BO he says :
IM i * i *& u
n Na, not. ^ Cha, and. ?jfe^ Asiddham, disproved. fcnVTTOl Yikarat
from change.
VAI£ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
29. Nor is (the dependence of Sound upon a cause) dis
proved by its modifications. — 108.
From observing the loudtiess, softness, and other modifications, it
should not be concluded that the possession of a cause by Sound is
thereby disproved. For a loud or soft sound is perceived according
to the hardness or softness of the beating of the drum with'the drum
stick, and the like ; whereas the loudness, etc., (». e., the intensity)
of that which is made known, is not dependent on the loudness, etc.,
(t. e., the intensity) of that which makes it known. Hence from its
undergoing modification according to the modification of the
cause, it is inferred to be a product, and not something to be revealed
only— 29.
Above -continued.
Upaikdra. — It may bo argued, " It is the virtue of that which reveals, that it reveals
in the form of intensity, softness, eto. And it is Air impelled by the drum and the drum
stick, etc., which, being intense and soft or slow (in velocity and volume), produces lik«
perceptions," Hence he says :
n * i * v> u
Abhivyaktau, in (the theory of the) manifestation or revela
tion (of Sound). iVn^ Dosat, from defect. Because there will be a defect.
30. (Sound is not eternal), because the theory that it requires
to be revealed only, will entail a defect. — 109.
On the theory of the revelation of Sound, the defect will arise that
(in each case) an invariable relation of the revealer and the revealed
will have to be admitted in respect of things co-existent and caj able
of being perceived by the same sense. But the invariable relation-ship
of the revealer and the revealed is nowhere observed of such things.
If it be not assumed here, then it will follow that on the manifestation
of one letter, say ka, all the letters will become manifest. The rejoinder
that an invariable relation of the revealer and the revealed is in fact
observed to obtain among the characteristic of being existent, the
characteristic of being a man, and the characteristic of being a Brah-
mana, which are also co-extensive and are revealed by their individual
difference, situation, and origin, is invalid. For they lack in beii g
co-extensive, inasmuch as the extension of the characteristic of being
a man, or of the characteristic of being a Brahmana, is not so large as
that of the characteristic of being existent. — 30.
Above continued (Production of Sound.)
Upasfcdra. — He says that for the following reason also Sound is not something which
requires to be revealed only :
n R i ^ i \\ n
amyogat, from Conjunction. ft<rt?mf Vibhagat, from Dis
junction. «j Cha, and. <I5$1^ 6abdat, from Sound. ^ Cha, and.
frT: Sabda-nigpattih, production of St und.
KANlDA SUTRAS II, 2, 33. 91
31. Sound is produced from Conjunction, from Disjunction,
and from Sound also. — 110.
' From Conjunction' — i. e., from Conjunction of the drum and the
drum-stick. ' From Disjunctio.,' — i. e., when a bamboo is being split up.
Here Conjunction is by no means the cause of the fiist Sound, because
there is then no Conjunction. Therefore the Disjunction of the two
halves of the bamboo is the efficient or conditional cause, and the Dis
junction of the halves and Ether is the non-combii,ative cause. And
where Sound is produced in a distant flute, and the like, there Sound
which is produced in the order of a current, reaches the portion of
Lther limited by the hollow of the ear, and thereby becomes heard.
1 heref ore Sound is produced from Sound also. — 31.
Abcve continued.
Upaskdra. — He brings forward another ground of its being non-eternal :
II
ffl^:^ Lingat, from its mark. «BT Cha, and. Slfac1*: Ariitya^? non-
eternal. fl5^: oabdah, Sound.
32. Sound is non-eternal, also because of its mark. — 111.
The meaning is that Sound, consisting of letters ('i. e., articulate
Sound), is tion-eternal, because, while possessing a ' class/ it is capaple
or beii.g perceived by the ear, like the Sound of a lute, etc. — 12.
Arguments for the eternality of Sound.
Upaxkura. — No\v, in order to confute the arguments, advanced by the conclusioniat (tha
Minuimsa thinker), in support of the eternality of Sound, he says :
u * i * i ^ u
tt(: Dvayoh, of both. § Tu, but. S,^t: Provrittyoh, of the activities
-or occupations. ^>JjEU<l Abhavat, from the non-existence or absence.
33. (Sound is eternal), because (otherwise) the occupations
of both (the teacher and the pupil) will vanish out of exis
tence. — 112.
The word ' tu ' cuts off connection with the context, and introduces
the statement of an objection of the first party. The occupation or em
ployment ' of both/ i. *., of the teacher and the pupil i,» teahing and
learning respectively, is observed. " From its non-existence or absence,"
i e.y from the entailment of its non-existence. For teaching is an act of
gift or donation. The teacher makes a gift of the Veda to the pupil. If
it is something constant or fixed, then a donation of it is possible. The
second party may say, " A cow, and the like which are being given away,
are perceived as standing between the donor and the donee ; whereas
the Veda, etc., are not perceived as lying between the teacher and the
pupil. Therefore teaching cannot be a donation." Our (i. e., the first
party's) reply is that they are perceived in the interval between the
92 VAlgE§IKA PHILOSOPHY.
teacher and the pupil by the ear of a person standing there. Moreover,
the eternality of Sound follows from recurrence also. As in " He sees
the colour for five times/' the recurrence or persistency of colour which
is constant or permanent is observed, so the recurrence or persistency
of Sound in " The anuvdka or paragraph has been read ten times,
twenty times," is proof of the constancy or permanence of Sound. And
constancy or steadiness being proved, since nothing is known which
can destroy it, its eternality also is necessarily proved, on the principle
" What will afterwards destroy it which is constant or lasting all this
time ?" This is the import. — 33.
Arguments for the eternality of Sound — continued.
UpasJcdra.-~ He translates another reason urged in favour of the eternality of Sound :
Prathamasabhfit, from the word ' the first.'
34. From the word, 'trie-first,' (it follows that Sound is
eternal). — 113.
The meaning is that the thrice recitation of the first and the last
'mantra for kindling a sacrificial fire, as enjoined in the text, " The first
should be recited three times, the last three times/' is not justified or
accountable without the steadiness of Sound. — 34.
Bhdsya — reads H-Aii- 34 as Prathamd-ddi-/Sabddt while the meaning
remains unchanged. ( Adi = and others, e- </., the second).
Above continued.
Upa»kdra.—So translates another reason advanced by the oonolusionist for the eternality
of Sound :
II ^l R I * II
Sampratipatti-bhav&t, from the possibility or existence
of recognition. ^ Cha, and.
35. (The eternality of Sound follows), also from the pos
sibility of recognition. — 114.
' Sampratipatti-bhavat ' — i.e., from the existence of recognition.
The word 'pratipatti ' (cognition) alone would have conveyed the sense
of recognition which is a particular kind of the former ; therefore the
prefix ' Sam' (in the sense of thorough-ness) implies certainty. Thus,
•" He is reciting the very same poem which was recited by Maitra,"
" He is reading the same verse over and over again," " You are repea
tedly saying the same thing which has been said before/' " You are
«veu now making the very same statement which was made by you last
year and the year before," " It is that same letter ga," — on the strength
of the recognition of Sound in such cases, the steadiness or permanence
of Sound is proved. — 35.
KANlDA SftTRAS II, 2, 37. 93
The same refuted.
Upaskdra.—~ Confuting all these reasons, he says :
m
(: Saridigdhah, Doubtful. Uncertain. Inconclusive, flfa Sati,
•existing. qg£f Bahutve, plurality.
36. Plurality (of Sound) existing, (these arguments are)
inconclusive. — 115.
'Sandighah,' i. e., not one-pointed. So it has been said, " Kailyapa
taught that a contradictory, unproved, or uncertain mark was no mark."
Thus it is oberved that there can be learning, repetition, and also re
cognition, also if there is a plurality of diversity of Sound, therefore
these arguments are inconclusive. For, "He learns dancing," "He prac
tises dancing." "He danced the same dance twice/' "You are dancing the
«ame dance to-day, which you danced the other day," "This man also is
dancing the same dance which was danced by another dancer," — in
these cases, learning, repetition, and recognition (of Action) are obser
ved. But you (the conclusionist) too do not on this account admit the
permanence (or eternality) of dancing which is a particular kind of
Acti ng— 36.
Bhdsya : — reads II. ii. 36 as simply sandigdhdh, supplying for him
self the reason for the declaration there, and joins the latter part of it
to II. ii. 37, a-id interprets it to mean that in spite of plurality of indivi
dual sounds, their definite enumeration is possible by means of reference
to their genera or types.
Counter objection stated and answered.
Upaskdra.—lt may be objected, ' Fifty letters ; an eight-lettered mantra ; a three-lettered
mantra ; the eight-lettered raetra, anustubk ; ete. — 'How can there be suoh uses of members,
when, the letters being non-eternal, there is a possibility of their being infinite in number
according to the difference of utterance ? " So he says :
IM i * i ^ u
Samkhyabhavah, the existence or application of Number.
s Samanyatafyjfrom Genus.
37. The existence of number (in Sound) is with reference
to the Genus. — 116.
The meaning is thab the existence of the number, fifty, etc., arises
from the class notion of fca, ga, etc. Although there might be an infini
ty of ka'Sj etc., the letters determined by the notions of fca, ga, etc., are
fifty, three, or eight, in the same way as Substances, Attributes, etc.,'
are nine, twenty-four, etc., although there may be an infinity of them
according to differences within the group of each of them. This is the>
import.
94 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
The objector may say: " This is that ga," — This recognition itself
proves the permanence of Sound. Nor is it opposed by the perception,
* Loud ga, soft ga,' which conveys, contrary properties ; because loud-
ness, etc., are there due to external conditions. Nor is it to be main
tained that there cannot appear any difference from the difference of
the external condition also ; for, then, the crystal also will not shine as-
different, developing in the form of blue, yellow, etc., from the con
junction of the China rose tdpinja, etc., nor will the face also, when
reflected as elongated, etc., in the sword-blade, jewel, and looking-glass,
appear to be different. If it be asked, To what does this property of
loudness, etc., belong, which influences ga ? We reply : It may be the-
property of Air, or of utterance, or of resonance. What is the use of
fixing upon the particular one amongst them ? You also admit that
loudness, etc., are natural distinctions, as the relation of high and low
amongst them cannot be established or explained by the notions of
ka, ga, etc."
We reply : It is not so. Because even when such contrary percep
tion exists, viz., ' ga is produced,' ' <ja is destroyed,' < ga which was just
heard, does not exist,' ' the noise has stopped, etc., if this recognation
d'jes not then cease, then it must be supposed to relate to class-notions.
Otherwise such recognition coming to rest upon the permanence or
steadi-ness of individual Sounds, the above contrary perceptions.
themselves would not be produced. Nor is this the property of Air,,,
because the properties of Air are not the objects of aural perception.
Nor again is it the property of the utterance ; for if utterance is only
Air, then the defect has been already pointed out ; if it is something
else, then nobody, can say what it is. Nor again is it the property of
resonance, for loudness, etc., are perceived also in the resonance from,
the conch, etc., even though ya is not found there. The naturalness of
loudness, etc., however, does not involve an intermixture of classes, for
its diversity is obtained from its being pervaded by the class-notion of
ga, etc., Moreover, there is a very distinct mode of distinguishing
forms in the ga's, etc., utterer by male and female parrots and man,
as also in those uttered by a male and a female, as well as in those
uttered by those who are neither males nor females ; by which a parrot,,
etc., concealed from vision by branches, a screen, etc., are inferred.
But their being produced by external conditions does not arise from
external conditions which can be perceived, as in " a young woman
looking yellow with saffron." Nor is their being produced by external
conditions proved by argument, for no proof of such a conclusion
exists. So far in brief. — 37.
Here ends the second chapter of the second book in ^ankara's-
commentary on the Vaisesika aphorisms.
Vivrtti — Some explain the production of Sound on the principle-
of ripples and waves. According to them, the first Sound is produced
from the impact of a drum and a drum-stick, etc., within the limits of
that particular Space. Then outside that circle and within the confines.
of the ten quarters the second Sound is produced from the first, and
extends it. After that, beyond this second circle, and within the confines-
of the ten quarters, the third Sound is produced from the second. And
KANlDA SfiTRAB II, 1-10. 95
in the same way the production of the fourth and other Sounds should
be understood. Others, however, hold that the production of Sound
takes place on the principle of the ball of the kadamba flower. In their
view, the second and other Sounds are neither single nor confined to
the ten quarters take;i together, but are produced ten-fold in ten-quar
ters. (Thus the one is the theory of the successive production of single
Sounds, while the other is the theory of the simultaneous production of
multiple Sounds). " This is the difference.
VIA&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
BOOK THIRD— CHAPTER FIRST.
Objects <f the senses.
Upaskdra. — Having thus in the second book completed 'he examination of the external
Substances, the another following the order of enumeration, now proceeds to construct a basis
for an inauiry respecting the Soul.
: II \ I \ I ?ll
: Prasiddhah, universally known, perceived, ff^qisrf: — Indri-
object of the senses.
1. The objects of the senses are universally known. — 117.
The objects of the Senses, c. <j., Smell, Taste, Colour, Touch, and
Sound, are capable of being apprehended by the several external sens 3-
organs. Amongst them, the universal cognition or experience of S mnd
having been shown by the aphorism, " Sound is that object of which the-
organ of apprehension is the ear " (II. ii. 21). it is in like manner
demonstrated that Smell, etc., ending with Touch (i.e., Smell, Taste,
Colour, Touch) are universally known. Thus Smell is that object of
which the organ of apprehension is the olfactory organ ; Taste is that
object of which the organ of apprehension is the organ of taste ; Colour
is that object of which the organ of apprehension is the eye alone ;
Touch is that object of which the organ of apprehension is the organ of
touch alone. And by the word, ' object ' there is, in all these cases,
denoted a real entity possessed of properties, and therefore the defini
tions cannot be too wide by over-extending to Smell-ness, etc., and to
the non-existence of Smell, etc. Hence Smell-ness is the possession of
a sub-class of Attribute-ness, appearing in what is apprehended by the
olfactory organ. So also with regard to Taste, etc. Consequently,.
supersensuous Smell, etc., are not left out. — 1.
yivfiti __ ' Prasiddhah,' means subject of ascertainment by per
ception.
Mark of supersensuous object.
UpasTcdra — He explains the application of the universal (experience o" the objects of the
aenses to the inquiry respecting the Soul.
indriyartha-prasiddhih, the universal experience of
the objects of the senses. ff^'JTsfc'T: Indriyarthebhyah, from the senses-
and their object, sjsifar^q Arthantarasya, of a different object. \$j:
Hetuh, mark.
2. The universal experience of the objects of the senses is
the mark of (the existence of) object different from she senses and
their objects.— 118.
' Hetuh/ t. e.t Mark, ' Arthantarasya,' i, e.. of the Soul. ' Indriyar
thebhyah, i. e.t from the senses as well as their objects. The meaning-
is that it is the mark of the Soul which is a different object from Colour^
K ANADA SUTRAS III, 1, 4. 97
'etc-, as well as from those which possess them. Though it is implied here
that only knowledge is the mark of the existence of the Soul, yet inas
much as there being a universal experience of the objects of the senses,
the immediate presentation to the mind of Colour, etc., is more com-
•monly known, the mark of there being a Soul is described as constituted
by tliat universal experience. Wow this universal ex] erience must
: reside somewhere, either as an effect as a water-pot, or as an Attribute,
'or as an Action. This universal experience, again, since it is an act in
'the same manner as cutting is an act, must be produced by an instru-
'ment. That which is the instrument of the universal experience is the
senses ; and the latter, being an instrument, must be employed by an
agent, as an axe and the like, are employed. Thus, that in which this
•'universal experience resides, 'and which employs the olfactory and other
organs for its instruments, is the Soul. — 2.
The body or the st-nses are not the seat of perception.
U,pax\idrQ. — Lest it be said, "Let the body or the senses be the foundation of the universal
experience or perception, because their presence and absence are more manifest as determin
ing perception. What is the use of the ^supposition of any other foundation? Thus, consci
ous-ness is an attribute of the body, being its effect, dike its Colour, etc. The same should be
understood in tne case of its beirg an attribute of the senses ; " so he says :
M I ? I ^ II
^T: S:ih, that, i. e., perception. 3H<T^3r: Anapadesah, the semblance
or simulacrum of a mark ; a false mark.
3. Perception (as a mark inferring the body or the senses as
' its substratum) (is) a false mark. — 119.
( Anapadeiah' mea^s the appearance or semblance of an ' apadesa/
i. e., mark. Thus the meaning is that the being an effect of the body or
the senses is the mere semblance of a mark, inasmuch as such an argu-
jm,ent applies to the cognition produced by a lamp is therefore not-one-
.pointed, i. e., multifarious — 3.
BTidsyd — The sense or the object cannot be a mark for the inference
'of ;the geif.
Above continued.
!.}..:., ii •
Upaxkdra. — It may bo rejoined, " By ' the being an effect of the body or the senses ' is
meant the being an effect of them only in so far as they are determined by the characteristic
of consciousness ; whereas the whole of consciousness is not the effect of the lamp, eto. There
fore there is no indeterminateness of fluctuation." So he says :
II ^ I ? I S II
Karanajnanat, because the causes or constituents are
devoid of cognition or consciousness.
|, 4. (The body or the senses cannot be the seat of perception),
because there is no consciousness in the causes (i.e., the component
parts, of the body).— 120.
98 VAI&ESIKA. PHILOSOPHY.
It is mea,nt (that the body or the senses cannot be the seat of per
ception), because of the absence of consciousness in the hands, feet, etc.,
or in their parts, which are the causes, i.e., components of the body. For
it is observed that the particular attributes of Earth, etc., are preceded
by like attributes in their causes. In like manner, if there existed
consciousness in the components of the body, it might possibly exist
also in the body. But this is not the case. It cannot be urged that
consciousness may exist also in the components of the body ; for it
would entail the absence of uniformity in the actions of the body, since
uniformity is never observed amongst a plurality of sentient beings. It
would then alsj follow that, after the amputation of the hand, there will
be no more recollection of that which was experie iced within the limit
of the hand, according to the maxim, il One does not remember that
which has bean experienced by another." Moreover, the supposition
would entail that, after the destruction of the body, there would be no
experience of the Cv> isequences of the acts performed by the body, e. (/.,
causing hurt, etc., for certainly Maitra does not suffer the consequences
of the sins committed by Ohaitra. And hence there would be a i anni
hilate) i of acts performel, a id a i acce-ion of acts not performed. — 4.
The body or the senses are not the seat of perception, continue l-
Upaskdra. — It may be added in objection that consciousness exists in a minute degree in
the components of the body, whereas it is manifest in the body, and that therefore it cannot
be said that it is not preceded by a like attribute in the cause, nor does there arise the impos
sibility of uniformity. Anticipating this, he says :
\\\ m * n
Karyesu, in the effects. 3TT*U^ Jfumat, (because there would
be consciousness.
5. Because (there would be) consciousness in the effects. —
121.
If, as a matter of fact, consciousness existed in the primary causes
of the body, namely the ultimate atoms, then it would also exist in the
water-pot, etc., which are the effects originated by them also. Moreover,
consciousness would exist in products such as water-pots, etc., also
because the particular attributes of Earth pervade all terrene ex
istence. But consciousness is not observed to exist in these
products. — 5.
The body or the senses are not the seat of perception, continued.
Upaskdra.— In anticipation of the further rejoinder that consciousness) ra»y in reality
exist, in an imperceptible degree, in the water-pot, etc., also, he saya :
Ajnanat, because it is not known. *% Cha, and.
6. And because it is not known (that any minute degree of
consciousness exists in the water-pot, etc).— 122.
KANADA SftTRAS III, 1, 7. 99
The meaning is that there is no consciousness in the water-jar,.
etc., inasmuch as it is not known by any means of knowledge. If you
admit that which is beyond the range of all means of knowledge, then
you will have to admit also that a hare has horns, and so on. For, by
no kind of evidence, is it known that consciousness exists in the
water-jar, etc — 6.
Titi. — It is more proper to conceive some one other substance as
the seat of consciousness than to imagine a plurality of consciousness
iu various portions of matter. This is the import.
On the theory that consciousness resides in the body, recollection
of what is experienced in infancy, will be impossible in youth, etc t
because of the non-existence of that which had the experience, since
the destruction of the infant-body must be observed by the destruction
of its material. Similarly, there would be no activity at sucking the
breasts on the part of a child just born, because of the impossibility
at that stage of the understanding that this is the means of attaining-
the desirable which is the cause of activity. According to the advocate
of the existence of a separate conscious being, the activity explained by
the possibility of reminiscence due to the impression produced by the-
understanding in the previous birth that this is the means of attaining
the desirable. Recollection of other experiences in the previous birth.
does not take place owing the absence of appropriate extern nl
stimuli.
Bhdsya. — reads III. i. 5 and 6 as one aphorism, and explains it in
the sense that as cognition is found within one effect, e. g., the body,
and is not found within another effect, e. g., a jar, therefore, it follows
that there can be no cognition in their combinative causes (which must
be same in both cases).
Fallacious mark.
UpaskAra. — It may be urged, " It has been affirmed that an employer (a presiding soul)
is inferred from the organ of hearing tand other instruments. But this is not a legitimate
inference, for the auditory and other organs are neither identical with, nor are produced
by, the Soul, and, unless one of these alternatives be admitted, there|is.no proof of the universal
concomitance or inseparable existence of these organs and the Soul ; and, unless there be suck
inseparable existence, thero can bo no inference." So he says in reply :
\
I ? I vs n
Anyat, something else. ^ Eva, certainly. \?j: Hetuh, make.
jfr! Iti, hence. W^nflf:. Anapadesah, no mark.
7. A mark is certainly something else (than that of which
it is a mark). Hence (a mark, which is identical with the thing
of which it is a mark, is) no mark (at all.) — 123.
The mark or means of proof can but be something else than that
which is t-> be proved. It cannot be identical with that which is to be
proved ; for, were it so, it would follow that the thing which is to be
proved, would have no differance from the means of proof. Therefore, a.
means of proof, constituted by identity with that which is to be proved,
is no means of proof, i. e., no mark at all. — 7.
100 VAI^ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
Bhdsya. — Something quite different is the mark of inference of the
Self; the sense or the object cannot be such a mark. What this
* something quite different ' is, is declared in the eighteenth aphorism
of this chapter.
Fallacious mark — continued.
UpaskAra. — It be may said, "As the Soul is not identical with the auditory and other
organs of sense, so there is no production of the latter from the former. For the senseorgans
•of hearing, etc., are not produod from the Soul, as smoke is produced from fire " So he says :
II ^ I ? I c; ||
fcrc Arthantaram, any one thing : ft Hi, because- 9rafcTC9T Arlh-
antarasya, of any other thing. ^TT^T: Anapadesh, not a mark.
8. (Although a mark is quite different from that of which
it is a mark, still they are not wholly unconnected), for, any oi.e
thing cannot be a mark of any other thing.— 124.
Because, as the effect, e. g., smoke, etc., is a different thing from
an ass, so it is also a different thing from its cause, e. g., fire, etc. So
that i'i the absence of any distinction in respect of being a different
object, a particular nature is the regulative principle here, whereby
the smoke does not infer an ass, but only fire. And if that nature
belongs to any thing other than the effect, then that too really becomes
a mark. Thus an effect cannot be a mark, if it is devoid of the parti
cular nature intended here. Thus, identity and causation only cons
titute inseparable existence or universal concomitance ; these two are
reduced into inseparable existence ; or, it is co-ordinate with them as
the principle of inference ; or, its apprehension is dependent upon
the apprehension of the above two only. Hence the aphorism is only
the statement of an argument for causing confusion to the disciples
in the above way. This is the import. — 8.
Marks of inference.
Upaskdra. — Now, in order to make it clear that universal concomitance or inseparable
existence may be found elsewhere than in the cases of identity and causation, he saya :
n \ i ? i s. i)
Sariayogi, the conjunct. ^Mlfa Samavayi, the combined or in
herent. ijTr^^TT^rf^ Ekarthasamavayi, the combined together in oi.e
thing, or co-inherent. R<tf^I Virodhi, the contradictory.
9. The conjunct, the combined, the con-combined, and the
contradictory also (are marks of inference). — 125.
" The body has skin, because it is the body" — here the mark is
the conjunct or the contiguous. For skin is described as a natural in
tegument of matter capable of growth and decay. And it is neither an
effect nor a cause of the body, but merely produced together with the
body and in invariable conjunction with it. Similarly, the combined is
also a mark. For instance, " Ether possesses Magnitude or extension,
"because it is a Substance, like a water-pot, etc." ; here Magnitude or
KANADA StfTRAS III, 1, 12. 101
extension which is to be proved is proved by the property of Substance-
ness which is in essential combination with Ether. Or, to take another
•example. Tho extension of an atom, a particular form or limit of exten
sion or Magnitude is proved by this that the relativity or degree of
-extension or Magnitude must somewhere cease ; whereby the ultimate
atom is inferred as that in which the limit of extension rests.
The inference of Ether by Sound, etc., and the inference of the Soul
by knowledge, etc., are inferences of the cause by the effect ; so that
they are not i-istanced here. — 9.
Marks of inference — continued.
Upask'ira — Tae author of the aphorisms illustrates the co-inherent or co-existent
II \ I ? ( ?° II
q Karyyam, an effect. ^TT^qfaTC^ Karyyantarasyi, of another effect.
10. One effect (may be ^he mark of inference) of another
effect.— 126.
An effect 6. g., Colour, is the mark of another effect, e. g., Touch.
This is merely illustrative. Thus, that which is not an effect, e. g., the
unity of Ether, is a mark of the individual separateness of Ether, and
so in the case of its extreme largeness. — 10.
Above continued.
Upaskdra. — He illustrates the contradictory mark.
II \ I ? I \\ II
Virodhi, the contradictory. ^PJrf Abhiitam, the non-existent,
or non-product, or that which has not taken place. ^cT^T Bhutasya, of
the existent, or that which has taken place.
11. The opposite, i.e., the non-existent (is a mark) of the
existent.— 127.
That which has not taken place, e. g., a shower, [is a mark of that which
has taken place, e. g., the conjunction of air and clouds, (where clouds
l^eing dispersed by air, showers do not take place). So also is the
recitation of a mantra which is the contradictory or counter-agent of
a tumour, etc. Thus that which has not taken place, i. e., has not been
produced, e. g., a tumour, etc., is the mark ef that which has taken
place, e. g., the recitation of a mantra or sacred text, (where a tumour is
prevented by the recitation of the appropriate mantra"). — 14.
Marks of inference — continued.
[7pa8kdra.—T3.e gives another illustration of a contradictory mark :
II \ I ? \ ?R II
v$3 Bhutam, that which has taken place. ^T*|?T^T Abhutasya, of that
which has not taken place.
102 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
12. That which has taken place, (is a mark) of that which
has not taken place. — 128.
That which has taken place, e. g , a tumour, etc., is a mark of that
which has not taken place, e. </., the, recitation of a mantra. So also that
which has taken place, e. y., the conjunction of air aid cloudsis amark
of that which has not taken place, e. g., a shower. Similarly that which
has taken place, e. g., a burn, is a mark of that which has not taken
place, e. y., the application of a gem, etc., to destroy the burning pcwer
of the fire. Similar instances should be understood. — 12.
iLbove continued.
Upaskdra.— He illustrates another contradictory mark :
n * m
ijjr: Bhufcah, that which has taken place *$3^T Bhutasya, of that
which has taken place.
13. — That which has taken place, (is a mark) of that which
has taken place.— 129.
There is sometimes inference of an existing contradictory from an
other existing contradictory ; as when, on seeing a snake swelling with
anger, it is inferred that there is an ichneumon behind a bush. In this
case, the snake excited is that which is, existet t, ai d the ichneumon
hidden by the bush is also in existence. Therefore, an existentr
as the mark of another existent object. On the other hand, a shower
cannot exist at the same time as the conjunction of air and clouds,
nor can tumours, etc., co-exist with the recitation of mantras. — 13.
MarTfs of inference — continued.
UpaskArc. — Now he shows the importance or use of the above recapitulation :
I ^ I f I tVHI
Prasiddhipurvakatvat, because preceded by (the re
collection of) the 'pervasion' or universal relation. 3n^R3J Apade6asyar
of the mark.
14. (These are valid marks), because the characteristic of an
inferential mark is that it is preceded by (the recollection of the)
universal relation (of itself and of that of which it is a mark). —
130.
' Prasiddhi ' means recollection of universal relation. ' Apadesa r
denotes a mark. Therefore the mark attended with the recollection of
universal relation, is described by that member of an argument which
states the mark, or by that member which states the deduction ; so that
the mark is, as has been stated, preceded by recollection of universal
relation. Thus universal relation, (i. e.} a true major premiss) exists-
in all these cases of inference of an agent by the instruments suchas-
organ of hearing, etc., and of the Soul as their substratum by th&
KANADA StTTRS II, 1, 14. 103
attributes such as knowledge, etc.; whereas there is no universal rela
tion in the inference by which you (i. e., the opponent) have sought to
establish knowledge as a i attribute of the body, through the mark
that it is an effect o? the body. This is the import.
It may be asked, what is this universal relation ? It is not merely
inviolable relation /for, in the case of inference from cause to effect,
it is not known that inviolable or invariable concomitance is the being
not the ground of the co-existence of the absolute non-existence of
ihat which has to be proved, and because inference from cause to effect
it is impossible that invariable concomitance is the not being the seat
-of that which is not the seat of that which has to be proved, and
also because smoke, etc., are the seat of that which is not the seat of
that, whatever it may be, which has to be proved.
Nor is it inseparable existence, for that is either the non-existence
-of the mark i i the absence of that which is to be proved, or existence
•of the mark after deduction has been drawn from that which is to be
prove 1. It cannot be said that because sometimes there is non-existence
of smoke, also where no ass exists, and there is existence of smoke also
where an ass exists, therefore uniform agreement and uniform difference
-are intended here ; because the very same uniformity is the subject of
•enquiry.
Nor is it relation to a whole. If it be the relation of the whole of
the major term to the middle term, such relation does not exist even
in the case of smoke, etc., which are not equally pervasive as their
corresponding major terms. Let it be relation of the whole of the
middle term to the major term ; but this is impossible, for there does
not exist in the whole of the middle term relation to a single major
•term- Let it be relation of the whole of the major term to the whole
of the middle term. This also is not valid, for it is nowhere possible
-that there should be relation of the whole of the major term to the
whole of the middle term, inasmuch as the individuals denoted by the
major and ths middle term are related each to each. And in the
case of the terms being unequally pervasive, there would be a want
•of pervasion or universal relation.
Nor is the relation essential. For essence means either the nature
•or condition of a thing, or (condition in itself, or production by itself).
Now, if the nominal affix which converts * essence ' into the form
4 essential,' has the sense of production thereby, then the definition
will be too narrow to apply to universal relation characterised as
-Combination. If the affix bears the sense of dependence upon it or
-residing in it, in that case also the definition will be too narrow to
-apply to Combination, for combination does not reside in, i. e., depend
upon, anything whatever ; and also because even Conjunction neither
resides in, nor is produced by, smoke-ness, etc., which are the pro
perties of the middle term.
Nor is the relation, non-accidental or non-coditional. For an
•up&dhi, accident or external co idition, itself is difficult to ascribe, and
were it easy to ascribe, would be difficult to conceive. And were it
«asy to conceive, it would still involve 'mutual dependence' or
104 YAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
* reciprocity ' or argument in a circle, for there being pervasion of
the major term, the conception of the non-pervasion, etc., of the middle
term would depend upon the conception of the universal relation.
Nor is universal relation mere relation. Fcr, though variable
relation also appears as universal relation, though its reference to
particular' place and particular time, yet, as the knowledge of it does
not govern the inferential process, it is, therefore, required to deter-
-mine that universal relation only which, by being known, will become
the means of inference. . , , .
Nor is universal relation co-existence with the major term which
is not the counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence 'appertaining to
that which contains the middle term, (i. e., the rniuor term; For fire-
also is the counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence, presort -ih
that which has smoke, since it is not that in a kitchen hearth there is.
'not the absolute non-existence of volcaiii'c fire. In such a,n intance
as "This has conjuncetion, because ii is a Substance," the definition
'would become too narrow, as the absolute non-existence of Conjunction
would be co-extensive with the mark or means of inference. It cannot
lbe said,- Universal relation is co-extension with the major term which
is not the counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence which is
co-extensive with itself and which is the contradictory of the countpr-
opposite, because the absolute non-existence of conjunction falls short
of being the contradictory of the counteropposite." For the absulute
non-existence of conjunction also is the contradictory of the counter-
. opposite ; otherwise, it would be useless to imagine differences of
/delimiting circumstances for differences , of delimitations are not
imagined for the purpose of showing the states ;of -being produced and
.non-eternal. ;
Nor is universal relation the not being the foundation or substratum
•of non-co-extension with the major term ; for in the inference from
cause to effect, there is not konwn any such non-co-extension with the
•-major term. It is in fact another form of being th^ foundation of that
•which is not the foundation of the major term.
Nor is the universal relation of a thing the possession of the form
which determines its relation to something else, for the characteristic
,of fire also has the function of, determining relation to or the co-
extensioji of smoke. It cannot be sait that because of wider extension
this is not the case ; for it i,s o^sevred that, that which determines the-
pervasion (e. g., fire) has a wider extension (in other words, fire exists-
where there is no smoke), and the characteristic of Smoke also has a-
wider extension inasmuch as there exists smoke pendant on the surface
of the sky e. g., in clouds;. If therefore, a qualification be added for
the purpose of excluding such instances, then it must be allowed that,
that which determines the characteristic of being the middle term.
(yy&pycC) the same is intended to determine the characteristic of being
co-extended, and hence there is the fallacy of self-dependence (Atmdsra-
yo). The view also that two things are universally related, when the
One possesses the form of determining the co-existence of the other in a.
common substratum, is fallacious in the same way.
In reply to the above objections, we may proceed to state as-
follows: pervasion or universal relation is a non-accidental relation;
KANADA SftTRAS III, 1, 14. 105
while by the being non-accidental is meant co-existence in the same
substratum with a variably present sddhya or that \\hich has to be
proved (i.e., the major term which is predicated of the minor, in the con
clusion), of all those in which the mark or middle term is sometimes
present and sometimes absent, or co-existence in the same substratum
with a yddhyd co-existent with the absolute non-existence of the counter-
opposites of all those which are the counter-opposites of the absolute noi -
existence co-existing in the same substratum with the mark. The mean
ing of the two expressions is co- existence in the same substratum with
the sddhya which is not pervaded by anything that does not pervade tie
sddhana or the middle term ; in other words, it is the characteristic < f
being pervaded by all that which is jervasive of the sddhya. It may
be said that this is difficult to understand from the relative com
pound which has been employed here. For this reason there is i. eed of
observation and argument also. In other words, pervasion, vydjiti, is
co-existence in the same substratum with the sddhya which is i. ot the
counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence co-existing in the same
substratum with the sddhana. By absolute non-existence is intended
that which possesses the counter-opposite determined by the genera of
fire-ness, etc., Therefore, even though in the smoke of the kitchen
hearth there is co-existence in the same substratum with the absolute
non-existence of mountain fire, yet it is no fault, because there never
Arises the intuition that there is not fire in that which has smoke.
Substanceness, however, is never co-existent in the same substratum
with the absolute non-existence of the charateristic of being in con
junction, for we never have the intuition that substance is not con
junct, because, although conjunctions singly do not appear in that
which is the subject of pervasion, yet the generic quality of being
conjunct appears in that which is the subject of pervasion, and is
itself pervasive.
Objection. — But the being non-accidental implies the absence of
accident or adjunct, upddhi ; and upddhi itself is difficult to obtain.
Answer. — It is not so. Because the characteistic of upddhi belongs
to that which does not pervade the sddhana, i. e., the middle term, while
it does pervade the sddhya, i. e., the major term. So it has been said,
" upddhi is that which is dependent upon another upddhi, (for determin
ing non accidentally), in the case of the sddhana, and which is not
dependent upon another upddhi, (for determining non-accidentality),
in the case of the sddhya."
Objection. — But the definition does not include an upddhi which is
only non -pervasive of the sddhya. For example, A iris perceptible, because
it is the substratum of touch which is perceptible. Here the possession
of developed colour is such an upddhi. So also is the characteristic of
being produced by eating herbs (which might produce blackness), in,
*' He is black, because he is the son of Mitr& " (a low-born woman). For,
the possession of developed colour is not pervasive of perceptibility,
since it does not exist in the perception of the Soul as well as of Attri
bute and Action ; nor is the characteristic of being produced by eating-
herbs pervasive of blackness, since it does not exist in the case of the
blacki.ess of the black crow, cuckoo, cloud, black-berries, etc.
106 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
Answer — The objection is not valid. For, that which is non-perva
sive of the sddhana, while it is pervasive of the sddhya as finally deter*
mined, — the same is intended as the upddhi. And a sddhya becomes
finally determined, when it is determined by a property, by determina
tion by which the pervasiveness of the upddhi remains unbroken. In the
instances given the possession of developed colour is pervasion of per
ceptibility by the determination or limitation of external substantiality,
and is apprehended by agreement and difference. As regards the second
instance, it has been ascertained in the works of Charaka, SuSruta, and
other medical writers, that the characteristic of being produced by
eating herbs is pervasive towards the sddhya determined by the black
ness of a person, which can be produced (artificially). Other cases
should be similarly understood.
Objection. — Still it is not the meaning of the word, updplii. An
upddhi is something the property of which shines in another object, t-g-,
a China rose, etc., in reference to a crystal, etc. In the case of an un
equally pervaded upddhi, there being absence of the characteristic of
that which can be pervaded, its property cannot shine in the approved
sddhana.
Answer. — This is true. The primary use of the word, upddhi, is
only where it is equally pervaded (as the sddhya), e. g-,in the possession
of fire produced from moist faggots, (for wherever there is such firer
there is smoke, and vice versa). In other places, its use is secondary.
The secondary sense infers variation, or deviation, according to the
rule that, that which deviates from the pervader of something, also
deviates from that thing. And there exists sddhana which deviates fyom
the upddhi which is pervasive of the sddhya. Hence, that the sddhana
deviates from the sddhya, and that, that which is not pervaded by that
which pervades an object, is also not pervaded by that object, together
infer that there is no proof of the characteristic of being pervaded, or
brings forward a contrary argument, satpratipaksa* there being proof
of the non-existence of the sddhya from the non-existence of the upddhi,
which is pervasive of the sddhya, in the paksa, i. e., the subject, which
is the minor term). So it has been said, u The disputant may bring
forward an upddhi, governing the sddhya finally determined, even
though it be divorced from the rule or determination of the sddhya
maintained by the speaker, such upddhi being equally (a means of
discrediting the conclusion, or) a source of xatpratipaksa." And such
upddhi is brought forward by arguments adverse to the absence of
arguments in favour of bddha obstruction, (i. e., the certainty of the
non-existence of the sddhya), and deviation (i. e-, the non-co-existence
of the sddhana with the sddhya).
It has boen held that by the non-co-existence of which the non-cc-
existence of the sddhana with the sddhya arises, the same is upddhi. But
here the instrumental case-ending is used to express neither instrument,
nor means, mode, nor mark. Nor is the construction to be completed
thus, By the non-co-existence of which beingknown, the non-co-existence
of the sddhana with the sddhya becomes known ; for the definition, not
* satpratipaksA has boen defined as " an argument which contains a counter-mark capable
of demonstrating 'the non-existence ef that which has te be proved," (vide Tarka-samgrahaj.
KANADA StTTRAS III, 2, 16. 107
applying to an unknown upddhi, would not apply to upddhis in obvious
cases of non-co-existence. It is diffcult to ascertain it (i. e., upddhiy
significatively or by its significance, since it is impossible to formulate
or invent, an upddhi without (first) establishing the characteristic of
being the means of the inference of non-co-existence. The characteris
tic of being other than the paksa (or the subject of the conclusion),
again, though suffering from the characteristic of an upddhi, is yet not
an upddhi ; for, it would involve obstruction to itself, e. g., dubiousness
and not-one-pointedness in the paksa. For if there is no doubt about
it, then it is not a paksa ; if it is a paksa, then doubt is necessary, and
consequently, dubiousness and not-one-pointed-ness become certain.
That which remains to be said on this topic, may be sought in the
Mayukha. — 14.
Enumer ration of fallacies.
Upaskdsa. — Now. with a view to distinguish (logical) marks (of inference) which have
gone before as well as those which will come hereafter, from fallacious marks, he begins the
section of fallacies, ardisays :
: II ^ I ? I
Aprasiddhah, unproved, ^jsfq^l : Anapedesah, a fallacious
mark. ?^r^ Asan, non-existent. tff?5*>*: Sandigdhah^, dubious. *3 Cha, and.
i=*Hcffol: Anapadesa^i, A fallacious mark.
15. The unproved is a false mark ; the non-existent and the
dubious also are false marks. — 131.
1 Aprasiddhah, means that which is not pervaded or in universal
relation, and that the universal relation of which has not been observed,
and that which is in opposite universal relation, i. e., the contradictory.
The word includes the two forms of the unproved, in point of universal
relation or being pervaded, arid the contradictory. ' Asan 'means non
existent in the paksa or the minor term, i. e., that which has not the
property or possibility of residing in the paksa or subject. And this is
due sometimes to the unreality of the form (attributed to the mark), and
sometimes to the absence of uncertainty and the desire to prove 'as) in
the proof of that which has been already proved. ' Sandigdhah' means
that which causes the doubt whether the sddhya be existent or iion-exist-
ent (in the subject of the conclusion). And this arises sometimes from
the observation of common property, sometimes from the observation of
a non-common property, and sometimes from the observation of the
mark accompanying the sddhya as well as its non-existence. The first
is general multifarious, the second is particular multifarious, and the
third is inconclusive. — 15.
Bhdsyi. — splits up III. i. 15 into two aphorisms: " Aprasidhah
anapadtsak " and Asanasandigdhah cha anapadesah."
Fallacy illustrated.
Upaskdra. — Of the above-mentioned false marks, he gives an illustration or a mark which.
is fallacious because it is not pervaded by the denotation of the major term, also because it is
contradictory, and also because it is not known to exist in the form attributed to it :
: M 1 1 1 1* u
108 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
— Yasmat, because. ftmqft Visani, (It) has horns. ?npn^. Tasmat,
therefore. 9J>^: Afivah, a horse.
16. Because (it) has horns, therefore (it is) a horse. — 132.
Where, the hody of an ass becoming the paksa or subject of the
conclusion, such confusion, as u This is what is a horse, because it has
horns," due to the observation of the negative co-existence (or, simply,
disagreement) that that which is not a horse is not horned as a hare,
a jackal, a man, a monkey, etc., prevails, there it is an example of the
not-pervaded, the unreal, and the contradictory marks (i. e., the
fallacies of noa-pervasion, unreality, and contradiction). — 16.
Above continued.
Upaskdra. — Ha illustrates multifariouenesa :
Yasmat, because, fa^mft VisjXni, (it) has horns. <T^Tct Tasmat,
therefore. »ft: Gauh, a cow. fft Iti, such, this. "^ Cha, and.
Anaikantikasya, of a not-one-pointed or many-sided mark.
Udaharanam, an example.
17. And, "Because (it) has horns, therefore (it is) a cow,'*
such is the example of a many-sided (mark). — 133.
Where, taking a buffalo as the paksa or subject, it is concluded that
it is a cow because it has horns, there is general many-sided-ness. But
when it is concluded that Ether is eternal because it is the seat of
Sound, then there is particular many-sided-ness. So also in such ex
amples as " Sound is non-eternal because it is sound," there being no
universal relation, there is only particular many-sided-ness. But when
the sddhya or the middle term is proved (to exist) only in the paska or
the minor term, by bringing forward arguments which exclude vipaksa*
or contrary instances, it is then, that is, when co-existence with sapaksa^
(or objects of the same class as the paksa), becomes known, that the
mark of inference is a valid mark, for a paksa j also must be a sapakxa.
There, (i. e., in the fifteenth Sdtram above), the unproved is that
which is not proved by pervaded appearance in the paksa. And it is
three-fold : (a) unproved in point of being pervaded, (6) unproved as
such or by itself, (*'. e., in respect of the form attributed to it), and (c)
unproved by substratum or situation. Of these, the unproved in point
of being pervaded, is that of which the pervasion or invariable co-exist
ence has not been observed, whether from the non-observation of
actually existing pervasion, or from the non-existence of pervasion.
Hence the non-existence of favourable arguments, etc., are different
kinds of the unproved. And this invalid mark has a thousand divisions
according to the diversity of impossibility of predicate, impossibility of
* Vipaksa is that wherein the non-existence of that which has to be proved, is certain.
t Sapaksa is that wherein the existence of that which has to be proved, is certain.
t Paksa or subject, is that wherein the existence of that which has to be proved, i»
doubtful.
KANlDA StfTRAS III, 1, 16- 109
subject, impossibility of both, uncertainty and impossibility of predicate,
uncertainty and impossibility of subject, uncertainty and impossibility
of both, and so on. And in all these cases, only absence of proof can be
-discerned.
Here the idea is this : The mark of inference is of three kinds only,
according to its division into the purely positive, the positive-and-
negative, and the purely negative. Amongst these, the purely positive
is an attribute belonging to all subjects of attributes, (i- e., objects) ;
.e.g., knowableness, nameableness, qualifiability, predicability, absolute
non-existence of annihilation in attributes etc., destructible by the
destruction of the subtratum of the absolute non-existence of eternal
substances, etc. For, no such thing exists, as that in which these
attributes do not exist. The characteristic of the purely positive, there
fore, is that it penetrates everywhere, or that it is the counter-opposite
of absolute non-existence. Though these exist in themselves also,
(and so that uniformity of the mutual distinction of the container and
the contained, is violated), that is no fault ; for it has been said, li In
the case of appearance or existence (of one thing in another), recourse
should be had to proof, and not to that which establishes difference and
non-difference."
That mark is purely positive, of which the sddhyaia purely positive.
Of this there are four forms, namely, existence of the paksa} existence
of the sapaksa, unobstructedness, and the not being confronted with a
.satpratipaksa or equally valid argument to the contrary, which are the
means of leading to inference. The same, together with the non-exist
ence of the vipaksa, are the five forme of the positive-and-negative.
With the exception of the existence of the sapaksa the remaining are
the four forms of the purely negative. That mark, therefore, is a mere
semblance, i. e., a false mark, which is void of one or another of all the
forms which, as a true mark, it might possess as the means of leading
-to ait inference. Accordingly, the characteristic of being a false mark
or fallacy, is the being void of One or another of the forms which are
the means of leading to an inference. Hence doubt also, like certainty,
about the voidness of one or another of these forms, is an obstruction
to inference, and proof of the inconclusiveness of the mark put forward
by the speaker. But the purely positive and purely negative mark? do
not become fallacies by being void of one or another of their forms ;
because, in the case of the purely positive, non-existence of the vipaksa,
and in the case of the purely negative, existence of the sapaksa, lack
the characteristic of being the means of leading to an inference. Simi
larly, the unproved by situation (e. g., a castle in the air), the unproved
by itself (e. g., a golden lion), and the unproved in part, are fallacies
by reason of the absence of that form which is existence of the paksa ;
the unproved in point of being pervaded, the contradictory, and the
;general many-sided, are fallacies by reason of defect in that form
which is non-existence of vipaksa; the particular many-sided and the
inconclusive are fallacies by reason of defect as regards existence of
the sapaksa ; the obstructed and the confronted with an equally valid
argument to the contrary, are fallacies by reason of the absence of
the characteristics of not being obstructed and of not being confronted
with an equally valid argument to the contrary. So also, accidental-
110 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
ness and inapplicability do not lead to inference, because of the
absence of certainty of tlje non-existence of the vipaksa • absence of
favourable argument, and unfavourable argument, also do not lead to
inference because of the absence of certainty of the non-existence of
the vipaksa. In like manner, apparent (but fallacious) examples^
inadequate in regard to the sddhya, or in regard to the yAdhana,
or in regard to both, if invalid as being fallacies, are so through the
uncertainty of the existence of the sapaksa. If they are fallacious by
themselves as being examples in appearance only, yet they are so
mediately through the mark which is the same uncertainty of existence-
of the sapaksa.
Marks of which the positiveness or agreement is not manifest, and
marks of which the negativeness or difference is not manifest, however,,
are resolved only into the insufficient, the inopportune, and the ground
of defeat.
Self-dependence, mutual dependence, circle in an argument, and
infinite regression, by unsettling the certainty of universal relation or
pervasion, become deficient in respect of one or the other of the forms
of existence of the sapaksa and non-existence of the vipaksa, and there
by acquire the nature of fallacies.
Amongst these fallacies, that is accompanied with non-co-existence,.
which causes doubt alternating between the existeace and the non-
existence of the sddhya. The contradictory is that fallacy which pro
duces certainty of the non-existence of the sddhya. The unproved is
that which is void of pervasion, existence in the paksa and proving.
According to Kasyapa, obstruction and an equally valid argument to
the contrary are not independent fallacies. Of these, obstruction
resolves itself either as the unproved by situation, or as the many-
sided ; as it has been said, " In obstruction (bddhd~), the mark is either
non-existent in the paksa, or is many-sided." An equally valid argu
ment to the contrary, also by causing doubt in respect of pervasion or
invariable co-existence, etc., in other places, really resolves itself into
the many-sided, etc.
The writer of the vritti, however, says that the word, ' cha/ in the-
Sutram, ^MRi^tSTq^fts^T^ ^V^^FH^T: (III, i, 15, ibid'), has the sense of
bringing forward bddhd (obstruction} and satpratipaksa (an equally valid
argument to the contrary), and thereby follows the view of Gautama
as expressed in thosdtram, " Fallacies are five, that which is accompanied
with non-co*existence, the contradictory, that which is identical with
the paksa that which is identical with the sddhya and that which is
post in time,"(Nyaya Sutram, 1. ii.4). But, from such statements as
" The contradictory, the unproved, and the dubious, declared Kasyapa,
are no marks," it appears that the Sutrakara, i. e.} Kanada), himself
was inclined to uphold the threefoldness of fallacy. The word ' cha/
however, has the object of bringing forward what has been stated
before.
This ;s the idea. I have not dilated upon it for fear of increasing;
the bulk of the book. More details should be sought in Maytikha. — 17.
Mark of Inference of Soul.
.—'H.Q now points out the result of the analysis of fallacies :
KANADA SUTRAS III, 1,18. Ill
i ^ i ? I ?c; ii
Atma-indriya-artha-sannikarsat, from contact
of the soul, the sense, and the object. ^ Yat, which. f^|T^ Nispadyate,
is produced. ?TJ Tat, that. ?T«I^ Anyat, other, different.
18. That (i. e., knowledge) which is produced from the
contact of the soul, the sense, and the object, is other (than a false
mark). — 134.
From the contact of the soul, the sense, and the object, it is know
ledge that is produced. And it is a mark of the existence of the soul,
and, as such a mark, is different from the unproved, the contradictory,
and the many-sided, that is to say, is not a fallacy. Thus, knowledge
is, in two ways, a mark of the existence of the soul ; either by the
inference that knowledge must reside somewhere, because it is an effect,
like colour, etc., or by assuming the form of recognition, e. </., " I who
saw am the same as I who am touching." In. the former case, effectness
belonging to knowledge is not unproved, because of the assertion
•" (that) which is produced ;" nor it is contradictory, for here, as in all
other instances of analoguous inference or inference from a sdmdnya-
todrista, or commonly -observed mark, there can be no contradiction ;
nor is it many-sidod, for the very same reason. So that by means of
the commonly observed characteristic, appertaining to it, viz., of being
an effect or an attribute, knowledge truly becomes a mark of the
existence of the soul. Recognition, again, resiling from other agents,
resolves into having but one agent or cause.
(The Bauddha theory criticised.)
Objection. — Recognition may be also due entirely to the relation of
effect and cause subsisting between understanding and consciousness.
Answer. — This cannot be, as it would entail recognition also, of the
understandings of the disciple and the preceptor.
Objection. — But relation of the matter (i.e., knowledge which causes
activity or inclination) and the form does not exist there; and that
relation is the exciting cause of recognition.
Answer. — 'Matter,' having the property of Substance, cannot
possibly exist in the understanding (which is an attribute). Even if
its existence were possible, understandings being momentary, recogni
tion of what was perceived before, would not be possible. For, no
impression is thrust into subsequent understandings by a previous
understanding, since you do not admit the existence of an abiding
impression. And if it consists of the form of a stream of temporary
understandings, it cannot be the cause of recollection at another time,
nor of recognition.
Objection. — The stream of subjective consciousness, which is really
•different from the stream of objective consciousness, is that which ra
collects as well as that which recognises.
112 VAlSESxJiA PHILOSOPHY.
Answer — If it is permanent, then our obeject is fulfilled. If it is of
the form of a stream of temporary understandings, then it has not yet
freed itself from the fault already pointed out ; for then even there-
can be no permanent impression. Moreover, proof is wanting that it
is something different from objective consciousness.
Objection — Proof is supplied by the stream of understandings, ' I
am,' ' am/ and so on.
Answer. — May be. But if here states of objective consciousness-
take in or receive as their matter, only the subjective consciousness,
then, in the absence of the characteristic of being the matter, from the-
states of objective consciousness, their efficient causality also will,
disappear ; for efficient causality is derived from the characteristic of
being pervaded by the characteristic of the material cause.
Objection. — Let there be no efficient causality also.
Answer. — In that case, their existence also is gone. For the cha
racteristic of an entity or real substance is that it is the means of
serving necessary purposes.
Objection. — Both the streams are received, as material, jointly by
the stream of objective consciousness and the stream of subjective-
consciousness.
Answer. — If it is so, then what fault has been committed by con~
junction of wholes made up of parts, etc., when you also admit that
a cause can operate at a different place ?
Therefore, recognition proves, as being permanent, the soul which
is inferred by knowledge, as its substratum. Hence nothing remains-
unproved.
Or, the stitram, <i||cHP4^m*<jfil«hMf^ qfasq^ W5«R; is calculated to-
refute the Saiiakhya theory that the understanding, being eternal, is-
not fit to infer the soul as its cause. It should be, then, interpreted
thus : what you call the principle or entity, viz., the understanding, is-
nothing but knowledge ; for, there is the statement of synonyms,
namely, " understanding, comprehension, knowledge." And it is-
produced from the contact of the soul, etc., and is really other than
the inner sense the existence of which you admit. This is the meaning.
The import, therefore, is that that does become the mark of the ex
istence of the soul — 18.
Vivriti — He gives another proof of the existence of the Soul :
From 'contact, i.e., of the mind with the 'object of the sense,' which:
is the 'soul,' in other words, from the conjunction of the soul and the-
mind, the 'knowledge which is produced/ in the form of "1 am happy/'
etc., is 'different/ i.e., other than inference, as a proof of the existence-
of the Soul. This is a roundabout way of indicating that knowledge-
produced by the cognition of the soul and the mind, is perceptual,,
since the definition of perception is knowledge produced from the*
contact of the senses ond objects. Altough such perception does not-
prove the soul as different from the body, etc., yet, as it proves the»
aoul in general, it is unobstructed. This is the import.
KANADA StTTRAS III. 1. 19. 113
Or, the s&tram states that the mark which infers the soul, is not a
false mark.
Marks of Inference of other Souls.
Upaskdra.— Having described the inference of one's own soul, he now shows the
inference of other souls :
I 3. I \\
Pravritti-nivritti, activity and inactivity, occupation and
withdrawal. ^ Cha and. HWrifufr Pratyag-atmani, in the in-going or
in-dwelling soul, in one's own soul, IE Driste, observed. *W* Paratra,
elsewhere, of other souls, f^ff^ Lingam, mark.
19. And activity and inactivity, observed in one's own soul,
are the marks of (the existence of) other souls. — 135.
'Pratyag-atmani' means in one's own soul. ' Pravritti-nivritti' are
particular volitions caused by desire and aversion. By them are
produced bodily actions, characterised as ^&\ or muscular motion, of
which the objects are the acqisition of the agreeable and the avoidance
of the disagreable. So that, on observing muscular motion in another
body, the inference of another soul takes place in the following man
ner. This muscular motion must have been produced by volition,
because it is muscular motion, as is my muscular motion. And that
volition, is the product of a soul, or is seated in a soul, because it is
volition, as is my volition — 19.
Here ends the first chapter of the third be ok in the Commentary
of Sankara upon the Vaifiesika Aphorisms,
114 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY
BOOK THIRD— CHAPTER SECOND.
Mark of the existence of Mind.
Upaskdra. — Distinction of real and fallacious marks is the subject-matter of the (prece-
dirg) chapter. Now, going to bring the examination of the Soul to a close, the author, by
a transgression of the order of enumeration (of the Substances) (vide I. i, 5;, introduces th»
examination of the Mind, and says :
Atmendriyarthasanriikarse, on contact of the Soul
with the senses and their objects. STT'fi?! Jnanasya, of knowledge. m&:
Bhavah, existence, production, appearance. ?nrfW Abhavah, non-
existence, non-production, non-appearance. (Bhdsya. — reads the words
' bhdvah ' and ' abhdvah ' in a compounded form as bh&vdbhdvah.'') ^ Cha,
and. *H*T: Manasah, of the Mind. f^JT Lingam, Mark.
1. The appearance and non-appearance of knowledge, on
contact of the Soul with the senses and the objects are the marks
(of the existence) of the Mind. — 136.
He will say that the movement of the Mind is the mark (of tha
Soul). If, therefare, Mind is found on examination to be the instrument
or means of knowledge, and as being dense, moulded, or ponderable
( ifa* )> then it becomes proved that the Soul is that, being directed
by which, the Mind comes te be connected with the sense apprehensive
of the desired or agreeable object, rather than with any other
sense. This is the reason of the violation of the order of enumeration.
The meaning is that the Mind is that which, while there is contact of the
soul with the sense and its object, being connected with the sense, there
is production ef knowledge, and which not being so connected with the
sense, there is non-production of knowledge.
Objection. — Mind is all-pervading or universal. Nevertheless, non-
simultaneity of knowledge can be inferred from this alone that Mind
possesses the property of an iastrument. Moreover, Mind is universal
because, like Time, it is a substance void of any distinctive attribute;
because, like the Soul, it is the substratum of Conjunction which is the
non-combinative cause of knowledge ; and because, like Ether, it pos
sesses the absolute non-existence of Touch ; and there are similar other
proofs of its universality.
Answer. — It is not so. If Mind were universal or all-pervading,
then as it would be connected with all the senses, there would be only
one cognition including all the senses (i. e.} omui-sensuous). If it be
replied that (objection} such is not the case, because there is a contrariety
amongst the effects ; we deny this, (answer} for a complete cause does
not take notice of contrariety and non-contrariety whereby it might be
apprehensive of the contrariety of the characteristics of belonging to
perception by the eye, organ of taste, etc. It cannot be said, (objection)
"Or, it (cognition) may be of a variegated form like variegated colour,
as it is in the case of eating some pudding," (where perceptions of
taste, flavour, etc., take place all together) ; for (answer} even there
KANiDA SftTRAS III, 2, 2. 415
attention or attachment to a particular object (i. e., taste or flavour,
etc.,) is observed. Nor can it be asked, (objection) "• How then does the
complex belief arise, viz., i I perceive Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch
simultaneously '"i" ; for, (answer") it is merely a sense of simultaneity
in respect of the five cognitions, produced by the swiftly moving Mind
and presented in memory. It cannot be objected that attention to
particular objects is also dependent upon the property of the instru
ment, for the answer has already been given. If it be maintained
(objection') that attention depends upon the desire to understand ; we
deny this, for, (answer*) on that supposition, it would follow that when
there was a desire to understand all, there would be a total presenta
tion of all objects, wliereas the only result of a desire to understand is
connection of Mind with the sense percipient of the oject desired.
Inasmuch, therefore, as non-simultaneity of cognition is otherwise
impossible, the Mind is proved to possess a minimum of divisibility.
Consequently, the marks of universality are obstructed by proof which
comprehends or infers the subject. Moreover, if the Mind were all-per
vading, then there would not be such local character of pleasure, etc.,
as in " pleasure in my foot," " pain in my head," etc. ; for, the effects of
'universal substances' uniformly appear in places delimited by their
non-combinative causes. It cannot be said that in our view also it
follows that pleasure, etc., are confined to the place of the atom ; for,
the rule is that a non-combinative cause really produces an extensive
effect at its own place, so that there is no opposition to their produc
tion even beyond the limits of their instrumental causes, e. g., sandal-
wood, etc. It cannot be urged, " Mine too is request for remoteness
from ths instrument causes ; " for, it would entail a breach of the above
uniformity. Further, how will there be conjunction of the universal
Mind with the Soul ? It cannot be replied that it is without beginning,
for then disjunction will also necessarily become beginningless. It canot
be said that owing to the difference of their limitations (i.e., substrata
wherein they take place), both of them remain uncontradioted ; for, the
difference of the limitations of conjunction and disjunction depends
upon their own causes, whereas in the case of the difference of things
which have no beginning, such dependence does not exist. This is the
direction. — 1.
Mind is a substance, and te eternal.
Upnskdra. — Now, it may be asked, ''The perception of pleasure, etc., is producible by
an instrument, because it is an act, like the perception of Colour : from inference in
this way, or by the non-production of simultaneous cognition, Mind is proved as the instru
ment of that perception. But whence does it derive its Substance-ness, and eternality?"
Hence he says:
II \ I R I R I!
Tasya, its, of the mind. 5*^=1 fa?T& Dravyatva-nity atve, substance-
ness and eternality. ^nTH Vayuna, by Air. «-m<?^lci Vyakhyate, ex
plained.
2. The Substance-ness and eternality of Mind are explained
by (the explanation of the Snbstance-ness and eternality of)
Air.— 137.
116 VAI!§E§IKA PHILOSOPHY.
As the ultimate atom of Air, inferred from Substance made up of
parts, is a Substance, because it possesses attribute and action; BO
Mind, inferred by the non-production of simultaneous cognition, IK &
Substance, because it possesses attribute. For it is not productive of
cognition, withont conjunction with the sense, whereby it might appear
that possession of attribute does not belong to it. Moreover the pre
sentation of pleasure, etc., (to the Soulj must have a sense as its
instrument, because it is a presentation, like the presentation of Colour,
etc. Hence Mind is proved as an instrument or sense. And the being
a sense means the being the foundation or seat of the conjunction of
the Mind which is the instrument of cognition ; so that the Subtance-
ness of Mind is proved without much ado. And its eternality follows
from its not being made up of any other Substance. Arid this latter
characteristic follows from the absence of any proof for the supposition
of its being made up of parts — 2.
Mind is one.
Upaskdra.—- Then the doubt arises whether there be one Mind, or more than ons Mind,
existing in eaoh individual body. He states the means of decision :
II ^ I R I ^ II
. atnayaugapadyat, from the non-simultaneity of
volitions. STPTqtTTfn^ Jfianayaugapadyat, from the non-simultaneity of
cognitionjs ^ Cha, and. ^r*j Ekam, one.
3>. From the non-simultaneity of volitions, and from the non-
simultaneity of cognitions, (it follows that there is only) one
^Mind) (in each organism). — 138.
" Mind in each organism " is the complement of the Sutram.
If there were many Minds in a single organism, then cognitions and
volitions would be simultaneous. It is not a valid conclusion that
many volitions are produced at one and the same time, because simulta
neous actions are observed in the fingers of the hands and the toes of
the feet of a dancing girl ; for, that being explained or possible by the
swift movement alone of the Mind, simultaneity of necessary or corres
ponding particular attributes of the Soul in their indestructible state,
is not obtained. Hereby (t. e., by the necessary particular attributes of
the Soul in their indestructible state), the theory that in one and the
same body there are five Minds, and that on the conjunction of two,
three, four or five of them with their respective senses, two, three, four
or five cognitions are simultaneously produced, is refuted, as it would
entail a superfluity of suppositon ; while the sense of simultaneity is
upheld ( as an illusion). The implication of the simultaneity of two
cognitions, e. g., the cognitions " bitter treacle," produced by the
connection of the Mind with the sense-organ of Touch, und«r the limita
tion of the sense-organ of Taste, also does not exist in view of the pro
perty (t. e., of rapid transition) of the instrument or internal sense, (i. c.t
Mind). Action also in the two parts of a lizard, snake, etc., cut into two
or three pieces, arises from the impact of the chopper, etc., or the rapid
transition of the Mind, or the invisible operation of another (and barren)
Mind which has just slipped off from a liberated Soul.
KANADA SftTRAS III, 2, 4. 117
The view that Mind is really a whole made up of parts, like a leech
and that by its contraction and expansion, like those of a leech, simul
taneity and non-simultaneity of cognitions are respectively produced
is opposed by the fault of redundancy in the supposition of its parts!
This is the direction. — 3.
Marks of the existence of the Soul.
ffpatkdra. — Now, showing the purpose of the violation of the order of enumeration, he
, with a view to complete the enquiry into the Soul :
faftlft II ^ I R I « II
Prana-Apana-Nimesa-Unmesa-
Jivana-Manogati-Indriyantaravikarak, ascending life-breath, descend
ing life-breath, closing the eyelids, opening the eyelids, life, the move
ment of the Mind, and affections of the other senses. g<Sf:^3fT^^SpJ5n:
Sukha-Duhkha-Ichchha-Dvesa-Prayatna, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aver
sion, and Volition, ^r Cha, and. ^n?*TT: Atmanah, of the Soul.
f^jflf^r Lingani, marks.
4. The ascending life-breath, the descending life-breath, the
closing of the eye-lids, the opening of the eye-lids, life, the move
ment of the Mind, and the affections of the other senses, and also
Pleasure, Pain, Desire , Aversion, and Volition are marks (of the
•existence) of the Soul. — 159.
It must not be imagined that cognition itself is the only mark of
the Soul. There are also the ascending life-breath, etc., which are the»
marks of the Soul. Thus that is surely the Soul in consequence of the
volition of which the upward and downward motions in the air moving;
within the body and characterised as the ascending and the desceud-
ing life-breath, take place, not being possible otherwise than by voli
tion, just as the throwing upward and the throwing downward of
a pestle, etc-, (in a mortar, etc.), are not possible without volition.
For, Air, the nature of which is to blow obliquely, cannot undergo
sush cha-ige of nature without volitioa. It cannot be said that two
bodies of Air flowing in opposite directions and producing different
effects may, like two similar bodies of water, have an upward
motion. For, were this the case, there would be then the upward
motion only but not the downward motion, nor oblique motion as
in exsufflation or blowing by the mouth. There is then a being,
who, by his volition, impels the air upwards or downwards.
I cannot be asked how there could be upward and downward motions
of the ascending and descending life-breaths in a state of deep or
dream-less sleep ; for, at that time, though volition proper does not
exist, there exists another kind of volition which is called volition the
source of vitality. In like manner, the closing and the opening -of the
eye-lids also infer a presiding agent in the organism. Thus the closing;
of the eye-lide (nimesa) in an action which produces the conjunction.
of the lids of the eye ; unmesa or the opening of the eye-lids is an action.
118 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
•which produces their disjunction. These two actions, being cons
tantly produced without any visible cause such as molecular motion,
impact, etc., are not produced otherwise than by volition. As the danc
ing of a wooden manikin depends upon some one's volition, so also does
the dancing of the eye-lids. Thereby an entity, possessing volition, is-
inferred. Similarly, life also is a mark of the Soul. Thus by the
word ' life ' the effects of vitality, such as growth, the building up of
wounds, fractures, etc., are indicated by implication. So that as the
owner of a house builds up a broken edifice or enlarges a building
which is too small, so the presiding agent of the organism effects, by
food etc., the increase of enlargement of the organism which is to him in
the stead of a habitation, and with medicine and the like, causes what
is wounded to grow again, and broken hands and feet to grow together
again. Thus like the master of a house, at guardian of the body is also
proved. In the same way, the movement of the Mind also is a mark of
the Soul. Thus it has been proved, in the foregoing section, that the
Mind is something moulded or ponderable (m&rto*) and that it is indivisi
ble. Its application to a sense percipient of the desired object is
dependent upon desire and attention. So that the inference is that the
Soul is that being whose desire and attention direct the Mind, as a boy
standing at the corner of a room sends a top or ball of lac hither and
thither within the room itself.
It may be objected, " The dancer of the wooden manikin, the
master of a house, or the boy (referred to above) is not different from
his body, 30 that he could be adduced as an example. Moreover, it is
the body which is the seat of consciousness inasmuch as it is the object
of the sense of I-ness (a/iam/cdra) ; for, there are tl lam fair/' " I am
stout/' and the like intuitions which are co-extensive with I-ness. It
may be urged that, on this theory, a man would not recollect in his
youth or old age wrhat he perceived in his boyhood, because as in the
case of a difference of bodies, like those of Chaitra and Maitra, so here
too there would be no recognition, on the maxim, " One does not remem
ber what another saw." Here we may point out that Chaitra and
Maitra being two different currents, there may not be any correlatior,
whereas (in the case of a single indvidual) in syite of the differences of
boyhood and youth, the current being the same, correlation by means
of the relation of cause and effect will be possible.'' To this argument
we Mill reply that it would follow, on the above theory, that the son also
would remember what was perceived by the father. If it be rejoined
that perception of the difference of body prevents this, we reply that
correlation (in the form of recollection) will not be possible also in the
case of an old man who perceives his present body only as different
from the body which he had as a boy, and also that there is no percep
tion of the difference of body for a boy who has nevor known his
father. In " My body," the sense of I-ness appears as identical with
the sense of ' My-ness ' Cand not as identical with the intuition of the
body). If it be replied that the same holds good in the case of " My
Soul " also ; wo reply that it does not, because the use of ' My' is there
topical, since the genitive may be used even where there is no differ
ence, as in " The head of Rahu " (Rahu being all head). The consequ
ences of killing, etc., (i. e., Merits and Demerits) also will not result to-
the agent or doer, as his body will be different and different (at every
KANlDA SfrTRAS III, 2, 5. 119
stage of transmigration). Further, (on your theory), consciousness
being limited to the bhutas or elements (which constitute the body and
are different at every new birth), if a man desires a sinful act, he will
escape the consequences of his own acts, and there will be also the
defect of the acquisition of the results of acts not done by him who
experiences them- This is the point.
" From the affections of the other senses." — For surely is observed
an overflow of the salivary juice , induced by a strong desire for the
taste, of one who, after experiencing the particular taste, accompanied
by the particular colour, of an orange or a chira-vilva, observes such
fruit again. Now, this cannot take place without the inference of the
acid taste ; nor the inference, without the recollection of the universal
relation or invariable co-existence (of the taste and the colour); nor the
recollection, without impression (Samskdra) ; nor the impression, with
out the experience of the universal relation ; nor the experience, with
out repeated observation. This concatenation of cognitions, standing
to one another in the relation of cause and effect, cannot be possible
without (the existence of) a selfsame agent. Thus there is the Sutram
of Gautama. " From the affections of the other sense." (Ny ay a- Sutram.
I1II. i. 12).
Pleasure and the like also are to be regarded, like cognition, as marks
of the Soul. Thus pleasure and the like must reside somewhere or must
reside in some substance, because they are things which are produced,
or qualities like colour, etc. Hence an inference by analogy, accom
panied by an exclusion of other possibilities, takes for its subject
inherence or residence in a Substance other than the eight Substances.
For the proposition that desire which does not reside in Earth and seven
other Substances, resides in a Substance, is not complete unless it assu
mes as its mood the being resident in a Substance other than the eight
Substances. Where, however, exclusion of other possibilities does not
appear at first, there the being resident in a Substance other than the
eight substances, will have to be proved by argument from effect to cause or
negative reasoning. This is the distinction. It is absurd to say that
inference has only the mjod of that which determines the universal
relation ; for that alone is the mood there without which the intuition
or inference would not result. Otherwise, in " A dyad not being
resident in an effect, must reside somewhere, because it is a whole made
up of parts," and such other cases, there would be no inference having
for its mood the being resident in a noneffect. — 4.
Soul is a substance, and is eternal.
Upaskdra. — Well, granted that there is proof of a fixed Soul. But whenoa is it eternal
and whence is it a Substance ? To meet this obj action, he says :
M I * I VI •«
Tasya, its, of the Soul. ^sqwf^Rq^ Dravyatva-nityatve, Subs
tance-ness and eternality. ^T<HI Vayuna, by Air. 5qr<?q[^ Vyakhyate,
•explained.
5. Its Substance-ness and eternality are explained by (the
•explanation of the Substance-ness and eternality of) Air.— 140.
120 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
As there is no proof for the supposition of parts in the ultimate-
atom of Air, and therefore Air is eternal, so also in the case of the Soul.
As the ultimate atom of Air is a Substance, because it possesses-
attributes, so also is the Soul. This is the meaning 5.
Objection : I. Mark of the Soul, not visible.
Upatkdra. — Ho cites an objection of the opposite party to the foregoing conclusion :
\: Yajnadattah, He is Yajnadatta. tffr Iti, this, sfa^ Sannikarese,.
there being contact. M*ft!l*J|«Ucl Pratyaksabhavat, from the absence of
perception. Because there is no perception. eg Dristam, visible,
Lingam, mark, f Na, not. fau^ Vidyate, exists.
6. There is no visible mark (of the existence of the Soul),.
because there being contact (of the senses with the body of
Yajnadatta), perception does not arise that this Soul is Yajna
datta).— 141.
There being contact, if no such perception take place as " This is
YajSadatta," then there is no visible mark, i. e., no mark the universal
relation of which with the sddhya or what has to be proved, has been
grasped by perception. The meaning is that as smoke, perceived as
accompanying tire which is perceptible, is a visible mark in the case
of fire, so there is no such visible mark which can estaclish the ex
istence of the Soul. — 6.
IJpaskdra. — Lest it might be urged, " Although no visible mark exists, the universal
relation of which has been observed by perception, yet a sdmdnyatcdrittam, or commonly-
observed or analogous mark, will be the mark, for it is not that there can be no inference from
that," therefore the objector says :
: II ^ I R I v*
Samanyato-dristat, from a commonly-observed or analo
gous mark. ^ Cha, and. uf^fa: Avisesah, non-particular. Not a thing
in particular or as such.
7. And from a commonly-observed mark (there is) no
(inference of anything in) particular. — 142.
A commonly-observed mark also becomes a mark of inference. But
it does not prove the Soul as Soul, nor as a Substance over and above
the eight Substances. It would only prove that desire, etc., must be
resident somewhere. And this does not suggest the thought of a Soul.
This' is the meaning. Therefore it is stated, " Not a thing in
particular." — 7.
3. — Therefore Soul proved by Revelation.
eins
Upskdra.—Are then the texts of the Vedas, for instance, " He is the Soul, in whom all
are killed," etc., meaningless ? Apprehending this, the same objector says :
KANlDA SftTRAS III, 2, 9. 121
n ^ i R i c n
Tasmat, therefore, because the Soul cannot be proved by
reasoning. ^Tlf^: Agamikah, scriptural, proved by the revealed texts.
8. Therefore (the Soul is) proved by Revelation. — 143.
The Soul is really proved by Revelation only, but not by inference,
since visible and commonly-observed marks do not exist. Therefore,
mental vision of the principles or essences of things results from the
proper hearing of the Upanisads, and not from the course of intellec
tion. So that this Regulation (i. e.} the Vaisesika system), which
teaches intellection, is no regulation. For, it is observed in the case of
" ten ghosts, swimming across the river," etc., that the cognition of the
person who has representation of these things in his consciousness,
arises only from the very instructions that ten ghosts dwell on this
tree, that such and such an object floats across the river, etc.). — 8,
Objections answerd.
Upaskdra. — Toi this objection of the first party, set forth in the three foregoing sdtras,
the upholder of the doctrine of inference replies :
Aham. I. ff^T Iti, this, Jffs^T Sabdasya, of the word.
Vyatirekat, exclusion, non-application, divergence, abhorrence, T Na,
not, ^Hlfr^'J^ Agamikam, Scriptural. Proved by Revelation.
9. (The proof of the existence of the Soul is not solely) from
revelation, because of the non-application of the word T (to other
designates or objects).— 144.
Revelation alone is not the proof of the existence of Soul ; but
the Soul is proved also by the inference that the word * I/ or the word
*Soul/ must have some designate (or objective reality corresponding-
to it), because it is a word, like the word, water-pot, etc. Lest it
might be said that it is Earth, etc., which are its designates, so he says,.
"Because of non-application," in other words, because of the non-appli
cation or divergence of the word 'i' from Earth, etc. For, there never
arises any such use of language or intuition as "I am Earth," "I am,
Water," "I am Fire," "I am Air," I am Ether," "I am Time," I am
Space," "I am Mind." If you object that such intuition or use arises
with respect to the body, we reply that it does not, for it would then
entail such intuition or use with respect to the bodies of others ; if, that
it arises with respect to one's own body, we reply that it is not so, for
*one's own' or one's self, as different from the Soul, has no meaning or
is not proved by etymology, and because the intuition, " My body,"
proceeds upon a difference of substrata. It cannot be said, (objection)
"Well, but this too is an inference by analogy which however does not
and with a particular thing, and is therefore defective ; " for, (answer)
in the word 'I,' I-ness or Soul-ness itself forms the specification or
distinction. So that on the strenght of the property of its being an
122 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
attribute of the subject of the argument (pafoa), it follows that I-ness
is the cause of the inference of Soul, and as it is not common to any
other object, therefore the particular object (or the Soul in parti
cular) is proved. Similarly, there is proof of the particular object,
from the analogous inference or commonly observed mark accompained
with the exclusion of other possibilities. The objection which has been
made, namely, " From ' hearing ' alone results realization or intuition
of the Soul ; what is the need of all this proof ?", is not sound. For,
without reflection or intellection, the dross of unbelief in wavering
minds cannot be purged away ; without this purification, there can
be no aptitude in them for constant meditation ; and without constant
meditation, there can be no realization of truth or intuition of the
Soul, which is capable of uprooting false knowledge together with
desires or appetencies, as it is from habit only that a sad lover
suddenly comes to have a mental realization of his beloved lady, and
because verbal or inferential knowledge is not capable of uprooting
false knowledge, as is seen in the case of delusion in respect of direc
tion in Space, etc. This is the import.
If it be asked, "Still how can a sign or indication (of its existence)
be apprehended in the Soul which is imperceptible '?", we reply, "Who
has ever said that the Soul is not perceptible ? On the contrary, the
Soul is apprehended by its proximity through or in the form of con
junction, to the Mind. Otherwise, how can there be such intuitions as
'I am happy,' 'I know,' 'I desire,' 'I will/ 'I feel pain,' etc ? For these
intuitions are neither unsubstantial nor of doubtful substantiality,
because like that of the perception of blueness, their substantiality is
undoubted. Nor are they inferential or derived from marki, for they
arise even without any knowledge of marks. Nor again are they
derived from verbal information or authority, for they do not follow
upon enquiry for that." If it be urged that they are appearances of
perception (and not true perceptions), we reply that they must have
then for their object something which is not apparent (i.e, real), for
it will be shown in the sequel that that which is not object of certain
knowledge, cannot be applied by metaphor to or superimposed upon,
another object — 9.
The s&tram is illustrative. It should be known that
inferences, as described above, by the marks of knowledge, etc., are
also proofs of the existence of the Soul.
Counter-objection stated.
Upaskdra. — "If this be so (i.e., if the Soul can be known by sense-perception)," the
objector says, "then what is the need'of inference ?"
n ^ i ^ i to ii
qft Yadi, if. $j Dristam, observation. 3T?5Rf Anvaksam, sensuous.
*Tf* Aham', I. ^JrT: Devadattah, Devadatta. ST?" Aham, I qjTT?T: Yajna-
dattah, Yajnadatta. ?f>r Iti, such.
10. If (there are) such sensuous observations (or perceptions)
as 'I am Devadatta,' 'I am Yajfiadatta,' (then there is no need of
inference). — 145.
KANlDA StfTRAS III, 2, 11. 123
The word 'iti' marks the form of knowldge, In 'dristam,' the affix
<kta' is used in a passive sense. 'Anvaksain' means sensuous or per
ceptual. Therefore the meaning is : if there is perceptual or sensuous
observation in the form of 'This is Devadatta,' 'This is YajEadatta/
then what is the use of taking the troule of making an inference ?
"For an elephant being in sight or observation, those who infer, do not
infer it by its screaming." — 10.
Above answered.
Upaskdra.—To this the advocate of Inference says :
f*Tf
II
52 Driste, (lit. Seen), grasped by perception, sn^fr Atmani, the soul.
Linge, being accompanied with marks. W: Ekah, one. ^ Eva, only
Dridhatvat, because it becomes more firm or fixed. W9T*H<t. Praty-
aksavat, like other percepts or perceptions. SRgq: Pratyayah, intuition.
Belief.
11. As in the case of other percepts, so, if the Soul, which is
grasped by perception, is also accompained with, or comes at the
top of, marks (from which it can be inferred), then, by means of,
confirmation, the intuition becomes fastened to one and only one
object. — 146.
' Driste/ i. e., grasped by perception ; l atmani ' ; ' linge/ i. e., having
all its marks or causes developed ; eka eva,, i.e., having one object only
as its matter ; ' pratyayah/ ' Pratyayah ' implies the expulsion of all
apprehension of error. " How can it be so ? " Hence he says, ' dridha-
tvat/ i. e., because the current of proof is capable of removing the
apprehension of its being otherwise. He gives an example, 'pratyksavat';
i. e., as even when there is perception of water from a distance, yet
inference of water by the mark of the baldkds (water birds) is made for
the purpose of corroboration. So it has been said, "Skilful logicians
desire to understand by inference even what is grasped by perception."
The import here is this : Although at times the Soul really shines in
mental perception, yet, like knowledge, produced by the flash of light
ning, it does not derive so much fixity or permanence being overclouded
by such other conflicting perceptions as " I am fair," li I am lean/' and
the like. Here another form of knowledge produced by marks which
cannot but lead to their proper inference, confirms or fixes the very
knowledge previously obtained from perception. Moreover, inference
must be applied to the Soul owing to the desire to infer the knowledge
that intellection of the Soul as taught in the precepts "(The Soul)
should be heard about, reflected upon," and the like, is a means towarda
the realization of that which is desirable, i. e., the Supreme Good.
Because if there be no intellection of the Soul, then constant medita
tion would be impossible, and consequently there would be no realiza
tion of the Soul in the understanding, and so salvation would be
impossible. This is the purport.
124 VAI£E§IKA PHILOSOPHY.
The statement of the two separate intutitions, 'I am Devadatta,'
and " I am Yajnadatta," in the foregoing Sutrara, is intended to show
that there can be only individual intutition of every Soul. — 11.
Counter-objection stated and answered.
Upaskdra.—'" Well," it may ba objected, " if the intutition, ' I am Yajnadatta ' refers
to the Soul, then the appearance (of the notion Yajnadatta) as co-existing in the samo snbs-
tratum with Going, as in ' Yajnadatta goes,' is impossible." So he says :
: Devadattah, Devadatta. JT^fcf Grachchhati, goes. ?nr^rT: Yajna-
dattah, Yajnadatta. JT^ajfa Gachchhati, goes. ffrt Iti, such. These.
S*HKI?J Upacharat, by transference. SKft Sarire, in the body. R9iq:
Pratyayah, intutition. Belief.
12. 'Davadatta goes,' 'Yajladatta goes,' — in these cases, the
belief (that their respective bodies go) is due to transference. — 147.
For there are such intutitions as " I am fair," " I am stout," and
there is also such differential intutitiou as " My body." Now, in
" Devadatta goes," the perception of co-existence with motion, and
the use of language to express it, are topical, whereas the intutition
lt my " is real as carrying its own meaning. Although the property of
being Devadatta is a jdti, kind or genus, existing in the body whereby
the use of language as Devadatta goes " is in the primary sense and
the intutition is true in its own meaning, yet if the term Devadatta be
applied to the Soul delimited by it, it is then to be understood as a
transferred epithet.
Another objection.
Upaskdra. — Here he apprehends (an objection):
: II \ [ * I
Sandigdhah, doubtful. 3 Tu, however. ST^T*: Upacharah,
Transference.
13. The transference, however, is doubtful. — 148.
The word 'tu' points out the opponent's view. The intutition and
the use of the word, 'I,' are observed both in respect of the Soul and
body. Therefore the doubt arises which intutition and expression be
the primary, and which the secondary ones. — 13.
Above answered.
t7pAskdra.—"'H.& solves the (doubt:
Aham, I.ff^T Iti, this. U3(J||wPt Pratyag-atmani, in the in-going or
individual Soul. *TRT^ Bhavat, because it exists. *&.% Paratra, other-
KANiDA SftTRAS III, 2, 15. 125
where. SRTWC Abhavat, because it does not exist. ?TO???TCSlW^r: Arthantara-
pratyaksah, (Intuition) wherein the individual soul is the object of
perception.
14. Because the intuition T exists in one's own soul, and
because it does not exist otherwhere, therefore the intuition has
the individual Soul as the object of perception.— 149.
' Arthantara-pratyaksah ' is that intuition in which l arthantaram,*
i. e., the Soul itself, is the percept. The meaning is as follows : Since the
intuition ' I ' arises in respect of ' pratyagatma/ i. e., one's own Soul,
and since it does not arise ' paratra ' i. e., in respect of other Souls,
therefore it is proper to regard the reference to 'arthantaram' or one's
own Soul as the primary reference. If, on the other hand, the primary-
reference were to the body, then the intuition whould be produced by
the external senses, for the body is not an object of mental perception,
and the intuition ' This is I ' is mental being produced even without
the operation of the external senses, since the mind takes in as its
object the Soul as modified by appropriate particular attributes in the
form of ' I am happy/ < I know,' * I will,' ' I desire,' This intuition is
not inferential, as it is produced even without seeking any mark of
inference. Nor is it verbally communicated, since it is produced even
•without the apprehension of any authoritative text. Therefore it is
•only mental ; further because the mind, as it is not an independent agent
-outside its own sphere, does not apply into the body and other external
objects. Moreover, if it be urged that, if it referred to the body, it
would refer to the bodies of others, and if it referred to one's own Soul,
it would also refer to the Souls of others ; we deny this, for the Soul of
one man is beyond the senses of another, since its particular attributes
have no fitness for or relation to, them, and since its fitness for or rela
tion to, them arises from the taking on or super-imposition of appro
priate particular attributes. Nor is this the nature of the Soul only,
but of every Substance. For Substanc^ becomes perceptible only by
the taking on of appropriate particular attributes. If it is said that
Ether also should, for the same reason, become perceptible by the
accompaniment of Sound, we reply that such would be the case, if the
car were capable of apprehending Substance, or if Ether possessed
colour. If it is rejoined that the Soul also is equally devoid of colour,
we reply that it is in the case of external Substances only that posses
sion of colour is a requisite with regard to perceptibility. The word
•' pratyag,' in-going, points out divergence from others. — 14.
Another objection.
Upaskdra. — He apprehends another objection :
I 11 U II
Devadattalj, Devadatta. »T5a[% G-achchhati, goes. tf$f Iti, thii.
, from transference. Sfflwr'rtfJ, Abhimanat, from fancy,
126 VIAgESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
reference to Soul, Conceit, Egotism, or Self-identification. rTT^ Tavatr
because, therefore, JU^fkuw^r Sarirapratyksah having the body as the
object. ?T5"^n!: Ahankarah, ahamkara. The intuition of I. I-ness.
15. The intuition of 'I' has the body for its object. There
fore to say that, in 'Devadatta goes,' there is a transference (of
epithet), is a mere fancy. — 150.
' Ahankarah,' i. e., the intuition of ' I.' It is ' Sarirapratyaksah/
i. e., that which has the body as the percept or subject-matter. You
have determined that the intuition or, for the matter of that the expres
sion, " Devadatta goes, " is due to transference. Now, this transference
is a fancied one, because such intuitions and expressions as " I am
fair," " I am lean," " I am fortunate, my brith is a mere repetition/'
and the like, cannot be reconciled on the theory of transference. This
is the meaning. — 15.
Above answered.
Upatkdra. — He gives the solution:
'» U ^ I Rl
r: Sandigdhah, doubtful, g Tu, but. HHK' Upacharah, trans
ference.
16. The transference, (as characterised by you), however,
is doubtful.— 151.
The word Hu ' here points out the solution (of the foregoing objec
tion). The meaning is that there is doubt even in what has been said
(by you, ». e., the opponent^), namely that the transference is a fancied
one, whereas the intuition of ' I ' is in respect of the body itself. Since,
therefore, the intuition is a false witness on either side, we must endea
vour to find out a distinction. Since on making this endeavour, we
observe that even a man, whose eyes have been closed, still has the intui
tion of ' I,' we must hold that it refers to an object different from the
body, and beyond the cognizance of the external senses. If it referred to
the body, it would reter to the bodies of others, and also would not take
place in independence of the eyes. If it be asked how there can be
such common measure or co-extension as in "I who am stout or thin,.
am happy;" we reply that in this case it is possible that the body
would appear as the condition of pleasure, etc., as in " This forest is
resonant with the roar of a lion " (there is such appearance). Mere
I-ness, presented by the Mind, is superimposed upon the body, just as
heat, presented by the organ of touch, in the judgments, " The water
is hot, " " The body is hot/' etc __ 16.
Above answered — continued.
UpaslcAra. — By elaborating the solution ihe says :
: \\\
«T Na, not. 3 Tu, but. *Ftt*ft$qRt $arira-vifiesat, perceiving the di
fference of bodies, qv^foa^fa^: Yajnadatta-Visnumitrayoh, of Yajna
KANADA StiTRAS III, 2, 18. 127
datta and Visnumitra. $n*f Jnanam, knowledge, thought, fc^: Visayah,
object
17. But the thoughts of Yajfiadatta and Visnumitra do not
become objects of perception to them, while they perceive the
difference of their bodies. (Therefore consciousness is not an
attribute of the body).— 152.
' Jnanam' implies sensible pleasure, pain, and other attributes of
the Soul. As the bodies of Yajnadatta and Visnumitra are mutually
•different, so are also their knowledge, pleasure, pain, and the like
different. Accordingly, as is this body of Yajnadatta, so also, though
no knowledge, or pleasure, etc., be produced in \ ajnadatta, will the
knowledge, etc., "I feel pleasure," "I know" " I will, " " I desire, " be
objects (of perception) ; because the sensible body being an object of
perception, knowledge, etc., which are (ex hypothesi) its properties, like
its colour, etc., will have the possibility of being perceptible. But this
i? imposible. Therefore Csuch is the import), it should be said that the
seat or subject of knowledge, etc., is something really different from
the body. l ^ariraviiesat' means from difference of body. The fifth
case-ending has been used in the sense of the infinitive. So that the
meaning is that knowledge or thought is not an object of perception,
while difference of body is being perceived. — 17.
Proof of Soul not from Revelation only.
Upaskdra. — It may bo objected as follows : — " The Soul ia not perceptible, since, like
Ether, it is a colourless Substance, or a Substance without component parts. Therefore th«
body itself should be affirmed to be the object of the cognition " I am thin, pale." If
occasionally there arises also the consciousness " I feel pleasure," it is proper to suppose
that pleasure and the like becoming manifest without a substratum, are transferred to or
superimposed upon the body. As in " Hot, fragrant water," heat and' fragrance appearing
without a substratum are superimposed upon water, but for the sake of this the intuition of
water also does not contain as its object anything except common water ; so 1-ness in "I
am " is real only in reference to the body, whereas pleasure and the like are sometimes
superimposed upon it. There is then, in respect of the Soul, no knowledge of it in the form
of perception. That which has to be supposed as the substratum of pleasure, etc., must be
established by revelation. There is no perception of it." In reply to this objection, he says •
II \ \ ^ \
Aham, I. $fr Iti, this, g^qfrq^f Mukhya-yogyabhyam, by innate
or self-evident and perceptive or sensible cognition. 3^^ J§hbdavat,
like sound. sqf^fojfsqfiRrTCT^ Vyatirekabyabhicharat, from the invari
ability of absence or divergence, f^qfa^: ViSesa-siddheh, frcm proof in
particular. ^ Na, not. ?Hqfa^r: gamikah, scriptural, proved by
revelation.
18. (The soul is) not proved (only) by Revelation, since, (as
Ether is proved by Sound, so) (the Soul is) proved in particular, by
the innate as well as the sensible cognition in the form of 'I,'
accompained by the invariable divergence (of such cognition from
all other things), as is the case with Sound. — 153.
128 VAI£E§IKA PHILOSOPHY.
This is the meaning. The cognition, " I feel pleasure," or " I am
in pain/' is neither scriptural, nor verbally communicated, nor in
ferential, since it arises even without the help of verbal communication
or of marks of inference- Whereas it has been said that colourlessness
and simplicity (or the not being an aggregate of component parts) are
obstacles to the perception of the soul, this holds true in the case of
perception by external senses, for of this the possession of colour and
the possession of more than one substance are the necessary conditions.
or exciting causes, while mental perception is independent of these.
It may be objected that this would be the case were there proof of the
existence of the Soul, but that there is none. Accordingly it has been
said, "From proof in particular by invariable divergence, as is the case
with Sound." As in the Substances, Earth, etc., the absence of Sound ig
invariable, i. e., uniform, and there is thereby proof of a particular
Substance, namely Ether, in addition to the eight Substances, as the
Substratum of Sound, so on account of the invariable divergence of desire
froui Earth, etc., the substratum of desire also must be different from the
eight Substances. Lest it be argued that all this goes to show only
that the Soul is a subject of inference, not an object of perception,
the words " by the innate as well as the sensible cognition in the
form of 'P are employed. By the word 'iti' the form of the cognition is.
indicated. Therefore the cognition, in the form of 'I/ which is pro
duced, without the help of verbal communication and mark of inference,
in one whose eyes are closed, should be explained by the innate idea,
of Egoity or I-ness and its sensible or perceptible attributes, and not
by reference to the body, and the like, since the divergence or absence
of desire is invariable there. After "by the innate as well as the sensible
cognition" the words "Should be established" are to be supplied.
There are many proofs of the existence of the Soul. They are omitted
here for fear of increasing the volume of the treatise. They should
be sought in the Maytikha — 18.
Vivfiti. — Vedantins, however, hold that the soul is nothing but
eternal knowledge (vijnana) according to the Sruti, SlfsfawN'S^S^ *J f ?H I
^Tr*i JTsT*H'??f sHF, "Lo ! the Soul, imperishable, is truth, knowledge,,
infinite, and all-pervading," (Brihaddrnyaka Upanisad IV. v. 14).
Although, in reality, it is one, yet, owing to the diversity of its Upddhi
or adjuncts in the form of the inner sense, which are products of Mdydr
i.e., limitation, it appears as manifold. That it is so, follows from such
Srutis as yt>*HlRdlM*t "One only, without a second," Chhdndogya
Upanisad, VI. ii. I), q^^sTI ^4^?TTrd<lr*4| ^T 5*f nRlfrMHffi "^o tne one"
inner Self of all beings, for every form, became its counterform""
(Katha Upanisad, II. v. 9.)
He discredits this view.
The words, i object of perception ' are the complement of ' aham
Hi/ ' I ' — this. Thus, the object of such popular mental perceptions
as ' I feel pleasure/ etc., is not ' agamika/ i. e., identical with tsvara^
the probandum, of such l agama ' or text of the Veda as " truth, know
ledge, infinite, and all-pervading," (Taittiriya Upanisad, II. i. 1). He
states the reason of this by g^pftn^vqf etc. ftfofe^: because difference
from Isvara is established by pleasure and pain, which, though primary
KANADA StiTRAS III, 2, 12. 129
or instinctive or original or innate, are yet sensible. The instinctive-
ness of pleasure lies in agreeables or desirables, since it is there the
object of desire which is not dependent upon any other desire ; whereas
the instinctiveness of pain lies in disagreeable, since it is there the
objeet of aversion which is not dependent upon any other aversion.
Sensibleness, again, is the being the object of perception (i. e. by the
inner sense). This is mentioned for the purpose of removing the
(possible) apprehension that the mark is an unproved or unknown
mark, and also to prevent overeaten sion, in the case where eternal
bliss is attributed to Isvara, because eternal bliss can never be an
object of perception. Pleasure and pain, therefore, being products,
are proof of the difference between the Jiva and fsvara. This argu
ment is illustrative : it should be observed that knowledge, volition,
desire, and also aversion, as products, establish difference from Isvara.
It may be urged that in such inferences as, u The soul which is the
object of the perception, ' I am/ is different from Isvara, because it
possesses pleasure which is a product," there being no example, and
consequently no observation of congruity of similar instances, know
ledge of the universal relation is impossible. For this reason, it has
been said wjfaVflJWfftraTT^ i- e., from the uniformity of difference. The
use of the ablative inflexion has the object of denoting the (necessary)
condition leading to the inference, and the syntactical connection of
the word is with the word f^fa%3[: The import, therefore, is, that,
even though there is no example by way of agreement, yet, Isvara
being an example by way of difference, an inference with respect to
the matter in hand is possible, through the observation of the universal
relation of difference, dependent upon the concomitance or congruity
of difference.
It may be urged, again, that that a mark can establish difference
from Isvara, by the universal relation of difference, has not been
known before. To remove this apprehension, it has been stated JT»^c£
i. e., like Sound, etc. The meaning is this : As the difference of Ether
from Isvara is proved by the mark, namely Sound, which is known by
the method of the universal relation, or uniformity, of difference, so
the difference of the soul from tsvara is proved by the possession of
pleasure, etc., which are products.
Bhdgya: — In III. ii. 6 — 17, the author gives, in the form of a
dialogue, contrary arguments as to whether the Self be an object of
perception only, or of inference only, or of both, and gives his own
conclusion in III. ii. 18.
Unity of Soul, as an objection.
Upaskdra.—- Having thus finished the section on the investigation of the Soul, he now
begins the section on the plurality of Souls. Therein the following aphorism s«ti forth an
adverse doctrine.
I \ ( * \
% Sukha-du^kha-jnana-nispatti-avilesat, because
there is no difference in the production of pleasure, painj and know
ledge. f TRWf Aikatmyam, identity or unity of Soul.
130 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
19. Soul is one, since there is no difference in the produc
tion of pleasure, pain, and knowledge. — 154.
There is only one S:>ul, in spite of the difference of the bodies of
Chaitra, Maitra, and others. Why ? Because of the non-distinction in the
prodiiction of pleasure, nain, and knowledge, i. e., because the origin of
pleasure, pain, and knowledge is really undifferentiated in this that it
is determined by, or confined to, the body as a whole. If there were
another mark to prove the difference of the Soul, the difference of the
Soul might be proved, but there is no such mark. As Ether is only one,
in spite of the production of Sounds within the limits of particular
•paces, since there is no distinction in Sound which is its mark ; as
Time is only one, since there is no distinction in the intuition of simul
taneity, etc., which is its mark ; »s Space is only one, since there is no
distinction in the intuition of East, West, etc., which is its mark ; (so
the Soul is only one). — 19.
Vivirti. — It may be urged that the identity of Jiva and Isvara must
be admitted, on the strength of the texts of the Veda, " One only, with
out a second. dH*4fa ^H%d1, " Thou, 0 !§vetaketu, art that," (Chhan-
dogya Upanisad VI. viii. 7), etc. It cannot be held that difference is
proved by the aforesaid inference ; because, pleasure, pain, etc. , being
properties of the internal organ, are unproved by themselves (t. e., have
no independent existence). Thus says the Brihadaranyaka Upanisnd, I.
V. 3-, TW' tf^ftfrf%for?ST3r3CTS9T3CT ^rdcT^fcfWfb^ H^ *nr^, "Desire, Inten
tion, Doubt, Faith, Unfaith, Patience, Impatience, Modesty, Intelli
gence, Awe, — all this is verily Mind " Here the word Desire denotes
pleasure, and the word Intelligence denotes knowledge in the from of a
faculty. Moreover, pain, algo, appearing, as it does, in co-existence
with pleasure, cannot be an attribute of the Soul.
This he apprehends :
The meaning is that, Tlft'Stalc^ ». e., becasue the difference of the
Jivatma (embodied Soul) from fsvara is not proved, fr«R*TT, ». «., by the
certainty or ascertainment, g^r^TT'TFTf , i. e., of pleasure, pain, and
knowledge ; in other words, they, being proved in the mind by the
above Sruti or Vedic text, are thereby disproved in the Soul.
It* diversity explained.
Upatkdra. — H« itatoi the solution or conclusion :
5fWT M I R I Ro ||
: Vyavasthatah, from status. ^TTfl Nan a, many.
20. Plurality of Souls is proved by status. — 155.
Souls are many. Why ? Because of status. Status means several
conditions, at one is rich, another miserable, one is happy, another un
happy, one it of high, another of low, birth, one is learned, another
ignorant. These circumstances being impossible without a diversity of
Souls, prove a diversity of Souls. It cannot be maintained that as the
states of one and the same Soul is diversified by the difference of birth
KANADA SftTRAS III, 2, 21. 131
or by the difference of childhood, youth and old age, so also it will be
in the case of the difference of the bodies of Chaitra, Maitra, and
others, for it is possible to impose contradictory attributes (on one and
the same subject) by means of change of Time (i. e.} at different
times).— 20.
Vivriti. — He removes the apprehension. STTTT means non-identity of
the Souls, in other words, that the Jivatma is not identical withfivara.
Whence ? •5T3^TT?T:, because of the certainty of the existence of pleasure,
pain, and knowledge, in the Soul. For pleasure, etc., are not proper
ties of the mind, because the mind not having largeness or large size,
pleasure etc., Would be imperceptible; and minuteness or atom-ness or
subtleness must be affirmed of the mind as determining the non-simul
taneity of acts of knowing. The 5ruti, " Desire, Resolution, etc.,"
however, like "Life is clarified butter/' etc., demonstrates that the mind
is the cause of desire, etc., but not that it is their receptacle, nor that
it is identical with them.
Its diversity explained — continued.
I7paskdra.-—Ho gives another proof :
l M I R I ** II
^astra-samarthyat, from the authority (or force or signi
ficance) of the Sdstras. •g Cha, and.
21. (Plurality f of Souls follows) also from the authority or
significance of the Sdstras, — 156.
' ^astram' means Yeda or revelation. Because difference of Soul is
proved by it also. For it is heard. " Two Brahmans (i.e., Souls) have
to be known," etc.; and also "Two birds, friends and kindred, embrace
the same tree, etc." (Mundaka Upanisad III, i. I.) — 21.
Here ends the second chapter of the third book in the Commentary
of !§ri !§ankara on the Aphorisms of Kanada.
It cannot be asked. "What then will be the fate of these
texts , viz., " Thou art that, O &vetaketu ! " " One who knows Brahman,
verily becomes Brahman," etc. ? For the text, " Thou art That," conveys
the sense of identity in this sense that what is devoted to, or, belongs to
That, is not different from That. The text, "One who knows Brahman*
verily becomes Brahman, ll does not convey the sense of identity, but thatr
of similary of the Jiva (t. e., the embodied Soul), to Isvara (i.e., the Great
Soul), in point of freedom from suffering etc. ; for, otherwise, the text.
'The stainless one attains to supreme similarity," can have no meaning.
In popular language also there is the topical use of identity in the
sense of resemblance, as when there is an abundance of wealth, it is said,
"this priest has become a king," and so on. Nor should it be ma
intained that identity is produced in the state of salvation, on the
cessation of ignorance or false knowledge, since difference, being
eternal, is incapable of destruction, and even if we admit the destruc
tion of difference, then since there is necessity for the existence of two
individuals. So much in brief.
132 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
Bhasya '.—Interpret* III. ii. 19, 20, and 21 in the monistic sens*
namely, that there exists only one Self, variously differentiated on the
phenomenal plane, as witnessed by such texts as " One only, with-
out a second," " One ihitiing Being is immanent in all created things,"
< All Selves become one," "All Selves emanate from this, Same Self"
Two birds," etc.
— :* : —
KANiDA StTTRAS IV, 1, 1. 133
BOOK FOURTH— CHAPTER FIRST.
The eternal defined. *
Upaskdra.— Having finished the enumeration, definition, and examination of th« nina
'Substances, Earth, etc., and desiring to refute the dootrine, held by the Samkhya philoso
phers, that prakriti or Matter is the prime cause, and to establish that ultimate atoms are
the prime cause and enter into the composition of earth, etc., the author first of all gives the
definition of the Genus, eternality.
u * i n m
^ Sat, existent ^WTCJpTc^ Akaranavat not having a cause, uncaused,
causa suifaff Nityam, eternal.
1. The eternal is that which is existent and uncaused. — 157.
'Akaranavat,' means not having a precedent cause, on the maxim of
the purity of words (which excludes other interpretations of the term).
Hereby the water-pot, and the like are excluded. Still the definition
may be too wide by including previous non-existence ; so he says,
4 existent' i. e., having connection with existence. In the case of the
Predicables, Combination and Species, connection with existence is
nothing but combination or inherence in one and the same object with
existence. In the case of any other Genus and of existence connec
tion with existence consists only in being the object of the cognition
that it exists. This cognition ia not in respect of a thing as such.
" Let.it be so; " it cannot be objected, " in other cases also. What is
the use of existence ? " For, existence has already been proved as the
cause of assimilative understanding. — 1.
Vivriti. — Seme hold that the existent is produced from the non
existent. What they have in view is this. Seeds, etc., are not productive-
of effects such as shoots, etc. Were this the case, then seeds, etc., lying
in a granary, would also produce shoots, etc. But since shoots appear
only after the destruction of seeds sown on a field, by the disjunction of
their parts, it follows that it is the destruction of seeds, etc., which is
the cause of shoots, etc., So we have the stttram of Gautama, stating
the argument of an opponent, " Production of exietence (is) from
non-existence, as there is no appearance without destroying." (Nyaya-
Sutram, IV. i. 14).
Only to refute this view, he strengthens the theory of progressive
origination by the series of ultimate atoms, etc.
' Sat/ means something in the form of existence ; ' akaranavat '"
means a non-product ; ' nityam ' means an entity which opposes an
nihilation. The meaning is : the primary cause of compound bodies is
not non-existent, that is to say, because, if causality of destruction were
admitted, then it would entail the production of shoots even from pow
dered seeds.
Mark of existence of ultimate atoms,
Vpaskdra.— After describing the Genus, sternal, he now says with reference to ultimata
atoms :
134 VAI£ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
* n i * n
Tasya, its. Of the ultimate atom. «pp^ Karyyam, effect,
Lingam, mark.
2. The effect is the mark (of the existence) of the ultimate
atom. — 2.
1 Tasya/ i. e. of the ultimate atom ; karyyam,' e. g., the water-pot
and the like ; ' lingam.' Accordingly the stitram of Gautama. " From
the evolved is the production of the evolved, on the evidence of (ex
perience by) perception," (Nyaya-sutram IV. i. II). Now the inter
relation of parts and wholes is perceived. If it were unlimited, there
would be no difference in size of measurement between mount Meru and
a grain of mustard seed ; for, they wauld be without distinction, both
being orginated by infinite parts. Nor can it be said that difference
will be caused by the differences of the size of each part, and of the
aggregation of parts ; for, without a difference of number, these also would
be impossible. If it be said that pralaya or destruction of the creation
may be the limit (of the series of parts and wholes) ; (we reply that) the
final something ex-hypothesi) having no parts, pralaya itself would be
impossible, for it is only disjunction and destruction of parts which can
destroy substances. Nor is disjunction the limit, for it is impossible for
it to have only one substratum. Therefore, a substance without parts,,
must be the limit, and this the ultimate atom. A mote is not the limit ;
for, being a visible substance, it possesses magnitude, and is composed'
of more substance than one ; magnitude, as the cause of visual percep
tion, presupposes, or is dependent upon, multiplicity of substance ;
else there would be no magnitude even, what then would be the cause ?
Nor are the constituent parts of the mote atoms, for we must infer
that they also, as originatfve of a substance possessing magnitude,.
are compossed of parts, like thread, and like potsherd. Therefore.
whatever substance is an effect, is composed of parts, and whatever
substance is composed of parts, is an effect. So that from whichever
part the nature of being an effect goes away, from it goes away also
the nature of being made up of parts. This is the proof of the existence
of indivisible ultimate atoms. So it has been said by Professor
Prasastadeva, " Earth is twofold, eternal and non-eternal. — 2-
Law of Causation.
Upaskdra — Now he states an argument or proof, to prove that there are colour, etc., ia
the ultimate atom :
: II 3 I? I ^ II
Karana-bhavat, from existence in the cause.
Karyyabhava.i, existence in the effect
3. The existence (of colour, etc.) in the effect, (follows) from,
(their) existence in the cause.— 159.
The existence of colour, etc., in the effect, is due to their existence
in the cause. For the attributes of the effect result from the attributes
KANlDA SftTRAS IV, 1, 4. 135
of the cause, the same being observed in the case of the water-pot,
canvas, etc. This is the meaning. — 3.
VivTiti. — He points out an objeotion to the primary causality of
nonexistence.
'Bhavah/ i. e., the existence, of the ' effect/ i. e., compound bodies,
follows from the existence of the ' cause,' i. e., the primary cause (viz.,
ultimate atoms). Otherwise, like the quality of being clayey, of that
which is made of clay, it would follow that effects, i. er compound bodies
would be non-existent, because they are constituted by what ia non
existent.
The eternal exists.
Upaskdra. — With a view to silenoa the advooate of the doctrine of the itransieney of all
things, he now saj's :
: H a i * i * 11
Anityah, non-eternal, ffif Iti, such, t. e., such intuition and
expression .f^RfaW: ViSesatah, of the particular, i.e., the eternal. srf^Nnrra1*
Partisedha-bhavah, the form of negation.
4. "Not-eternal" — such (intuition and expression) can be
accounted for only as the negation of the eternal.— 160.
In ' visesatah ' the affix ' tasi' is used in the genitive sense. There
would be negation of ' visesa' i. e., the eternal, if there were not such
intuition, and application of the word as ' non-eternal,' because the
prefix nan (non) has the force of negating the meaning of the word
next to it. Therefore how can there be the intuition and expression,
4 non-eternal/ in the absence (of that) of the eternal ? Hence it is
proved that the eternal exists. Or, (the meaning of the S&tram may
be), the negation of the eternal must be made by you in this way that
(it is) " not eternal," i. e., that the ultimate atom is not eternal. But
negation in this way is not successful, since it is frustrated by proof
and disproof. (In this interpretation), the siltram should be rendered
thus : The word ?f (not) will be a negative term by itself, as the rule,
•"SJ, TT, 'ft, and ^n are negative terms." Thus " non-eternal " will mean
not eternal. 'Pratisedha-bhavah, means the nature or form of negative.
Hence " not eternal" — this is the form of the negation of visesa/ • i.e.y
the eternal, and it(is not possible. This closes the argument. — 4.
Vivriti. — He refutes the view that all is non-eternal, that there is
nothing which is eternal.
3tf (in the aphorism) is an indeclinable, having the same meaning as
5T*T (non). Thus, ' not eternal' — such negation is i visesotah/ i. e., with
reference to particular things. So that, there may be the negation that
compound bodies are not eternal, but such whole-sale negation as every
thing is not eternal, is not possible, because the eternal, which is the
counter-opposite, is frustrated by proof and disproof. This is the whole
meaning.
136 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
The theory that atoms are not eternal, is erroneous.
Upatldra, — It may be objected as follows : The ultimate atom is not eternal, since it is
corporal of ponderable, like a watei-pot. Similarly, the possession of colour, the possession of
taste, etc., may be, one by one, adduced as so many reasons. So also by simultaneous conjunc
tion with six (other ultimate atoms), an ultimate atom has six parts ; so that from its posses
sion of parts, and from its being the substratum of the conjunction appearing in objects which
it cannot pervade, (we may infer that the ultimate atom is not eternal). Moreover, if there
be Ether within an ultimate atom, then being porous, it must have parts ; if there be no Eth«r
inside it, then it would follow that Ether does not penetrate every where. Further, (the
ultimate atom is not eternal), because it casts shadow, and possesses circulation. Again, the
inon-eternality of the ultimate atom follows also from the inference whi oh establishes transi
ency, e. g., the inference, that all that exists is momentary. If then there be such a series of
inferences, how can it be maintained that the ultimate atom is eternal ?
To meet these objections, he says :
n $ i n * n
Avidya, ignorance, error.
5. (It is) an error (to suppose that the ultimate atom is not
eternal). — 161.
Every inference, which has for its subject the non-eternality of the
ultimate atom, is ignorance, i.e., is of the form of error, since it springs
from a fallacy, This fallacy is occasionally obstruction or opposition to
the proof which comprehends the subject ; always absence of the
characteristic of being pervaded (or being the mark), due to want of
evidence preventive of its existence in the vipaksa (i. e., in which the
non-existence of that which has to be proved, is sertain) ; sometimes
unproof by itself ; and others which should be learnt from the kindred.
system (i.e-, the Nyaya-Sutram of Gautamaj. — 5.
Bhdsya. — Reads IV. i. 3.4, and 5 as two aphorisms only, viz., Icdrana-
bhdvdt kdryabhdvo, nilya iti', and Visesatah pratisedhabhdvo lvidyd', and
interprets them to mean, respectively, "The nature of the effect,
(though) following from the nature of the cause (which is eternal) is
non-eternal" and " It is an error to suppose that because things (e.g.r
atoms) exist as effects (e.gr., compound bodies), therefore they cannot
exist in the causal (or atomic) state", — in order to explain the applica
tion of the word "non-eternal'' in, I. i. 8 where the reference is to things
which are products.
Requisites of perception.
Upaskdra. — It may he objected, " Well, if the ultimate atom exi«ts, why is it not per
ceived by the senses ? It is you who have proved that the possession of colour, the possession
of touch, etc., are exciting causes of sensibility." Hence he says :
II tf I ? I $ II
Mahati, in respect of an object possessing magnitude.
Aneka-dravya-vattvat, by means of its possession of what is composed of
more than one substance. ^TTrT Rupat, by means of colour. ^ Cha, and.
YTftf^: Upalabdhih, perception.
6. External perception (takes place), in respect of an object
possessing magnitude, by means of its possession of that which
is composed of more substances than one, and by means of its.
colour. — 162.n
KANAUA SfiTRAS IV, 1, 7. 137
' M.aliati ' means in respect of a substance possessing magnitude
the affix, , matup, denoting possession, among affixes denoting quality'
being elided after the word, mahat, denoting measure. l Anekadravyat-
*-at' mtans from the nature or state of containing that of which more
substances than one are the substrata. This being so, Air also would
be perceptible. Hence he says, " And by mean? of Colour/' i. e. as
will be later on said, developed and un eclipsed or un obscured colo'ur.
' Uj alabdhih " is complemented by the words, "by the external sense/'
"Therefore it goes without saying that there is no external perception of
the ultimate atom, since it does not possess magnitude. " The possession
of that which is composed of more than one substance " means either
the being constituted by a compound of more than one substance, or
the being the substratum of the magnitude which is due to a multiplici
ty of component parts.
It cannot be said that the possession of that which is a compound
of more than ore substance, is rendered futile (as a condition precedent
of i erception), by the very possession of magnitude ; since the reverse
is also i cssible. Nor can it be said, "Futility of the producer is caus
ed by the producible,, but not that of the producible by the producer •"
for the agreement and the difference of the producible and the producer
being simultaneously apprehended, there is no futility, since otherwise
it would follow that the futility of the staff, etc., will be caused by the
whirling of it, etc. Nor can it be said that there is a development of or
rise in, perceptibility at a distance due to development of, or rise 'in
magnitude; for a development of, or rise in, the possession of a
compound of more substances than one being also possible, there can be
no discrimination. Moreover, while a spider's web measuring four
cubits, etc., is not perceptible frcm a distance, the perceptibility of the
spider itself is certainly due to a development of the possession of a
compound of more substances than one, since a preponderance of
magnitude exists in the web. So also it should be observed that while
^ a piece of cloth, constituted by five yarns, is not perceptible at a dis-
jtance, is in spite of a preponderance of magnitude in it, a club of a very
small magnitude is perceptible there __ 6.
Cause of non-perception
I'j.atMra.- Such being the case, there should, it might bo urged, also be perception of
tl e light of a t- hooting star at midday, of the light of the eye, or of Air, as well as of magnitude
which ecu bintb -with colour by means of its combination with Touch. Hence ho says:
H a i ? i vs ii
i, there being. ^^ Api, even, in spite of. %sqf3( Dravyatve,
substance-ness, *T5<% Mahatve, magnitude. ^T Rupa, colour. *f^K Saras-
kara, impression, evolution, reformation. .SPTT^ Abhavat, on account
of the absence or non-existence of. efPTt: Vayoh, of Air. Sljjq^fa: Anupal-
abdhih, non-perception.
138 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
7. The non-perception of Air, in spite of there being subs
tance-ness and magnitude, is due to the non-existence of the evolu
tion of colour.— 163.
•
By the term " evolution of colour " are intended combination or
inhesion of colour, the development of colour to the degree of appre
ciability, and the no.i-obscuration of colour. Though, therefore, i.i
the case of Air, the selfsame combination of touch is alse the combina
tion of colour, yet it is not qualified or determined by colour, for
there is in it absolute non-existence of colour. In the light of the eye,
there is no^evolution, that is, appreciability, of colour. In the light of the
shooting star at midday, there is no ev<»lnv.on, that is, non-obscuration,
of colour. Of these, therefore, there is uo perceptibility. In like man
ner, evolution of colour is to be analogously applied to the heat of the
summer, the fire in a frying pan, gold, etc.
The writer of the VTitti has, however, said that ^T^f^rR is a com
pound of the words ^T and ^TCTC^TC, formed by tho elision of one of
the tvvc ^T's, and that, therefore, the non-perception of Air is in conse
quence of the non-existence of colour in it, while the non-perception
of the ocular light, etc., is due to the non-existence of the evolution
of col oar — 7-
Requisites of perception of colour.
Upnskdra. — -In this way having, itum3diatJly after t'ae section on the eterpality of the
ultimate ato:us, finished the section on fie perospfcibility of external objects, as a subsi
diary topic, by their being the inferential marks of the ultimate atoms, and intending to
sot forth, by introducing an example, the section on the perceptibility of Attributes ° he
says :
II 8 I ? I e; II
Aneka, more than one. %zq Dravya, substance. ^nftr^T^ Samava-
yat, from combination in. ?5*r Rupa, colour. fa^ftTci; Visesat, from some
special characteristic of. 5^q[ Rupa, colour. ST^fsvr: Upalavdhih,
perception.
8. Perception of colour (arises) from its combination with
a compound of substances more than two, and from (its possession
of) some special characteristic of colour. — 164.
' Rupaviiesa ' means the species or peculiarity inherent in colour,
and that consists of the characteristics of being developed to the degree
of appreciability, of being unobscured, and of being colour. From
this, perception of colour takes place. Lest it might be said that, such
being the case, the colour of the ultimate atom as well as of the dyad
would be perceived, so it has been added — ' anekadravya-samavayat.'
The word ' aneka ' denotes multitude ; hence l anekadravya ' means
that to which many substances belong as its substratum, e. g., a
molecule of the atoms, and the like. To term 'anekadravya-samavayat'
therefore, means from combination with such a compound substance.
The water-pot, etc., although they are originated by two parts, (i- e.y
potsherds, etc.), really contain a multitude of substances as their subs
tratum, in the serial arrangement of the parts of these parts, and so
KANiDA StiTRAS IV. 1. 9. 139
on As taste, touch, etc., lack in the characteristic of colourness, so
there is no ocular perception of them. In the case of ocular fire or
light non-visibility is due to the absence of the degree of appreci abi
lity. ' Development or appreciability is only a particular universal
entity or l class ' belonging to the particular attributes of colour, etc.,
and is pervaded by, or included in, colourness, etc.
Objection : _ This being so, no relation of higher and lower (classi
fication) will be at all established even by whiteness, fragrantness,
sourness, etc. If, however, you suppose a manifoldness of develop
ment or appreciability, pervaded by, or included in, them respectively,
then there will be a redundancy of supposition, and the term develop
ment or appreciability, 33?5T also will have various meanings.
Answer : _ It is not so ; for, development or appreciability denotes
the ur.ddhi or condition, namely, the characteristic of the attribute
cay.able of being apprehended by each individual external sense,
while non-development or non-appreciability denotes only the absence
of the upddhi or condition. Some say that appreciability is simply
the non-existence of non-appreciability. This should be considered,
since non-appreciability also cannot be similarly established. It may be
said that non-appreciability is a particular attribute beyond the
cognizance of the senses. If it be so, then it would follow that appre
ciability is a particular attribute within the reach of the senses. If it
be asked " What is the determinant of sensuousness ?," we reply that
both of us, (i. e., the disputants) are equally at a disadvantage here.
They also say that appreciability is the one and only one ' class '
present in all particular attributes, and that the non-establishment of
the relation of higher and lower is no fault in the case of the class
inhering in attributes. — 8.
Perception of Taste, Smell, and Touch.
Uvaskdra —Of the attributes other than Touch, co-exsistsnce in the same substratum
with colour is "itself the nectary condition of their being perceptible by the external senses.
For this reason, after having stated the conditions of perception of colour, he now extends
them to other cases, and says :
i s i ? 1 8. ii
^srTena, by this,. ?3W«?J*I3 R'asa-gandha-sparsesu, in respect of
taste, smell, and touch, srtf Jnanam, knowledge. sqriqra^ Vyakhyatam,
explained.
9. Hereby is explained (perceptual) knowledge in the case
of Taste, Smell, and Touch. — 165.
1 Ten a ' means by the preceptual knowledge of colour. As precep-
tion of colour arises from some special characteristic of colour,m'z., colour-
ness, non-obscuration, and appreciability, so perception of taste arises
from some particularity of taste, characterised as tasteness, non-obscura
tion, and appreciability. This should be applied to other cases. Com
bination with a compound of more than two substances, should be also-
extended. From inappreciabilitj to the organs of the ear, the tongue,
140 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
and the skin, result non-apprehension of smell, taste, and touch Being
undeveloped or inappreciable, smell and taste are not perceived in a
stone, etc. ; for they are perceived in their ashes. Some maintain that
they are perceived indeed in the stone, etc., but not distinctly The
non-apprehension of the colour of a watery substance, the parts of which
have been disjoined from one another, is due to non-developrae it of the
colour. So also is the non-apprension of taste. In hot water, there is
non-approhension of the colour of the fire, in consequence of its non-
development, and of touch, in consequence of its obscuration. In com
minuted camphor, the champaka flayer, etc., non-apprehension of colour
taste, and touch is due to thoir non-djve1 -pment or inappreciabilit/
In gold, and the like, colour is indeel do /eloped, but whiteness and
lummousness are obscured. Some hold that colour also is obscured
whereas the apprehension of gold takes place with the help of other
colour. Obscuration, again, is non-apprehension caused by the appre
hension of a more powerful like object, and not merely relation or
connection with a powerful like object. For, since connection with a
powerful like object has to be ascertained by non-apprehension it is
the non-apprehension which is of primary importance. Whereas the
powerful like object is not of primary importance, as the necessary
condition of non-apprehension ; because neither non-apprehension, nor
antecedent non-existence of apprehension, nor its absolute non-exis-
tenoe is subject to its operation, while the annihilation of apprehension
does not exist there. If it be objectei, « Then your proposition also
that obscuration is non-apprehension caused by the apprehension of a
more powerful like object, is not proved," we reply, « Let it be so- Still
apprehension and non-apprehension alone are the necessary condition*
of the strength or weakness of a like object, or of the existance of such
a relation ; and the same is the meaning of the word, obscuration." 9.
Gravity, not perceptible.
Upaskdra.—lt may be asked, " Since Gravity also is combined with a compound of more
than two substances (». e.' atoms), and appears in the sama substratu n with colour and ma-'ni-
tude, why then it is not perceptible ; " Henco he says :
<fl^ Tasya, of this, i. e., the genus of colourness, etc., and develop
ment or appreci ability. sroRT^ Abhavat, because of the non-existence
^rsqfr^rc: Avyabhicharah, non-deviation. No breach of uniformity OP
the rule.
10. Because of the non-existence of this, there is no viola
tion (of the above law of perceptibility in the case of Gravitv }-
166.
Gravity is not perceptible, because of the non-existence, in Gravity
of this, Viz., the genus of colourness, etc., and development or apprecia-
bihty. It might be said that granted that, colourness, etc., do not exist
there, yet there may be perception of Gravity. To prevent this, he adds
* avyabhicharah.' There is < non-deviation ' i. e., unbroken uniformity
of the five « classes ' or universals, e. g., colourness, etc., towards.
KANlDA SftTRAS IV, 1, 11. 141
apprehensibility by each individual sense. Whenever there exists one
or another of the pentad of colourness,etc., there also exists apprehensi
bility by the respective external senses, as shown by the method of
difference (that where the former are not, there the latter does not
-exist). This is the meaning.
Gravity, by reason of its being left obscure in tha sutram, as the
topic of discussion, by Prasastadeva classed annng things supersen-
suous, is by Vallavacharya said to be perceived by touch. — 10.
Where Numbers, etc., are objects of visual perception.
LTpaskdra. — Having thus st ited objects pjrc3ptible by the senses individually, he now
enumerates objects porceptible by two senses jointly :
<E'<?3T: Saiiakhyah, numbers. TK^Tfiinfa Parimanani, magnitudes, exten
sions. «£^«t>^ Prithaktvam, separateness. ^f4tJlf%*:ITin Sanayoga-vibhagau,
conjunction and disjunction. Tlr^lTi^ Paratva-aparatve, priority and
posteriority. ^r*qc Karmma, action, "qr Cha, and. ^^sq^T^rT^T^ Rupi-dra-
vya-samavayat, through combination with substances possessing colour.
^T^rfifr Ohaksusani, visible, objects of visual perception.
11. Numbers, Magnitudes, Separateness, Conjunction and
Disjunction, Priority and Posteriority, and Action become objects
of visual perception, through their combination with Substances
possessing colour. — 167.
The words have not been formed into a compound in order to indi
cate their mutual independence in respect of their visual or tactual
perceptibility. Although there is dependence upon JTff3T, i. e., largeness,
yet it is not as upon a mode of extension or magnitude. The word ' cha'
hastheforce of involvingthe addition of Viscidity, fluidity and Impetus.
The word ^T^^fa implies tactual perceptibility ; or the word l cha '
should be applied after the word ^T^ fflT also. The plural number in
Numbers, comprehends all numbers, from unity upwards. If it be held
that unity is only a Genus, and not an Attribute, then if it appear in
substances only, its denotation will be neither more nor less than that
of substanceness ; if, on the other hand, it be present in attributes and
actions also, then its denotation will be neither more nor lesr than that
of existence. " How, then," if it be asked," can there be perception of
unity, etc., in attribute, etc. ?," it may be answered that it is by means
of attributed unity ; or that by reason of the proximity known as
combination or co-inhere:ice in one and the same object, the percep
tion of unity is quite justified. This unity is eternal in eternal subs
tances, and in non-eternal substances it has causal unity for its
non-combinative cause. On the other hand, duality, etc., are the
product of relative understanding. Relative understanding is the
mental basis or support of various unities, when two homogeneous or
heterogeneous substances are in contact with the eye. — 11.
142 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
Here they are not.
Upaskdra. — Having in view all the above things up to action, he says :
Arupisu, in substances not possessing colour. .?r31^ITftr Achaksu-
sani, not objects of visual perception.
12. In substances not possessing colour, they are^not objects
of visual perception. — 168.
Numbers, etc., up to action, are not objects of visual perception,
when they are present in substances which are devoid of colour. It
should be observed that they are not objects of tactual perception
also. It has not been said that they are imperceptible ; for, if it were
so, then the unity of the Soul also would not be an obiect of percep
tion.— 12.
Attribute-ness and existence perceptible to all the senses.
Upaskdra. — Colour, etc., are uni-sensuous or perceptible by the senses individually.
Numbers, etc., are bi-sensuous or perceptible by two senses jointly. Pleasure, etc., are
mental or perceptible by the inner sense. So that it results that the two Genera, Attribute-
ness and existence, are omni-sensuous. tSo he says :
I 8 I ? I U H
t$;f Etena, by this. flUF^T Gunatve, in regard to attributeness. *n3T
Bhuve, in regard to existence. ^ Cha, and. ^o^f?^ Sarvvendriyam,
omni-sensuous. Relating to all the senses. *rr;f jnanam, knowledge.
Vyakhyatam, explained.
13. By this it is explained that knowledge in regard to attri
buteness and existence, is omni-sensuous or of all the senses. — 169.
Capability to apprehend the individuals, is itself the capability to
apprehend the class. And if the individuals are respectively appre
hended by all the senses, then it results that also the classes, vizr.f
Attribute-ness and Existence, are apprehensible by all the senses.
This is the meaning. — 13.
Here ends the first chapter of the fourth book in the Commentary
• of Sankara upon the Vai&esika Aphorisms.
KANADA SftTRAS IV, 2, 2. 143
BOOK FOURTH __ CHAPTER SECOND.
Three-fold division of Earth, and other products,
Upaskdra. — la the fourth book, of whio'a the subject-matter is the examination of
tangible substances, intondin; to exa:nin3 only tangible sub.itanc3s by their effjots, im n>
di&tely after the examination of tne ultimate atonic which are the root causes, he says :
II 8 I ^ I ? II
?Tcj; Tat, that. <$*: Pu'iah, again. "jfa$<JfI^frf£'i?J'7 Piithivi-adi-karyya-
dravyam, earth, and oth9r produat-substa-ice. frftsf Trividham, three
fold. ^f^?'7R^Wir^^^arira-indriya-visaya-samjiiakam, named as body,
Mease, and object.
1. The aforesaid product-substance, Earth, etc., is, again,
three-fold, under the names of body, sanse, and object. — 170.
Here corporeity or the characteristic of the body is a kind of upadhi
or adjunct, namely, the characteristic of being constituted by final parts
(i.e., atoms), possessing activity, of which the non-combinative cause is the
conjunction of the soul exercising volition. But corporeity is not a class
-or universal eatitiy, since in that case Earthness, etc., will establish
no relation of higher and lower divisions. The characteristic of being
a sense, is the being the seat of the conjunction of the mind, which is
the cause of knowledge which produces no reminiscence, or the being a
seat of the conjunction of the mind, which is the cause of knowledge,
while at the same time it is not a substratum of appreciable particular
attributes other than sound. 0;i the other hand, the light of the eye of
animals that prowl at night, is really another kind of light. In regard
to its being treated as forming the visual sense, the words " not being
a substratum of appreciable particular attributes other than sound aud
colour " should be added. The characteristic of being a sense, how
ever, is not a l class/ for the a the characteristic of Earth, etc., will not
establish the relation of higher and lower divisions without entailing
cross-division). And objectivity, or the characteristic of being ari
object, although it is the being the means of phenomenal experience,
that is to say, the being the object of ordinary perception, common to
substance, attribute, action, genus, and non-existence — yet should be,
in accordance with the aphorism, observed to be the characteristic of
being a product-substance which is the object of ordinary perception,
for the aphorism is this only that Earth and other product-substances
*ire three-fold. Objectivity also, therefore, is not a class or universal
entity. — -1.
Body is not a compound of Jive elements.
Upaskdra. — Now, in order to refute the assertion that the body is composed of three
•elements or four elements, he says :
ii 8 i ^ i
144 v AI£ESX_;A PHILOSOPHY.
Pratyaksa-apratyaksanam, of perceptible and non-per
ceptible objects. ?J4t*fl?T Samyogasya, of conjunction. ?IR?!fr?3T3; Apraty-
ksatvat, on account of imperceptibility. TajfiJT^r Paiichatmakam, Penta-
substantial. Constituted by five elements, !f Na, not. fifST^ Vidyate, exists.
2. (Nothing exists, which is constituted by five elements,
or) the body is not constituted by five elements, for the conjunc
tion of things, perceptible and imperceptible, is imperceptible. —
171.
Were the body, by reason of its odour, moisture, digestive heat,
breath, and porosity, composed of five elements, then it would be imper
ceptible. In the same manner as the conjunction of pen eptible and
imperceptible objects, e.g., air and trees, is imperceptible, the body
also would be imperceptible. Thus the aphorism employs an example.
The word ' body ' is the complement of " penta-substantial does not
exist." Moisture, digestive heat, etc., however, belong to the efficient
causes or conditions of the body, namely, water and fire. The theory
that the body is composed of four elements should be also similarly
understood. Let it then, it may be urged, contain three elements, as
there is perception of three elements. This cannot be, for an origina
tion not of heterogeneous elements is denied. One attribute in a whole
made up of parts is not originative of similar other attributes. If,
therefore, the production were from Earth and Water, then that which
they originate would be void of smell and taste. In like manner, if it
originated in Earth and Fire, it would not possess smell, colour, and
taste ; if in Earth and Air, it \\ould be destitute of smell, taste, colour,
and touch. Other cases should be similarly understood. — 2.
Nor a compound of three elements.
Upaskdra. — Ho continues the same topio :
II tf I R I \ II
Gruna-antara-apradurbhavat, by reason of the non-
appearance of another attribute. ^ Cha, and. sf Na, not. 3^[?JT^J3; Tri-
atmakam, tri-substantial. Composed of three elements.
3. And by reason of the non-appearance of another attribute,.
it is not composed of three elements. — 172.
A body originated by Earth, Water, and Fire only, which are
objects of perception, might be perceived, if there were manifested in
it another attribute having for its antecedent a like attribute in the
cause. But this can never be the case, as it has been already stated
that a single smell, etc., is not originative. Therefore the body is not
composed of 'even three elements, i. e., is not originated by the three
elements possessing colour. — 3.
Bndsya — reads IV. ii. 3 as two aphorisms, viz., "G-undntardprddur-
bhdvdchcha," and " Na trydtmakam."
KANADA StTTRAS IV, 2, .5 145
Conjunction of various atoms, not denied.
UpasMra. — How then is there perception of digestive heat, etc., in one single body?
He gfves the answer :
• II 8 I R I 8 II
V3
Anusaiiayogah, conjunction of atoms. 3 Tu, but.
•
Apratisiddha^, not denied.
4. But a conjunction of atoms is not denied. — 173.
A mutual eon junction of the five elements as (the basis or) condi
tional causes of oue another, is not denied. But it is not desired that the
conjunction of two heterogeneous atoms can be the non-combinative
cause of a substance. Thus, as its conditional or efficient causes,
digestive heat, etc., are perceived in the body- If it be asked, then,
of what nature the human body is, the answer is given by the aphorism
of Gautama : _ " (The body is) terrene, the distinctive attribute of
Ether being perceived (in it)." Nyaya-Sutram III. i. 28(?} ). Smell
which is the distinctive attribute of Earth, is observed in the human
body as not departing from it till its dissolution, whereas digestive
heat, etc., are not observed in the decayed body. These attributes,
therefore, are accidental, while Smell is essential. Hence itsterreneness
is established. — 4.
Body is two-fold: sexually produced, and asexually produced.
UpasMra. — He divides the body :
fljf Tatra, therein, amongst terrene, aqueous, and other bodies,
Sariram, body, terrene body, fefev* Dvividham, two fold, qtf^f Yonijam,
sex-begotten, sexually generated. IRtfrsn^ Ayonijam, not sexually gene
rated. <9 Cha, and.
5. Of these, the body is two-fold : — sex-born and not sex-born.
— 174.
Of these, i. e., among terrene, aqueous, and other bodies, the
terrene body is two-fold. What are the two kinds ? In answer, he
says, l sexborn and not-sex-born/ Aqueous, igneous, and aerial bodies,
well-known in the spheres of Varuna, Aditya, arid Vayu, are entirely
a-sexual. A-sexuality means independence of the commixing of semen
and blood. The bodies of gods and sages are also a-sexual, according
to the text of revelation, " Manu and others, the mind-born or desire-
born of Brahma." If it be asked how there can be an effect without
a cause, we reply that the female organ of generation is not a cause
essential to or determining corporeity, as it does not apply to the
bodies of worms, mosquitoes, etc., produced by warmth. The posses
sion of a particular constitution also is not proved, since our bodies
are different in appearance in comparision with the bodies of goda
and sages.
146 VAI£ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
The sexaul body, again, is two-fold, womb-born and egg-born.
Womb-born are bodies of men arid animals, wild and domestic, the
womb being the name given to the receptacle of the embryo. The
bodies of birds and reptiles are egg-born. Snakes, worms, fishes, etc.,
also are really reptiles, since it is their nature to crawl about.
Trees and the like also are no doubt so many kinds of bodies, being
the seat of experience (i. e., the field wherin particular souls reap the
consequences of their acts in previous births). For without the charac
teristic of being the seat of experience, life, death, sleep, waking, use
of medicine, propagation of the seed, approaching the agreeable, avoid
ing the disagreeable, etc., would be impossible. And growth and the
healing up of wounds and fractures, which prove experience, are mani
fest in them. There is also the sacred text :
" The Sarala and Arjuna trees, which grow on the banks of the
Narmada from contact with the waters of the Narmada, attain to the
highest state hereafter," etc. And also,
" In the cemetery grows a tree haunted by herons and vultures,
etc.," etc. Yet germinant bodies do not evidently possess activity or
movement and senses, and they are therefore not treated as bodies. — 5.
Vivriti. — That trees, etc., are bodies (i. e., ground of the experience
of the consequences of acts) is evidenced by the text of Manu, viz., "A
man acquires the candition of an immovable existence, by faults of
action, born of the body.''
A-sexual bcdies, how produced.
Upasltdra.—'S.Q states the cause from whioh asexual bodies are produced :
II $ 1 R I ^ II
A-niyata-dik-desa-purvakatvat, because it(». «.,
a-sexual body) has for its antecedent ultimate atoms which are not
constant in direction aud place.
6. Because a-sexual bodies are formed by ultimate atoms
inconstant in direction and place. — 175.
Ultimat atoms, inconstant in direction and place, possess activity
or movement produced by a particular dharma or virtue. And they
are tho antecedents of a-sexual bodies. — 6.
i. — In the words of Varuna, etc., there exist a-sexual,
aqueous, igneous, aerial, and mental bodies, which are not dependent,
for their production, upon semen, blood, etc. Whence come the ultimate
atoms which orignate them ? In the case of sexual bodies, it is observ
ed that only the ultimate atoms of semen and blood are their origina
tors. To remove this apprehension, the present aphorism has been
KANADA SUTRAS IV, 2,8. 147
formulated. Terrene, aqueous, igneous, and aerial ultimate atoms exist
in all directions and in all places. Since there is nothing to confine them
to direction and place, there can be no scarcity of ultimate atoms in the
production of a-sexual bodies For it is not the case that ultimate
atoms other than the ultimate atoms of semen and blood, are not ori
ginative of bodies, seeing lhat in that case there would be no produc
tion of gnats, mosquitoes, trees, shrubs, etc.
A-sexual bodies, how produced — continued.
Upaskdra. — It may be objected, how there ean be preduction of a substance (»'. «., a body),
without conjunction which is the non-oembinative cause of substance, seeing that there can
be no conjunction without the action of the ultimate atoms. Heuoe he says :
H a i * i vs u
Dharmnia-visesat, from a particular dharma or virtue. ^
Cha, and.
7. And (the action of the ultimate atoms arises) from a
particular dharma or virtue. — 176.
The sense is that, at the beginning of creation, action or motion
arises in the ultimate atoms in consequence only of the conjunction of
the soul carrying with it the invisible (adristam) consequences of its
previous acts, and the ultimate atoms, having by that action come
together, originate, in the order of binary atomic aggregate, etc.,
the a-sexual badies of gods and sages.
The aphorism is illusrative. It should be also observed that, in
consequence of particular adharma or vices, the tortured bodies of mos
quitoes and other small insects, generated by heat, are produced. — 7.
Proof of their existence.
Upskdra. — He gives another proof that the bodies of gods and sages are a-sexual :
n 8 i * \ * u
Samakhya-bhavat., because name or definitions exist.
^ Cha, also,
8. Also because names or definitions exist. — 177.
^nn^ means a significant name, or definition, such as is well-
known in Sruti, Itihasa, Purana, etc. Thus, Durvasas, and other sages
were born from the mind (of Brahma) ; Angiras was produced from
ahamkdra (the sense of * I") ; and so on. From this also it is known
that there ar © a-sexual bodies of gods and sages. — 8.
Yviriti. _ But whence do a-sexual bodies derive their names, in the
absence* of parents, etc. ? For it is observed on earth that the names
Chaitra, Maitra, etc., are affixed by parents, etc. Lest there be such an
apprehension, so he says :
1 Bhavat/ i. e., from the existence, of ' Samakhya,' i. e., the name ;
i even in the absence of the procreative parents, etc.' is the complement.
148 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
For, all names are not affixed only by parents, etc., as it is not the case
with the names, water-pot, canvas, etc. Therefore, the import is that
the names, Ma'iu, Marichi, etc., have been put upon a-sexual bodies, by
the very same Isvara by whom names have been affixed to the water-pot,
canvas, and other unconscious objects.
A-sexual bodies, how produced. — continued.
Upaslidra. — Ho gives another proof :
n s i ^ i s. n
i-* Samjnayah, of name, ^fftc^ A-ditvat, because of the primitive-
ness.
9. (The existence of a-sexual bodies is proved) from the
primitiveness of the name. — 178.
By means of the name, Brahma, etc., which came to be the begin
ning, i. e.j primordial, at the beginning of creation, it is known that
a-sexual body exists. For then there were net parents of Brahma, by
whom the name Brahma, etc., should be given. — 9.
Vivriti. — But there being no proof of the existence of tsvara, how
can it be affirmed that the names of the water-pot, the canvas, etc., have
been given by Him ? So he says :
Because livara, which is the complement of the aphorism, ia the
beginning (adi), i. e., the cause or source, of names. Thus the proof of
fsvara having been already stated, by the characteristic of His being
the author of names, in the aphorism, " But name and effect are the
mark (of the existence) of beings distinguished from ourselves" (II. i.
18 Ibid;, being the author of names remains unobstructed. This is
the sense.
Conclusion : A-sexual bodies exist.
UpasTcdra. — He concludes :
Santi, exist. SHftfr3T|: Ayonijah, a-sexual bodies.
10. A-sexual bodies exist. — 179.
The words " particular forms of bodies " are the complement of the
aphorism — 10.
Another proof that a-sexual bodies exist.
UpasTcdra. — In order to strengthen the above cooclu.sion all the more, he gives aiother
proof :
n s i ^ i \\\\
Veda-lingat, from the texts which throw light upon the
mantra portion 'of the Veda, i. e., from the Brahmana portion of the
Veda. =gf Cha, and.
KANiDA StTTRAS IV, 2, 11. 149
11. (The existence of a-sexual bodies is proved) also from
the Brahamana portion of the Veda. — 18J.
1 Veda ' means mantra. That by which it is linjyate, i. e., made
known, is ' veda-lingam/ i. e.} Brdhmanam. From this also a-sexual
body is proved. This is the meaning. Thus there is the Brdhmanam :
" Prajapti (i. e., the lord of creation) created numerous creatures :
He practised peaauce, with the desire, " I may be able to create
creatures." He created the Brahmana from His mouth, King from his
arms, the Vaisya from His thighs, the Sudra from his feet. "
There is also the Veda :
" His mouth became the Brahmana ; the arms were made the King
i. e.j Kstriya) ; it was His thigh, which became the Vaisya ; the Sudra
was born from the feet, etc."
Thus terrene body, sexual and a-sexual, has been described in the
above way. Aqueous, igneous, and aerial bodies can be only a-sexual,
since semen and blood are, as a rule, terrene, and a terrene substance
does not originate an aqueous one.
The terrene sense is the organ of smell, common to all living beings.
The organ of smell is originated by terrene particles unoverpowered or
unobscured by water, etc. The organ of smell is terrene, because it
causes manifestation of smell, while it does not cause the manifestation of
taste, etc., like the excrement of the fowl which causes the manifestation
of the perfume of the musk. Similarly, the organ of taste, the tongue,
is the aqueous sense, as it causes the manifestation of taste only, while
it does not cause the manifestation of colour, etc,, like water which
causes the manifestation of the taste of the pudding. In like manner,
the eye is the igneous sense, because it causes the manifestation of
colour only, while it does not cause the manifestation of taste, etc., like
light. The skin is the aerial sense, because it causes the manifestation
of touch only, while it does not cause the manifestation of smell, etc.,
like the wind blown by the fan which causes the manifestation of the
coolness of the water (perspiration) sticking to the body.
The object which is terrene, is characterised as earth, stone, and
the immoveable. Therein the modifications of earth are the divisions of
the land, wall, brick, etc., Stones are the troantains, jewels, diamond,
red-chalk, etc. The irnm^veable are grass, herbs, trees, shrubs,
creepers, and trees bearing fruits without flowers. Aqueous objects are
rivers, seas, dew, hail-stone, etc. Igneous object is four-fold, differen
tiated as terrestrial, celestial, abdominal, and mineral. Tlie terrestrial
is that which is produced from fuel, such as wood. The celestial is not
produced from fuel ; e. g., lightning, etc. The abdominal is the sto
machic, capable of extracting the juice of rice, etc. And the mineral
is gold, etc. .The aerial object is the wind wdich is the seat or support
> -of touch which can be felt. The fourth effect of Air, which is called
150 VAlgESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
Prdna; i.e., the life-breath, and which is the means of disposing of the
essences (rasa), excreta; and the humours or \ital fluids (dhdtu') within
the body, though it is one, still acquires the names of Apfina (i.e., the
»ir which throws out)' etc., according to the diversity of its func
tions. — 11.
Here ends the second chapter of the fourth book in the Commen
tary of Sankara upon the Vaisesika Aphorisms of Kanada.
KANADA SfrTRAS IV, 2,2. 151
BOOK FIFTH— CHAPTER FIRST.
Action in the hand, how produced.
Upaskdra. — The subject of the fifth book is the investigation of Action. The investi
gation of Action, producible by volition, is the subject of the first chapter. In this there
are sections treating of (1) throwing upwards, (2) throwing upwards effected without volition,
<3) action which has virtue or merit as its cause, and (4) actions, goods, bad, and indifferent.
II VI I t I t II
Atma-seHa.yoga-prayatnabh.yslm, by means of con
junction with, and volition of, the soul. f^" Haste, in the hand.
Karmma, action.
1. Action in hand (is produced) by means of conjunction
with, and volition of, the Soul. — 181.
With reference to a particular form of muscular or bodily action,
(e. (jr., in using a pestle and mortar), the author says :
By means of conjunction and volition of the soul, Action (is pro
duced) in the hand which is its combinative cause. And of this
Action, conjunction with the soul exercising volition, is the non-
combinative cause, aid volition is the efficient or conditional cause. It is
this which is called muscular action , for muscular action is action which
has for its non-combinative cause conjunction with the soul exercising
volition, or action producible by volition of something other than, that
which possesses touch and which is not combined with, and is additonal
which to that in which the action appears (e.g., hand.) — 1.
Vivriti- — Here 5^ 'in the hand,' is an illustration. The meaning
is that by the conjunction, and volition, of the soul, action, in the form
of muscular motion, is caused in the body as well as in the parts there
of. So it has been said.
That which is produced by the Soul, may be called Desire. That
which is prodnced by Desire, may be called first Impulse or stir. That
which is produced by Impulse, may be called muscular motion. It it
that which is produced by muscular motion, that may be called Action
or physical change.
Action in the pestle described.
Upaskdra.—A.Her describing the throwing upwards of the hand, he describes the throw
ing upwards of the pestle, which depends upon the former :
n * i n * u
Tatha, similar. iJ^tf^HtTT^ Hasta-sarayogat, from conjunction with
the hand. ^ Cha, and. g^f Musale, in the pestle, qpfff Karmma, action.
2. And, from conjunction with the hand, a similar Action
appears in the pestle. — 182.
152 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY
The word ' cha ' implies ' gravity/ which is another efficient cause.
* Tatha ' means 'like that/ i. e., of the form of throwing upwards. Or
' tatha ' and ' hasta-sasayogat ' may be taken as constituting a single
term, which will then mean 'from conjunction with hand possessing
upward motion.' Here, again, conjunction of the pestle with the hand
conjoined with the soul exercising volition, is the non-combinative
cause ; the pestle is the combinative cause ; volition and gravity are the
efficient causes. — 2.
Above continued.
Upaskdra. — He states the caiise of tho sudden motion upward which is produced in the
pestle when struck by the mortar :
: II * I ? I \ II
Abhighata-je, produced by impact. gqfaT^ Musat.adau, in
the pestle, etc. ^rwffiif Karmmani, in action, sqf^fri^ Vyatirekat, because
of absence (of volition). 3T^TT?;*rf Akaranam, not cause. l^rT^ftr: Hasta-
BaBayogah, conjunction with the hand,
3. In the action, produced in the pestle, etc., by impact,
conjunction with the hand is not a cause, because of the absence
(of volition).— 183.
Here, though there is also conjunction of the hand with the rising
pestle, yet that conjunction possesses no causality On the other hand,
the impact of the mortar only is the non-combinative cause. It may be
asked, u Why so?" Therefore he adds, * vyatirekat/ which means
because of the absence of operativeness of volition." If there were
volition at that moment, there would surely be no sudden upward motion
in the pestle. By a volition to hold fast, there would be rather susten
tion of the pestle ; or, the upward motion again of the pestle would be
caused by muscular action. This is the import. — 3.
Vivriti. — Conjunction with the hand is not the combinative cause.
* Conjunction ' is indicative. Volition and muscular action also, it
should be understood, are not the efficient causes.
Action in the hand.
"Upaskdra. — With a view to specify a particular cause of the action of the hand, as it
flies upward with tho pestle, and for the purpose of disproving the non-combinative causality
of conjunction with the soul exercising volition, he says :
u * i n 8 n
Tatha, the same, i. e., not a cause. ^fTrfl^f^tT: Atma-samyogah, con
junction with the soul. l^rRTWTcftr Hasta-karmmani, in the action of the
hand.
4. In the case of action of the hand, ccnjunction with the
soul is not a cause. — 184.
KANADA StTTRAS V, 1, 6. 153
In the case of the action of the hand, as it springs upwards with
the pestle, ' conjunction with the soul,' i. e , conjunction with the soul
exercising volition, is ' the same, i. e., not a cause. The term ' not-a-
cause ' which appears in the preceding aphorism, is carried over here
by ( tatha.' the same. — 4.
Vivriti. — Yhis too is illustrative. If shouln be understood that
that volition also is not a non-common efficient cause.
Above continued.
Upaskdra. — " Whence then at that time the upward motiou in the hand " ? In answer
to this, he says :
H U* I 3 I U> II
Abhighatat, from impact. JjJW^nftTT^ Musala-sarayogat, from
conjunction with the Beetle. 5^" Hoste, in the hand. ^WT^Karmma, action.
5. The action (i. e., upward motion) in the hand is from
impact, and from conjunction with the pestle. — 185.
As, when the pestle flies upwards, the iron-ring at the end of the
} estle rises upwards, so the hand also at that time springs upwards.
Here by the word, ' impact,' re-action (i. e., recoil) produced by
impact, is expressed by transference. By the vigorous action of the
up-going pestle, accompanied with the impact, re-action or recoil is
produced in the pestle itself which is the substratum of that subs
tratum of that action. Subject to the re-action so effected, upward
motion appears in the hand also, in consequence of the conjunction of
the hand and the pestle, as its non-combinative cause ; and not that
this upward motion has for its non-combinative cause conjunction with
the soul exercising volition, for the hand rises involuntarily together
with the pestle. This is the idea. — 5.
Action in the body.
Upaxkara. — " well," it may be asked, " conjunction with theisoul exercising volition is
the cause of the action which is produced in the body or in a part of the body. Why is it
«ot so in the present instance " ? Henoe he says :
II U. I t I 3 II
Atma-karmma, action of the body, and its members.
Hasta-samyogat, from conjunction with the hand, ^r Cha, and, also.
6. Action of the body and its members is also from conjunc
tion with the hand.— 186.
The word ' atma,' by transference, means the body and its parts,
For, impossibility of order or coherence in the text, is the germ of a
transference of epithet. Thus the action which appears in a part of
the body also, that is, in the hand, arises from the conjunction of the
hand and the pestle. Th« would l cha ' implies also impetus. In the-
action of the hand, conjunction with the hand is really th« non-combi-
154 VAI£E§IKA PHILOSOPHY.
native cause. There is no deviation or breach of uniformity in this
respect. This conjunction is sometimes conjunction with the soul
exercising volition, and sometimes conjunction of the hand with pestle,
•etc., possessing impetus, as is the case with the action of the body and
its parts, of a mad man. — 6.
Falling how produced.
Upask&ra. — Ho begins the section on action' independent of volition :
II * I ? I V9 II
Sarayoga-abhave, in the absence of conjunction.
Gurutvat, from gravity. WTflC Patanam, falling.
7. In the absence of conjunction, falling (results) from
gravity. — 187.
By the term, ' conjunction,' every kind of impediment is indicated.
Hence in the absence of impediments, in consequence of gravity as its
non-combinative cause, falling i. e., an action resulting in conjunction
below, is produced. Here in fruit, etc., possessing gravity, the impedi
ment is conjunction ; in a bird, etc., however, volition to hold up is the
impediment to falling ; in an arrow, etc., when discharged, it is the re
action that is the impediment to falling. The meaning is that, in the
absence of these, falling is caused by gravity. In the case of holding
up of poison, etc., in the air, by thought-transference, etc., conjunction
with the soul endowed with adristam (invisible after-effects of pre
vious acts), or mantra, and the like are really the impediments. These
also are included by the term ' conjunction.' — 7.
Bhdsya. — reads Samskdra in the place of Sam-yoga.
Falling how produced — continued.
Upaskdra. — Will, if falling is caused by gravity, then how can there be sometimes an
upward, and sometimes a sideward motion in a stone, etc., when thrown up ? To meet this
objection, he says :
I \ I c: II
Nodana-visesa-abhavat, owing to the absence of a
particular movement or impulse. ?T Na, not. 3^>^ Urddhvam, upward.
*f Na, not. ffc4«f» Triyyak, oblique, sideward. JUT^flC Gamanam, going.
8. Owing to the absence of a particular molecular movement,
there arises no upward or sideward motion (in the fruit, bird, and
arrow). — 188.
The upward or sideward motion which takes place in a stone, arrow,
etc., though they possess gravity, results from a particular i. «., a
violent, molecular movement. So that in the case of the falling of a
fruit, a bird, an arrow, etc., in the absence of conjunction, volition,
3,nd re-action, there does not exist a particular movement, and conse
quently there is no upward or sideward motion. This is the sense. — 8.
KANADA SftTRAS V, 1, 11. 155
Above continued.
Upnskdra.—But, whenoo is particular molecular movement itself produced ? Ho gives
the answer :
II VI I t I & II
. Prayatna-visesat, from a particular volition. 5
Nodana-viSesah, particular molecular movement or impulse.
9, Particular molecular movement (results) from particular
volition. — 189.
Particular volition is caused by the desire " I will throw sidewardr
upward, far, or near." By this, particular nodana or molecular move
ment is produced, from which upward or sideward motion is possible
produced in a substance possessing gravity, a. </., a stone, etc. — 9.
Throwing far away, how produced.
(Tpaskdra. — ' Udasanara ' means throwing far upwards.
, Nodana-viSesat, from a particular molecular movement.
Udasana-visesah, particular throwing away.
10. From particular molecular movement, (results) particular
throwing away. — 190.
Vivriti. — sftvrt^faRfc *• «•> from a heterogeneous molecular move-
tuont produced by the aforesaid volition, 33CTTq, i. e., throwing high
upwards, going upwards, *Rfrf, »'• e., takes place, which completes the
aphorism. Thus, by agreement and difference, the causality of parti
cular molecular movement toward upward motion, is proved. a^TT^,
going upwards, is an indication. Sideward motion, etc., also should be
understood.
Non-volitional action, not a cause of virtue or vice.
Upask-lra. — The action which is produced in the hand together with the pestle, by th&
impact of the mortar, is not at all preceded by volition, nor is it the source of virtue and vice.
He extends a similar nature to the playful movements of the hands and feet, etc., of a child :
541H9MMH II % I t I K II
Hasta-karmmana, by the action of the hand. 3T<<$'<#uf Daraka-
karmma, the action of a child. itWRlftfC Vyakhyatam, explained.
11. By the action of the hand, the action of a child (has
been) explained. — 191.
Although a child's movement of its hands, feet, etc., is surely pre
ceded by effort, it has not for its result the acquisition of the good and
the avoidance of the evil, nor is it consequently a source of virtue and
vice. This is the meaning of the extension or analogy. — 11.
But how is action, in the form of sideward and upward.
motion, of the hands and feet of a child lying on the lap, produced, in.
156 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
the absence therefrom of the particular molecular movement or im
pulse ? So he says ;
By the action of the hand, of the form of throwing upwards, etc.,
simultaneous with the throwing upwards of a stone, the action, i, e., the
throwing upwards of the hands and feet, of a child, is explained, i. e.,
proved. Thus, a particular molecular movement is not the cause of all
throwing high upwards, but only of particular acts of throwing high
upwards. Hence the throwing upwards of the hands and feet of a child
is not unproved. Otherwise, the throwing upwards of the hands of
one who throws up a stone, etc., will be also unproved.
Certain volitional action altsn, not a cause of -virtue or vice.
Upaskdra. — Now, extending similarity to the action of a child to action which , though
preceded by volition, is yet not the cause of a virtue and vice, he says :
n *i i ? i ?R u
Tatha, the same. ^T^J Dagdhasya, of a burnt person.
Visphotane, in the case of a boil.
12. The same (is action directed towards the killing of a
felon), when (a house being set on fire by him) the body of a
person burnt therein, is torn open by fire. — 192.
A house being set on fire by a felon and in it boils being caused to
a person burnt by the fire, action which is produced in the hand, etc.,
by volition directed towards the killing of that felon, is neither a cause
of virtue nor a cause of vice ; as it has been said, " In the slaying of a
felon, there is no sin in him that slays openly or covertly : wrath
encounters wrath. An incendiary, a poisoner, an assassin, a thief, a
ravisher of wife and field, — these six are felons. " —12.
V'ivriti — Sometimes throwing upwards, etc., result also from parti
cular molecular movements which are not dependent upon particular
volition produced by the desires, " I throw upwards," etc. This he
points out :
5*\=r^T, of a burnt body, building, fruit, etc. ; f^rlte^, in the going
sideward and upward of their parts ; <T«IT ? molecular movement, caused
by a particular volition, is not the cause. This is the meaning.
Non-volitional action in the body described.
Upaskdra. — Now, he points out actions which take place without volition.
n * i ? i ^ n
Yatna-abhave, in the absence of volition. M^dfrU Prasuptasya,
of the sleeping. ^FTJ^ Chalanam, movement.
13. Movement of the sleeping (takes place) in the absence
of volition. — 193.
The word' prasuptasya' implies the state of absence of conscious
ness. Therefore, the movement caused by air in the unconscious state
of a person in swoon, while living, should be observed here. — 13.
KANlDA SftTRAS V, 1, 15. 157
Vivriti. — Even in the absence of volition caused by the desire, " I
throw up," etc., 'movement ' of the body, i. e., action such as the side
ward and upward movements of the limbs of a person 'sleeping' or
attended with deep sleep, is produced. Therefore, a particular voli
tion is not everywhere the cause. This is the import.
Action in things other than the body.
Upaslcdra. — Having explained the actions of the body, he treats of other actions :
n % i * i * 9 n
rjjrfr Trine, in the grass. ^frwf Karmma, action. ^HJ^T^tTT^ Vayu-samyogat,
from conjunction with air.
14. Action in the grass (arises) from conjunction with air.
— 194.
By the term ' grass/ he implies trees, shrubs, creepers, and all such
other objects — 14.
Vivriti. — He points out .similar other actions also.
Even in the absence of a particular volition, from conjunction with
-air, action is produaed in the grass.
Action produced by adristam.
UpasMra. — Enumerating actions dependent upon adcistam, he says :
II % I 3 I ?V, ||
JTT^WfMani-gamanam, movement of the jewel. ^qfaspfqi Suchi-
abhisarpanam, approach of the needle. ^TfgsRW^ Adrista-karanakam,
have adristam, (i.e., the invisible consequences of previous acts) as their
cause.
15. The movement of the jewel, and the approach of the
needle, adristam as their cause. — 195.
By the term ' jewel,' bell-metal, etc., are implied. In the going
which takes place, therefore, of the jewel, bell-metal, etc., informed with
mantra or incantation, towards the thief, there, of that movement the
jewel, etc., are the combinative cause, conjunction of the jewel with the
.Sjul of the thief possessed of adristam, is the non-combinative cause, and
the vice of the thief is the efficient or instrumental cause. By the word
* needle,' in ' the approach of the needle/ all metal as well as grass are
implied. Thus, in the case of the movement of the needle, etc., towards
that which is attractive of iron (i. e., the magnet), and of the movement
of grass towards that which is attractive of grass, the needle, etc. are
the combinative cause, conjunction with the soul of the person possess
ed of adristam, who is affected for good or for bad by that movement
of the grass, the needle, etc., is the non-combinative cause, and his
yery adristam, is the instrumental cause. Other instances, e. g. the
naming upwards of fire, the sideward motion of air, the action of the
ultimate atoms at the beginning of creation, etc., should be similarly
understood. — 15.
158 VAlgfiSIKA PHILOSOPHY.
Vivfiti. — By the terra, ' jewel/ are intended vessels made of gold,
etc., and filled with water. To such a vessel magicians apply incanta
tions for the recovery of stolen property. The tradition of the ancients is-
this. The vessel is set on the grou id, and some other person lays his-
right hand upon it. The vessel accompanied with the hand, in conse
quence of the efficacy of the incantation, moves towards the spot where-
the stolen property has been deposited, and on reaching that place,
stops.
The reason of the movement of such a vessel is not a particular
volition, but the efficient cause is the merit of the former possessor or
the demerit of the thief. The non-combinative cause is conjuuction of
such a vessel with soul possessing such adristam (or results of actions-
done in previous states of existence) ; and the combinative cause is-
such a vessel. In like manner, adristam is also the causa of the attrac
tion towards a loadstone, which takes place in needles, i. e., iron-rods,.
when in proximity with the magnet. If it be asked, in consequence of
whose adristam motion takes place in needles, etc., the reply, is that it
is the adristam of him to whom benefit or injury accrues by the motion,
that is the cause. The term,' needle/ is indicative, iro:i in general
attracted by the load-stone being inte idel. It is to be understood that
adristam is the cause of the motion of grass attracted by that which is
attractive of grass (amber ?), of the upward flaming of fire, of the side
ward motion of air, and of the aotiou of the ultimata atoms at the
beginning of creation.
Plurality of action.
Upaskdra — It may bo doubted whether an arrow, a bird, a wheel of burning charcoal, etc.,.
have only one action, or many, till they come to a stop. To remove this doubt, he says :
: n * i ? i ?$ u
jq\ Isau, of the arrow. SinjTT^ Ayugapat,
Samyoga-visesah, peculiarities of co iju ictio is. ^r«fr:q?% Karmma-
anyatve, in respect of diversity of action.^: Hetuh, cause. Mark
16. Peculiarities of non-simultaneous conjunctions of the
arrow, are the mark of the diversity of its actioa. — 195.
In ' isau ' the locative inflection has bee i used in the se:ise of the-
genitive. The sense of the aphorism is as follows : After conjunction
with a wall and the like, of an arrow, etc., moving with impetus, a
cessation of motion is observed, even though the arrow, etc., still exist;.
Here it is not the destruction of the substratum which causes the-
destruction of the motion, for the substratum continues to exist. A ly
contradictory attribute is also not observed. It is, therefore, inferrel.
that it is conjunction produced by itself, that destroys the action. And
this conjunction, produced at the fourth moment, destroys action of
the fifth moment. Thus, first there is production of action, then dis
junction, next destruction of the previous conjunction, after it sub
sequent conjunction, and lastly destruction of action. The meaning,
therefore, is that peculiarities of non-simultaneous conjunctions make-
known the diversity of the action. * Saiayoga-viiesah ' means-
KANlDA SftTRAS V, 1, 17. 15&
peculiarity in conjunction, which is nothing but self-produced-ness.
•Otherwise, were conjunction, as such, destructive of action, action
could not abide anywhere. — 16.
Action produced by Samskara.
Upaskdra. — After the section on Action producible by impulse, he begins the section on
Action producible by resultant energy.
K
II V, I \\ \\3 II
Nodanat, from impulse of molecular movement. 9TI^} Adyam,
original, first, %q\: Isoh, of the arrow. *&*] Karmma, action. dcijfcw
Tat-karmma-karitat, produced by that action. =5 Cha, and. fl'frftKT^ Sams-
karat, from resultant energy. HrfT Uttaram, the next. <T«IT Tatha, simi
larly. SflT Uttaram, the next. Sfrf Uttaram, the next. ^ Cha, and.
17. The first action of the arrow is from impulse ; the next
is from resultant energy produced by that (i.e., the first) action ;
and similarly the next, and the next.— 197.
Of the first action, which is produced in an arrow, when discharged
from a bowstring, drawn by the volition of a person, the arrow is the
combinative cause, volition and gravity are the efficient causes. And
by this first action, resultant energy, called impetus, and having the
^ame substratum, is produced, it is proved even by perception, viz.,
" It (i. e., the arrow) moves with velocity." By that resultant energy,
action is produced in that arrow ; of which the non-combinative cause
is the resultant energy, the combinative cause is the arrow, while the
•efficient cause is an intense form of molecular movement. In like man
ner, a succession of actions one after another is produced by the
resultant energy which continues until the arrow falls.
Since, on an action being destroyed by subsequent conjunction
produced by (the action) itself, another action is produced by resultant
•energy, therefore, a single resultant energy only is productive of a
succession of actions ; whereas, on the ground of redundancy, it is not
proper to assume a succession of resultant energy, similar to the
succession of actions. To point out this, he says " similarly the next,
and the next," and also uses the singular number in " from resultant
•energy produced by that action." In the Nyaya doctrine, however,
' which admits a succession of resultant energies like the succession of
actions, there is redundancy. The reason, again, that of two arrows,
simultaneously discharged, the impetus of the one is swift and that of
the other slow, is the swiftness andslownees of the impulse or molecular
movement. — 17-
Vivrtti. — The original action itself of a discharged arrow, etc.,
destroys, at the third moment from its own origin, its cause, viz.t
molecular movement or impulse, given by the bow. Therefore, there
VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
being absence of impulse, how will other actions be produced at the
fifth, and succeeding moments ? In view of this objection, he states
the aphorism.
Falling of arrow, how caused.
Upa*kdra.--Svt if only a single resultant energy be productive of a succession of actions
there would be, under no circumstances whatever, a falling of the arrow, because of the
the resultant energy which is productive of aciton. (To this objection, he
Saiiiskara-abhave, in the absence of resultant energy (or
propulsive energy generated by action). p^T^ Gurutvat, from o-ravity.
Patanam, falling.
18. In the absence of propulsive energy generated by action,
falling (results) from gravity. — 198.
Gravity, which is the cause of falling, invariably follows (the-
arrow), at every moment. That gravity, being counter-acted by resul
tant energ/, could not cause the falling (of the arrow;. Now, in the-
absence of the counter-active, the very same gravity causes falling.
This is the meaning. — 18.
Here ends the first chapter of the fifth book in Sankara's Com
mentary on the Yaiiesika Aphorisms.
KANiDA SfiTRAS V, 2, 2. 161
BOOK FIFTH— CHAPTER SECOND.
Causea of action in Earth.
Upatibira. — This is the section on the examination of Action producible by impulse, etc.,
Therein he says:
Nodana-abhighatat, from molecular movement or impulse,
and from impact. ^Tfi^^JlWC, Saiiayukta-Saikyogat, from conjunction
with the conjunct. ^ Cba, and. ^fa^T Prithivyam, in Earth. sp,»*i Kar-
mina, action.
1. Action in Earth (results) from impulse, impact, and con
junction with the conjunct. — 199.
^\\*f is a particular form of conjunction : conjunction, action pro
duced by \\hich does not Leccme the cause of the disjunction of conjoint
things from each other ; or, conjunction which does not become the
efficient cause of Sound. That j articular form of conjunction is called
impact, \vhich becomes the efficient cause of Sound, and action produced
by which becomes the cause of disjunction of conjoint things Irom
each other. By each cf them also action is produced in. Earth called
clay. In Earth action is produced from imrulse given by the foct, as
weil as from the impact of the foot. Here clay is the combinative
cause ; impulse and impact are respectively non-combinative causes ;
gravity, imj etus, and volition are, so far as they are necessary, efficient
causes. " From conjunction with the conjunct : " Because action is
simultaneously observed in a water-pot, etc., lying on clay, when action
is produced in that clay from impulse or from impact. — 1.
Above continued.
l~ ],cn>l:«ra. — But \\hat is the non-combinative caute of earthquake, etc., which take
place M ithout the intervention of impulse and impact ? He gives the answer :
^ , Jl ^ I R I R II
b, that, i. e., action in Earth. f^^^Jir Visesena, with a particu
lar consequence. ^j^S^lfrcf Adrista-karitam, caused by adrisiam or
destiny.
2. (If action in Earth happens) with a particular conse
quence, it is caused by adristam. — 200.
' Tat ' alludes to action in Earth. Action in Earth alone, if it
happens with a particular consequence, i. e., under the tendency (vdsand)
of transmigratory souls towards birth, life, and experience (bhoga"), is
then caused by adristam. Therefore, the non-combinative cause of
earthquake is conjunction of the soul, possessing adristam, of a person
whose pleasure or pain is produced by the earthquake ; the earth is the
combinative cause ; and adristam is the efficient cause.
162 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
'Or' ' tat ' alludes to impulse and impact. i Visasa.i ' means absence.
So that, the meaning is, action in Earth, which is produced in the
absence of impulse and impact, is caused by adl'istam. — 2.
JBhdsya. — explains adrista in V. ii. 2 in the sense of unseen natural
force, the causes of seismic disturbances, of the revolution of the ter
restrial globe round the sun, and of other actions in Earth.
Cause of rain.
Upaskdra. — Now, in the section on the examination of action combined with fluid (which
includes liquid) substance, he says :
t A pain, of waters. ^nTfiT^ra Samyoga-abhave ; in the absence of
conjunction. JT^rSTT^ Gurutvat, from gravity. 'TrFTflt Patanam, falling.
3. The falling of waters, in the absence of conjunction, is
due to gravity. — 201.
The falling of waters, in the form of a shower, is caused by gravity,
which is its non-combinative cause. It takes place in the absence of
conjunction, *. c., conjunction with the cloud. Therefore, absence of
conjunction is the efficient cause. This is the meaning. — -3.
Causes of flowing of ivater.
Upaskdra. — But how is action, productive of mutual conjunction amongst the drops of
water themselves, produced ? He gives the answer.
Dravatvat, from fluidity. ^Tr^rq Syandanam, flowing.
4. Flowing (results) from Hudity. — 202-
By the mutual conjunction of drops of water fallen on earth, a
large body of water, in the form of a stream, is produced. And the
flowing or distant progression, which takes place- in it, is produced
from fluidity as its non-combinative cause, and from gravity as its
efficient cause, in water drops which are its combinative causes — 4.
Cause of evapc ration of water.
Upaskdra. — But the falling in rain, due to gravity, would be po&sible, if water lying on
earth went up. But how does this take place ? fe'o he says :
Nadyah, the sun's rays. ^r^^TTr^Vayu-saKiyogat, through con
junction with air. 3Tntr?<!IflC Arohanam, ascent.
5. The sun's rays (cause) the ascent (of water), through
•conjunction with air. — 203.
The word, ' cause ' (verb), is the complement of the aphorism. The
rays of the sun cause the going up of water, through conjunction with air.
KANADA StTTKAS V, 2,7. 163
In the summer, the sun's rays, being impelled "by air, cause the
ascent of water. This is the meaning.
Where the reading is Tlg^l3S'qVlffi(. there it should be interpreted
as conjunction with air related to the sun's rays. — 5.
Cause of evaporation of water, continued.
Upaskt'tra. — But how do the sun's rays come to possess such power that they carry up
water lying on the earth ? Hence he says.
— Nodana-apidanat, from concussion, or being violently
shaken by or through the impulse. sfgflsf^TJTT^ Saihyukta-samyogat,
from conjunction with the conjunct. ^ Cha, and.
6. (Particles of water fly upwards), by means of concussion
with impulse, and of conjunction with the conjunct. — 204. .
Particles of water fly up, being conjoined with the sun's rays,
which are, in turn, conjoined with air, through concussion with the
imj ulse of strong wind ; in the same way as the rays of fire, bestirred
by air, carry up particles of water boiling in a cauldron. The word
' cha' conveys the sense of ' as.' And here only particles of water
boiling in a cauldron should be observed to be the simile. — 6.
NOTE : Upaskdra compares the two processes of evaporation and
ebullition of water
Cause of circulation of water in trees.
Upasl'ura. — Water peured at the root, gots up in all directions, through the interior of
a tree. Neither impulse and impact, nor the sun's rays prevail there. How, then, is it
caused ? He gives the answer.
II * I R I V9 II
qOT Vriksa-abhisarpanam, circulation in trees, ff^ Iti, this.
Adrista-karitaro, caused by adfistam or destiny.
7. The circulation (of water) in trees is caused by adristam.
—205.
1 Abhisarpanam ' means flowing towards oV all over. That takes
place in a tree, of water poured at its root. It is caused by adristam, i. e.f
of those souls whose pleasure or pain is produced by the growth of the
leaves, branches, fruits, flowers, etc. The meaning, then, is that action
by which water rises up and causes the growth of trees, arises from
conjunction with the above-mentioned souls, possessing adfistam, as
its n on- combinative cause, and from adfistam, as its efficient cause, in.
water which is its combinative cause. — 7.
Cause of condensation and dissolution of water.
Upaxkara. — Constitutional fluidity has been stated to be the characteristic of water.
Upward, downward, and sideward motion of such water only has been proved. The aqueous-
ness of snow, hail, etc., also are proved without a dispute, since they possess coldness. There
fore, how do these possess condensation, i. e., hardness, and how dissolution ? Hence
i\e says.
164 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY
TT Apara, of waters. ^-fHT: Sanghatah, condensation, fr^ppf Vilaya
nam, dissolution. ^ Cha, and. ^3T:*f<ffmt Tejah-sarkyogU, from conjunc
tion with fire.
8. Condensation, and dissolution, of water, are due to con
junction with fire. — 206.
Aqueous ultimate atoms, originating a binary atomic ao-aieo-ate
in consequence of being impeded by celestial fire, do not originate
fluidity in these binary atomic aggregates. Snow, hail, etc, void of
fluidity, are thus originated, in the course of binary and others atomic
aggregates, by constituent {.arts void of fluidity. Therefore hard iess
is observed in them.
Such being the case, it may be asked, what proof is there that s iow
hail, etc., are modifications of water V Accordingly it has bea i said'
Dissolution also from conjunction with fire." °By a more powerful
conjunction with fire, aotion is produced in the ultimate atoms oricrjlia-"
tive of s:io\v, hail, etc. Action produces disjunction. Froin° the
successive destruction thereby of originative conjunctions follows the
destruction of the larger compounds, snow, hail, etc. In consequence
of the departure therefrom of conjunction with fire, which was aa
impediment to fluidity, the very same ultimate atoms originate fluidity
in binary atomic aggregates; whence dissolution takes place of s lovv
hail, etc., thus endowed with fluidity. Here also the subsequent ingress
of a more powerful fire is the efficient cause. — -8.
xplils up V. ii. 8 into two aphorisms, viz., Apdm San jhdtak
and vilayanclia tejah
Above continued.
UpaskAra.— But what is the proof that thare i* sub.^iuent in jrojs into \v-ii v of a m ,rn
powerful nro present in other ? So he says :
I ^ I R | 8. II
Tatra, there, i. e., in the case of the ingress of fire into water."
^ Visphurjjathuh, the pealing of thunder. fafflC Lingam, mark.
9. The pealing of thunder is the mark of that.— 207.
1 Tatra/ i. e., in the matter of the subsequent ingress of fire, present
in ether, into water floating in ether, ' visphurjjathuh lingam/i.e. the
pealing of thunder itself is the mark. This is the meaning. Par-reach
ing flash of lightning is clearly perceptible ; thunder which iirnndiate-
ly follows it, is also really perceptible. By this it is inferred that fire
present in ether, in the form of lightning, has entered into the cloui
from which hailstones appear. By its presence, as a condition, irn >edi-
ment is caused to the fluidity of water-particles originative of hail
stones. — 9
S&TRAS V, 2, 12. 165
Cause of condensation of water, continued.
Upaskdra. — Of this he gives yet another proof .
r u * i R i ?on
T Vaidikam, Vedic, Derived from Veda. =g Cha and.
10. (There is) Vedic (proof) also.— 208.
The meaning is that the ingress of fire into water is proved by the
Veda also. Thus : —
" Those waters held fire in their womb, which held fire in their
•svomb," etc. — 10.
Cause of thundering .
Upaskdra. — But how is thundering produced, since conjunction and disjunction, which
are the causes of Sound, are not observed ? Hence he says :
i R i ?
Apum, of waters. S'qtJTT^ Samyogat, from conjunction, .
Vibhagat, from disjunction. ^ Cha, and. ^crTft?%r: Stanayitnoh. of cloud.
11. (Thunder-clap results) from conjunction with, and dis
junction from, water, of the cloud. — 209.
" Visphuvjjathuh " is the complement of the aphorism. Conjunction
with, and disjunction from, water, of the cloud, by becoming efficient
causes, produce sound, i. e., thundering, in ether as the combinative
cause, through the conjunction of the cloud itself with ether, as the
non-combinative cause. Sometimes, again, conjunction with, and dis
junction from, air, of the cloud, are the efficient causes, and conjunc
tion of the cloud with ether, and its disjunction therefrom, are the
non-combinative causes. This is collaterally mentioned in the topic of
the causes of action. Or, since action is the leading topic here, it is
indicated that, conjunction of the cloud and ether, or their disjunc
tion, being the non-combinative cause of sound, the (efficient) cause is
action produced from the impulse and impact of water alone — 11.
Vivriti- — Thundering takes place from the conjunction of water,
i. e., from the impact of air with it, and from its disjunction from the
cloud.
Causes of conflagration, tempest, etc.
UpasMra. — It has been stated that conjunction with soul possession adristam is a eauso
of earth-quake. A; there, so in the case of the action which is produced in fire which causes
sudden conflagration, and in air which eausos a sudden agitation uf trees and the like con
junction with soul possessing adristam is also the non-combinative cause ; air and tiro are tha
.combinative causes ; and adristam is the efficient cause. This is the meaning.
II V* I R I
166 VAlgESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
n Prithivi-karmmana, by the action of Earth. ?HT:^wr Tejah-
karmma, action of fire, sn^wf Vayu-karmma, action of air. =g Clia, and
Vyakhyatam, explained.
12. The action of Fire, and the action of Air are explained
by the action of Earth. — 210.
The twice recurrence of the word action in the aphorism, has the
object of indicating the action of meteors, etc. — 12.
Causes of initial action of fire, air, atoms, and mind.
Upskdra. — Ho mentions other actions of which conjunction with soul possessirg ailrixtam
s the non-combinative cause.
%: Agneh, of fire. 3^33^1 sf Urddhva-jvalanaiii, flaming upward.
: Vayoh, of air. faafoTiryyak, sideward. T^ Pavan am, blowing. INg»rj
Anunam, of atoms, JTT^r: Manasah. of inind. ^ Cha, and. ^fr^4 Adyam,
initial, first. q;»»| Karmma, action. *%%% ^TT^rTq Adrista-karitam, caused by
adristam.
13. The initial upward flaming of fire, the initial sideward
blowing of air, and the initial actions of atoms, and of mind are
caused by adristam. — 211.
' Adyam' means contemporaneous with, or existing at, the beginn
ing of creation. At that stage, impulse, impact, etc., being non-existent.
conjunction with soul possessing adristatii is in these cases the non-
combinative cause. The adjective, ' initial,' qualifies upward flaming,
and sideward blowing also. It is proper to hold that impetus is the
non-combinative cause of other (than initial) actions of fire and air,
for there being a visible or known cause there is no occasion for the-
supposition of an invisible or unknown cause — 13.
Cause of action of mind.
Upaskdra. — With reference to non-initial action, he says :
r Hasta-karmmana, by the action of the hand.
Manasah of mind or the internal organ. ^FFJ karmma, action. s^f-
Vyakhyatam, explained.
14. The action of mind is explaind by the action of the
hand.— 212.
As in the throwing upward, etc., of the pestle, the action of the-
hand has for its non-combinative cause conjunction with soul exercis
ing volition, so the action of the mind also, for the purpose of coming'
KANADA StTTRAS III, 2, 12. 167
into contact with the (external) sense receptive of the object desired,
really has for its nou-corabi native cause conjunction with soul exercis
ing volition. Although mind, the sense, is not directly subject to
volition, still it should be observed that action is produced in mind by
volition which can be reached by the nervous process by which mind
travels. That the nervous process can be apprehended by the tactual
sense-organ, however, must be admitted ; for, otherwise, assimilation
of food, drink, etc., also will not be possible by volition which can be
reached by the nervous process through which life or the vital energy
travels. — 14.
Pleasure and pain are marks of action of mind.
UpasMra. — But, it may be objected, there is no proof that action is produced in the
.•mind. Hence he says :
II
1^ Atma-indriya-manah-artha-sannikarsfit, from
contact of soul, sense, mind, and object. g<Sf:^ Sukha-duhkhe, pleasure
and pain.
15. Pleasure and pain (results) from contact of soul, sense,
mind, and object. — 213.
' Pleasure and pain ' is indicative ; cognition, volition, etc., are to
he understood. The universality or ubiquity of mind has been already
refuted and its atom-ness established. It has also been stated that the
non-production of cognitions simultaneously is the mark of mind.
There could, therefore, be no pleasure and pain at all, without the con
junction of mind with the respective localities of the senses. The mean
ing is that, did no action take place in mind, there could be no feeling in
-the form of " Pleasure in my foot," "Pain in ray head," etc. Although
all the particular attributes of the soul depend upon contact of mind, yet
pleasure and pain are (alone expressly) mentioned*, because, on account
of their intensity, they are very manifest. — 15.
Yoga described.
Ifpaskdra. — Well, if the mind is so fickle or restless, then there being no inhibition or
restraint of the internal organ there can bo no ycga or communion, and without yoga there
jan be no intuitive knowledge of the soul, and without it, there can be no moksa or salvation,
Therefore, the undertaking of this treatise is futile. In anticipation of this objection
he says :
$
I 1 I ^ II
Tat-anarambhah, non-origination of that, i. e., pleasure
.and pain, or action of mind. ?TTr*T$f Atrnasthe, steady in the soul. JfTf^T
ananasi, mind being. SETTta^ Sarirasya, of body, i. e., of the embodied
;-soul. 5:^1^3": duhkha-abhavah, non-existence of pain. ^ Sah, that*
Yogah, yoga, communion.
168 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
16. Non-origination of that (follows) on the mind becoming
steady in the soul ; (after it, there is) non-existence of pain in the
embodied soul. (This is) that yoga.— 214.
When the mind of an indifferent person who has come to believe in
the vanity of all objects of enjoyment, comes to stay only in the soul at
that stage, owing to the absence of volition corresponding to its action
action is not produced in the mind which then becomes comparatively
steady. It is this (state) which is (called) yoga, since the characteristic
I yoga is the inhibition or restraint of the internal organ, chittam.
1 Tat-anarambhah, means non-origination of action of mind. Or
by the word, Hat/ only pleasure and pain are denoted, being in the*
context. < Duhkha-abhavah' ; Being the means of the non-existence of
pain, Yoga itself is (spoken of as) non-existence of pain as is the
expression " Food is life." Or, it is a relative compound word mean
ing where there is non-existence of pain, 'garirasya' means the soul
as limited or determined by the body. 'Sah yogah' : here the word
1 that / refers to a universally known object," (the meaning bein^ this
is that Yoga.
Or, by the word, ' fitma,' life is here denoted by transference since
soul is inferred by life. So that, by action in the nervous process
which is the channel of tho life breath, action of the life breath
(respiration ), is also produced. Or, the action of the life breath has for
its non-combinative cause, conjunction of the life-breath with soul
exercising volition the source of vitality. And volition, which is the
source of vitality, is supersensible, and has to be inferred by the
movement of the life-breath. Otherwise, ho\v can there be inspiration
of air, even in the state of deep sleep ? This is the import _ 16
i.—1 Atmasthe manasi,' i. e., when, quitting the senses, etc.
in virtue of tho six-limbed Yoya, mind abides in the soul alone, then''
< tat-anarambhah,' i. e., ' anarambhah ' or non-production of action of
mind. The mind then becomes fixed or steady. In this state, 'Sarlrasya-
duhkha-abhavah,' i. e., pain in relation to tho body is not produced.
' Sah,' i. e., conjunction of mind, resiling from the outside, with soul'
is called Yoya.
The following verses of Skandapurdnam also prove the same thino- ;
i t
" So also, (i'. e. restkss) is Chitta, (i. e., the internal organ), smitten
with air. Therefore, do not trust it Accordingly; restrain air, for the-
purpose of steadiness of Chitta. For the purpose of restraining air,
practise Yoga, of which there are six angaa or limbs. Posture, Regula
tion of breath, Abstraction or Inhibition of the senses, Concentration
of mind, Meditation, and Absorption, — these are the six anyas or
limbs of Yoga or communion.0
KANiDA SftTRAS V, 2, 17. 169
Therefore, there being cessation of false knowledge, etc., brought
about by the manifestation of intuitive knowledge of soul, after the
attainment of Yoga, final emancipation remains unimpeded. Conse
quently a system of thinking about things (like Kandda Stttras} is not
fruitless. This is the import.
Other actions of mind, etc. independent of volition,
and dependent on adristam.
Upnskdra. — But, if volition were the efficient cause of the action of life and mind, then,
when life and mind go out from the body, in the state of death, and, on the production of
another body, re-enter into it, there being no volition, both the.^e actions would ba impossible.
How, again, can be produced action, productive of conjunction of even what is eaten and
drunk, i. e., food and drink, which conjunction is the cause of the growth of the body and its
limb*, 'as well as action %vhich causes conjunction and disjunction during life within the
womb ? In anticipation of this objection, he says :
n * i i i
far Apasarpanam, going out, egress. gr<T?T*T<f?n; Upasarpanam, com
ing into, ingress. ^ri^rnfa^frTT: Asita-pita-samyogah, conjunctions of
what is eaten and drunk. ^T^fcdMJMlTI1 Karyya-antara-samyogah, con
junctions of other effects or products. =5 Cha, and. ^Tfg^ni^Trfr Adrista-
karitfi'ii, caused by adfistam.
17. Egress and ingress (of life and mind, from and into,
body), conjunctions (i.e., assimilation) of food and drink, and con
junctions of other products, — these are caused by adristam. — 215.
Here the neuter gender in the word ' adrista-kiiritani ' is according
to the rule that word of the neuter gender, appearing together with a
word of another gender, may optionally entail neuter gender in both.
The word, ' Samyoga/ again, secondarily denotes action which is its
cause. l Apasarpanam/ i. e., the going out of life and mind from the
body alone, on the wearing away of action which originated the body ;
*• Upasarpanam/ i. e., the entrance of life and mind into another body
as it is produced ; action which is the cause of the conjunction (i. e.f
assimilation) of food, drink, etc. ; and action which is the cause of the
conjunction (i. e., pulsation, etc.) of another product, i. e,, the foetus ; —
all these have as their non-combinative cause conjunction with soul
possessing adTistam. The word, ' iti/ implies that the actions of the
humours and excreta of the body are also caused by conjunction with,
soul possessing adristam, as their non-combinative cause. — 17.
Vivriti- — He mentions other actions dependent on adTistam.
' Apasarpanam/ i. e., egress of mind from the body at death ; ( Upa
sarpanam,' i. e., the ingress of mind into another body when it is pro
duced ; action from which conjunctions of what is eaten and drunk,
i. e., food and water, are produced ; action from which conjunctions of
other effects, i. e., the senses and life, with the body, are produced : — all
these are caused by conjunction with soul possessing adristam, as th&
non-combinative cause.
170 VAI£ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
Moksa described.
Upattkdra. — But, it may be urged, if the production of another |body were necessary, how|
-would there be Moksa ? Hence he says ;
Tat-abhave, in the non-existence of that, i. e., the causal body,
or potential body, or the subtle body of impressions and tendencies,
acquired during life, which becomes the cause of re-birth, and in re
birth, becomes encased, as it were,, in the gross, physical body. 5f4tTT*n^:
Samyoga-abhavah, non-existence of conjunction, i. e., with the existing
physical bodv. ?THTiHfe: A-pradurbhavah, non-re-appearanco, or non-re
birth. «g Cha, and. in^f: Moksah, salvation. Moksa.
18. Moksa consists in the non-existence of conjunction with
the body, when there is at the same time, no potential body exist
ing, and consequently, re-birth cannot take place. — 216.
Here the idea is as follows: The power of Yoya produces intui
tive knowledge of the self ; false knowledge, attended with desire, is
thereby annihilated ; consequently, attraction, aversion, stupidity or
irrationality or spiritual blindness (moha"), and other faults due to it,
disappear ; then inclination or activity goes away ; birth, due to it,
therefore, does not take place ; and, consequently, pain, bound up with
birth, also vanishes away. This, then, is the nature of things. Now,
in virtue of the power born of yoya, a yoyin, considering the entire
mass of virtues and vices, or merits and demerits, which are the un
common or particular causes of pleasure and pain to be enjoyed, at
particular places and times, in the bodies of a horse, an elephant, a
serpent, a bird, etc., in accordance with those merits and demerits, and
then going through those several forms of physical existence, thereby
wears away or exhausts his previously produced merits and demerits
by experiencing them. His faults being thus neutralised, when other
merits and demerits are not produced, and when there is in coi. sequence
no production of another future or potential body, at that time, it
is the non-existeuce of conjunction, which then exists, with the
former body, that is (called) moksa. ' Tat-abhave ' means in the absence
of conjunction, in the non-production of a future body.
To meet the objection that this state is common to all at pralaya,
or periodical dissolution of creation, he adds ' apradurbhavah. The
meaning is, after which manifestation of body, etc., does not again
take place. ' Sah moksah :' that is, annihilation of pain, which results
in that state, is Moksa. — 18.
VivTiti. _ It may be objected that the stream of bodies being with
out beginning and without end, the impossibility of emancipation is
also the same. Hence he says :
' Tat-abhave/ i. e., in the absence of adristam, that is to say, where
future adristam is exhausted by intuitive knowledge of self, and existing
adristam, by experience, bhoga ; ' samyoga-abhavah.' i. e., a severance
KANADA StiTRAS V. 2. 20. 171
takes place from connection with the stream or succession of
bodies ; following it, is ' apradurbhavah ; i. e., non-production of pain,
since the causes, viz., body andfadristam, do not exist. It is then and
there that emancipation becomes possible. Therefore, emancipation is
notichimerical like the horns of a hare. This is the import.
Darkaess is non-existence.
Upaskdra. — It may be objected : — The action of a substanca is observed also in darkness^
there being the perception, " The shadow moves." Here there is no volition, no impulse or
impact, no gravity or fluidity, no resultant energy. Therefore, another efficient cause should
be enumerated ; but it does not fall within observation. Accordingly he says :
t II <i I ^ I 33. H
because of difference in production from Substance, Attribute, and
Action. ?PTT^: Abhavah, non-being, non-existence. rR:Tamah, darkness.
19. Darkness is non-existence, because it is different in its
production from Substance, Attribute, and Action. — 217.
By this aphorism, the determination or delimitation that substances.
are nine only, also becomes established.
Now, the production of substance is dependent upon substance*
possessing touch ; but in darkness, touch is not felt. It cannot be that
touch is only undeveloped here , for development of touch is essential
to development of colour.
Objection. — This is the rule in case of Earth, whereas darkness is
the tenth substance.
Answer. — It is not- For no other substance is substratum of blue
colour, and gravity is inseparable from blue colour, as also are taste
and smell.
Objection. — As sound is the only distinguishing attribute of Ether,.
so also will blue colour be the only distinguishing attribute of dark
ness.
Answer. — It is not so, as there is contradiction to its visibility. For,
if darkness were something possessing blue colour, or were it blue*
colour itself, then it would not be perceived by the eye without the help
of external light. — 19.
Above continued.
Upaskdra. — What, then, causes the 'perception of motion (in darkness) ? Ho giv« th»
Answer :
II H* I < I ** II
: Tejasah, of light. jfiqi-flMl Dravya-antarena, by another subs
tance. wnTOR^ Avaranat, because of obscuration. <9 Cha, and also.
20. (Darkness is non-existence), also because (it is produced)
from the obscuration of light by another substance. — 218.
172 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
Light being obscured by another moving substance, non-existence
of light is not observed in the places falling behind, and is observed
n the places lying before. It is from this resemblance of the nou-
xistence of light to the moving substance, that, motion is mistake i
in it, but not that motion is real in it. This is the meaning, the -.orcep
tion appearing so (i. e., erroneous) from agreement and diffjre >j
(That is, whenever a body in motion obscures light, the shad ,\v caused
thereby also moves ; and where the obscuring body is not iu nntiou
the shadow also does not move).
Darkness, (then), is non-e-iste ice of every trace of light possessing
developed or appreciable colour. — -2J.
Space, Time, Ether, and Soul are void of action.
Upasktra.— Having thus finished the parenthetical action on darkness, in two aph iri-
srm, ho bo^m.s t 10 section on voiati3ss of aoti m :
Dik-kalau, space a-id time, srr^rtf Akasam, ether. ^ Clia,
and also. ftarra^NcRlfet Kriyavat-vaidharmmyat, because of difference
from that which possesses activity. fM^lffar Niskriyani, inactive.
Space, Time, and also Ether are inactive, because of
their difference from that which possesses activity. _ 219.
The word ' Cha ' brings in the soul. Difference from that which
possesses activity lies in the imponderable less or incorporiety of
space, etc., for activity always accompanies cjrpoi-eity or form. __ 21 .
Action, Attribute, Genus, Species, and Combination are v)id of action.
Upaskara. — Ho points out the inactivity of actions and attributes :
H * i R i RR n
!$••* Etena, by this. ^n=ir!ftl Karmmaui, actions. JTqjT: Grunah, attributes.
^ Cha, and. s^T^FTf: Vyakhyatah, explained.
22. By this, Actions and Attributes are explained (as in
active).— 220,
' Etena ' means by difference from that which possesses activity.
Difference from that which possesses activity, in other words, in-
corporeity or imponderableness, belongs to attribute and action. They
are, therefore, explained to be inactive. — 22.
'iti; — The worfl ' Oka ' implies Grenus, etc.
Combination has no beginning, and so is independent of action.
a.-^L^ may be urged : — If attribute and action are inactive, how then can there
be relation of substance with them ? Connection by conjunction may be possible ; but that-
is dependent upon action. Hence he says :
wrenr* *p* g: iru* i R i % u
KAN ADA StTTRAS V, 2, 25. 173
j Niskriyanaih, of the inactive, ^*r=nJj: Samavayah, com
bination. ^Rp:q: Karmmabhyah, from actions. f%f^« Nisiddhah,
excluded, beyond, independent.
23. (The relation) of the inactive (i.e., Attribute and Action),
(to Substance), is Combination, (which is) independent of actions.
—221.
It is combination which is the relation of attributes and actions
(to substance;. It is excluded from actions. The meaning is that this
relation, i. e., combination, has no production even, and that its depen
dency upon action, therefore, remains at a long distance. — 23.
Attributes are non-combinative causes.
Upaskara. — It may bo objected : If attributes, bain ; impondjrable, are nob the combina
tive causes of action, then how are attributes and actions produced by attributes ? For
causality, save and except in the form of combinative icausality, is not possible. To moot
this objection, ho says :
- II * I * I
Karanaih, cause. § Tu, however. ?RT*T5fTft*tt A-sainavayinah,
non-combinative. JTOn: Grunah, attributes.
24. Attributes are, however, non-combinative causes. — 222.
Attributes are non-combinative causes but not combinative causes
also, whereby they might be receptacles or fields of action. And that
non-combinative causality arises, in some cases, from combination in
the same object with the effect, as that of the conjunction of soul and
mind in the particular attributes of the soul, and of conjunction,
disjunction, and sound in sound, and, in other cases, from combination
in the same object with the cause, as that of the colour, etc., of pot
sherds, etc., in the colour, etc., of the water-pot, etc. — 24.
vTiti. — The use of l cause ' instead of causes, is aphoristic.
Space is a non-combinative cause.
.— It may be objected : — Action is produced here. Action is produced now.
On the strength of such perceptions, Space andfTime also are surely combinative causes of
action. How, otherwise, could they be assigned as the seat of action in these oases ?
Accordingly he says:
II
-\
Trap Gunaih, by attributes. f^> Dik, space. STR^ffi! Vyakhyatah. ex
plained.
25. Space is explained by Attributes. — 223.
The meaning is that gravity, and other attributes, being impon
derable, are not the combinative cause of action, so space also, being
imponderable, is not the combinative cause of action. As to being the
-.seat or receptacle, however, it can arise even without combinative;
VAI£E§IKA PHILOSOPHY.
causality, as in " cotton-seeds in a bowl," " curd in a bowl/' " the
roaring of a lion in the forest/' and other instances. — 25.
Time is an efficient cause.
Upaskdra. — With the same object as already stated, he saya :
II * R I
Karanena, by cause, i. e., by way of efficient causality.
Kalah., Time.
26. By way of (efficient) causality, (the reference of action
to Time as its seats, being explained), Time (is explained to be
inactive, so far as combinative causality is concerned).— 224.
The syntactical connection of the aphorism is with " explained to
be inactive," — corresponding words in the preceding aphorism, with
necessary changes. The use of 'Karanena/ instead of ' nimittakar
auena/ is an instace of denoting an object principally as an existence,
(i.e., without qualification). The meaning, therefore, is that Time,
being the efficient cause, is only the seat of action, but is not its com
binative cause. — 26.
Here ends the second chapter of the fifth book in the Commentary^
of Sankara upon the Vissesika Aphorisms.
KANlDA SftTRAS VI, 1, 2. 175
BOOK SIXTH— CHAPTER FIRST-
The Veda is a work of intelligence, and therefore, authoritative,
Upaskdra. — The subject, of the sixth book is th^ examination of dhar/na,, virtue or merit,
and adharma, vioe or demerit, whiea are the root causes of transmigration, Dhartna and
adharma, again, have to b-> supposed on the strength of such precepts aad prohibitions as
" Let him who desire heavoa, perform sacrifices." " Let him not eat tobacco," etc., and their
existence depends upon the authoritativaness of these perceptive and prohibitive texts. And
that authoritativeness can be possible or arise from the speaker's previously possessing the
attribute characterised as knowledge of the moaning of the sentences as corresponding to
objective reality since authoritativeness per se is excluded. Hence the author, in the first
place, commerces the demonstration of the attribute which clothes the Veda with authorita
tiveness.
g'^jo^^ Buddhi-purvva, preceded by understanding, ^,f^^%: Vakya-
Kritih, composition of sentences. ^ Vede, in the Veda.
1. In the Veda the composicion of sentence has been preced
ed by understanding. — 225
1 Vakya-kritih/ i. e., composition of sentences, is ' buddhi-purvva/
i. e., preceded by the speaker's k lowledge of the meaning of the sen
tences as corresponding to objective reality because it is composition
of sentences, like composition by ourselves and others of such sentences
as " There lie five fruits on the bank of the river.'
' In the Veda ' means in the aggregate of sentences. Here the com
position of aggregated sentences is the paksa (i. e., the subject of the
conclusion). It cannot be otherwise established (as authoritative),
namely by the characteristic of being preceded by the understanding
of ourselves a-.id others ; for, in such instances as " Let him who desires
heaven, perform sacrifices," the fact that performance of sacrifices is
a means of attaining the desired object, or that securing heaven is an
effect, is beyond th« reach of our and others' understanding. It is,
therefore, proved that the Veda, as au effect, has for its antecedent an
Absolute or Independent Person. And the characteristic of the Veda
is that, while the subject of its mea.iing is not certain knowledge pro
duced by proof other than the proof supplied by words and all that
which depends upon them, it is word of which the proof or authority is
not produced by knowledge of the meaning of sentences produced by
words. — 1.
VivT'iti- — By this aphorism, the doctrine of Mimamsa philosophy,
that word is eternal, is refuted.
The Veda is a work of intelligence, and therefore, authoritative, continued.
Upaskdra. — He shows in another manner that the sentences of the Veda have boon
•preceded by understanding :
H n i R ii
Brahmane, in the portion of Veda, so called. ^|<fc*V Samjna-
Karma, attribution or distribution of names, f^fe^g^ Siddhi-lingam,
mark of knowledge of things named, or of the conclusion that the Veda,
is an intelligent production.
176 VAI!§ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
The distribution of names in the Brfihmana (portion of
the Veda) is a mark of knowledge, (on the part of the framer of
the names), of the things named (therein). — 226.
Here ' Brahmanaiii ' denotes a particular portion of the Veda.
1 Samjna-Karmma,' i. e , the distribution of names, which appears there,
points to understanding on the part of the framer of the names, as in
the world the distribution of such names as Long-ear, Long-nose
Long-neck, does. — 2.
The Veda is a work of intelligence, and therefore, authoritative,
continued.
Upaskdra. — He mentions another form of proof :
II $ I \\ \ II
m Buddhi-purvvah, preceded by understanding. TOfr: Dadatih,
givf s, to give, gift.
3. (Precepts enjoining) gift (are) preceded by understanding.
—227.
The injunction of gift (as a source of dharma), which has been
established in such text as " Let him who desires heaven, give a cow,"
has been made from the knowledge that it is the means of attaining
the object desired. The conjugated form, < dadatih,' gives, topically
denotes ' gift ' which is the meaning of the root ' to give.' 3.
Above continued.
Upaskdra — He gives yet another proof :
a $ i n a ii
Tatha, so, the same. Slfwflf: Pratigrahah acceptance.
4. The same is acceptance (of a gift.) — 228.
Texts of the Veda, enjoining acceptance of gifts, are also preceded
by understanding. The word, "pratigrahah" indicates a Vedic text
of which it is the subject. Thus, texts of the Veda, enjoining accep
tance of land, etc., imply its efficacy to the welfare of the acceptor.
Texts of the Veda, of which the subject-matter is the acceptance of the
skin of a black-and-white antelope, point out or bring to light it*
efficacy towards that which is not desired by the acceptor. And
efficacy towards the desired and efficacy towards the undesired, or
potencies for good and for evil, cannot, in these cases, appropriately
fall within the cognizance of t,he understanding of persons later
born. — 4.
i. — Although all these have been already explained by the-
Erst aphorism, still this much undertaking is for the purpose of point
ing out some of the dharmas or duties.
KANlDA SfiTRAS VI, 1, 5. 177
Attributes of one soul do not produce effects in another soul : he
reaps who sows.
Upaskdra. — Now, in justification of the aphorism of Jaimini, "Result (of action),
indicated by the gastra, ( aocruse ) to the performer, " (Purva-Mlmariisa Sutram) he saya :
$ I $ I Ml
Atma-antara-gunanam, of the attributes of one sold.
Atma-antare, in another soul. ^T^TW^'RC, A-karanatvat, be
cause there is no causality.
5. [" Result (of action) indicated by the Sastra, (accrues)
to the performer"], because there is no causality of the attributes
of one soul in (the attributes of) another soul. — 229.
Because the attributes of one soul, e. g., merits and demerits arising
fromsacrifice, slaughter, etc., are not causes of the attributes, in the shape
of pleasure and pain, of another soul. This being the case, pleasure
and pain are produced by dharma and dharma appertaining to each
individual soul, and not by dharma and dharma existing in different
substrata. Otherwise, the fruits of sacrifice, slaughter, etc., will
accrue to him by whom these were not performed, and hence, loss of
the fruits of acts done, and acquisition of the fruits of acts not done
will be the result.
Objection. — There is no such universal rule since there is a viola
tion of it in the sacrifice for the birth of a son, sacrifice in favour of
the departed ancestors, etc. Thus, it is heard that the fruits of
jSrdddha or performance of obsequies, etc., performed by the son, accrue
to the departed ancestor ; it is also heard that the fruit of the sacrifice
for the birth of a son, performed by the father, accrues to the son.
You connot say that here is really in these cases the co-existence of
the performance and its fruit is the same subject, the agent-enjoyer,
by means of the fruit accruing to the son and the departed ancestor ;
in the one case, the fruit of the Sraddha accrues to the son in this way
that he becomes the son of departed ancestors participating in the
enjoyments of heaven and in the other case, the fruit of the sacrifice
accrues to the father in this way-that he becomes the father of a.
vigorous son.
For this view his adristam becomes inoperative, conflicts with the
Veda ; for, it is heard that the fruit is only the satisfaction, etc., of
the departed ancestor, and the vigorousness, etc., of the son, the sup
position of any other fruit being precluded by redundancy.
Anwer. — Let then dpurvam or adristam accrue to the agent as the
fruit, while heaven accrues to the departed ancestor.
Objection — It cannot be so, since activity must in your theory,
uniformly co-exist in the same subject with the fruit. Otherwise where,,
immediately after the performance of the £rdddha, the son is liberated
and consequently, heaven will not accrue to the departed ancestor.
178 VAlSESxKA PHILOSOPHY.
Objection- — It cannot be said that it " will not accrue," since it is
the same in the other way, for, when the departed ancestor is already
liberated (t. e., freed from the bonds of all enjoyment and suffering what
ever) (prior to the performance of the Srdddha) then no such fruit will
issue from the Sraddha, however perfect it may be in all its parts.
Conclusion. — But this is not the case. For, the declaration that
u Result (of action), indicated by the Sastra, (accrues) to the performer,
being a general rule, admits of exception, in the presence of a strong
contradiction, and, in the matter in hand, it is the Sruti, or Revelation
of the fruit accruing to the departed ancestor and the son, which is the
contradication.
Objecti(n. — This being so, there is proving too much.
Answer. — Not so, for, the corresponding texts of the Veda them
selves prevent any such too much proving.
Another objection. — In the case of the greatest gifts (mahdddnam, a
technical term which denotes sixteen kinds of specially meritorious
gift), heaven only (*. e., heaven without the mention of the enjoyer) is
fruit, and in the name of whomsoever person they declared to be are
performed, the fruit they produce, accrues to that person.
Answer. — This is an absurd argument. For, here there being no
contradiction to the general observation, the general observation
accompanied with the absence of contradiction or exceptional instance,
becomes the rule, and hence, it would not follow that kings and such
other persons need not observe fast, etc., though observance of such and
such acts would be possible for them by means of other persons, with
the intention or prayer that the fruit of those acts may accrue to the
former. Moreover, it is the rule, that the thorough performance of the
duties of a householder produces fruit in the form of attainment of the
world of Brahmd, and thus the declaration in general terms has been
made with the object of showing that fruit accrues to each individual
agent.
The writer of the Vfitti, however, says : " Result (of action), indi
cated by the {§astra," etc., is really a rule without an exception. On the
other hand, the fruit which accrues to the departed ancestor, etc.,
results from the influence of benedictory mantras pronounced by
Brahmanas entertained at the /Srdaddha, etc., the mantras in question
being in the case of sacrifice for the departed ancestor, " May thy
pitris or departed ancestors have their objects fulfilled," and, in the
case of sacrifice for the son, " May a son be born unto thee, who will be
vigorous, beautiful as the moon, and the feeder of all," in the same way
as neutralization of the effect of poison on the body of a person bitten,
by a snake, is produced from the recitation of mantras or incantation
by foresters. — 5.
Vivfiti. — " Result (of action), indicated by the Sastra, (accrues) to
the performer,'' — this aphorism of the system of Jaimini should be
supplied at the end of the present aphorism ; for otherwise, the ablative
in it will remain unconnected.
KANADA SUTRAS VI, 1,8. 179
Entertainment of impure Brdhmanas at a Srdddha is useless.
Upaskdra. — Those fruits accrue from the benediction of Brdhmanas who have been
aatisfied with the entertainment, and who are not wicked, in other words, whose conduct is
in accordance with the Sdstra, but not from the benediction of the wicked who have been
excluded from the category of recipients, e g., an illegitimate son born during wedlock, an
illegitimate son born after the death of the husband, etc. This is what he says here :
n ^ I * i $ n
fl^ Tat, that, i. e., the fruit of benediction. £g4fcl% Dusta-bhojane,
(Sraddha) in which impure (Brahmanas) are entertained. * Na, not. fcej^
Vidyate, exists, accrues.
6. That does not exist where the impure are entertained.
230.
' Tat ' alludes to the fruit of benediction. The meaning is that
where at a Srdddha (i. e., the observance of obsequial rites) evil or
impure Brahmanas are entertained there the fruit of benediction does
not accrue to the departed ancestor, or the meaning is this that the
fruit of the Srdddha itself does not accrue to the departed ancestor. — 6.
Impure explained.
Upaskdra. — Who are they that are called impure ? Accordingly he states the characteris
tic of the impure.
? I V9 0
55 Dustam, wickedness, impurity. fl'^-TTTPl Himsayam, in killing.
7. Impurity (lies) in killing.— 231.
Here ' himsayam ' is indicative of all prohibited acts whatever.
The meaning, therefore, is that a person, given to or occupied in a pro
hibited act, should be known as impure — 7.
Association with the impure is sinful.
Upaskdra.— He says that ,not only non-existence of fruit accrues from entertaining an
impure Brahmana invited at a Srdddha, but sin also accrues.
M I I I « II
Tasya, his, of the wicked or impure Brahmana. ^TTfasqTfrr/T: Sa-
mabhivyaharatah, from companionship or association. $fa: Dosah, vice,
demerit, adharma.
8. Demerit results from association with him.— 232.
The meaning is that ' dosah,' i. e., sin, accrues, 'Samabhivyaha-
ratah,' i. e., from association, characterised as eating in the same row,
sleeping in company, reading in company, etc., with a Brahmana
engaged in forbidden acts. — 8.
Entertainment of a pure Brahmana is not sinful.
Lr2>at<kdra.—Doen then sin accrue also from association with one who is not impure ? H«
sayi, No.
180 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
II $ I ? I 8. II
^ Tat, that, i". e., sin. "Sjjg A-duste, in the case of (entertaining)
one who is not impure. ?f Na, not. frq^1 Vidyate, exists, accrues.
9. This does not accure in the case of (entertaining) one
who is not impure. — 233.
The meaning is that 'tat,' i. e., sin, ' na vidyate,' i. e., does not
accrue, where a Brahmana, whose conduct is in accordance with the
precepts and prohibitions of the Sdstra, is entertained at a Sraddha — 9.
Preference should be given to worthy recipients afterwards.
Upaskdra. — It may be asked, what should the rule of conduct be in a case where worthy
recipients being not available, unworthy ones are at first invited, but gradually worthy recipi
ents become available. To this he replies :
: n ^ \
5^: Punah, again, afterwards, fafat Vifiiste, in or to a superior, or
a qualified or worthy person, i. e , recipient. 5^%: Pravrittih, inclina
tion, attention, preference.
10. Preference (should be given), to a worthy recipient (who
is available) afterwards. — 234.
At a Srdddha, or where gifts have to be received, if qualified per
sons, i. e., those who do not transgress the rules of the Sdstra in their
conduct, are obtained, then one should entertain them only, leaving
aside the censurable ones, although invited. The rule, " One should
not reject persons invited," refers to worthy recipients only. One should,
however, gratify censurable persons, who have been invited, by giving
money, etc. — 10.
Vivriti. — But what is to be done where Srdddka, etc., have been per
formed through the services of an impure Bramana ? He gives the
reply :
Attention should be given to the thing of quality, i. e., the, re-per
formance of the tirdddha, etc., by a pure Brahmana, etc. The Srdddha>
previously performed, is all useless. This is the 'import.
Equals or inferiors, if pure , should be accepted as guests or recipients.
Upaslcdra. — He lays down the rule of conduct where, at a Srdddha, distribution of gifts,
etc., recipients superior to the agent himself, are not obtained :
H^ Same, in or to an equal, ffi Hine, in or to,an inferior. ?TT Va,
or. ST^frT: Pravrittih, inclination, attention, preference.
11. Preference (should be given) to an equal, or to an
inferior, (if he is free from impurity or fault). — 235.
KANlDA SfrTRAS VI, 1, 13. 181
r
The meaning is that at Srdddha, charity, etc., attention or prefer
ence should be given to a recipient, free from fault, who is equal, i. e.,
like oneself, or inferior, i. e., less than oneself, in point of merit, etc.,
because happiness accrues, to the departed ancestor, from blessings
pronounced by them only. The import is that persons prohibited are
by all means to be rejected, but not the pure, whether they be equals or
inferiors. — 11.
Reception of gift i.y also a source of dharma, or} stealing is not sinful,
in certain circumstances.
Upaskdra. — Having described the production of adharma, by the meritorious character
of the donation at a Sraddha or charity, he extends production of dharma from reception also
of a similar nature :
n $ i n vui
Etena, by this. fK^TM^=nfrT%»T: Hina-sama-vifiista dharm-
'mikebhyah, from inferior, equal, superior virtuous persons. 'K^fT^T'f
Parasva-adanam, reception of property. sq^MId'^ tVyakhyatam, ex
plained.
12. By this is explained reception of property from virtuous
persons who are inferior, equal, or superior (to oneself).— 236.
The excellence of dharma, is in the order of its mention. The mean
ing is that dharma, accrues from the reception of a gift of land, etc.,
from a virtuous person, whether he be inferior, equal, or superior to
oneself. ' Parasvadanaia ' means reception of property from another.
The writer of the Vritti, however, says : " ' Parasvadanam/ i. e.t
the taking of another's property, by theft, etc., is explained. Thus,
according to the fjruti, 5$jgf^ fl-c^f^qRiqq- ^ffaqi^ ^^ m^Tf^sn^f^j to
save himself or his family, suffering from starvation, a man may steal
the food of a Siidra, when he has not obtained food for seven days.
Similarly, when he has not obtained food for ten days, or when he has
not obtained food for fifteen days, or when life is in danger, to steal
food from a Vaifiya, a Ksatriya, or a Brahmana respectively, does not
tend to adharma or sin." — 12.
Killing is not sinful in certain circumstances.
UpaskAra.— -Not only is the taking of another's proparty, when life is in danger, nofc
'forbidden, but in such circumstances those who do nofc give anything to take away, may
•even be put to death. By all this there is no loss of dbar/na, or app3arano3 or production of
.adharma. This is what he saya :
II $ I n U II
Tatha, likewise, frs^f^ Viruddhanam, of th*se wh« stand in
the way. &ni\: Tyagah, the making away with.
13. Likewise the making away with those who stand in the
Way, (is justified). — 237.
182 VAI£E$IKA PHILOSOPHY.
The meaning is that they are to be put to death who act in the con
trary manner, (i. e., who play the enemy), in such circumstances. So it
has been said :
'• Let a man save his poor self by whatsoever deed, mild or cruel.
When he is able, let him practise dharma or righteousness." — 13.
Vivriti. — He points out that certain censurable deeds also do not
produce sin :
The meaning is that the killing of those who are about to take
one's life, is likewise not forbidden, according to the saying " Let one-
kill an aggressive felon without a second thought."
Note. — The author of the Upaskara gives up his own context, and
here follows the Vritti quoted by him under the preceding aphorism.
Above continued.
Upaskdra. — But is the making away with another to be resorted to with any distinction-
whatever ? He says, No :
r: II $ I \ [ ?8 U
^% Hine, in an inferior. ^ Pare, in another. r*TT»T: Tyagahr
making away with, killing.
14. Making away with another (is not sinful), if (he is)
inferior (to oneself.) — 238
If another who does not give anything to take away, is inferior to
oneself, he, the Sudra, or the like, maybe put to death. — 14.
Vivriti. — ' Para ' means an enemy, (and not one who does not give
anything to take away).
Killing is not sinful in certain circumstances, continued.
Upaskdra. — With reference to an equal, he says :
II
^ Same, in the case of an equal. ?HcTrc*n*T: Atma-tyagah, self-
abandonment. Suicide. TroW: Para-tyagah, destruction of another.
m V a, or.
15. In the cause of an equal, either suicide or destruction!
of the other (may be resorted to). — 239.
Where it is a Brahmana, equal to oneself, who becomes the ad
versary, theri destruction of oneself only by starvation, etc., is to be-
committed. Or, if there appear no other means of preserving oneself
or one's family, and the opponent be an equal, he is to be then made-
away with. — 15.
Above continued.
Upaskdra. — If, then, a person, superior to oneself, become the adversary, should he ever*
bo put to death ? He says, No :
KANADA SftTRAS VI, 1, 16. 183
I t I M II
f % II
Visiste, in the case of a superior. «nr*T?^TT: Atmatyagah self-
destruction. ff?t Iti, finis.
16. In the case of superior, self-destruction (is to be com
mitted).— 240.
In the case of a person, supericr to oneself, i. e., excellent by the
study of the Veda, etc., becomming the opponent, destruction of oneself
only is lawful. The meaning is that even when life is in danger, a man.
may design only his own death, but must not slay a Brahmana.
' Iti ' indicates the end of the chapter. — 16.
Here ends the first chapter of the sixth book in 'the Gonimeatary
of Sankara upon the Vaisesika Aphorisms.
184 VA1&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY
BOOK SIXTH— CHAPTER SECOND.
Exaltation is the motive of actions of which no visible motive exists.
Upaskdra.—ThuB, in the first chapter, because the proof, supplied by the Veda, is
produced by some attribute or quality, therefore, in connection with its production, a descrip
tion of the attribute or quality then the consideration that " Result ( of action ), indicated
by the S^stra, (accrues) to the performer," and also the consideration of this that under
certain circumstances there is non-production of demerit, even on the performance of for
bidden acts, have taken place. Now, the author, with a view to explain fehe second aphorism,
" Dharma is that from which (results) the attainment of exaltation and the Supreme Good"
(I. i. 2, above), is going to make an examination of the production of dharma or merit, in
particular cases, and accordingly he says :
t Drista-adrista-prayojananam, of which the motives are
risible and invisible. ^gTHT^T Drista-abhave, where no visible motive
exists. snftlR Prayojanam, motive. ^VH^F! Abhyudayaya, for the purpose
of exaltation or knowledge of reality.
1. (Of actions) of which the motives are visible and invisible,
the motive, where no visible (motive) exists, (tends) to exaltation.
—241.
Actions of which the motives are visible, are agriculture, com
merce, service under the king, etc. Actions of which the motives are
invisible, are sacrifice, charity, brahmacliarya or celibacy and devotion
to learning, etc. Amongst these actions, where no visible object is
observed, there an invisible object has to be supposed. And that is
conducive to ' exaltation,' i. c., knowledge of reality or truth. Or, in
' abhyudayaya/ the dative has been used in the sense of the nomina
tive. The meaning, therefore, is that the fruit (of the action) is exalta
tion. The invisible fruit is nothing but adristam (or potential after
effects of past acts). If it is produced by yoga or holy communion, then
the exaltatton is spiritual intuition of tho self. If it is produced byr
sacrifice, charity, etc., then the exaltation is heaver.. Here, again,
unlike the actions milking, cooking, etc., which bear fruit then and
there but like the actions sowing, ploughing, etc., which bear fruit
after a while, the actions sacrificing, giving alms, practising brahma-
charya, etc., by no means bear fruit then and there, for no such pro
duction of fruit is observed. Nor are gain, etc., through being known
as virtuous, themselves the fruit ; for those who practise brahmacharya
have no eye to such fruit. Therefore, heaven, etc., which will accrue
in the distant future, are the fruit. And this is not immediately con
nected with action which by nature speedily vanishes out of exis
tence. Hence it results that there is an intermediate common sub
stratum of the action and the fruit, and this is aptirvam or adristam.
Actions of which the motive is invisible.
[ UpasMra. — He enumerates actions of which the fruits are invisible :
II ^ I R I R II
KANiDA StTRAS VI, 2, 3. 185
Abhiseoha-
na—upavasa—brahmacharyya— gurukulavasa— van aprastha~y ajna—dana-
proksana-dikasatra-kala-niyamah — Ablution, Fast, Brahmacharya, Resi
dence in the family of the preceptor , Life of retirement in the forest,
Sacrifice, Gift, Oblation, Direction, Constellation, Seasons and Reli
gious observances. ^ Cha, and. 5T^gT*I Adristaya, condusive to adristam,
or invisible fruit.
2. Ablution, fast, brahmacharya, residence in the family of
the preceptor, life of retirement in the forest, sacrifice, gift, obla
tion, directions, constellations, seasons, and religious observances
conduce to invisible fruit. — 242.
1 Adrstfiya ' means for the purpose of the fruit characterised as
adristam, or for the purpose of the fruit, characterised as heaven and
salvation, through the gate of adristam. Hereby are included all actions
or duties enjoined in the Veda and smriti and having adrtstam as their
fruit. Here ' abhisechanam means ablution as enjoined in such precepts
as " One should bathe in the Ganga (Ganges)." Fast denotes such as is
enjoiued in such precepts as " One should abstain from food on the
eleve ith day of the moon." l Brahmacharyyam ' means clutivation of
dharma in general. ' Gurukulavasah/ is that of Brahmachdrins or stu
dents for the purpose of studying the Veda the twelve-year vow called
Mahdvrata, etc., ' Vanaprastham' means the duty of those who have
retired to the forest 011 the ripening of age. 'Yajiiah' denotes Rdjaasuya,
Vdjapeya, and other sacrifices. 'Dan am' is as en joined by such precepts as
''One sbould give away a cow." ' Proksanam,' is as enjoined by such
precepts as "One should offer rice." 'Dik' denotes such as is enjoined by
the precepts., "One should perform sacrifice on an altar inclined towards
the east," " One should eat rice, etc., facing towards the east," etc.
1 Naksatram ' is such as Maghd (the tenth lunar asterism), etc., on the
occasion of a sadddha, etc. ' Mantrali' denotes " 0, ye waters, who are
the sources of pleasures," etc. (Rig Veda X. ix. 1), and other sacred
hymns. ' Kalah' is as is enjoined by such precepts as " IVIonth after
month food shall be given to theo " where one should offer food in the
afteri 0011 of the day of new moon, " In summer let one be surrounded
with five fires," " In spring let one deposit the sacrificial fires," etc.
1 Niyamah ' means conduct, in accordance with the Sastra, of those
who observe the distinction of caste and the four stages of holy living,
i. e.) Varna and Asrama.
Now, it will be seen that of the dharma, so produced, the soul is the
combinative cause, conjunction of the soul and the mind is the non-
combinative cause, and faith and the knowledge of the motives or objects
characterised as heaven, etc., are the efficient causes. — 2.
Other sources of dharma and sources of adharma.
UpasTc&ra. — Having thus mentioned the sources of dharma, he now mentions them along
with the sources of adharma also :
186 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
Chaturafiramyam, the observance of the four Asramas or
stages of holy living, viz., the life of continence and scholarship, the
ife of a householder, the life of retirement in the woods, and the
life of absolute selfrenunciation, (lit. living on alms). STOl : Upadhah,
defects in respect of faith, misbeliefs and disbeliefs. STg^T Anupadlui,
non-defects in respect of faith, beliefs. =g Cha, and.
3. The observance of the four Atramas (has been already
mentioned) Misbeliefs and disbeliefs as well as beliefs are also
(sources of adnstam or dharma and adharma}.— 2^.
That which is the means of dharma, common to the four Asramas,
has been (and thus the sentence should be completed), e^haustivel^
denoted by the preceding aphorism alone. 'Upadhah' means defects of
bhdva (*. e sentiment; or faith ; 'anupadhfth, means non-defects of
bhdva or faith 1 hey too should be understood to be the sources of
dharma and adharma, according to themselves. By the word, < upadhAh
all the means of adharma •have been included. _ 3.
Upadha and anupadM explained.
purity, aa regards their
Bhava-dosah, defect of feeling, impurity of emotion, or of
the soul. *q*T Upadha, (cty.) that which is placed, or settles, upon or
near anything. Impurity. ?r*fr: Adosah, non-defect. ?T3^T Anupadha,
purity. Purity of emotion, or of the soul.
4. Upadha or Impurity (denotes) impurity of emotion, or of
the soul ; anupadhd (denotes) purity. — 244.
Feeling, desire, attraction, inattention, unfaith, vanity, conceit,
envy, and other impurities of the soul are denoted by the word
upadhd or impurity. Faith, complacence of mind, perseverance
in the performance of prescribed actions, determination of what
should be done in particular situation, (or presence of mind), and
certitude are called anupadhd or purity of the soul. The efficient
causality of all these towards dharma and adharma, is here de
clared. — 4.
What objects are pure or holy.
Upaskdra. — (Purity and impurity may be internal as well as external, that is, may relate
to thought as well as to things. In the preceding aphorism, purities and impurities of the
soul have been mentioned. With regard to external objects it is said as follows). Things
pure and impure are also called upadhd or purity and anupadhd or impurity. Here he
distinguishes between pure and impure objects :
R i^ n
which. £aVUyiT?SRW, Ista-riiparasa-gandha-sparsaci posse
sses prescribed! colour, taste; smell, and^touch.sJtf^RfJProksitam, aspersed.
KANiDA SfiTRAS VI, 3, 6. 187
Sprinkled with water together with the pronunciation of mantras or
sacred hymns. «r*gf%rf Abhyuksitam, sprinkled with water without the
pronunciation of mantras. The above rendering of the two words,
' prok^tarii ' abhyiksitani ' is in accordance with the view of $ankara
misra. But,
" Sprinkling of water with the pronated hand is called proksanam •
that with supinated hand is called abhyuksanam ; and the same with
the inclined hand is known as avoJfsanam."-
From the above saying of the Smriti, it would appear that the
correct translations would be, sprinkled with water with pronation, in
the case of ' proksitam,' and sprinkled with water with supination, in
the case of ' abhyuksitanV ^ Cha, and. ?Tcj;Tat. that gfe $uchi, pure,
clean, holy.
5. The pure is that which possesses prescribed Colour, Taste,
Smell, and Touch, and is sprinkled with water along with the
recitation of sacred hymns, and also without it, or is sprinkled with
water both with pronation and with supination. — 245.
Whatever Substance possesses such colour, etc., as are ' istam/ i. e.
prescribed by the Veda and the Smriti, the same is of that character
(i. e., pure). Therein, Colour (is prescribed) in such texts as " He
buys the soma drink for a cow, ruddy, one year old, with tawny eyes/3
" He should obtain a white goat," etc. i Proksitaik, means sprinkled
with water during the recitation of sacred hymns ; •abhyuksitam/
means sprinkled with water without any sacred hymn. The word ( cha
t implies that which is lawfully acquired, and that is brought out by
such restraining percepts as " A Brahmana, should acquire wealth by
performing sacrifices, by teaching, and by receiving presents, etc. — 5.
What objects are impure or unholy.
Upaskdra. — Ho states the characteristic of impure objects :
Asuchi, impure. ffrT Iti, this Such, sgfrsrf?^: ^uchipratisedhah,
the negation of exclusion of the pure.
6. Impure, — such is the form of the negation of the pure.
—246.
The meaning is that the contrary of such substance as ia pure, is
impure. In other words, a substance of unpraiseworthy colour, taste,
smell, and touch, or not aspersed, or not sprinkled, or sprinkled with
forbidden water, or unlawfully acquired, as the substance of a Brahmana
acquired by agriculture and commerce, is impure. — 6.
What objects are impure or unholy, continued.
'He mentions oteher impure objects :
VAI£E§IKA PHILOSOPHY.
n $ i * { vs n
Arthantaram, something else. Another thing. ^ Cha, and.
7. (It is) also something else. — 247.
The meaning is that where a thing possesses praiseworthy colour,
taste, smell, and touch, and is at the same time aspersed, sprinkled, and
lawfully acquired, even there that thing also is impure, if it is vitiated
by speech or vitiated by intention. — 7.
To produce'.exaltation, purity must le coupled with selfres-traint.
Upaskdra. — Now ho points ont another contributory oauso of dharma and adharma :
n
Ayatasy, of the unrestrained. gfavft^Rt. £uchi-bhojanat, from
eating that which is pure. 3J**R?J : Abhyudayah, exaltation. ^ Na, not.
fq^Yidyate, exists. Accrues. pnjJTpTRT^ Niyama-abhavfit, owing to the
absence of self-restraint. RST^1 Vidyate, exists. Accrues. ^T Va, and.
?J£lfccTC?=rT3(. Artha-antaratvat, being a different thing, q*T^ Yamasya, of
self-reatraint.
8. To the unrestrained, exaltation does not accrue from
eating what is pure, inasmuch as there is an absence of self-res
traint ; and it accrues, (where there is self-restraint), inasmuch as
self-restraint is a different thing (from eating). — 248.
' Ayatasya ' means void of restraint, or unrestraint. The eating of
one, void of the restraints brought out in such precepts as. " A man
should take food after washing his hands and feet, and rinsing his
mouth, restrained in speech, while taking food, though restrained, he
should twice rinse his mouth," does not tend to exaltation, but to sin.
It may be asked, Why ? Hence he says, ' niyama-abhavat/ i. e., owing
to the absence of self-restaint, which is a contributory cause. That
which takes place where self-restraint exists, is now stated. ' Vidyate
va,, i. e., exaltation verily accrues from eating by means of the accom
paniment ef the self-restraint mentioned above. It may be asked, How ?
So he says, ' Artha-antaratvat yamasya,' i. e., because self-restraint is
something else than eating. Therefore the meaning is that without the
contributory cause there is no production of the fruit, and that with it,
there is production of the fruit. — 8.
Bhdsya — reads Vidyateva ' rthdntaratvdt yamasya as a separate
aphorism.
Self-restraint alone, again, is not sujficint for the purpose.
Upaalc&ra. — It may be objected, " If self-restraint .alone is the goveruing element, then
eating is not a governing element at all," Aooordingly he says :
u $ i R i a n
KANlDA SfrTRAS VI, 2, 11. 189
Asati, non-existing. ^ Cha, and. ^TffTTTc^ Abhavat, because of
non-existence.
9. (Self-restraint alone is not the cause of exaltation), for
there is non-existence (of exaltation), where (the eating of pure
food) does not exist. — 249.
' Of exaltation' is the complement of the aphorism. 'Abhavat/ i. e.,
since exaltation does not exist, ' asati,' i. e., where the eating of pure
food does not exist, although there is self-restraint. The meaning, there
fore, is that it is both, of them, namely self-restraint and eating, which
is the cause of merit. The word, eating, is illustrative Yama and
Niyama, i. e., self-restraint, external and internal, are accessories also
of sacrifice, charity, ablutions, oblations, and other actions prescribed
by the Veda and the Smriti. — 9.
Origin of desire which, being a fault, is an accessory to adharma.
Updslcara. — Having thus stated self -restraint as a contributory towards the production
of dharma, he now points out the origin of fault, with a view to spocify fault as ian (accessory
to adharma :
Sukhat, from pleasure. ;TJJT: Ragah, (Lit. Colouration), Desire.
10. From Pleasure (arises) Desire. — 250.
{ Sukhat," i. e., from pleasure derived from the enjoyment of gar
lands, sandal-paste, women, and other objects, ragah/ i. e., desire, is
produced successively for pleasue of a similar kind, or for the means
of attaining it. It is also to be considered that from pain begotten by
snakes, thorns, and the like, aversion arises with regard to such pain, or
with regard to its source. Desire, aversion, and infatuation are called
faults, inasmuch as they are incentives to activity (which serves to bind
the agent down to this world). Accordingly there is the aphorism of
G-autama, " Faults have for their characteristic incitement to acitivity
(or worldly occupation)." (Nyaya-Sutram, I. i. 18), — 10.
Origin of desire which, being a fault , is an accessory to adharma,
continued.
Upaslc&ra.—'" Now," it may bo objected, " if only pleasure ani pain produced desire
and aversion, how then can the latter exist after the destruction of the former ? " Hence
ho says :
cf-fnr^ig M i R i ** H
W^T^^T^Tat-mayatvat from transformation into, absorption, or entire
occupation of mind with, or habituation to, that, 'g Cha, and.
11. (Desire and Aversion arise) also through habituation to
.that.— 251.
' Desire and aversion arise' — this is the complement of the aphorism.
^Tat-mayatvam means a particular kind of comparatively powerful
impression produced by constant or habitual experience of objects,
190 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
through the influence of which, a sad lover, who does not win his mis
tress, sees his beloved in every object ; audihe who has been once bitten
by a snake, i'i consequence of the strong impression regarding that,
sees snakes everywhere. So it has been said, l' Tat-mayatvam (lit, full-
of-that-ness) means the manifestation of that both internally and
externally." — 11.
Above continued.
(Tpa,9kdra. — He brings forward another source (of desire andjaversion) :
II $ I R I & II
Adristat, from destiny*or adristam. ^ Cha, and. Also.
12. (Desire and Aversion arise) from adristam also. — 252.
' Desire and version' — this forms the complement of the aphorism.
Although adristam is a universal cause, still particular causality, to
wards desire and aversion, sometimes attends it. For instance, it
should be inferred by such cases as of desire for a (mistress or) woman
on the breaking forth of youth even in one who has not in that birth
enjoyed the pleasures of love, and of aversion towards snakes even in
those who have not experienced the pain of snake-bites. Nor is it only
samakdra or impression produced in a previous existence (that is to say,
instinct), which supplies tlio missing link in these cases. For there
being no proof for the supposition of its existence, or for thfc supposi
tion 'of its resuscitation, the supposition of adristam becomes neces
sary. — 12.
Origin of desire which, beiny a fault, is an accessory to adharma,
continued.
UpasMra.—'H.Q mentions another contributory cause (of desire and aversion) :
n 5 i * i \\ \\
Rtaffit. Jati-visesfit, from particularity of race or racial distinc
tion. ^ Cha, and.
13. (Desire and Aversion arise) also from racial distinctions.
—253.
Thus, human beings have desire for rice, etc., animals of the deer
class, for grass, etc. ; those of the camel class, for briers. In these
cases also, adristam which produces birth in such and such a race, is
the governing principle, while race, i. e., distinction of birth, is only a
means or medium. Similarly, pigeons, etc., possess desire for crops.
In the same way, animals of !the buffalo class possess aversion towards
the horse ; dogs, towards the jackal ; ichneumons, towards snakes ; and
from other instances, it is to be inferred (that racial distinction is a
means of desire and aversion). — 13.
Desire and aversion produce dharma and adharma through inclination.
Upvskdra.— Having thus enumerated the efficient causes of desire and aversion, desire
and aversion being the efficient causes of dharma and adharma, he now points out that the
causality of fault towards dharma and adharma operates through the medium of activity or
'inclination.
KANADA SftTRAS VI, 2, 15. 191
I R I *« II
Inhchha-dvesa-purvvika, preceded by, or having for
its antecdents, desire and aversion. >iWrfcrRT*5i<|;f^r : Dharma-adharma-
pravrittih, Activity, tendency, inclination, or application to dharma
and adharma.
14. Application to dharma and adharma has for its antece
dents Desire and Aversion. — 254.
' Pravrittih ' or employment in a prescribed action, is due to the
link of desire, and in a prohibited action, e. y., killing, is due to the link
of aversion. Employment, due to the link of desire, in sacrifices, etc.,
begets dharma; employment,;due to the link of aversion, in killing, etc.,
begets adharma. These same desire and aversion cause the wheel of
transmigration to revolve. Accordingly there is the aphorism of Gau
tama/' Pravritli or employment is the operation or exeratioii of speceh,
mind, and body," (Nyaya-Sutram, I. i. 17). Verbal employment is exer
tion of speech ; it is meritorious, if it is for the expression of what is true,
kind, and beneficial ; it is sinful, if it is for the expression of what is
nature, unkind, and baneful. By ' Buddhih/ (mind), is meant that by
which objects are cognised, i. e., mind. Therefore mental employment
is compassion towards all creatures, and other activities. Bodily
employment, such as almsgiving, ministration, etc., is tenfold as sinful,
and tenfold as meritorious. — 14.
Vivriti. — The aphorism has been framed in a general way. Hence
no harm has been done to the production of dharma, etc., also from
chance contact with the water of the Grafiga (the Granges) and such
other sources, even though desire and aversion do not exist here.
Dharma and adharma are causes of birth and death.
Upaskdra. — Now he states the end or object of dharma and adharma, ». e., reappearance
after passing away :
: n ^ i ^ i mi
Tat-samyogah, conjunction produced by them.
Vibhagah, disjunction.
15. Conjunction (of soul with body, sense, and life), produced
by them (i.e., dharma ar.d adharma), (is called birth) ; Disjunc
tion (of body and mind, produced by them, is called death). — 255-
From these, namely dharma and adharma, conjunction, i. e., birth,
results. Connection with non-pre-existing body, sense, and life is here
termed conjunction. ' Vibhagah ' again, denotes disjunction of body
and mind, characterised as death. The meaning, therefore, is that
this system of births and deaths, samsdra or ceaseless flow of existences,
otherwise termed pretya-bhdva or re-appearance after passing away, ia
caused by dharma and adharma. The Vedic name of this very pretya-
bhdva is ajarafijart-bhdva or uon-decrepit decrepitude. — 15.
192 VAI^ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
How moksa is attained.
Upaskdra. — To ascertain, therefore, what moksa is, in which there is an end of this
re-appearance after passing away, of the system of births and deaths, ho says :
t II $ I R I ?$ II
Atma-karmmasu, actions of the soul taking place.
Moksah, salvation, sqpjqTrT: Vyakhyatah, declared.
16. (It has been) declared that the actions of the soul taking
place, salvation (results). — 256.
This same disjunction of body and mind rises into mohsa or libera
tion, when there exist the actions of the soul. This is the meaning.
Now, the actions of the soul collectively are as follows : 'audition/
intellection, practice of holy communion, or yoga, constant meditation,
posture, regulation of breath, (lit. lengthening of life, the acquisition
of the control of the external senses and of the control of the internal
sense, spiritual intuition of one's own soul and of the souls of others,
accurate knowledge of previously produced dharma and adharma,
which have to be experienced in other bodies and places the building
up of various bodies suitable to such experience, the exhaustion of that
dharma and adharma by experiencing them, and ultimate success or
emancipation, characterised as cessation of pain, on the cessation of
bii h, when there is cessation of tendency to action, in consequence of
the non-production of subsequent dharma and adharma, due to the
overcoming of the mists of faults characterised as desire and aversion.
Of these the prime action of the soul is knowledge of the real nature or
essence of the six Predicables. — 16.
Here ends the second chapter of the sixth book in the Commentary
of £ankara upon the Vaisesika Aphorisms.
Vivfiti. — Spiritual intuition of the reality of the self steals away
false knowledge, sprung from spiritual blindness, of which the subject-
matter is that the soul is not distinct from the body, etc. Thereupon
there is cessation of faults, characterised as desire and aversion ; from
which there follows destruction of activity or inclination productive of
dharma and adharma. And from the non-existence of inclination results
annihilation of birth in the form of the initial conjunction of lifeiwith a
future body. And hence there results final annihilation of the threefold
afflictions. It is in this that moksa consists. Therefore this treatise is
useful, as a system of thought intended for the purpose of intellection
or thinking abont things.
KANiDA SftTRAS VII, 1, 2. 195
BOOK SEVENTH— CHAPTER FIRST-
Allusion to I. i. 6.
Upaxkdra. — Having examined dharma and adharma, as the root oamei of Samidra «r
transmigration, as the efficient causes of all that has a production, as the meana of bhoga or
worldly experience, and as uniformly attaching to each individual soul, from their origin, as
wall as the adristam of others as conducive to fruits to be experienced by those others, the
(tiUhor now calls back to the mind of the disciples the enumeration and definition of Attri
butes with the intention of examining these Attributes.
: Uktah, stated, mentioned, enumerated. *pm '• Gunah, attributes.
1. Attributes (have been) mentioned (above).— 257.
The meaning is that Attributes have been enumerated and defined-
Of these colour, etc., seventeen in all, have been verbally stated, and
seven have been brought forward by the word cha, l and '. Accordingly
all the twenty-four Attributes have been mentioned. Now, Attribute-
ness connotes possession of the l class ' directly pervaded by existence
appearing in eternals present in the eternals, or possession of the 'class'
directly pervaded by existence appearing in eternals which do not
appear in combinative causes, or possession of the ' class ' directly per
vaded by existence appearing in eternals appearing in non-combina
tive causes, or possession of the ' class ' not appearing in action which.
does not co-exist in the same substratum with the effect. — 1.
What attributes are non-eternal.
Upaskara. — 'Now, the examination of Attributes, as Attributes, is the subject of the ••Tenth
book. Of this, in the first Chapter, there are five sections, viz., (1) the examination of Attri
butes as eternal, (2) the examination of Attributes as non-etenal, (3) the examination of Attri
butes due to the action of heat, (4) the examination of Attributes which appear of function
in more substances than one, e. g., Number, etc., and (5) the examination of measure or exten
sion. Herein he states the non-eternality of the four Attributes, colour, etc.
I VS H R II
Prithivi-adi-rupa-rasa-gandha-sparsah, the
Colour, Taste Smell, and Touch of Earth, etc., L o., of Earth, Water,.
Fire, and Air. 5«nfrsrc*n^ Dravya-anityatvat, on account of the non-
eternality of the substances in which they reside, nfrtn: Anityah, non-
eternal. ^l Cha, also.
2. The Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch of Earth, Water,
Fire, and Air, are also non-eternal, on account of the non-eterna
lity of their substrata. — 258.
Of the wholes made up of parts, beginning with Earth, and ending
\vith Air, the four Attributes, colour, and the following, are non-eternal.
Although other Attributes also, being present in whole made up of parts,
are really non-eternal, yet (they are not referred to here, because) their
destruction is also due to other causes. The four Attributes, beginning
vrith colour, disappear only on the destruction of their substrata, and
194 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY
not in consequence of another, aid contradictory, Attribute. { Dravya-
anityatvat :' The meaning is that the non-etertiality of the dependent
Attributes is on account of the uon-eternality of substances upon which
they depend. — 2.
What attributes are eternal.
Upask&ra. — If the non-eternality of substrata governs the non-eternality of colour, etc.,
then, he says, it is obtained from necessary implication, that those colour, etc., which reside
in eternal substrata, possess eternality.
I V9 \ \ I ^ II
Btena, by this. f^T?^f Nityesu, in eternals. T?!^ Nityatvam, eter
nality. 3<E*^ Uktam, stated. Implied.
3. By this is implied eternality (of Colour, etc., which reside)
in eternal substances.— 259.
Of the same four Attributes, colour, etc., present in eternal subs
trata, eternality is implied ' by this,' which means, by the declaration
of non-eternality by reason of the non-eternality of the substrata.
The writer of the Vfitti, however, explains thus :
—this is the reading, with the addition of an sr, (so that instead of
' eternality,' the reading is ' non-eternality.') Thus, colour, etc., residing
in terrene ultimate atoms, disappear on the conjunction of fire. — 3.
Above continued.
Upxakdra. — Does, then, eternality belong also to colour, etc., which reside in terrene
eternal substances ? Accordingly he specifies (the eternals referred to in the preceding
aphorism).
II V9 I $ I 8 II
Apsu, in water. ?fa% Tejasi, in fire. %\q\ Vayau, in air. =g Cha,
and. fr?n: Nityalj, eternal. i[«^Pl9T^Ii^ Dravya-nityatvat, in consequence
of the eternality of substrata.
4. And also in consequence of the eternality of their (respec
tive) substrata, (Colour, etc.) are eternal in Water, Fire, and Air.
—260.
In aqueous ultimate atoms, Colour, Taste, and Touch are eternal ;
in igneous ultimate atoms, Colour and Touch ; in ultimate atoms of Air,
Touch is eternal. " But," it may be asked, what is the contradiction,
if colour, etc., present even in things eternal, be themselves non-eternal
like Sound, Understanding, etc. V" Accordingly, an additional reason,
viz., non-appearance of another attribute (vide IV. ii. 3 ante~), is indicat
ed by the word xi, ' and.' For, in Sound, the. manifestation of a
different attribute is observed in the form of tones, high, low, etc. ; and
in knowledge, etc., samskdra, impression or habit, etc., contradictory
of, or which oppose, knowledge, etc., (are observed). In aqueous,
igneous, and aerial ultimate atoms, other attributes, contradictory of
colour, etc., do not appear. If they appeared, then Colour, etc.,
KANiUA SftTRAS VII, 1, 6. 195
heterogeneous from the antecedent ones, would be observed also in the
aqueous and other wholes made up of parts, or compounds, originated
by the same ultimate atoms, in the order of binary and other atomic
aggregates. But colour, different in kind from white colour, does not
belong to Water and Fire ; nor do Touches, different in kind from cold
and hot Touches. " Hot water," "Cold air/' — such intuitions are,
however, due to the influence of upddhi or adjunct or external coadi- ,
tion. This is the import. — J.
Vivriti. — " But Colour, etc., residing in aqueous ultimate atoms,
being destructible by the conjunction of fire/' it may be objected,
why this generalisation, namely, "in eternals " (in tha preceding
aphorism) '?" Hence he specifies the eternals.
The meaning is that Colour, etc., inherent in the eternal earth ( i. e.f
ultimate atoms of earth), are not certainly eternal, but that it has been
stated in the preceding aphorism that those only are eternal, which in
here in the eternal Water, Fire, and Air (i. e., aqueous, igneous, and
aerial ultimate atoms).
What attributes are non-eternal.
Upaskdra.— 'Already it has been stated that (Colour, etc., are) non-eternal in non-
eternals among terrene substances. Now he states it ia the case of aqueous other non-
oternals also.
-"
II VS | t I % H
Anityesu, in non-eternals, srf^zns Anityah, non-eternal.
— Dravya-anityatvat, in consequence of the non-eternality of
substrata.
5. In non-eternals, (Colour, etc., are) non-eternal, in conse
quence of the non-eternality of their substrata. — 261.
The meaning is that Colour, etc., of aqueous, and other wholes
made uo of parts, disappear only on the dissolution of substrata, but
not in consequence of other, contradictory, attributes. — 5.
Vivriti. — Are Attributes, inhering in non-eternals, and other than
Colour, etc., eternal ? If so, then Conjunction, etc., also will be eternal.
To remove this apprehension, he says :
The meaning is that Attributes which exist in non-eternal substan
ces, are, all of them, non-eternal, because their substrata are non-
eternal, so that eternal Attributes do not at all exist in non-eternal
substances.
Colour, etc., of Earthy produced by burning.
Upaskdra. — In earth, appearing in the form of wholes made up of parts, (i. e., in terren*
bodies), also, Colour, etc., appear and disappear only on the conjunction of fire. How,
therefore, are they destructible only by the destruction of their substrata ? To reraore thit
apprehension, he says :
i \ i ^ u
196 VAI&E§IKA PHILOSOPHY.
: — Karana-guna-purvvakah, preceded by, or having fo
antecedents, the attributes of the causes. $fa«rt Prithivjam, in earth.
i^lTI* Pakajah, produced by burning. Due to the action of heat.
Thermal.
6. In Earth, (Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch) have for
their antecedents (like) attributes in (its combinative) causes, (and
are also) due to the action of heat. — 262.
' Pakajah ' means Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, due to the
action of heat, < Karana-guna-purvvakah' means preceded by the
attributes of that, e. g., potsherds, etc., which is the combinative caus&
of the substratum of Colour, e. y., a water-pot. Thus, the Colour of the
potsherd is the non-combinative cause of the colour of the water-pot,
by means of the proximity known as combination in the same object
with the cause. So also in the case of Taste, etc. Colour, Taste, Smell,
and Touch possess the jdti or ' class' directly pervaded by attribute-
ness such as colourness, etc.
Objection, — Colourness, which is nothing but apprehensibility by
the eye, is the udpdhi or external condition (of colour-perception).
Answer. — It is not. For, this would entail non-appearance of the
intuition of colour immediately on the falling of the sense, since an
U}>ddhi or external condition which is not adjacent, is unfit for produc
ing the intuition of that which is conditioned or super-imposed. Here
the itpddhij again, is the eye, and the same— the ocular sense — is
supersensuous. And apprehensibility is the being the object of
apprehension. This too is not an object of ocular perception, since
perception distinguished or determined by colour-ness is ocular.
Colour-ness, therefore, is the characteristic of the attribute perceptible
by the external sense of the eye alone.
Ob j notion. — But it does not pervade or include supersensuous colour.
Answer. — The objection does not arise ; for, the possession of the
jdti or class apprehensible by the external sense of the eye alone, is
intended. Such jdti is colour-ness ; as also are blue-ness, etc.
Objection. — The manifestations of blue, yellow, etc., are eternal,
only as each of them is a single, individual, manifestation. There are
not blue-ness, and other classes, inasmuch as their denotation is a single
individual.
Answer. — This is not the case, as it would entail the non-appearance
of the intuition of deeper blue, deepest blue, etc.
Objection. — But the use of the comparative and the superlative may
be caused here by the absence of inter-penetration of whiteness, etc-
Answer. — It cannot, since there is no proof of it, and also because
01 the intuition, " Dark colour is gone, red produced."
Ob j action. — But such intuition is caused by the produc ion and
destruction of combination.
K AN£DA SUTRAS vn, i, «. 197
Answer. — No, since there is no trace of combination there, and
since combination is eternal. The same (*'. e., production and destruc
tion of combination) being applicable also in the case of the non-
eternality of the water-pot, etc., the result would be non-finality, since
AnyathAgiddhit production by other means, or plurality of causes, can
be easily ascribed there by way of the very non-eternality of com
bination.
Another objection. — The attributes, blue, yellow, etc., are not
different from substance, since there is no difference between a property
and that of which it is a property.
Answer. — -This cannot be the case, as it would entail such uses as
" Colour is water-pot," " Toucth is water-pot," etc.
Objection. — But there is no harm in it, inasmuch as there are really
such intuitions as " White cloth," " Blue cloth," etc.
Answer. — -The analogy does not hold, because the intuitions are
•explained by the supposition of elision of the affix, matup, denoting
possession, or by the supposition of transference of identity.
Objection. — This supposition would be somewhat probable, were
there proof of difference.
Answer. — But difference is proved by means of such predication as
-' Colour of s-.i idal-wood," " Smell of sandal-wood," etc. If the cloth
were identical with colour, then, like the cloth, colour also would be
perceived by the sense-organ of the skin, and being asked to bring the
colour, one would bring some substance whatever.
Objection. — Let, then, there be identity in difference, seeing that
in the case of absolute difference as well as of absolute identity, co
existence in the same substratum would not be possible.
Answer. — -This cannot be, for it is impossible for identity and differ
ence, which are contradictory to each other, to appear together in the
same place, without the difference of their situation.
Objection. — But the characteristic of mutual non-existence (or non-
existence which is the counter-opposite of identity, e. g.y a waterpot ia
not a cloth) a ipears in that which appears in what is not pervaded or
included, since it is the characteristic of being the property of that
svhich appears in eternal non-existence, like the characteristic of
absolute non-existence (or non-existence which is the counter-opposite
of connection with the past, the present, and the future, e. g., there is
no waterpot inside the earth).
Answer. — This is not the case. For, in virtue of the intuition of
conjunction and its absolute non-existence, the characteristic of appear
ing in that which is not pervaded, is observed of absolute non-existence,
but, in the case of mutual non-existence, such intuition does not exist.
Now, this colour is of various kinds in Earth ; in Water and Fire
it is only white. Sometimes there is one more colour, i. e., variegated
or compound colour, also in a cloth, etc. ; for, otherwise, they would net
be objects of visual perception, since only substances possessing colour
oan be objects of perception by the eye.
1&8 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
Objection. — -But there can be no origination of colour by heteroge
neous colours.
Answer. — This is not the case ; for, homogeneity, only as constituted
by the characteristic of being colour, is required in the origination of
blue, yellow, etc., since otherwise, as has been already stated, they
would not be objects of visual perception.
Objection. — But the apprehension of the colour of a whole made up
of parts is possible by means of the apprehension of the colours of those
parts.
Answer. — It is not, as it would entail that the parts also, possessing
variegated or compound colour, are themselves void of colour. More
over, wherever, in consequence of the action of heat, variegated colour
appears in ultimate atoms, there also variegated colour is produced in
the cloth, etc., originated by them successively.
Objection. — In the yellow rnyrobalan, then, taste also is variegated.
Answer . — No, for no harm would be done, even if the yellow inyro-
balan were void of taste. The tradition of six tastes, however, is due
to the causality which produces the effects or properties of those
tastes.
Similarly, smell also is not variegated, since a fragrant and a non-
fragrant part are not its 'originators.
Objection — In the parts of a karkatl or cucumber, there is sometimes
bitterness, and sometimes sweetness. Which taste, then, exists in
karkatt ?
Answer. — Only sweetness.
Objection. — There existing a conflict of attributes, how can it
be so ?
Answer. — On account of the non-existence of bitterness in the parts
thereof.
Objection. — How, then, does such sensation (of bitterness) arise ?
Answer. — It arises from the bitter taste of the bilious substance
existing at the tip of the tongue irritated by the eating of the karkati.
It is from this cause that sometimes the mouth also becomes bitter.
Objection. — But how does not this explanation apply in the case of
the yellow myrobalan also ?
Answer. — Because, in the parts of the yellow myrobalan, various
tastes are felt, e. g., sour, sweet, salt, etc. There is no need of further
Argumentation or elaboration.
And this colour is an auxiliary to the eye.
Objection. — Such being the case, how do the non-existence of Colour
In air, and darkness become objects of ocular perception ?
Answer. — The question does not arise, since colour is an auxiliary
to the eye in the apprehension only of existences or objective realities-
KANlDA SUTRAS VII, 1, 6.
The colours of all the three, viz., the object, the light, and the eye, are
exciting causes of ocular perception.
Taste, again, is that which possesses the jdti or ' class,' taste-
ness. Taste-ness is the jdti or i class ' which is the object of immediate
cogaition producible by the sense taste aloae. And the possession of
such a jdti or ' class ' is taste-ness. It is this, the source of vitality,
growth, strength, and health, that is a:i auxility to the tongue. Thus,
taste-ness being possession of the jdti or ' class ' pervaded by attribute-
ness capable of being apprehended by the organ of the tongue, there is
no non-pervasion, i. e., exclusion, of super-sensuous taste.
Attribute, apprehensible by the nose alone, is Smell. Smell-ness is
the possession oc the jdti or l class' pervaded by attribute-ness appre
hensible by the nose only. It is two-fold, being fragrant and non-
fragrant. Or Sruell-ness denotes the possession of the jdti or ' class '
directly pervaded by attribute-ness appearing only in that which is
present in Earth.
In like manner, Touch also is the attribute possessing the jdti or
* class,' touch-ness. Touch-ness denotes the possession of the jdti or
4 class ' directly pervaded by attribute-ness apprehensible by the organ
of the skin only. Inhering in the quartet of substances, (namely, Earth,
Water, Fire, Air), it is, again, three-fold, according to the differences
of neither hot nor cold, cold, and hot.
Now, in passing, the process due to the action of heat, is considered.
Here, according to those who hold the theory of the burning of an ear-
thenpot (as a whole), the whole of the effect and the cause is burnt.
Those who hold the theory of the burning of the ultimate atoms (consti
tuting the whole), maintain that it is the ultimate atoms which are
separately burnt, that it is in them that there take place destruction of
the previous colour and production of the succeeding colur, etc., and
that, following the course of the attribute of the cause, colour, etc., are
produced in the burnt (wholes made up again) of (burnt) parts. Hera
the sense is as follows : From the impulse or the impact, given by fire,
to a raw substance, e. g., a water-pot, etc., thrown in a kiln, disjunction,
which is the counter-opposite of conjunction originative of a compound
substance, appears among the ultimate atoms originative of that raw
substance, and on the destruction of originative conjunction by the
disjunction, destruction of the substance must take place. For, it is
seen that of rice, etc., placed in a pan, destruction takes place at once
from frying, only by the application of heat from below, arid that, (under
similar conditions) intense ebullition takes place in milk, water, and the
like. Therefore, it is hoping too much that substances, smitten with
flames of fire on all sides, in a kiln, will endure. Moreover, if there be
no destruction of substances, then burning at their centre will not be
possible. For, there is no possibility of conjunction of fire at the
centre which is enclosed with harder other constituent parts. So that
there will be this great incongruity that the parts are dark but the
whole made up of those parts is red.
Objection. — Substances which are wholes made up of parts, are cer
tainly porous. H)W, otherwise, can oil, clarified butter, etc., poured.
200 VAlSE§IK A PHILOSOPHY.
into a jar, etc., ooze out, and how also can these be boiled ? Hence, at
the centre also, there can be conjunction of fire.
Answer. — This cannot be, inasmuch as, on account of exclusion of
ponderable or corporal or dense substances in virtue of the property of
impenetrability, conjunction of fire is impossible at the centr* which
is already conjoined with other (constituent^ parts.
Objection. — If there is destruction of the substance, how, then, can
there be the recognition, " This is that very water-pot ?" How, again r
in all changes of conditions, in the kiln, etc., are the water-pot, etc.,
observed in one and the same form '? How is it that a pan, a plate,
etc., placed on the burning water-pot, etc., are observed in the same-
position ? For they should fall down on the dissolution of the water-
pot, etc. How, again, are exactly the same number of wholes as are
placed in the furnace, afterwards obtained from it ? For, during the
process of burning, the origination is possible, of more or less substan
ces, by the (dissolved) ultimate atoms, in the order of binary and other
atomic aggregates. How, again, are water-pot, etc., of exactly the
same dimensions, observed to come out from the furance? How, again,,
will not the marks of lines and prints be obliterated ? Burning, there
fore, takes place only in the wholes.
Answer. — Such is not the case. For disjunction of three or four
tertiary atomic aggregates being effected from a water-pot, etc., with
the point of a needle, there being destruction of substance as a whole
in consequence of the destruction of conjunction originative of subs
tance, all such contradictions appear in, or are explained on, both the
theories. For, even they who hold the theory of the burning of the
water-pot as a whole, cannot venture to say that substance as a whole-
is not destroyed in the case of the above instance.
Even in that case the water-pot, etc., are not destroyed, since it i*
possible for an effect to continue to exist by inhering in the remaining
constituent parts even when there has been destruction of some cons-
"tituent parts. Were it not so, recognition, etc., would be really
impossible. This is the view of the Mimdmsakas. But they should be
asked ; how the water-pot, etc., bearing relation to the situation or
arrangement of all the constituent parts, can appear in a smaller num
ber of consituent parts. If it be their reply that it is possible in the
same way as is possible contraction of measure or extension or quantit
in a cloth which is not yet destroyed ; we reply that there can be no such
analogy, for there is no observation of contraction and expansion in
the case of wood, stone, pillar, earthen jar, etc., made up of harder
constituent parts. It cannot be rejoined by th«m that what is said to
destroy the water-pot, etc., destroys only its measure or extension ;
for, measure or extension can be destroyed only by the destruction
of its substratum. Moreover, like the recognition of the water-pot,
etc., measure or extension also is recognised in the case of the needle-
scratch, whereas in their view its destruction also is impossible. This-
is the point.
On the theory of those who hold that disjunction which is the
counteropposite of conjunction originative of substance aa well as
disjunction which is not its counter-opposite, are produced by one and
KANADA StiTRAS VII, 1, 6. 201
the same action in the constituent part, there is production of red
colour, etc., at the ninth moment counting from the destruction of the
binary atomic aggregate, in another binary atomic aggregate, since
action is conceived to exist in the very same ultimate atom. Thusr
there is first action in the ultimate atom originative of the binary
atomic aggregate, from the impulse given by fire; then, disjunc
tion : then destruction of conjunction originative of substance ; thenr
destruction of the binary atomic aggregate ; then, in consequence of
conjunction of fire, disappearance of dark colour, etc., from the pure
or singly existing ultimate atom, after the destruction of the binary
atomic aggregate ; after destruction of dark colour, etc., production of red
colour, etc., from another conjunction of fire ; after production of red
colour, etc., cessation of action in the ultimate atom ; following it,
action in the ultimate atom, from conjunction of soul possessing adrist-
am or destiny ; then, disjunction ; then, cessation of previous conjunc
tion, originative of substance, with another ultimate atom; then,
production of the binary atomic aggregate ; after the production of the
binary atomic aggregate, production of red colour, etc., in the pro
gressive order of the attribute of the cause- These are the nine moments,
if a different action is produced just at the moment of the cessation of
the previous actioii. If, on the other hand, a different action is pro
duced not at the moment of the cessation of the previous action, then
there are ten moments. Even if disjunction, etc., produced by disjunc
tion, be admitted, still there are ten moments, if disjunction produced by
disjunction has reference to the time in which destruction of conjunc
tion originative of substance takes place. If, on the other hand disjunc
tion produces another disjunction with reference to the time in which
destruction of substance takes place, then there are eleven moments
in the process. Thus, destruction of the binary atomic aggregate
and disjunction produced by disjunction, at one moment; then, destruc
tion of previous conjunction, and cessation of drak colour, etc. ;
subsequent conjunction and production of red colour, etc. , cessation
of disjunction produced by disjunction and of action, by means of
subsequent conjunction ; then, action in the ultimate atom, favourable
to origination of substance, disjunction from action ; cessation of
previous conjunction from disjunction ; thence, conjunction originative
of substance; thence production of substance ; production of red colour,
etc., in the produced substance. These are the ten moments. Where
however, production of disjunction by disjunction depends upon the
passing of the time containing the destruction of substance, there are,
by the increase of one moment, eleven moments. Thus, destruction'of subs
tances; then disjunction produced by disjunction and cessation of dark
colour, etc.; then subsequent conjunction and production of red colour, etc.
then cessation of disjunction produced by disjunction and of action; then
action in the ultimate atom, favourable to the origination of substance ;
then disjunction ; cessation of previous conjunction ; production of
conjunction originative of substance ; production of the binary atomic
aggregate ; production of red colour, etc. These are the eleven moments.
•Such is the process on the conception of action and cessation of action
in one and the same ultimate atom. If action favourable to the origi
nation of substance is conceived to take place in a different ultimate
atom, then the production of red colour, etc., should be understood to
202 VAlSESAIAK PHILOSOPHY.
appear at the fifth, sixth, seventh, or eighth moment commencing from
destruction of the binary atomic aggregate. The same has been ex
plained in Kandda-Rahaxyam. — 6.
Colour, etc., of Earth, produced by burning, continued.
UpaskAra. — In order to establish that the Colour, etc., of terrene ultimate atoms have
conjunction of fire as their non-combinative cause, he says :
I V9 I { | V9 II
Eka-dravya-tvat, Because of the characteristic of inher
ing in one substance.
7. Because their substratum is the same. — 263.
The expression, " of (attributes) produced from burning," is the
complement of the aphorism. " Being attributes," and " being effects,"
are also intended here. The whole sentence, therefore, means : Colour,
etc., of terrene ultimate atoms, have conjunction for their non-combi
native cause, inasmuch as these, being product-attributes, are at the
same time non-abhorrent or incongruent attributes inhering in eternals,
like Sound, and like Understanding, etc. Or the sddhya, or what has
to be proved, is merely the characteristic of being produced from con
junction. Hence there is no undue extension to, or inclusion of. Sound
produced from disjunction, since conjunction of Air is the efficient
cause of all Sounds whatever. And from the observation of the pre
sence and absence of fire in relation to them, the non-combinative
causality of conjunction of fire, towards terrene colour, etc-, is proved
by the force of 2^aksa-dharmatd i. e., the characteristic of the vydpya or
the middle term, the mark of inference, existing in the paTcsa or the
subject of the conclusion- — 7-
VivTiti. — The question may arise; how the attributes of the cause,
as they do not exist in the effect, can be productive of the attributes of
the effect, when there is thus a difference of substrata. Apprehending
this, he says :
Because they have one substance as their substratum, that is to say,
because there is co-existence in the same substratum. Thus, even
though the attributes of the cause do not exist -in the effect by the
relation of immediate combination, yet, inasmuch as they exist in the
effect by the relation of co-existence in the same substratum in the
form of combination with that which is in combination with them, their
productiveness of the attributes of the effect is not unproved. This is
the import.
Non-cognition of Minuteness and cognition of Magnitude,
explained before.
Upaskdra.— Having elucidated Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, by long discourses, and
going to begin first the examination of Measure of Extension, in violation of the order of
enumeration (of the Attributes), following the maxim* of the needle and the kettle, inasmuch
as Measure of Extension is proved by co union consent, whereas there is a wide range of
divergent views on the question of Number,— «he says :
* The maxim of the needle and the kettle is that when a man has got to turn out a needle
and a kettle, he first makes the needle, the smaller and easier piece of work, and then devotes
his whole attention, energy, and time to the manufacture of the kettle, th« l»rg« and more
difficult piece of work.
KANlDA SfiTRAS VII, 1, 8. 203
II V9 | ? ( c; ||
ft: Anoh, of the atom or atomic. J?f?r : Mahatah, of the molecular
or the dense or the extended. ^ Cha, and. ^T^svqgqtTs^ Upalabdhi-anu-
palabdhi, cognition and non-cognition. f?R^ Nitye, in (the book treating
of) the eternal. s^TS^n^ Vyakhyate, explained.
8. Cognition and non-cognition of the atomic and the extend
ed or massive, respectively, have been explained in (the fourth
book treating of) the eternal. — 264.
The term, l in the eternal/ signifies the fourth book, demonstrative
of the eternal, i. e., the container, by the contained. l Cognition and
non-cognition ' : The application ( of these words ) will be according to
relevancy, 01 the maxim., " When one thing is relevant to another, it
belongs to that other, even though lying at a distance." So that the
proposition, "Non-cognition of the atomic" is obtained. In like
manner, in the perceptual cognition, therefore, namely, " l&rge,
blue jug/' Measure or Extension also is as much an object (of
perception) as blue colour. And by means of this Measure or
Extension, Measure or Extension terminating in the ultimate
atom, is inferred, as also from Substance-ness. Moreover, n the
perceptibility of Substance, Measure or Extension also is a cause,
like colour ; for, without magnitude, substance cannot be perceptible.
It is, therefore, ascertained that, as being a cause of the perceptibility
of Substance, and being itself perceptible, an attribute, called Measure
or Extension, exists. For, were the distinctive form of a water-pot,
etc., its Measure or Extension, a man would bring any water-pot,
when he was told to bring *Tf^ > the massive or the extended, and thus
there would be a contradiction between the order of the master and
the apprehension of it by the servant. Likewise from the term water-
pot, Measure or Extension would be understood, or from the term,
Measure or Extension, a water-pot.
Measure or Extension is the non-common or specific cause of the
usage or application of measures, or a universal attribute inhering in
the object which is the cause of the perceptual cognition of Substance.
Application of measures is the application of cubits, etc., but not the
application of weights, numbers, etc., This Measure or Extension is.
of four kinds, namely, Largeness, Smallness, Length, and Shortness.
Of thesr, extreme largeness and extreme lenght exist in the four
1 universals ' (i. e., Space, Time, Ether, and Soulj ; extreme smallnsss-
and extreme shortness exist in the ultimate atoms ; the next (higher)
degree of smallness and shortness exists in binary atomic aggregates;
largeness and length exist in substances from tertiary atomic aggrega
tes upwards to composite wholes (or compound bodies as they exist in
nature). In this manner, all substances whatever possess two Measures
or Extensions. The attribution of smallness to a vilva or a bael fruit,
dmalaka (phylanthus emblica'), etc., and of shortness to fuel-sticks, etc.,
is relative. And relativity here denotes non-existence of bulkiness.
The bulkiness that exists in the dmalaka (emblic myrobalan), does not
exist in the jujube ; the bulkiness that exists in the wilva, does not exist
in the dmalaka. It is this bulkiness, which is the denotation of the-
204 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
terra, relativity, inasmuch as it partakes of both the primary and
secondary uses.
Some maintain that length and shortness do not exist in the
eternal substances. Others hold that these are not even modes of
Measure or Extension ; for, what they mean is this : As in the com
mand, " Bring the longer ones from amongst these bodies," so also in
the command, " Bring the spherical and the triangular ones from
amongst these bodies," discrimination boing equally possible, spheri
city or roundness, etc., also could then have |to be admitted as modes
of Measure or Extension. — 3.
Largeness or magnitude how produced.
Upaskdra. — -Ho now enumerates the causes of measure or extension.
II vs i ? i s. ii
Karaua-vahutvat, from a multiplicity of causes. ^
Cha, also.
9. Largeness or Magnitude is produced, from a multiplicity
of causes also. — 265.
The word ' cha ' implies the addition of magnitude and pracliaya
i. e.j loose conjunction among parts. " Measure or extension is pro
duced " — this is the complement of the aphorism. Among these,
multiplicity of causes alone produces largeness or magnitude and
length in tertiary atomic aggregates, since magnitude and accretion
do not exist in their causes. That multiplicity is produced by the
relative understanding of God, and the apprehension of particular
adr*stam or destinies, determines this plurality of objects in such rela
tive understanding. Likewise, it will be stated hereafter, duality
existing in two atoms is productive of measure or extension in a binary
atomic aggregate. In a piece of cloth, originated by two non-coales-
cent threads, it is magnitude alone which is the non-combinative
cause, since multiplicity and coalescence do not exist there. Where
again, a ball of cotton, in this case, inasmuch as an increase of
measure or extension is observed, therefore accretion is the cause,
since multiplicity does no!; exist, and since magnitude though existing,
is not a condition or occasion for increase of measiire or extension.
Such being the case, were magnitude cause here, there would be no
defect in the argument, for it has been said, " By two, by one, or
by all."
Prachaya, coalescence or accretion, is originative conjunction,
and is defined as conjunction in an object of some of its constituent
parts towards itself, in which object some of the constituent parts
were not in conjunction towards itself. And this conjunction of cons
tituent parts, it has been observed, is dependent upon a loose con
junction among their own constituent parts, is productive of measure
or extension, and is involved in the origination of Attributes and
Actions. — 9.
KANlDA SftTRAS VII, 1, 11. 205
The atomic is the opposite of the large or massive ; the short, of the long.
Upaslcdra. — Having demonstrated magnitude and length, he now demonstrates atomic-ness
or minuteness.
u vs i ? i ?o n
^
?RT: Atah, of this. f^nrftf Viparitam, the contrary. ?fqj Arm, the atomic,
small, or minute.
10. The contrary of this is the atomic. — 266.
' Atah/ i. e., from large or massive measure or extension estab
lished by perception ; ' viparitam/ (i. e., divergent). The meaning is
that that is atomic measure or extension. The contrariety arises from
imperc'eptibility, and from contrariety of causes also. For in the case
of magnitude or massiveness, magnitude, multiplicity, and accretion
are the causes, while in the case of atomic-ness or minuteness, duality
inhering in the cause and produced by the relative understanding of
God. is the cause. By this is also to be understood that the contrary
of length is shortness, and here too the contrariety is as afore
said. — 10.
In ichat sense the same thing appears both small and large.
Upaskdra. — He now shows that in the case of a jujube, an dmalaka, etc., the attribu
tion of smallness is secondary or relative
v»
^Tirr Anu, atomic, small, minute. JTfc^ Mahat, large, massive. f[f?T Iti,
such, rfft1!^ Tasmin, in that, i. e., in respect of one and the same object1
fe^nHl^T^. Visesa-bhavfit, from the existence of the species, or of the
peculiarity. fe^T^T^T^Visesa-abhavat, from the non-existence of the
species, or of the peculiarity.
11. ' (It is) smaller,' ' (It is) larger,' — such affirmations, in
respect of one and the same object, arise from the existence of
the species, or of the peculiarity, and from the non-existence of
the species, or of the peculiarity. — 267.
The word, ' iti/ indicates the sense of attribution or usage. There
is, then, all this usage that a jujube, is .small in relation to a fraeZ-fruit,
that an emblic myrobolan is large in relation to a jujube, that a hael-
fruit is large in "relation to an emblic myrobalan. Amongst these,
'(It is) large' such usage with regard to them is primary. If it be asked
how it is so, says, < visesa-bhavat/ i.e., because of ' bhava, i.e., existence
of ' visesa/ i."e. the very species, magnitude, by ' bhava/ i. e.. the
relation of more,, etc. On the other hand, the trantment of them ag
*mall, is secondary or relative. If it be asked how this is so, he says,
< visesa-abhavat/ i. e., because of the non-existence in them of the
species, smallness. For, smallness, as an effect, resides only in binary
atomic aggregates, and, as eternal, resides in the ultimate atoms, and
•consequently it does not exist in a jujube, etc.
206 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
Or, the meaning may be, that the treatment of a jujube, etc., as
small is secondary, because of the ' bhava,' i. e., the existence in the
constituent parts of the jujube, etc., of the ' visesa, i. e, the cause of
magnitude, namely, multiplicity of constituent parts, magnitude, and.
accretion, and because of the ' abhtxva,' i. e., the non-existence, in the
constituent parts of the jujube, etc., of the ' vifiesa,' i. e.f the cause of
smallness, namely, duality which does not co-exist in the same substra
tum with magnitude. — 11.
In what sense the same thinj appears both small and large, continued.
ives the reason why the attribution of small nas.s is secondary :
I V9 I * I ^ II
Eka-kala-tvat, from simultaneity (of the cognitions of
largeness and smallness).
12, (The attribution of smallness is secondary), because of
the simultaneity (of the cognition of largeness and smallness in
respect of the same object.) — 268.
Magnitude and minuteness are perceived at one and the same time.
And these, magnitude and minuteness, being mutually contradictory,
cannot appear together in one and the same substratum. The intuition
of magnitude, therefore, is there primary inasmuch as the cause of
magnitude exists there, and the intuition and application of minute
ness are secondary. This is the meaning. — 12.
Above continued.
Upaskdra, — He status tho reason for the priiuarinoss of the intuition of magnitude :
II VS \\ I \\ \\
• Dristantat, from example, or analogue. ^ Cha, And.
13. Also because there is the analogue. — 269.
The meaning is that it is seen likewise that in the natural order of
things the practical recognition, i. e., the application, of large, larger,.
and largest, must be with regard only to things possessing magnitude,
namely, the jujube, the ernblic myrobalan, and the bael fruit, just as
the application of white, whiter, and whitest, is, according to the
nature of things, with regard only to white objects, namely, a piece of
cloth, a conch-shell, a crystal, etc. — 13.
Minuteness and magnitude do not exi^t in minuteness and magnitude.
Upask&ra. — It may be objected : In virtue of the usage, " Small Measure or Extension,"
" Large Measure or Extension," it is known that there is magnitude also in magnitude as
ft measure or extonsion, and that there is sm allness in smallness also. How, then, can these
bo said to exist in Substance alone ? H ow, again, does not the contradiction result, in
Attribute, of being existent in Attribute ?
KANlDA SfrTRAS VII,jl, 16. 207
Anutva-mahattvayoh, in minuteness and magnitude.
^lmtva~inakattva-abhavah, non-existence of minuteness
and ef magnitude. qTR^^i: Karmma-guuaih, by Actions and Attri
butes. sqi^FT: Vyakhyatah, explained.
14. The non-existence of minuteness and magnitude, in
minuteness and magnitude, is explained by (the explanation,
already given, of the non-existence of Actions and Attributes, in)
Actions and Attributes. — 270.
To this he replies :
The meaning is that as Attribute and Actions do not possess
minuteness and magnitude, so also do not minuteness and magnitude
possess minuteness and magnitude. The usage should be regarded as
derivative. — 14.
Above continued.
It may be urged that as Attributes are possessed of Attributes, — ^and how else could there
be such uses as '• Large (i. e., extensive) Sound," " Two Sounds," " One Sound," " Twenty-
four Attributes," etc. ? — and as Actions appear to be possessed of Actions, — and how else
could there be such uses as " It goes quickly," " It goes s.viftly " ? so minuteness and magni
tude must also be possessed of minuteuess and magnitude.
: II vs I $ 1
: Karmmabhih, by actions. ^wrffijr Karmmani, actions.
Ounaih, by attributes. ^ Cha, arid. JTITi: Grunah, attributes
Vyakhyatah, explained.
15. Actions have been explained (to be void) of Actions
and Attributes, of Attributes. — 271.
With this in view, he says :
By Actions, Actions are not possessed of Actions. By Attributes
Attributes are also not possessed of Attributes. In like manner, minute
ness and magnitude are also not possessed of minuteness and magnitude.
The usage, however, is, in all these cases, derivative. This is the
meaning. — 15.
Minuteness and Magnitude do not exist in Attribute or in Action.
Upaakdra — It may be urged that usage suoh as " Lirge Actions," " Minute Actions,''
" Large Attributes," " Minute Attributes," etc., entails that Actions possess minuteness
and magnitude, and also Attributes possess both of them. In anticipation of this, he says :
u ^ n i
Anutva-mahattvabhyam, by minuteness and magni
tude. ^j5TcirmTKarmma-gunah, actions and attributes. ^ Oha;and.
Vyakhyatah, explained.
16. By minuteness and magnitude, Actions and Attributes
also are explained (to be void of minuteness and magnitude).
—272.
208 VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
The meaning is that as minuteness and magnitude are not posses
sed of minuteness and magnitude, so Actions are not possessed of either
of them, nor are Attributes possessed of either of them. This treatment
as such however, is derivative as aforesaid. This is the import. — 16.
Bhdsya. — Minuteness and magnitude may be predicated of action
and attribute.
Length and shortness do not exist in length and shortness.
Upaskdra. — He extends ths process of minuteness and, magnitude to length and shortness,
II \3 I \ \ \\3 \\
Eteua, hereby. 5>J?cr^?rr% Dirghatva-hrasvatve, length and
shortness. STTW^ Vyakhyate, explained.
17. Hereby are explained Length and Shortness. — 273.
Length, and shortness also are not possessed of length and short
ness, Whatever is productive of magnitude, the same is productive of
length ; whatever is productive of minuteness, the same is productive
of shortness. If it be asked, the cause being the same, how there can
be this difference in the effect, the reply is that it is proved or explain
ed, like attributes produced by burning, by the difference of antecedent
non-existence. Wherever there is minuteness, there is shortness ; where
there is eternal minuteness, there is eternal shortness, etc. This is the
meaning of the extension or analogy. — 17
How Measure or Extension is destroyed.
Upaskdra. — He now points out that which destroys (Measure or Extension): _
u
Anitye, in the non-eternal ^TpTcZW; Anityam, non-eternal, peri
shable.
18. In the non-eternal, (Measure or Extension also is) non-
eternal. — 274.
All this four-fold Measure or Extension, being present in perisha
ble substance, disappears only on the destruction of the substratum,
and not on account of contradictory, other attributes.
Objection. — But the Measure or Extension of a water-pot is destro
yed, although the water-pot still exists; how else, even after the
breaking of the ueok of the water-pot, can there be the recognition,
"This is that very water-pot"?
Answer. — This is not the case, in as much as the destruction of
the water-pot is necessary or inevitable, by the destruction of the
substratum. For, it stands neither to reason nor to experience that,
the binary atomic aggregates being destroyed on the destruction of
the conjunction of two ultimate atoms, there is non-destruction of
the tertiary atomic aggregates constituted by the binary ones, and
of limestone, etc., constituted by the tertiary atomic aggregates.
KANADA SUTRAS VII, 1,21. 209
Objection. — How then does the recognition arisa?
Answer. — It is an error, like the recognition, "This is that very
flame of the lamp."
Objection. — But the recognition of the the lamp is certainly correct
knowledge; whereas minuteness and magnitude undergo production
and destruction.
Answer. — This cannot be maintained, because it has been already
mentioned that their destruction is not possible without the destruction
of their substratum. — 18.
What Measure or Extension is eternal.
I Upaskdra. — Is then minuteness, inhering in ultimate atoms, destroyed, as are Colour r
etc., of terrene ultimate atoms? Is magnitude also, inhering in ether, etc., destroyed, aa
are Sound, Understanding, etc.? In anticipation of these objections, he says:
n
Nitye, in the eternal. f^R^q; Nityam, eternal.
19. In the eternal, (Measure or Extension also is eternal.
—275.
Measure or Extension which exists in eternal substances, e. g.,
ether, etc., and also in the ultimate atoms, is eternal since there is
nothing to destroy it. — 19.
Eternal Measure or Extension is called Parimandalam.
Upaskdra. — He states the name by which the Measure or Extension of the ultimate
atom is denoted in the Vaisesika system: —
n vs i ? i ** n
Nityam, eternal. TfcW^TO; Parimandalam, Parimandala, the
allround, or the spherical. Measure or Extension of the ultimate
atom.
20. Parimandala is eternal. — 276.
Pdrimandalyam has the same denotation as 'Parimandalam/ So
it has been said, "Elsewhere than in Pdrimandalya, etc." — 20.
Proof of true Minuteness and true Shortness.
Upaskdra. — It may .be asked: If minuteness, or shortness as applied respectively to a
jnjube, an emblic myrobalan, etc., and to fuel-sticks, sugar-canes, etc., is not transcendental
or real, (but apparent only), what then is the proof of them as transcendental?
Accordingly he says:
Avidya, false knowledge. Nescience. *3 Cha, moreover, and.
Vidya-lingam, mark or indication of knowledge.
210 VAI£E§IKA PHILOSOPHY.
21. False knowledge is, moreover, the (inferential) mark of
(true) knowledge.— 277,
'The mark of knowledge' is 'false knowledge.' The meaning
therefore, is this: The cognition or consciousness of minuteness
in respect of a jujube, an eiublic myrobalan, etc., and the consciousness
of shortness in respect of sticks for fuel, sugar-canes, etc., are all
avidySi or false knowledge, inasmuch as real or transcendental minute
ness and shortness do not exist there. Moreover, it is admitted by
those who hold the doctrine of anyatha-khyati, illusion of the senses,
that every where unscientific knowledge is just preceded i. e., pre
supposed, by scientific knowledge. So that true consciousness of
minuteness, as well as true consciousness of shortness, should
be inferred. This is the meaning. In like manner, secondary use of
words being impossible without the primary use, minuteness and
shortness, in the primary sense of the terms, must be thought of to be
present somewhere. — 21.
Vivriti. — -But why should substance, in the form of the ultimate
atom, be admitted, when it is not perceptible to the senses'? On the
other hand, substance which is perceptible to the senses, such as a
tertiary atomic aggregate, etc., should be recognised.
To meet this objection he says :
' Avidya/ i. e., unscientific knowledge, in other words, cognitions,
such as " Earth is eternal," Water is etrnal," etc., of which the
obje-rs are wholes made up of parts, is the inferential ' mark/ of
' Vidya,' i. e., scientific knowledge, namely, that Earth is eternal, of
which the object is (i. e., in respect of), the ultimate atom ; because
everywhere scientific knowledge, is preceded by unscientific know
ledge, for nowhere it is possible for a man to have the erroneous idea
that Earth is eternal, if he does not know what eternality is. This is
an indirect proof. The method ef proof of ultimate atoms as realities,
which has been pointed out before, should be preferred.
Ether and Soul possess infinite Measure tr Extension.
Upaakdra.—'H.e describes the nature or proper from of the Measure or Extension of Ether,
«to. which has been already inferred by the mark of their substance-ness.
II \9 I t I RR II
Vibhavat, in consequence of omnipresence, infinite ex
pansion, or universality. *T£T^ Mahan, vast. Immense. Infinitely large.
H^istf: Akasah, Ether. ?r«n Tatha, so. The same. 5* Cha, and. Also.
*n?TT Atma, Soul.
22. Ether, in consequence of its vast expansion, is infinitely
large. So also is the Soul.— 278.
'Vibhavah' denotes capacity for conjunction, or the characteristic
of being in conjunction, with all dense bodies ; and this, being im
possible, or incapable of proof, without vast magnitude, leads to the
inference of vast magnitude. It is also observed by us that Sounds
KANlDA SftTRAS VII, 1, 23. 211
are produced, just at one and the same time, both at Bar&nast (Benares)
»nd at Pdtaliputra (Patna) ; It is one and the same Ether that is here
the combinative cause. Consequently the pervasion of Ether is proved.
Pervasion, again, consists only in connection with infinitely vast
Measure or Extension. To suppose a diversity of Ether would be
superfluous ; hence only one Ether should be recognised. Such re
ference as " A portion or division of Ether/' is, however, relative,
being due to conjunction with the water-pot, etc.. (occupying a limited
space, or) possessing limits. And the relativity consists in the charac
teristic of being in conjunction with substances possessing limits.
' Tatha atma ' : As Ether is immensely vast, since it possesses
universal pervasion, that is, the characteristic of being in conjunction
with all dense bodies, so is also the Soul immensely vast. Did not the
characteristic of being in conjunction with all dense bodies belong to
Soul, then action would not be produced in the respective dense bodies,
as a result of conjunction of the Soul carrying its adristam or destiny,
inasmuch as adristam, being present in a different substratum, is
dependent upon or stands in need of, ' proximity,' (or a common plat
form), in order that it may be productive of action ; and that '
proximity' is nothing but conjunction of the Soul carrying its adris*(iml
Likewise, as the body moves on, the production of knowledge, pleasure,
etc., in particular situations, is impossible or incapable of proof except
on the theory of the universal pervasion of the Sould. Consequently,
the Soul also is pervasive. The Soul, however, is not only one, like
Ether, since, as has been already pointed out, difference of status or
condition is observed. This is the import.
In these cases, the magnitude is infinite, and is also eternal, like
the minuteness of the ultimate atom.
In like manner, should be inferred infinite length in the case of
Ether, etc., and infinite shortness in the case of the ultimate atom. — 22.
Mind is infinitely small.
Upaskdra. — -It may be asked that Mind being all-pervading, inasrauoh as it is always a
touchless substance, like Ether, and inasrauoh as it is, like the soul, the field wherein takes
place the conjunction which is the non-oombi native cause of knowledge, etc., why has it nots
been raertioned along with Ether and the Soul ? Henoe he says :
II V9 I \ \
Tat-abhavat, in consequenes of the non-existence of that,
i. e., universal expansion. ?mj, Arm, atomic. Minute. Small, ift:
Man ah, mind. The internal organ.
23. In consequence of non-existence of universal expansion,
Mind is atomic or infinitely small. — 2,79.
' Manah' is ami,' in consequence of the non-existence of ' that/
i. «., universal expansion or the characteristic of being in conjunction
with all dense bodies. .Did the characteristic of being in conjunction
with all dense bodies exist (in it), then, there being simultaneous
conjunction with |0tt>re|3ian <6ne sense, simultaneity of cognitions would
212 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY
follow, with, the result that there would be no particular attachment or
act of attention. The two inferences, ^namely, that Mind is all-pervad
ing, because it is a touchless substance, and that mind is all-pervading,
because it is the seat of conjunction which is the non-combinative
cause of cognition, etc.) are, however, unproved in point of their sub
ject matter, so long as Mind is not proved (to exist), while in the state
of Mind being proved (to exist), they are counter-oppposed by proof
which leads to the cognizance of the object i. e., Mind as an atom.)
Objection. — Minuteness cannot be thus proved from non-existence
of universal expansion, since the inference would be unduly applicable
to the water-pot, etc.
Answer. — It would not, inasmuch as (only) non-pervasion (and not
atomic-ness) is proved by non-existence of universal pervasion.
In one body, therefore, there is just one mind, since the supposition
of plurality would entail randundancy. To imagine parts even of a
single mind would be showing exuberance of imagination. Moreover,
being touchless, they cannot originate. By such arguments, (infinite)
minuteness is proved. This is the import. — 23
Space is all-pervading.
Upasltdra. — He states the argument for the infinite magnitude of space : —
\ \ \ W \\
?T% G-unaih, by attributes. f\3T Dik, space. 5g[<5qffi[ Vyakhyata, ex
plained.
24. By attributes, Space is explained (to be all-pervading).
—280.
The meaning is that, * gunaih,' i. e., by attributes characterised as
priority and posteriority inherent in all dense bodies, and appearing
in the forms of the intuitions of the Bast, the West, etc., common to
all persons inhabiting all the island or divisions of the globe, space
also is explained under the aspect of pervasion. For, it will be men
tioned later on that in the production of (the notions of) priority and
posteriority, the cause is relative understanding having for its subject-
matter larger and smaller number of conjunctions with the conjunct.
Moreover, the supposition of a plurality of space is contravened by
(the fault of) superfluity of supposition.
Objection. — How, then, can there be the intuition and the expression
or reference, namely, " Ten spaces (i. e., quarters)"?
Answer. — 'The objection does not arise, since it has been already
stated that they are due to particular upddhi or external condi
tions. — 24.
Time is all-pervading"
Vpaskdra. — He explains the universal expansion of Time :
* n u 1 1 1 w n
KANlDA SftTRAS VII, 1, 24. 213
Karane, in cause. To a specific cause, or to a universal cause.
Kalah, time.
25. Time (is the name given) to (a specific, or a universal)
cause. (Hence, in either case' it is all-p3rvading).281
Time is the name which fully designates the substance which is the
cause of the intuitions of reciprocal prior and posterior, simultaneity
non-simultaneity, slow, and fast.- Such an intuition, common to all
persons in all countries, would be impossible without the universal
pervasion of time. Universal parvasion, that is to say, connection with
infinite magnitude, therefore, belongs to it.
Or, in virtue of such intuitions as "barn now/' Time is known to
be the efficient or occasional cause of all that is produced; a-id this is
dependent upon universal pervasion, for an occasional cause must be,
as a rule, in proximity with the cambinative and non-combinative
causes.
Or, the use or application of past, future, and present is universal:
consequently time is all-prevading.
Or, time is the name of the substance which is the cause of the
application or use of moments, lavas (thirty-six winks), hours, watches,
days, days-and-nights, fortnights, months, seasons, half-years, years,
etc- Consequently, such use or application being universal, time is
universal, and therefore, infinitely large.
The supposition of its manifoldness is, as has been already stated,
contravened by (the fault of) superfluity of supposition. — 25.
Here ends the first chapter of the seventh book in the Commentary
,of Sankara upon the VaiSesika Aphorisms.
«214 VAIS*ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
BOOK SEVENTH— CHAPTER SECOND.
Number : Proof of Unity.
[7paslcdra.~ln the second chapter there are five section : (a) the section on the examina
tion of attributes existing in one, and in more than one, object ; (b) the section on the
examination of attributes existing only in more than one object ; (c) the section, in passing,
on the examination of the relation of sound and significance (i. c., of words and their meaning);
(d) the section of the examination of attributes existing in one object and baring for their
non-combinative cause conjunction with universal substances void of particular or distingui
shing attributes ; and, (c) the section on the examination of combination. Now, the percep
tibility of Number, etc., also is dependent upon combination in the same object with magni
tude. Accordingly, with a view to examine number, and also separateness, immediately after
the determination of measure of extension, in violation of the order of enumeration, the
author says :
Rupa-rasa-gandha-sparsa-vytirekat, because of
difference from Colour .Taste, Smell, and Touch. smfaTTO ArtMntaram,
a different object, t^^q Ekatvain, unity.
1. Because of its difference from Colour, Taste, Smell, and
Touch, Unity is a different object.— 282.
' Rftpa-rasa-gandha-sparsa ' is indicatory of all attributes other
than the pentad beginning with number, (i. e.} number, measure or
extension, separateness, conjunction, and disjunction). ' Vyatirekat*
= because of difference or divergence. The meaning, therefore, is this i
li One water-pot '' — Such particular intuition can be produced by some
particularity. And that particularity is not colour, etc., for the intui
tion is produced by difference from, or without, them. Nor is it the
being a water-pot, etc., that is the condition or occasion (of the intui
tion), for such intuition is produced in respect of a piece of cloth also.
Nor is unity a Genus, like Existence, for its denotation is neither less-
nor more than that of Existence- Nor, again, is it a Genus confined to
substance only, for it is neither less nor more extensive than Subs
tance-ness. Nor does the difference or mutual distinction (of Unity
and Substance-ness) arsie from difference of intuition, even though
they are neither less nor more extensive than each other ; for if differ
ence of intuition were caused by itself, existence also would be differ
entiated • if, on the other hand, it were to be caused by difference of
subject-matter, then, difference of subject-matter, as has been stated,
is not possible, since, otherwise, there would be difference of the
characteristic of being a small water-pot and of being a large water-
pot. Nor is the view, held by Bhusana, that unity is non-difference
from (or identity withj itself, a reaaoi.able one. Were self-identity of
the water-pot its Unity, then there would be no intuition of Unity in
the case of a cloth, etc., Bhuiaha's other view, namely, that difference-
from itself constitutes Duality, etc., is also not valid ; for variety
of uses of difference from itself or self-distinction, as being common to
three, four, and so on, is not possible or capable of proof. This is the-
import.r — 1.
Proof of Separateness.
Upaskdra^—With a view to prove separateness also, by means of its similarity to Unity,,
he says :
KANiDA SftTRAS VII, 2, 2. 215
II V* I * I * II
HIT Tatha, similarly. ^W7^n Prithakatvam, separatenesg. Indivi
duality.
2. Similarly, Separateness (is a different object). — 283.
The practice of discrimination or separation verily exists, in the
form, namely " This is separate from, other than, a different object
from, this.'' For, separation means definite apprehension or grasp,
having regard to certain limits. Here, again, Colour, stc., are not the
cause, since they are not its invariable antecedents, and also because
the limits (of them) are undefinable.
Objection. — Separateness is nothing but anyonya-abhdva, mutual
non-existence, non-existence which opposes identitity ; for, like " This
is separate from, other than, a different object from, this," the intuition
u (This is) different from this " rests on anyonya-abhdva.
Answer.— li is not so. Although the terms separate, etc., are
synonymous, they do not convey the sense of anyonya-ahdva, 'since in
that case the use of the ablative ('from ,) would not be possible or
reasonable, because the intuitions, " This is separate from this, " and
•" This is not this, " contain different subject-matter. Nor is separat
eness an object or entity which possesses anyonya-abhdva, for , then, in
" A cloth is a not water-pot, ,, there would also be the use of the
ablative. Objection. — The intuitions, " It is separate, „ and „ It is
distinct, " having the same form, Separateness is nothing but distinct
ness. Answer. — It is not. For, in that case, while Maitra possessed the
distinction of a staff, the intuition, " This Maitra is separate fcrm
Maitra. " would also arise. Likewise it would entail the application of
Separateness to Ether it is distinguished by Sound, and to the Soul
when it is distinguished by Understanding.
For the same reason, dissimilarity or difference in property also is
not Separateness, inasmuch as it would entail, in the case of a water-
pot, which has been burnt to redness, such usage as " This water-pot
is separate from the dark water-pot." For, it is the possession of
properties repugnant to a thing, that constitutes difference in property
from that thing. And this appears in the state of redness immediately
after darkness.
Nor is it Genus itself, which is Separateness. For, the limits of a
-Genus are undefinable. Moreover, it would entail inter-mixture of
classes ; for, if it exist only in existent things, then its denotation
would be neither less nor more than that of existence, andlif it exist in
substance only, then, than that of Substance-ness. — 2.
Unity and Separateness do not exist in Unity and Separateness.
Upaskdra. — It may be argued that inasmuch a3 there is thia nsage, namely " On*
Unity," "Separateness is separate from colour, etc.," therefore (there is Unity also in Unity,
fieparateness, and similarly, iu other and other instances. Accordingly he saya :
216 VAIi§E§i£A PHILOSOPHY.
u vs i * i \ (\
Ekatva-ekaprithaktvayoh, in Unity and Separa-
teness of one, or Individuality.
abhavah, non-existence of Unity and Individuality.
Anutva-mahattvabhyum, by minuteness and magnitude:
Vyakhyatah, explained.
3. The non-existence of Unity and Individuality, in Unity
and Individuality, is explained by minuteness and magnitude.
—284.
The meaning is that as minuteness and magnitude do not possess
minuteness and magnitude, the application of which to them is deriva
tive, so Unity and Individuality do not possess Unity and Individu
ality do not possess Unity and Individuality, the application of which
to them is derivative.
" By Actions, Actions," " By Attributes, Attributes," — these two
aphorisms (vii. 24, 25, infra") also, which employ analogy, here seem to
carrv the same import as the preceding ( i, e., the present ) aphorism
employing an analogy. The meaning is that as Actions are not possess
ed of Actions, nor are Attributes possessed of Attributes, so Unity and
Individuality are not possessed ef Unity and Individuality. — 3.
Unity is not universal, but is confined to /Substance only.
Upaskdra. — It may be asked : The application or use of Unity is indeed common to
Attributes and Actions- What does here lead to the conclusion that Unity exists only in
Substances and not in Attributes, etc ? To this, he replies :
n vs i R i a n
Nih-amkhatvat, being void of Number. ^v&fTOiJFn Karm-
ma-gunanam, of Actions and Attributes, ^rssfa^ Sarvva-ekatvam, Uni
versal Unity. T Na, not. f^q^1 Vidyate, exsists.
4. Actions and Attributes being void of Number, universal
Unity does not exist. — 285.
Unity of all — that does not exist. On what ground ? So he
says. — ' Nihsamkhyatvam ' means the state or condition of standing
away from Number. Thus Actions and Attributes are void of Number.
Number being an attribute, Number by no means exists in attributes ;
nor, again, in Actions, because Attributes are excluded from, or denied
to, Action, since, otherwise, Actions would possess Substance-ness-
And the attributeness of Number has been proved, and also the Nunu
ber-ness of Unity. This is the import. — 4.
Cognition of Unity in Attribute and Action is erroneous.
Upaskdra. — How, then, do such cognitions arise, as " One colour,"" One taste, "etc. P1
To this, he replies :
KANiDA SftTRAS VII, 2,5. 217
I V9 I * I * II
yT'rf Bhrdntam, mistaken ; Erroneous. <T<^ Tat, that, i. e., the cogni
tion of Unity in Action and Attribute.
5. That (i.e., the cognition of Unity in Action and Attri
bute) is erroneous. — 286.
The meaning is that the cognition of Unity which arises in the
case of Attributes and Actions, is erroneous. 'Cognition' — this is the
complement of the aphorism, because an objection of the opponent has
bee i thrown into it. The application (of Unity in these cases) is,
however derivative, and it is non-difference from itself, or self-identity T
which constitutes the derivation. Nor is Unity nothing but that (i. e.,
self identity), for the reply has been already given. — 4.
Bhdsya : — explains VII. ii. 5 as demolishing the view contained
in VII. ii, 4.
Indirect proof of Unity.
Upaskdra. — It may bo asked : tk Let this application of Unity bo secondary in tho case
of substances also and the intuition of it erroneous, what is the use of unity at all ? " To-
this, he replies :
Ekatva-abhavat, in consequence of the non-existence of
Unity. *T?rfi: Bhaktih, derivative (function. Secondariness. 3 Tu, but.
However. ^ Na, not. frq^ Vidyate, exists.
6. In consequence of the non-existence of Unity, however,
secondariness would not exist. — 287.
If Unity in its transcendental or real sense be nowhere to be obser
ved, then the application of the term could not be secondary, for the
secondary, has for its antecedent the primary, use. Nor, again, could
the intuition be erroneous, for error has for its antecedent certain
knowledge. For it is the certainly known that is (erroneously) attri
buted, and not the erroneous, for the intuition of the non-existent has
been disproved, and the intuition of the otherwise (i. e., the existent)
has been proved. — 6.
J3hdsya : — explains^?!!, ii. 6in support of the interpretation of VII. ii.
5, thus: Did not unity exist everywhere, there would be no bhalfti, pro
duction, of things at all. For, any one thing is the joint product of
several things ; but there can be no such production in the absence of
one-ness or unity ; unity, therefore, exists in all places.
Unity and Separateness of one do not exist in effect and cause.
Upaskdra. — Effect and cause, e. g., threads and cloth, possess Unity and single Indivi
duality. Single Individuality also belongs to them for the very same reason for which Unity
belong to them. For it is not possible that a thing can be separate from itself. For when a
piece of cloth is torn asunder and the threads are drawn out one after another, a piece of cloth
different from them is not observed. Were a piece of cloth different from the threads, then it
shou Id be observed under the characteristic of being different from them, like a water-pot. In
like manner, a water-pot also is nothing but identical with the two potsherds (which compose
it), since a water-pot also being broken, nothing over and above the two potsherds is observed.
Accordingly it has been said, " A whole made up of parts is nothing else than the parts.":
This is the view of the Sftmkhya thinkers. And for the purpose of controverting it, he says :
218 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
v* I * I V9 II
'• Karyya-karanayoh, of or in effect and cause.
Ekatva-ekaprithakatva-abhavat, in consequence of non-exist
ence of identity and heterogeneity. f^rclNr1^^?^ Ekatva-ekapritha-
ktvam, Unity and Individuality. ?f Na, not. fcent Vidyate, exists.
7. Effect and cause are neither the same nor similar (in
being equally distinguished from all other things) ; therefore, Unity
and (single) Individuality do not exist in them.— 288.
Effect and cause — these two are not one. Why ? So he says : from
non-existence of 'ekatva,' i. e., from non-existence of non-difference and
because co-existence of plurality and unity in the same substratum is
not therefore, possible, as would be required by the proposition that
the very same thing which is the effect, is also the cause, e. y., that
threads are a piece of cloth.
Objection. — But there is as a matter of fact such co-existence in the
same substratum, seeing that the term, waters, is applied to a drop of
water only, and also seeing that the term, wives, is applied to a single
Woman.
Answer. — Such is not the case. For such applications can be
possible by reference to multiplicity of constituent parts. In the case
of the ultimate atom of water, however, such application takes place,
according to some thinkers, by means of multiplicity of colour, etc.,
naturally belonging to it ; while, according to others, it is due to the
characteristic force of sound or language which should not be found
fault with. Nor do fibres present in a salvinia cucullata and honey
comb obtain the application of cloth. Nor do threads singly prevail to
contain and to drag anything.
Nor, again, can the two, effect and cause, become the substratum
of single Individuality, for it is saor. that they become the limits of
each other. How ? So he says, ' eka-prithakatva-abhavat,' i. e., in
consequence of the non-existence of ' eka-prithakatvam,' or non-hetero
geneity or non-difference in property ; in other v\ords, because, of effect
and cause, difference in property is observed, for it is universal among
mankind that the notions of thread and cloth, as well as of warter-pot
and potsherds, are embraced by different acts of understanding.
Objection. — Why, then, are not Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch,
cognised by their difference (or separately from one another, i. e., one
after another always) ?
Answer. — Because of the absolute similarity of their forms, i. e.,
modes of manifestation. And when sometimes, as in a piece of cloth of
variegated colour, etc., separate cognition also takes place, it is because
the differences of Number, Measure or Extension, etc., are most mani
fest there. — 7.
KANADA StTTRAB VII, 2, 8. 219
Only non-eterml unity and separateness of one proceed from like
attributes in their causes.
Uj>'i->kdra.—T3.o points out that non-eternal Unity and Separateness-of-one have for
their antecedents attributes of these causes.
H V? I R | t; H
Etat, this, i. e., the characteristic of having the attributes of
the cause as antecedents. ^n^T3i4t: Anityayoh, of the two non-eternals,
namely, Number and Separateness. 5'7T<Rf<WC Vyakhyatam, explained.
8. This, (as) explained in the case of the two non-eternals
(namely, Number and Separateness, should be understood only
in the case of non-eternal Unity and Separateness of one). — 289.
The characteristic of having attributes of the cause as antecedents,.
which has been explained in the case of non-eternal Number and
Separateness, should be understood to apply to only non-eternal Unity
and Separateness-of-one, since other Numbers and Separatenesses are
produced by relative understanding. As the characteristic of having
attributes of the cause as antecedents belongs to non-eternal colour
and touch of Fire, so it belongs also to non-eternal Unity and Separate
ness-of-one. This is the import. It follows, therefore, that Numbers
beginning with two and ending with the highest arithmetical number,
possess or reside in more than one substance. It also follows that
separatenesses beginning with Separateness of two and ending with.
Separateuess of the highest arithmetical number, co-exist in the same
substratum with those Numbers. Now, the processes of the production
and destruction of Duality, etc., are as follows ; When two homoge
neous or heterogeneous substances are in contact with the eye, cogni
tion of the attribute qualified with the notion or characteristic of
Unity, which is the genus of the two numbers, Unities, inhering in the
two substances, are produced immediately after the elimination of differ
ence in thought i.e., the assimilation of the two substances under the notion
(of Unity); and it is this cognition which is called relative understanding
or the conception of the one in the many. By it Duality is produced in
the two substances. Then there takes place reasoning about the notion
or characteristic of Duality which is the genus of the Duality so produ
ced. After it, simultaneously there appear destruction of relative under
standing by means of that reasoning, and a qualified or concrete-
understanding having for its content the attribute Duality as qualified
with the notion or characteristic of Duality. And in the next
moment there are simultaneously produced destruction of the attribute-
Duality in consequence of the destruction of relative understanding,
and cognition, in the form of "Two substances," qualified with Duality.
Thereafter, results Samskdra, impresssion or a fixed idea, from the
above cognition of substances qualified with Duality. Thus, to sum
up : — Beginning with contact with the sense and ending with Samskdra
or impression, there are eight moments ; viz., contact of the sense with
the substratum of Duality which is going to be produced, then cognU
tion of the genus inherent in the attribute Unity, then relative under
standing in the form of cognizance of the many along with the
220 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
attribute Unity as qualified with the generic notion or characteristic
of Unity, then production of the attribute Duality, then cognition of
the genus inherent in Duality, then cognition of the attribute Duality
as qualified with that genus, then cognition of substances as qualified
with the attribute Duality, and then Samskdra or impression. The
order of destruction, again, is as follows : Destruction of the generic
notion or characteristic of Unity, from relative understanding ;
destruction of relative understanding, from cognition of the generic
notion or characteristic of Duality : destruction of the generic notion
or characteristic of Duality, from cognition of the attribute Duality ;
destruction of cognition of the attribute Duality, from cognition of subs
tances as qualified with the possession of Duality; and destruction of the
latter, from Samskdra or impression, or from cognition of other objects.
Objection. — Why is not cognition of substance qualified with the
possession of Unity, itself produced after the cognition of Unity, when
all the causes of its production are present there ? For, cognition of
attribute taking place, there can be no delay in the cognition of
substance. From that same cognition (of substance so qualified),
therefore, there being destruction of relative understanding, from its
destruction will follow, at its very next moment, destruction of Duality.
Hence destruction of Duality resulting at the very moment prior to the
qualified or concrete cognition in the form of " Two substances," the
production of cognition of substance as qualified with the possession of
Duality, becomes impossible.
Answer. — The argument is defective ; for, it is relative understand
ing uninfluenced or unobstructed or unobscured by the causes of the
production of Duality, etc., which invariably produces cognition
qualified with the content of substance, the above supposition being
made on the strength of the result.
Objection. — But still destruction of relative understanding being
caused by the very Samskdra or impression produced by itself, the
fault, pointed out above, again appears all the same, since there is
possibility of destruction of Duality at the very moment prior to the
cognition qualified with Duality.
Answer. — It does not, since cognition of pure attribute, or of
attribute unassociated with substance, is not productive of Samskdra or
impression. For pure attribute can be nowhere called back to mind,
since everywhere it is only by the background of, or as contained
in, substance, that there can be recollection of attribute.
Objection. — Let it be so; still inasmuch as even at the time of the
production of qualified or concrete cognition, there may be destruction
of Duality, the possibility of non-production of qualified cognition
remains in the very same state. For qualified or specific cognition,
illuminative of that which is present, cannot possibly appear at the
moment of the destruction of the qualification or that which serves to
specify, since there is no such observation.
Answer. — This is not the case. For, cognition of that which serves
to specify, contact of sense with that which, is specified, and non-appre
hension of non-association of the above two, which make up the whol*
KANADA SUTRAS VII, 2, 8. 221
cause of specefic cognition, are possible also in the case of the subject
under discussion. If, however, contact of sense with that which serves
to specify, is also required, then this too existing at the preceding
moment, the very contact, which exists at the preceding moment, is
observed to be the cause. That which serves to specify, or a qualifica
tion or distinction, which is beyond the compass of specified cognition,
may also exist: for, it is only the being the object or content of cogni
tion productive of specified cognition, which determines the charac
teristic of being a distinction or that which serves to specify, but the
being the object of specified cognition does not also determine it.
Objection. — In this view, an upalalcsdnam or indication also will
come to have the nature of a visesaiiani or distinction.
Answer.— By no means; for, existence in the same substratum,
which is invariable and which does not cause specified cognition,
determines the characteristic of being a distinction, whereas an indi
cation exists in a different substratum from that which it indicates.
Thus, when there is possession of a raven in the house of Devadatta,
then the raven is a distinction. But when, flying over the house, it
does not exist in it, then the raven is an indication.
Objection. — This being so it would follow that in such cases as
"There is taste in that which possesses colour," etc., colour, etc., also
would be distinctions.
Answer. — This is not an objection, since it is desired to be so.
Objection. — Then there too taste will exist.
Answer. — No, since that which exists in something distinguished by
the possession of something else, does not necessarily exist in that by
which it is so distinguished. For a distinction and that which is dis
tinguished are not one and the same thing.
Objection — At the time of the destruction of Duality, there exists
no connection with the distinction. How can specified cognition, or
•cognition of that which is distinguished, be produced?
Answer. — The question does not arise, for the meaning of the term,
the being distinguished or qualified, is only non-variation or non-
deviation or non-divergence from that (i.. e., the distinction); whereas
the manifestation of that (i. e.} the distinction) exists there (i. e., in
specified cognition) also.
Hence, the teachers say, nothing remains unproved.
In like manner, on the analogy of the production and destruction
of Duality, should be understood the production and destruction of
Triplicity.
Duality is destructible by the destruction of relative understand
ing, for an existing attribute cannot be destroyed in the absence of
another attribute opposed to the destruction of its substratum, like
ultimate cognition, since ulitimate cognition is destroyed by destruc
tion of adristam. In some cases it is destroyed also from destruction.
222 VAlgESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
of substratum, e.g., where there is knowledge of the genus, unity, simul
taneously with action in the constituent parts of the substratum of
Duality. It is in this way: Action in constituent parts and cognition
of the genus; Disjunction and relative understanding; destruction of
Conjunction and production of attribute Duality; destruction of
constituted substance and cognition of the genus Duality; — here des
truction of Duality results from destruction of substance, and destruc
tion of relative understanding from cognition of the genus Duality;
since, destruction of relative understanding taking place at the same
time with destruction of Duality, there exists no relation, resembling the
relation of effect and cause, between them. Where, however, there is
simultaneity of action in the constituent parts of the substratum of
Duality and relative understanding, there destruction of Duality results
from both destruction of substratum and destruction of relative under
standing. It is in this way: Action in the constituent parts and rela
tive understanding; production of disjunction and production of
Duality; destruction of conjunction and cognition of the genus Duality;
destruction of constituted substance and destruction of relative under
standing; destruction of Duality from both, the capacity of each for
destroying being observed. This process properly fits in with the-
theory of two cognitions being related as the destroyed and the-
destroyer ; and it is this theory which is legitimate or established
by proof.
Objection. — The entire group of cause being the same in the cases
of Duality, Triplicity, etc., how is it that there is this difference in
their effects, namely, Duality is constituted by two Unities, Triplicity
by three Unities ?
Answer. — The question cannot arise, since Duality, etc., do not exist
in Unity.
Objection. — It is Duality, Triplicity, etc., inhering in the combina
tive cause, which determine cognitions of Duality, Triplicity, etc.
Answer. — This is not the case ; for prior to the production of
Duality, etc., Duality, being absent therefrom, the enquiry after the
cause of Duality, etc., does not cease even there, and the existence of
such difference in relative understanding, and in Unities, or in the
supposition of that on the strength of the result, is contravened by
non-observation.
Objection. — Let the use also of Duality, etc., proceed from the
same source ; what is the need of Duality, etc.? Difference will result
from difference of adristam.
Answer. — Were it so, Triplicity, and Four-ness, would be sometimes-
produced also by the set of causes originative of Duality. Hence it
would entail non-uniformity. Moreover, it may be said in this con
nexion that difference in the effect is explained by difference in prior
non-existence ; aa in the case of colour, taste, smell, and touch, pro
duced by burning, difference is produced under the same set of causes.
Objection. — Prior non-existence also ia common to all, or ia th& j
same in all cases.
KANADA SUTRAS VII, 2, 8. 223
Answer. — It is not ; for each prior non-existence in each parti
cular case has been ascertained to have causality towards its own
effect only.
Or, the process should be carried on in this way that Duality is
produced by pure relative understanding, and Triplicity by relative
understanding accompanied by Duality. In such cases as " I have
killed a hundred of ants/' Duality is not at all produced in conse
quence of the non-existence of combinative cause. Accordingly, it
should be observed, the use of number is there derivative or secondary.
Professor Sridhara opines that in the case of an army, a forest,
etc., iu consequence of the non-existence of constant relative under
standing, only multiplicity is produced, but not hundred, thousand,
and ether numbers. With regard to this view, Professor Udayana
observes that if such be the case, then in these cases no doubt
could arise whether it be hundred, ' or thousand, etc., nor could
there be such cognition as " A large army," " A. larger army," and
that hence this is not the case. Here the matter should be discussed
in the following manner : Multiplicity is either nothing but number
commencing from Triplicity, and terminating with the highest arith
metical number, or another number different from them. It cannot
be the first since in the case also of any army, a forest, etc., there is
as a rule production of hundred, thousand, and other numbers. Nor
can it be second, since multiplicity different in mark from Triplicity,
«tc., is not observed. Multiplicity, therefore, is only number, namely,
hundred, etc., produced by relative understanding which is uniformly
•constant in each case and which does not depend upon Unity. The
manifestation of hundred, etc., does not, however, take place there,
since nothing exists there which can manifest it.
We, on the other hand, say that multiplicity is really a different
number, existing in the same substratum with Triplicity, etc., and
producible by relative understanding productive of Triplicity, etc.
It is so in consequence of the difference of prior non-existence. How
else can such a statement be possible as " All I can say is that there
.are many"? I do not know particularly whether they be a hundred or
a thousand "? As magnitude or largeness and length co-exist in the
same substance, so do Triplicity, etc., and multiplicity co-exist in one
and the same substratum. For, to the query, " Shall I bring a hundred
•or a thousand of mango fruits ?" the reply is given, viz., " Let a large
number of them be brought. What is the use of inquiring about a
particular number ?" This being so, Triplicity is produced by rela
tive understanding accompained by Duality, Four-ness by relative
understanding accompained by Triplicity, and so On, one after the
•other. In the production of multiplicity, on the contrary, there is no
rsuch uniformity or law that the relative understanding must be quali
fied with the possession or accompaniment of all the numbers which
.stand behind it. Hence in the case of an army, a forest, and the like,
only multiplicity is produced, but not any other number ; and sj the
alternatives amongst which Doubt has to swing also become really
non-existent.
224 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
Separateneas, again, exists in the same substratum with that (i. e.,
number). Hence as is Duality, so is also separateness of two ; and
so on.
Objection. — The use of separateness of two, etc., being possible by
means of separatenesses of one existing in the same substratum with
Duality, Triplicity, etc., what is the use of Separateness of two, etc.?
Answer. — The question cannot be raised in view of the discrepancy
that while in the case of "• A cloth and a clod are separate from a water-
pot" there is no perception of the separateness of the dual (cloth and clod)
being produced by the dual and the single limiting each other, there is
such perception in the case of their individual separateness. Nor does
this theory entail and explain Priority of two, for Priority of two is
explained and possible by means of two priorities existing in the same
substratum, or co-extensive, with. Duality- The contradiction in respect
of one being the limit of the other, which exists in the case of separate
ness, does not exist in the case of Priority ; since the intuition. " These
two are prior," is possible or proved in same way as the intuition.
" These two are blue." For, though two bodies occupying the same
part of space possess equal manifoldness of conjunctions with the con
junct, yet production of different effects is possible by moans of the
difference of the conjunction of space and body, which is the non-com
binative cause. Moreover, as two Unities jointly become the non-com
binative cause of Duality, it being, in like manner,, possible for two
separatenesses of one or single individualities, jointly operating, to
possess non-combinative causality towards the production of separate-
ness of two, or dual individuality, it is not observed that more than, one
i.e., many, conjunctions are, by their joint operatioii, originative of one
effect, which is not a constituted substance, by means of the proximity
known as combination in the same object with the effect. On the other
hand, by means of the proximity known as combination in the same
object with the cause, a larger number of conjunctions of threads and
the cylinder of wood in a loom do really originate a single conjunction
of a cloth and the cylinder of wood in a loom This is the direction.
On the analogy of destruction of Duality, etc., should be under
stood also destruction of separateness of two, etc. — 8.
Vivriti. — It may be objected : " The thread is distinct from the
cloth and is dissimilar to the cloth " — such intuitions are simply erro
neous, since it is threads conjoint among themselves, which becomes
the cloth, and since no proof exists that the cloth is distinct from the
threads. It cannot be said that difference from the thread can be
proved to exist in the cloth by means of its dissimilarity to the thread,
for dissimilarity itself is not proved. For, the nature of the cloth does
not constitute its dissimilarity to the thread, inasmuch as in the state
of the manifestation of the cloth, the nature of the cloth i.i recognised
in the threads themselves. Accordingly it has been taught by Professor
fjvarakrisna : —
The effect is existent (in the cause, in an enveloped state, prior to-
its production) ; For, there can be no production and manifestation of
KANADA StfTRAS VII, 2, 9. 225
that which is non-existent ; there can be no connection of the cause
with the effect (if the latter be non-existent) ; (some connection must
exist between the cause and the effect, since) the production of every
thing is not possible from everything else ; there can be production of
one thing from another, if the two are mutually related as the producer
and the producible (and such relation cannot be possible if the effect
be non-existent) ; and the cause and the effect are identical, (so that
the one cannot be non-existent, while the other is existent). — S&mkhya-
kdrikd, verse 9).
This being the case, the non-existence of non-difference and non-
dissimilarity between the cause and the effect remaining itself unprovedr
how can it establish the relation of Unity and of Separateness of one
or single individuality ?
To meet this objection, the author says :
' Etat/ i. e., the possession of the non-existence of Unity and
Separateness of one in consequence of the possession of the non-
existence of non-difference and non-dissimilarity, has been observed,
' anityayofy/ that is, in the case of non-eternal cause and non-
eternal effect. This is the meaning. Accordingly on the hypothesis of
the non-difference of the threads and cloth, it would follow that in the
state of the production of the threads, there would arise the intuition
and use of language that the cloth is being produced ; in the state of
the production of the cloth, that the threads are being produced ; iu the
state of the destruction of the threads, that the cloth is being destroy
ed ; iii the state of the destruction of the cloth, that the threads are
being destroyed ; and so on. Nor can it be maintained that production
and destruction are not themselves entitled to acceptance, inasmuch-
as such intuitions are explained on the very theory of development or
appearance and envelopment, or disappearance ; for the hypothesis of
an appearance, will entail a regress to infinity. If, on the other hand,
the production of the appearance is admitted, then how does the theory
of the production of the cloth, etc., become offensive ? If, again, the
production of appearance in appearance be not admitted, then appea
rance would become omniferous, or all-sided, (which is not desired by
the objector). For, the all-sidedness of appearance is not recognised
even by the Samkhya thinkers. In reality, the common consent of
humanity that the cloth is produced, the cloth is destroyed, and so
forth, is proof of production and destruction ; for, if experience of one
thing be admitted to have another thing as its object, we must deny
also the water-pot, cloth, etc.
Conjunction, how produced.
U'paskilra.—'H.Q begins another section or topio :—
5 Anytara-karmma-ja^, produced by the action of either
of two things. CTq^fTPF^T: Ubhaya-karmma-ja^, produced by action of
both. ?-f4tT5T: Samyoga-jah, produced by conjunction. ^ Oha, and.
Samyogali, conjunction.
226 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
9. Conjunction is produced by action of any one of two
things, is produced by action of both, and is produced by Conjunc
tion, also.— 290.
Unobstructed intuition that things are conjunct is proof of con-
juntion. So also are effects ; e. g., substance, in the case of conjuntions
of constituent parts ; colour and other attributes produced by burning,
in the case of conjunction of fire ; particular measure or extension, in
the case of accretion ; sound, in the case of conjunction of the drum
and ether ; such other instances should be understood. Nor is Con
junction merely production without the intervention of empty space.
The theories of transiency and transformation of things having been
thrown away, Conjunction is the coming together which has non-
coming together for its antecedent. And it is produced by the action
of one of two things ; as is the conjunction of a motionless post with a
hawk in motion, or the conjunction of one in motion, when the
motion is not directed where the conjunction takes place, e. </., conjunc
tion of a runner with the back of another runner. Conjunction pro
duced by the action of both the conjunct is that of two rams or of two
wrestlers, since it is produced by both of them exercising strength
towards each other. The third (conjunction producced by conjunction)
is the conjunction of the hand and the tree resulting from the conjunc
tion of the finger and the tree- And it results sometimes from one con
junction even, as the conjunction of cloth aud reed may result from
the conjunction of thread and reed. In some cases, one conjunction is
produced from two conjunctions, as from two conjunctions, of ether
with two threads, may result only one conjunction of a two-threaded
cloth with ether. In some cases, again, a single conjunction is originat
ed even by a plurality of conjunctions, as ten conjunctions of ether
with ten threads may originate only one conjunction of a ten-threaded
cloth and ether. Sometimes, on the other hand, two conjunctions are
produced even from a single conjunction as their non-combinative
cause. For example, there having first taken place non-originative
conjunction between two ultimate atoms, terrene and aqueous, subse
quently two conjunctions, originative of two binary atomic aggregates,
are produced, namely, one in the terrene ulimate atom with an other
terrene ultimate atom, and another in the aqueous ultimate atom
with another aqueous ultimate atom. By those two conjunctions
inhering in homogeneous things, two binary atomic aggregates
are simultaneously produced. Therein by that one non-originative
conjunction alone, produced between the terrene and the aqueous
ultimate atom, one conjunction of the terrene ultimate atom with the
aqueous binary atomic aggregate, and another conjunction of the
aqueous ultimate atom with the terrene binary attomic aggregate, are
produced simultaneously with the production of the colour, etc., of the
two binary atomic aggregates.
Inasmuch as the conjunction of cause and not-cause must neces
sarily produce conjunctions of effect and not-effect, the conjunction of
all-pervading substances (viz ., Space, Time, Ether and Soul) with dense
or corporal bodies is produced by action of one of the two only. Of two
all-pervading substances, however, there is no conjunction, since there
is no cause (of conjunction). For in them there is no action, nor is
KANADA SOTRAS VII, 2, 9. 227
there any (combinative) cause ; hence there cannot be in this case also
conjunction of effect and riot-effect resulting from conjunction of cause
and not-cause. Eternal conjunction, on the other hand, is not possible,
for conjunction is the coming together of two things, which has the
not-coming together as its antecedent, and eternality is opposed to it.
And were conjunction eternal, Disjunction also would be without pro
duction ; and eternality of conjunction will not be obtained, since it
would be impossibe for Conjunction and Disjunction, which are contra
dictories, to exist side by side in their indestructible states. More
over, yuta-siddhi or uncombined or naturally unassociated existence is
a necessary condition of Conjunction, and it is not possible in the case
of two all-pervading substances. For yuta-siddhi is merely the separate
existence of two or of one of two ^unrelated) things, or the relation of
one thing being inherent in another, as its substratum, when the twe
have been externally brought into relation with each other.
Destruction of Conjunction, however, results from Disjunction
having a common substratum with Conjunction. la some cases it results
from destruction of substratum also. For example, action is produced
in the constituent fibre of a thread immediately after the Conjunction
of two. threads ; thereby is caused Disjunction from another fibre ; from
Disjunction results destruction of originative conjunction ; from this
follows destruction of the thread ; and from destruction of the thread
results destruction of Conjunction, where two threads haying been long
conjoined, action is not produced in them. Some, on the contrary, main
tain that Conjunction is destroyed by simultaneously produced destruc
tion of substratum, and by Disjunction, inasmuch as action is conceived to
exist in another thread at the moment when by action iu the constituent
parts of a thread there is effected destruction of Conjunction origina
tive of the thread. This is impossible ; for there can be no production
of Disjunction at the moment of destruction of the combinative cause,
since the rule is that the combinative cause is of equal duration with
the effect.
This same Conjunction which is an independent agent in the origi
nation of substances, and a dependent agent in the origination of
attributes and actions, is the counter-opposite of the absolute non-
existence existing in the same substratum with itself, since it is obser
ved to be so. For it is perceived that there is conjunction of an ape
in the Banyan tree, although conjunction of the ape present in a large
Banyan tree is limited to a branch only. Were such mere limitation to
a part not sufficient to account for it, then conjunction would come to
exist in ultimate atoms, and so would not be cognizable. In the case
of the all-pervading substances also, it is the difference of upddhi,
adjunct or external condition, which serves to localise them. Conjunc
tion present by limitation to that is not pervaded in its denotation . Of
Conjunction residing in the ultimate atoms also, direction in space,
and the like should be regarded as determinants. — 9.
Disjunction, how produced.
Upaskdra. — By extending the mode of the production of Conjunetion to Disjunction ho
says :
228 VAl6E§IKA PHILOSOPHY.
: II vs I R I ?o ||
Etena, by this, f^rm: Vibhagafc, disjunction. «n$W Vyakhyatah,
explained.
10. By this Disjunction is explained. — 291.
Like Conjunction, Disjunction also is produced by action ef either
of two things, by action of both, and by Disjunction. Disjunction takes
place between a hawk and a post by the action of the hawk ; disjunc
tion of two wrestlers or of two rams fighting with each other, by the
actions of both. And Disjunction in these cases has its production at
the moment immediately following the production of action, inasmuch
as there exists nothing else to be waited for or depended upon. Accord
ingly it has been said," Action is an independent cause of Conjunction
and Disjunction " (vide Li. l~, t above).
Objection. — There is dependence upon substratum where Disjunction
has to be produced, and upon destiuction of antecedent Conjunction
where Conjunction has to be produced.
Answer. — This is not the case, for action is independent since it
does not depend upon anything in the form of an existence which has
its production immediately after the production of itself.
Disjunction, produced by Disjunction, however, is two-fold,
according to the difference of Disjunction of cause and not-cause pro
duced by Disjunction of cause alone, and the difference of Disjunction
of effect and not-effect, produced by Disjunction of cause and not-
cause. Therein Disjunction of potsherd and Ether, resulting from
Disjunction of the two potsherds, is an example of Disjunction of cause
and not-cause, resulting from Disjunction of cause alone; and Disjunc
tion of hand and tree resulting from Disjunction of finger and tree, and
Disjunction of body and tree, resulting from Disjunction of hand and
tree, are examples of Disjunction of effect and not-effect, resulting from
Disjunction of cause and not-cause.
Objection.- — There is no proof of Disjunction itself, the term, Dis
junction, being used to denote only non-existence of Conjunction.
Answer. — It is not so. For, if non-existence of Conjunction be
absolute non-existence, then it would follow that the term Disjunction
would be used to denote attribute and action also.
Objection. — Absolute non-existence of Conjunction, being present
in two substances, is the source of the intuition of the disjunct.
Answer. — It cannot be, since it would in that case follow that abso
lute non-existence of Conjunction, being present also in a constituted
whole and its constituent parts, would be the source of the intuition
of the disjunct.
Objection. — The term " two substances " should be qualified by tho
expression " not being related to each other as effect and cause."
KANiDA SftTRAS VII, 2, 10. 229
Answer. — In that case, absolute non-existence of Conjunction,
being present in the Vindhya and Himalaya mountains also, would be
the cause of the intuition of the disjunct.
Objection. — Indeed there it is.
Answer. — It is not. For there being existence of erroneous intui
tion, due to it, in the case of attribute and action also, it should be
considered how far it will be valid to make it the source of convention
or usage with reference to the accurate intuition only.
Objection. — Destruction of Conjunction is Disjunction.
Answer. — Were this the case, it would entail the use of the terra
Disjunction on Conjunction being destroyed by the destruction of any
one of the two things in Conjunction.
Objection. — "Things in Conjunction" should be qualified as being
•existent.
Answer. — In that case, it would entail the intuition of Disjunction
•even in the state of Conjunction of a jujube and an emblic myrobalan
which become conjunct again immediately after the destruction of one
conjunction.
Objection. — Disjunction is the destruction of all Conjunctions.
Answer. — If it be so, then there would be non-existence of Disjunc
tion in the case of destruction of one Conjunction, since the denotation
of 'all' finds no place there.
Disjunction, therefore, exists, and it is an additional attribute.
This attribute, again, is destructible by another contradictory attri
bute, inasmuch as, so long as the substratum exists, destruction of
attribute cannot be possible without a contradictory attribute existing
in the same substratum.
Objection. — Action itself may be destructive of Conjunction.
Answer. — It cannot be, since only a contradictory attribute is des
tructive of attribute. Moreover, although where finger, hand, arm, and
body come to have conjunction with the tree, by means of their respec
tive actions, there is possibility of destruction of conjunction of the
finger and the tree, by means of theiaction produced in the finger only,
yet there would not follow destruction of conjunctions of the hand and
the tree, of the arm and the tree, and of the body and the tree, since the
hand, etc. are inactive and the action of the finger rests in a different
substratum. If it be supposed that even action resting in a different
substratum may be destructive of conjunction, it would then follow that
there would be destruction of all conjunctions at one and the same
moment of time, by action wherever it may be produced.
Objection. — -What then is the solution here on your theory?
Answer. — Disjunction of the hand and the tree, produced by Dis
junction of the finger and the tree, is destructive of conjunction of the
hand and the tree. This is a matter of observation.
230 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
Sarvajna has said that there may very well be destruction of
conjunction of the hand and tree, by the very action of the finger, rest
ing in a different substratum, and that there will be no undue exten
sion (of the causality of action), inasmuch as it is observed that mutual
non-conjunction of the container and the contained is itself destructi
ble by action resting in a different substratum. This too is not a sound
opinion; for, distructiveness is everywhere observed to belong only to a
contradictory attribute appearing in the substratum, and it is not
reasonable to abandon that without some argument to the contrary.
Sound and Disjunction, again, are effects of Disjunction. Therein
we shall ponder over the non-combinative causality of Disjunction to
wards the production of Sound. For, of the Sound which is produced,
when a bamboo is being split up, and one of the two halves is held down
by the pressure of the foot, and the other is drawn upwards, we find no-
other non-combinative cause than the disjunction of the half and ether
(or of the ether within the halves). Nor do we find any non-combina
tive cause over and above Disjunction in the case of the sounding forth
of a bamboo bursting out while it is being burnt in a conflagration,
We also infer the Disjunction of the effect and not-effect from the Dis
junction of the cause and not-cause. How else, where conjunction of
the finger and the tree, conjunction of the hand and the tree, conjunc
tion of the arm and the tree, and conjunction of the body and the tree
are produced by the respective actions of the finger, etc., can there be
destruction of the conjunction of the hand and the tree, and of other
conjunctions, even on the destruction of the con junction of the finger
and the tree, consequent on the disjunction of the finger and the tree
produced by action produced in the finger alone? For, in this case,
it is the series of disjunctions, produced by disjunctions, that is, as has
been already stated, destructive of the corresponding conjunctions*
There is, however, no clear evidence in the case of disjunction of the
cause and not-cause, of which the antecedent is the disjunction of the
two (constituent) causes (i.e., the two halves of the bamboo); for, it is
observed that, production of the disjunction of ether, etc., like the dis
junction of one of the two halves of the bamboo, being also possible
by the action produced in the other half, disjunction is produced by
the action of that other half from all those with which that half was
conjunct. For it is not that disjunctions are not produced also from
particular parts of ether, etc., by action produced in a finger, equally
as disjunction from another finger. Nor is it that disjunctions from
particular parts of ether, etc , are not originated by action produced
in a lotus-leaf, even as disjunction from another lotus-leaf is produced.
We maintain, "Let a single action originate even a hundred disjunctions,
which are not opposed to the conjunction originative of substance. But
that action which originates disjunction which is opposed to the con-
jumction originative of substance, cannot also originate disjuuction
which is not opposed to the conjunction originative of substance. And
that which originates disjunction which is not opposed to the^ conjunc
tion originative of substance, cannot also originate disjunction which
is opposed to the conjunction originative of substance."
Objection. — Is there any reason for taking such a view ?
KANlDA SftTRAS VII, 2, 10. 231
Answer. — Yes, there ia, diversity of cause being rendered necessary
by diversity of effect.
Objection. — Variety is necessary in action, so that one action may
produce disjunction which is opposed to conjunction originative of
substance, as in the case of flowering lotus-blossoms, etc-, and another
action may produce both, i. e., disjunctions which are opposed and not
-opposed to conjunctions originative of substance.
Answer. — This cannot be. For contrariety of effect is the origin
of the supposition of diversity of cause ; and that contrariety arises
lay way of the characteristic of the one being the counter-opposite of
conjunction originative of substance, but by way of the characteristic
of the other not being the counter-opposite of conjunction originative
-of substance, inasmuch as diversity also ought to be supposed by those
very ways.
This same action, present in the one half of the bamboo, produces
only disjunction of the two halves. And this disjunction first originates
disjunction from the particular parts of ether, etc., — disjunction which
is not the counter-opposite of conjunction originative of substance.
And if it produced disjunction by itself, it would then bear the charac
teristic of action ; hence it depends upon time which is distinguished
-with the possession of destruction of substance.
Objection. — At that moment also let that action itself produce
Disjunction.
Answer. — It cannot do so, being past in time. In the production
of Disjunction, Time follows immediately after the production of action
itself.
Objection. — But subsequent Disjunction being thus produced by
antecedent Disjunction, action cannot produce conjunction with other
places.
Answer. — This is not the case ; for towards the production of con
junction, action is not past time. Otherwise, action will be never
destroyed, it being destructible only by subsequent conjunction.
This same Disjunction, destructible by subsequent conjunction,
lasts for three moments only. Sometimes it is destructible by destruc
tion of substratum. It is in this way : Action is produced in the fibre
which is a constituent part of the thread ; Disjunction of two fibres
follows it ; at the same moment, action is produced in another thread ;
then there is destruction of conjunction, originative of the thread, by
disjunctiou of two fibres, and Disjunction is produced by action in the
thread ; then there is destruction of the thread from destruction of
conjunction originative of substance, and from destruction of the
thread results destruction of Disjunction produced by action in another
thread.
Objection. — Such being the case, there will be no destruction of
action produced in another thread, since there is nothing to destroy
it. For, it can be destroyed by subsequent conjunction, but Disjunction,
being destroyed, there is no subsequent conjunction.
282 VAI£E§IKA PHILOSOPHY
Answer. — The argument is not valid. As Disjunction of the thread
in the state of being destroyed is produced by action which is produced
in the thread, so by the same action should be produced Disjunction of
the thread from the fibre also. Such Disjunction also is really opposed
to originative conjunction. By this Disjunction of the fibre and the
thread is produced Disjunction of the thread and ether, which produces
subsequent conjunction, and this, in its turn, causes destruction of
action. Or, wherever action is produced in a thread, action is pro
duced in its fibre also. That action, again, in the thread in the state
of being destroyed, originates simultaneous -Disjunctions from the
constituent parts of the thread, and particular parts of ether, etc., all
these Disjunctions being not opposed to originative conjunction. There
is, therefore, destruction of action combined or co-inherent in the
thread, by conjunction which has its production immediately after the
Disjunction of the effect, e. y., thread, from the not-effect, e. g., ether,
etc., produced from the Disjunction of the cause, e. <j.} the fibre, and
the not-cause, e. g., ether etc.
Sometimes Disjunction is destroyed jointly by subsequent conjunc
tion and destruction of substratum. It is in this way : There beino-
conjunction of a thread, and a thread, action is produced in the con
stituent parts of the thread, namely, the fibre, and action is produced
in the reed. This is one moment of time. By action in the fibre is
produced Disjunction from another fibre, and by ;his there is destruc
tion of conjunction originative of the thread. By the action in the
reed also, there is Disjunction of the thread and the reed, and
there is also destruction of the conjunction of the thread and
the reed. Destruction of the thread immediately follow destruction
of conjunction originative of the thread. Conjunction of the reed
with another portion of space immediately 'follows destruction of
conjunction of the thread and the reed. Jointly from both of them,
viz., destruction of substratum, and conjunction, results destruction
of Disjunction. — 10.
Conjunction and Disjunction do not possess Conjunction and Disjunction.
Upaakdra. — It may 'be said, " Let there be Conjunction in Conjunetion also, and Dis
junction in Disjunction also." To prorent this he says :
I R I \\ II
Samyoga-vibhagayot, in Conjunction and Disjunc
tion. ^nttrf^TTTT^n^ Samyoga-vibhaga-abhavah, non-existence of Con
junction and Disjunction. WJWTfr^Tvqi Auutva-mahattvabhyam, by
minuteness and magnitude. KJI^m^T: Vyakhyatah, explained.
11. The non-existence of Conjunction and Disjunction, in
Conjunction and Disjunction, is explained by Minuteness and
Magnitude. — 292.
As Minuteness and Magnitude are not possessed of Minuteness and
Magnitude, so also are not Conjunction and Disjunction posaeaaed of
Conjunction and Disjunction. — 11-
KANADA SUTRAS VII, 2,13. 233
Actions are void of actions, and Attributes, of attributes.
r: Karmmabhih, by actions. ^T*?!f^r Karmmani, actions. ȣ$:
Grunaih, by attributes. JT^: Guuah, attributes. %f H^^T^Issn Anutva-
mahattvabhyam, by minuteness and magnitude. ffrT Iti, this.
12. Actions are (void) of Actions ; Attributes are (void) of
Attributes. This (is explained) by Minuteness and Magnitude.
— 293.
Upaskara.— This second aphorism has been already explained. (Vide VII. i. 15 supra).
Bhdsya. reads VII. ii. 12 as two aphorisms viz., Karmabhirkar-
mdni yunair-gundh and Anutvamahattvabhydmiti, and explains them
in the same way as VII. i, 16.
Conjunction and Disjunction of effect and cause do not exist.
Upaskdra. — If it be asked why there cannot be conjunction of two substances, namely
of constituent part and constituted whole, so he says :
II v» I * I
Yutasiddhi-abhavat, in consequence of the absence
of separate or independent existence. ^TF3! * K*u4t« Karyya-Karanayoh,
of effect and cause. ^*^TJTf=t*n'M Samyoga-vibhagau, Conjunction and
Disjunction. !f Na, not. feef% Vidyete, exist.
13. In consequence of the absence of separate existence,
there exist not Conjunction and Disjunction of effect and cause.
—294.
' Yutasiddhih ' means the state of being existent, of two things
•which have no connection with each other, or the characteristic of
being supported by separate substrata. A constituent part and a con
stituted whole, however, do not possess this. This is the meaning. — 13.
VivTiti. — * Yutasiddhih' means the existence of two uncombined
things. Of cause and effect, e. g., of constituent part and constituted
whole, conjunction and disjunction do not exist, because of the absence
of their uncombined existence. For constituted wholes such as a water*-
pot, etc., do not exist having no relation to constituent parts such as
potsherds, etc., whereby their conjunction and disjunction might be
possible.
The relation between a word and its meaning is neither conjunction
nor combination.
Upaskdra.— ~ Now follows from the context another section 'intended to establish the
•conventional relation of words and objects. Therein he states an adverse argumint.
234
II vs I ^ |
> because it is an attribute.
14. (There can be no conjunction of Sound or Words with
Objects), because (Conjunction, is an Attribute. — 295.
' Of conjunction *- - this is the complement. Thus, the meaning isr
how can there be conjunction which is an attribute, of an attribute,
e. g., Sound or Word, with objects sujh a water pot, etc. ? — -14.
Above continued.
Upaxkdra. — Moreover, the object also is sometimes characterised as colour, taste, eto.r
Therefor*, conjunction is riot possible, inasmuch as the existence of attribute in an attribute^
has not been admitted. This is what he says :
n
nm: Gunah, attribute. ?ffa A pi, a^3()- f^TT5^ Vibhavyate, is known
or established.
15. Attribute also is known (to be an object denoted by
Word), or is established (by Word).— 296.
1 Attribute also, object' — this is the complete sentence. Attribute
also, e. <JT., colour, etc., is an object denoted by Word, but with that
there is no relation of conjunction. This is the meaning. Or, the
meaning is that attribute also is established (by being denoted) by Word
and that with that there is no relation of conjunction of Word. — 15.
Above continued.
Upaskdra. — .Further, conjunction (of Word and Object) cannot be produced by th<r
action of either or by the action of both, because any substance whatever, <>,. g., Ether, etc.,
as well as Word are inert. This is what he says :
u ^ i R i \\ ii
fM^T?TT^, Niskriyatvat, because of inactivity or inertness.
16. Because Word and Object are inert. — 297.
4 Of Word and of any Object whatever' — Such is the complement
of^the aphorism. — 16.
Above continued.
Upaskdra. — He states another obstruction to the inter-relation (of Word and Object) :
u v* i ^ i ?vs u
Asati, not existing. !f ?rf^T Na asti, (It) does not exist, ^frf Iti
such, q Cha, and. SpftTI^ Prayogat, because there is application.
KANADA SftTRAS VII, 2, 1§. 235
17, (Word and Object are not in conjunction), also because
in the case of a non-existent object there is such application (of
word) as " (It) does not exist."— 298.
Even in the case cf a non-existent water-pot, cloth, etc., such
application (of word) is observed as " There is no water-pot in the
room," " Cloth does not exist," "The letter r/ajwhich was heard before,
no longer exists," 5' There was a cloth," ' There will be a cloth,' etc. ;
therefore (there is no inter-relation) This is the meaning. The import
accordingly is that there is no conjunction, nor again combination,
•of Word with a non-existent water-pot, etc. — 17.
Word and Object are unrelated.
Upaskdra.— What then ? He gives the answer :
&abda-arthau, sound and sense. Word and object.
Asambandhau, unrelated.
18. (Therefore), Word and Object are unrelated. — 299.
If Conjunction of Word and Object does not exist, it then comes to
this that Word and Object are unrelated. This is the meaning. — 18.
Above continued.
{Jpaskdra _ It may be asked why one or other of the relations of Conjunction and
Combination should not exist (between Word and Object). Accordingly he says :
n
Samyoginah, which is in conjunction. The conjunct.
Dandat, from the staff. Wflfrr: Samabayinah, which is in combination.
The combined. f^t<*T^ Visesat, from a distinction or distinguishing
element. ^ Cha, and.
19. (Cognition of Conjunction results) from (e. £.,) the
staff which is in conjunction (with the hand of a man), and (of
Combination) from a distinguishing element which is in combina
tion (with the whole).— 300.
" This person is carrying a staff," " The elephant possesses a
trunk "—these intuitions take place. Of these, the first results from
conjunction, and the second, from combination. The intuition in
respect of the trunk which is a particular member of the body, is depen
dent upon its combination with the elephant, since it arises from the
distinction that that is an elephant to which belongs a trunk as being m
combination with it. The distinction itself, viz., the trunk, etc., is distinc
tive in consequence of the relation of combination. But there is no intui
tion of threads, etc. also, such as " A cloth possesses threads " ete.,
under the relation of distinctive possession of the parts. Likewise,
•" The object, water-pot, is that which possesses the word, water-pot," —
236 VAI^ESIKA PHILOSOPHY
such intuition does not take place. Of Word and Object, therefore
tport!l.l9 ""iwurtioi., nor again oombinatj This is &
Intuition of object from word proceed* from convention.
^a^5T^T: N vs | R | ^o ||
*wfor: Samayikah, conventional. According to direction. w*m;
babda-artha-pratyajah, intuition of object from word.
20 The intuition of Object from Word (takes place) accord
ing to the direction (of God).— 301.
.
object. The same is convention, depended ^ upor tL wm of Co 1 f V
example, -Whatever plant the ichneumo tw£^Mito£*h ?i
antidote to poison.- This is the meaning. 'h' 1S an
This convention is learnt sometimes from usage;,,/, when
employer gives the order -Bring the water-pot/' and an employe*
?n£g,%hU k J8C rST:\? VUbUlai> "eCk> a W standing Tear Jby
infers the knowledge of the latter in this way. This his
produced by knowledge, because it is activity? like my aotf± {ha
knowledge again is produced by the words of this o/der, because
follows immediately after it; and the subject-matter of this know™d«re
namely, this object with a tubular neck/is the denotation of the term'
water-pot. By such processes of transposition of verbs and cases
boy becomes informed in respect of the object, water-pot, cloth etc.
Sometimes the convention is learnt directly from testimony alone •
e.g that this tubular-necked object is designated by the term, water
pot. Sometimes it is learnt from comparison; e.g., from a con prison
cow Tat a11,0! ^ T CaS6S aS',Uiata Wa^« that which isP like a
w that as is mudga so is mudya-parni (a kind of bean), that as is
edVe of°obiecrf7ia;-U ?, fle*™'"?» ^^ etc. Sometimes (know!
•f objects is derived) from condemnatory passages also- e a «0
the camel with too pendulous upper lip and long neokf the eater of hard
thorns, the vilest of animals»-when after hearing 'this condenatory
sentence one sees a body of this description, knowledge arises in one
tm ^ "This is that camel/' Sometimes it springs from commun ty of
substratum, or synonymy, with words of known import; . T "The
honey-bee ,s sipping the honey with, n cloven lotus-blossoms^-after
hearing this proposition, (the knowledge arises), "This is what is desig
nated by the term, honey-bee, because it is the sipper of honey within
cloven lotus-blossoms," or as in the case of the proposition, -The cuckoo.
sings sweetly ,n the mango-tree.- Here, in the above instances, it's-
.ther a case of inference, or a case of word itself being productive of
KANiDA StTTRAS VII, 2, 20. 237
knowledge through the force of synonymy with words of known import,
or only a particular mode of comparison or analogy, inasmuch as the
being the agent in drinking honey infers resemblance to other
individuals such as the bee, etc.
The convention, again, has reference to classes only, individuals
being brought home by means of special characteristics, — such is the
view of the followers of Tutdta. According to the followers of Prabhd-
kara, the force of word is in respect of both the class and the individual,
but so far as it refers to the class, it denotes the object by the word, by
being known, and so far as it refers to the individual, by being its
proper form. The teaching of the ancients or elders is that convention
is the force itself and that classes appearing in the forms of the indi
viduals are the objects denoted by words. This is the case with words-
like cow, etc., but the objects denoted by words expressive of attribute
and action are both classes and individuals as detailed in the
l. — He now points out the connection between words and
objects, which is the means of verbal knowledge.
* * * • < gamaya ' is arbitrament or convention. It is two
fold, eternal and modern. Eternal arbitrament is called force (of
words), and modern arbitrament is called definition. Arbitrament has
for its form, This object is to be understood from this word, or Let this
word convey this signification. Accordingly it has been said,
Convention has been declared to be two-fold, original and modern.
Therein the original is the eternal, which is called force; whereas the
modorn is the occasional, imposed by scientific writers and others.
The apprehension of the force of words proceeds from conduct,.
etc. So it has been said,
The elders declare the apprehension of the force of words to proceed
from grammatical analysis or etymology, from comparison or analogy,
from lexicography, from authoritative sayings or testimony, from co.i-
duct (of the employer who gives an order which is carried out by the
employed,, from contiguity to a wordof well-known import, from context,
and from explication or description.
* The doctrine of the force of the word to denote
primarily the class is not sound, for, in such instances as " Bring the
cow," the fact which is established by experience, namely, that the indi
vidual is the object of verbal cognition, cannot be explained except on.
238 VAI£E§IKA PHILOSOPHY.
the theory of the force of the word primarily to denote the individual.
Nor does the knowledge of the individual arise from implication or
derivatively, for in the absence of a primary use a derivative use ia im
possible. Nor is the knowledge of the individual possible even by the
equivalence of the act and the object of cognition (in verbal knowledge);
for, inasmuch as the being an object of verbal cognition, standing in the
position of an effect, must be produced by a cause, the equivalence of the
act and the object of cognition (in verbal knowledge; which is sun >osed
to be the condition, cannot be the condition there, as is desired We
should, therefore, respect the doctrine that the force of the words cow
etc., lies in denoting the individual charaterised by, or possessing, the
generic form and the class or the universal. It has been a;;- u-dingly
laid down in the aphorism of Gautama, " The individual, the generic
form, and the universal are, however, the object of the word." (Nydya-
S&tram, II. ii 63).
Priority and Posteriority, how produced.
l7pankdra.—'Now he explains Priority and Posteriority, the next in the order of
enumeration, in one context, as these are the causes of mutually iuvolved USOH, and for the
purpose of clearing up the understanding of the disciples as well as for bhe sake of brevity.
ii v* m *t n
Eka-dikkabhyam, lying in the same direction.
Ekakalabhyam, existing at the same time *TflT£gfrjT£eT*<lT Sannikrista-
vipkraristabhyam, near and remote. ^ Paratn, prior, SPTC Aparam pos
terior. <g Cha, and.
21. The Prior and the Posterior (are produced by two
objects) lying in the same direction, existing at the same time,
and being near and remote. — 302.
" The Prior and the Posterior' — the reference here is principally in
a substantive sense. " Are produced"— such is the complement. Or, the
word "usage" or "convention" is to be supplied after 'The Prior and the
Posterior : such'. The word "such" should be understood. 'Ekadikkabhyam'
means by two bodies which have the same direction in space. Two bodies
•occupying equal place (i. e., equally distant) may also have the same
direction in space, but by them Priority and Posteriority are neither
produced, nor come into use. Accordingly it has been said, 'Near and
remote,' which expression means, possessing nearness, i.e., the quality or
state of containing a smaller number of conjunctions with the conjunct,
and remoteness, i. e., the quality or state of containing a larger number
of con junctions with the conjunct. Hereby combinative cause (of
Priority and Posteriority) is stated ; whereas conjunction of bodies and
direction in space is the non-combinative cause. Priority and Porteri-
ority are thus produced in a man standing with his face towards the east,
by observing a relative paucity of conjunctions with the conjunct in
one of two bodies lying in the east and a relative plurality of conjunc
tions with the conjuct in the other. The non-comcinative cause is thus
KANlDA StiTRAS VII, 2, 21. 239
stated. 'Near and remote' — the term implies intuition, as the contained
metaphorically denotes the container. Relative understanding or
cognition of relativity is thus stated to be the efficient cause. Priority
and Posteriority are produced in respect only of two bodies lying in
the same direction in space ; hence there is no production of them in
all places. Relative understanding is produced in One and the same
observer only ; hence there is no production of them in all circums
tances. Being regulated by relative understanding, there is no produc
tion of them at all times. There is no mutual dependence between
them, inasmuch as being produced from the capacity or power of the
cause, they are proved by sense-perception. For otherwise they would
be neither produced nor perceived. For in case of mutual dependence
there would be non-production as well as non-perception of both
of them. But Priority and Posteriority are perceived, and their
perception cannot be possible without their production.
' Existing at the same time ' — this has reference to Priority and
Posteriority in time. Now 'existing at the same time' means, by two
bodies one young and the other old, which occupy the same, i. e., the
present, time. Here nearness is the state of having the birth intervened
by a fewer number of revolutions of the sun, and remoteness is the
state of having the birth intervened by a larger number of revolutions
of the sun. Here too understanding i. e., the container, is implied by
the contained. Thus the young and old bodies are the combinative
causes. Conjunction of tirno and bodies is the non-combinative cause.
The understanding of the state of having the birth intervened by a-
fewer number of revolutions of the sun is the efficient cause in the case
of Posteriority, and the understanding of the state of having the birth
intervened by a larger number of revolutions of the sun is the efficient
cause in the case of Priority,
These, Priority and Posteriority, again, are produced even in
respect of bodies indeterminate in place and direction in space.
Now there is a seven-fold destruction of Priority and Posteriority
iu space but their production is simultaneous, else there would be
mutual dependence. Priority and Posteriority in space then are
destroyed from the destruction of relative understanding (1) from the
destruction of conjunction which is the non-combinative cause, (2)
from the destruction of substance which is the combinative cause, (3)
from the destruction of the efficient and non-combinative causes, (4}
from the destruction of the efficient and combinative causes, (5) from,
the desi ruction of the efficient cause, (6) from the destruction of the
non-combinative cause, and (7) from the destruction of the combinative
cause. Now, from the destruction of relative understanding, thus:
Production of Priority ; knowledge of the genus Priority ; then destruc
tion of relative understanding ; after its destruction, at the moment of
knowledge of substance distinguished by Priority, destruction of
Priority, — the process should be understood in the same way as in the
case of destruction of duality. Destruction of Priority and Posteriority
follows also from the destruction of the non-combinative cause. Thus, as
soon as there is relative understanding, action takes place in 'the body
which is the substratum of Priority ; as soon as Priority is produced
therefrom, disjunction takes place between direction in space and the
240 VAI!§ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
body ; after it, when there is knowledge of the genus Priority, then there
is destruction of the conjunction of direction in space and the body ; then,
destruction of relative understanding follows knowledge of the genus ; at
the very same moment, destruction -of Priority and Posteriority results
from destruction of conjunction of direction in space and the bodies.
And in this case destruction of relative understanding does not destroy
them, inasmuch as it is synchronous with destruction of Priority.
Objection. — On the theory of destruction of attribute even from de
struction of non-combinative cause, great confusion will result from
the thus possible destruction of Samskdra, (tendencies, impressions),
adristam (invisible after-effects of acts performed), etc., also from the
destruction of the conjunction of Mind and Soul.
Answer. — It is not so. For Priority being pervaded by the char
acteristic of being remote, there must needs be cessation of Priority
consequent on the non-existence of remoteness on the removal of the
substratum of Priority to some other place- Nor is there at the time
any other agent of destruction ; hence, such destruction being other
wise impossible, destruction of conjunction alone is conceived to be
the destroying agent. Ou the other hand samskdra, adristam etc., as
well as their effects, e. g., recollection, pleasure, etc., cannot be suppos
ed to be so destroyed, inasmuch as they are observed even after a
long time.
This also implies that Priority and Posteriority are destroyed also
"by the destruction of the conjunction between that particular place
and the standard limit as well -as the observer, the argument being the
same as above.
Destruction of Priority sometimes results also from destruction of
combinative cause. Thus, relative understanding arises at the very
same moment that action produced in a portion of a body causes dis
junction from another portion ; from disjunction results destruction of
the conjunction originative of the body, and then production of
Priority ; at the next moment, destruction of substance results from
destruction of conjunction, and there takes place knowledge of the
genus Priority ; destruction of Priority follows destruction of substance,
and destruction of relative understanding follows knowledge of the
genus. So that, being synchronous, destruction of relative understand
ing does not destroy Priority.
Destruction of Priority sometimes takes place by the destruction
of substance and destruction of relative understanding. It happens
in this way : Production of action and relative understanding in a
portion of the body ; then, disjunction from another portion, and pro
duction of Priority ; next desruction of originative conjunction and
knowledge of the genus ; thereafter, destruction of substance and des
truction of relative understanding , and following them, there is destruc
tion of Priority.
Destruction of Priority takes place sometimes from destruction of
substance and destruction of conjunction. It is in this way : Simultane
ously with disjunction amongst the constituent parts of substance,
KANlDA SftTRAS.VII,2, 22. 241
there is production of action in the body and of relative understand
ing ; following it, appear destruction of conjunction of constituent
parts, disjunction between space and body, and production of Priority -,
thereafter there are- destruction of substance, destruction of conjunc
tion of space and body, and production of knowledge of the genus :
thereafter destruction of Priority results from destruction of substance
and destruction of conjunction of space and body, and destruction of
relative understanding from knowledge of the genus.
Destruction of Priority takes place sometimes from destruction of
conjunction and destruction of relative understanding. It is in this
way : Production of Priority, and action in the body ; knowledge of
1 the genus, and disjunction ; destruction of relative understanding, and
destruction .of conjunction of space and the body • then, destruction
of Priority.
Destruction of Priority results sometimes from destructions of
combinative, non-combinative and efficient causes. It is in this way :
Production of Priority, disjunction among constituent parts of the
body, and action in the body, take place simultaneously ; knowledge of
the geauj Priority, destruction of conjunction of constituent parts and
disjunction between space and the body follow them ; thereafter results
destruction of Priority or of Posteriority in space, from destruction
pf » relative understanding, destruction of substance, and destruction
of conjunction of space and the body, which destructions are simultane
ously produced.
Of Priority and Posteriority in time, however, there is no destruction
due to destruction of non-combinative cause. As in the case of Priority
and Posteriority in space, there is destruction of nearness and remoteness
on the destruction of conjunction of space and the body, ao it is not the
case with Priority and Posteriorityin time. The three cases, therefore,
of their destruction namely from destruction of combinative cause, from
destruction of relative understanding, and from both jointly, should be
understood in the way described above. — 21.
Vivriti. — It should be observed that, according to the writer of
Muktdvali, destruction of relative understanding is destructive of
Priority and Posteriority in both their forms (i. e., in space and in
time), whereas in the Upaskdra it is stated that it is the destruction of
their three-fold causes which is destructive of Priority and Posteriority.
Priority and Posteriority in 21ime) how produced.
UpasM.ra.-~ He states a peculiarity in the oase of temporal priority and posteriority.
Karana-paratvat, from priority of the cause.
Karanaaparatvat, from posteriority of the cause. "^ Cha, and.
22. (Temporal Priority and temporal Posteriority are said,
by suggestion, to arise respectively) from Priority of the cause and
from Posteriority of the cause. — 303.
242 VAlgE§IKA PHILOSOPHY.
The cause of Priority and Posteriority is time. Priority and
Posteriority belong to it. Conjunction of time which is the non-
combinative cause of priority, and conjunction of time which is tfre
non-combinative cause of posteriority are stated, by implication, as
otherswise, the result would b« want of congruity or syntactical
connexion. For, priority and posteriority cannot be produced by
priority and posteriority themselves. The terms, priority and posteri
ority, denote, by implication, conjunctions cf time which are productive
of them. — 22.
Vivfiti. — If the uses of prior (remote) and posterior (near) are pro
duced by cognitions of remoteness and nearness, then, inasmuch as the
cognition, Ka4i (Benares) is near in relation to Prayaga (Allahabad),
refers also to Prayaga as its object subject-matter, why does not there
arise the use of Posteriority (or nearness) in respect of Prayaga ? Lite-
wise, why is there not the use of Priority (or remoteness), i» respect of
Kasi, etc., which also become the subject-matter of the cognition of
remoteness ?
He removes this incidental doubt.
1 Karana-paratvat,' i. e., owing to the priority or remoteness of the
combinative cause ; and also owing to its posteriority or nearness. 1 he
uses of priority and posteriority are only in respect of the combinative
cause, but not in respect of anything else simply because it becomes tn/e
subject-matter of relative understanding. For use is detemiued by 1$he
object in respect of which the use arises. This is the import.
Priority and Posteriority do not exist in Priority and Posteriority.
II V9 I * I 3 II
Paratva-aparatvayoh, in priority and posteriority.
Paratva-aparatra-abhavah, non-existence of priority
and posteriority. SH^Mfcfsrp^n Anutva-mahattvabhy&m, by minuteness
and magnitude. cqronft: Vyakhyatafc, explained.
23. The non-existence of Priority and Posteriority, in Priority
and Posteriority, is explained by mintuteness and magnitude.
—304.
Actions are -void of actions.
II vs I R I W II
KarmiDabhih, by actions qrwrffor Karmmani, actions.
24. Actions are (void) of Actions. — 305.
Attributes are void of attributes.
KANlDA SfrTRAS VII, 2, 26. 243
ip^: Gunailj, by attributes. 3TWT: GunAh. attributes.
25. Attributes are (void) of Attributes.— 306.
CTpa«fclra.-»-Those aphorisms, being rirfcually explained above, are nofc explained
here.— 23, 24, 25.
VIL ii. 24 and 25 aa one aphorism.
Combination
{7paskJra.—I» haa been stated that priority, posteriority, etc., are combined in deng»
or corporal substances only, 'and that knowledge, pleasure etc., are combined in the soul. Now
what ia this combination itself ? Hating regard to this inquiry of the disciples, he steps
ov»r Understanding which is the next subject for treatment according to the order of enuruer#-
ifeu, and describes the examination of Combination.
: II v$ I ^ i
{f Iha, here, 4. e., in the cause. ff*j Idam, this, i. &., the effect.
f% Iti, such. HT Yatah, whence. VT^f^TCCfr Karyya-karanayofc, qf
effect arid cause tf: Salj, that. ^WUfi Samavayab^, combination.
26. That is Combination by virtue of which (arises the intui
tion) in the foim of " This is here/' with regard to effect and
.'— 307.
' .^Aryya-karanayob/ is an indication ; non-effect and non-cause
also are implied. So it has been said in the section called the Locality
of the Predicables, " Combination is that relation of things mutually
involved or associated in nature and bearing to one another the
relation of the contained and the container, — -which ia the source of
intuition in the form of " (It is) here."" Ayuta siddhih, inseparable
association, is the non-existence of things unrelated. As in the case
of " There is curd here in the bowl," " There are jujubes here in th.e
bowl," so in the case of " There is cloth here in the threads," " Ther.e
is mat here in the reeds," " There are substance, attribute, and action
Here in substance," " There is bovineness here in the cow," " There is
knowledge here in the soul," " There is Sound here in Ether," the
cognition of here which is thus produced, cannot be produced without
somo relation ; whereby it is inferred that some relation exists. And
this relation is not mere conjunction. For the causes of conjunction,
namely, action or either of the two things, etc., are absent here ; it does
not terminate in disjunction ; related things do not exist unrelated ; it
can be inferred as a uniform substratum ; it is not perceptible to the
senses ; it is one ; and it is eternal.
Objection. — If combination be one, it would then entail intermix
ture of substance-ness, etc , since combination of action-ness, etc.,
would be possible in substance.
- Answer. — This cannot be the case, since non-intermixture follows
from tke very rule of the container and the contained. Although the
same combination which is the combination of substance-neas. is also
the comibation of attribute-ness, action-ness, etc., still substance
is not their container or substratum, since they are not observed there.
244 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
Substance-ness is observed in substances only, attribute-ness in ' attri
butes only, action-ness in actions only, but not elsewhere. It is from
the observation of this agreement and difference, that the uniformity
(of the container and the contained) results. As even in the absence
of a particular conjunction between the bowl and the curd, it is the
bowl which is the container, and not the curd, and hence there is the
uniformity of the relation of the container and the contained, so the
uniformity is valid in this case also from the very difference of the
power of the revealed and the revealer, for action-ness, etc., are not
revealed by substance in the same way as substance-ness is. Accord
ingly it has been said.
*rfa^ ft *m^ 3*tqj|ir *: «**K »
All-powerful consciousness is, verily our resource in the apprehen
sion of things. For consciousness in respect of the being the' container
is not reversible ; nor is there the intuition that substance is action ;
nor, again, that threads are in the cloth. It is for this reason thatr
notwithstanding the combination of colour in Air; " There is colour ia
Air" — such characteristic of being the container is not observed in
the case of Air. It is natural capacity , therefore, which everywhere
determines the relation of the container and the contained.
This combination, again, is eternal, inasmuch as it is uncaused.
For the rule cf production from combinative causes applies to exis
tences or beings, and efficient and non-combinative causes are subsi
diary to those causes. Therefore that which would be the combinative
cause of combination would be either another combination, or
that combination itself. It cannot be the first, as it would entail non-
finality ; nor the second, as it would involve self-dependence, for that
very combination cannot produce combination with itself.
Objection. — How does the intuition arise that there is combination
of cloth in threads, and that there is combination of colour in cloth ?
Answer. — It is by means of the relation of their intrinsic form, or
essential relation, as the supposition of another combination would
entail non-finality.
Objection. — The intuition of here, e. g., " There is colour here in th&
cloth," will, then, arise by means of the same essential relation. What
is the use of combination ?
Answer. — It is not so, since there is no obstruction here to the
admission of an additional relation.
Objection. — If it be so, then " Here in this place there is non-exis
tence of the water-pot," — in this case also there will be either. combina
tion or any other relation.
Answer. — No, as the intuition can be possible by means of essential
relation itself. For, on the contrary supposition, the absolute and
mutual non-existences of the water-pot, which are eternal and combined
with more than one substance, would have the characteristic of being
G-enera, subsequent non-existence also, being an effect in combination,
would be perishable or destructible, and antecedent non-existence also,
not being produced, though combined, would be indestructible.
KANlDA SftTR AS VII, 2, 27. 245
Nor is the quality of existence the determining factor there, for the
quality of existence can "be produced at any -time.-. • >-
The Bhattas maintain that in non-existence there really is present
a different relation called distinguisheduess or qualifiedness. Nor is this
distinguishedness be one and the same in the case of all individual mani
festation of non-existence, then it would follow that there is non-existence
of the water-pot even in that which contains a water-pot, inasmuch as
the distinguishedness of the non-existence of the water-pot would exist
by means of the same distinguishedness of the non-existence of the
cloth.
Objection. — But the water-pot itself will in this case prevent the
cognition of the non-existence of the water-pot.
Answer. — It cannot do this, since the non-existence of that which
will prevent such cognition is itself present there by means of the
relation of distinguishedness. Nor is the very nature of the substratum
.(i.e., where the water-pot lies) such that on account of it there can be
no manifestation of the non-existence of water-pot in that place, for
immediately after the removal of the water-pot follows the intuition of
the non-existence of water-pot in that very place.
Objection. — In your view also, why is there not intuition of posses
sion of colour after the destruction of colour, since Combination is, as
you say, eternal and one?
Answer. — Because non-intuition of colour is proved from the very
destruction of colour.
The arguments against Combination have been demolished in the
Maytikha under Sense-Perception. So we stop here. — 26.
Combination is different from Substance, Attribute, Action,
Genus, and Species.
Upaskdra. — By way of proving its difference from the five beginning with Substance (i. e.,
Substance, Attribute, Action, Genus, and Species), he says :
|| v9 \ ^
: Dravyatva-gunatva-pratisedhah, negation or exclu
sion of substance-ness a-nd attribute-ness, (in or from Combination).
Bhavena, by existence. «n^fiT: Vyakhyatah, explained.
27. The negation of Substance-ness and Attribute-ness (in
Combination) is explained by Existence. — 308.
' Bhavah, means Existence. As Existence is not identical with
substance, etc., being cognised by a different form of understanding, so
combination also is different from the same Substance, etc., i Dravyatva-
gunatva ' is an indication ; Action-ness, etc., also should be under
stood. — 27.
Combination is one.
Upaskdra. — He proves Unity :
246 VAL§E§IKA PHILOSOPHY.
drfHil^H \\ V9 I R I V: II
Tattvam, that-ness. One-ness. Unity. >n%T Bhavena, by Exis-
28. The Unity (of Combination, is explained) by Existence.
—309.
' Explained ' is the complement. ' Tattvam,' i. e , Unity,' bhavena,'
i. e., by Existence, is explained. As one Existence everywhere induces
the cognition of the existent, so one Combination everywhere induces
the cognition of the combined. Moreover the inferential mark of Com
bination is not differentiated, nor is there any other particular mark.
For, we do not find any particular mark, i. e., differentiating mark, of
Combination, whereby we could recognise its diversity. For the very
«ame reason, Combination is eternal ; for, as in the case of Existence,
non-eternality cannot appropriately belong to it which is un differen
tiated even in the difference of Space, Time, etc.
Objection — If combination is nothing but this relation, then there
may be disunion of threads and cloth, or of the cloth and its colour.
Answer. — This cannot be, for in the absence of (previous) uncor-
relsted existence, disunion is not possible. For, there is no unrelated
existence or colour and that which possesses the colour, or of the parts
and the whole, that there may be a disunion between them.
Objection. — But theirl uncorrelated existence may be brought to
pass.
Answer. — It cannot, for the effectuation is contravened by being
never so experienced.
The followers of Prabhdkara hold that Combination is manifold and
also non-eternal. But this is not a reasonable view to take, for the
intuition of " Colour is destroyed," whereas it is the intuition of no
body that the Combination of colour is destroyed.
The view of the school of Nyaya that Combination is perceptible to
the sense is also not valid. Combination is supersensuous, for being
different from the Soul, it is at the same time in a state of being ui;-
combined, like the Mind, or like Time, etc. — 28.
Bhdsya : — Combination is proved to be an attribute in the same
way as is existence, and further, like existence, Combination also is
produced by itself, p. e., does not depend upon any other Combiuation
lor its production.
Here ends the second chapter in the seventh book of Sankara's
Commentary on the Vaisesika Aphorisms.
KANADA SflTRAS VIII, 1, 1. 247
BOOK EIGHTH— CHAPTER FIRST.
Cognition explained by allusion to III. i. 2, 18.
\Jpaskdra.~— The order of enumeration was violated in favour of the curiosity of the
disciples. The author now adopts the order of enumeration. Therein the examination of
understanding is the subject of theleighth book. Understanding hat been already mentioned
for the purpose of proof of the Soul. By recalling it, he says :
Dravyesu, among substances. Jirff Jnanam, knowledge. Cogni
tion. sqi<p{||HH Vyakhyatam, explained.
1. Cognition (has been) explained among Substance. — 310.
By the term, " Among substances," the author implies the third
book, as the the container by the contained. The meaning is that
cognition, jndnam, has been explained by the two aphorisms, namely,
" The universal experience of the objects of the senses is the mark of
(the existence of) an object different from the senses and their objects"
(III. i. 2), and " That (i. e., knowledge) which is produced from the
contact of the soul, the sense, and the object, is other (than a false
mark)" (III. i. 18).
Now in the kindred system (i. e., the Nydya-Sutram of Gautama),
under the defination of understanding, there has been made a declara
tion of synonyms, namely, " Understanding, Apprehension, Cognition,
Intuition — these are synonyms/' (Nydyd-Sutram, I. i. 15), for the pur
pose of demolishing the Sankhya doctrine. For the Sankhyas maintain
a difference in meaning of the terms, Understanding, etc. Thus Prakritif
Matter, is the state of equilibrium of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, the
principles of purity, passion and darkness, or the principles of illumina
tion, evolution, and involution, respectively. Prakriti is one, and one
only, while Purusas, Spirits, are divided to infinity. They are seated
in the cave (i. e.} retired, unaffected, indifferent spectators), eternal,
immutable, and characterised, by eternal consciousness. They are
called lame, as it is not their nature to undergo modification or trans
formation, while Prakriti is said to be blind, being stupid or insensate.
When there arises in Prakriti a desire for fhe enjoyment of sensuous
objects, or a desire to see the difference between Prakriti and Pwrusa,
at that moment Prakriti is modified, or transforms, under the influence
or osculation of Purusa. And its first transformations Buddhi, Under
standing, a particular form of the inner sense. Understanding it is
that is called the principle of Mahat, the great one ; accordingly it
has been said, " The great one evolves from Prakriti." And this under
standing is pure or stainless like a mirror. And that particular trans
formation of it, which takes the form of an object in such shapes as
" It is a water-pot/' u It is a cloth," etc., through the channel of the
external senses, is called cognition, jndnam, and faculty, vritti. Appre
hension, upalabdhi, is the same as a kind of abhimdna, egoity or self-
consciousness, in the form of " I know," which arises in consequence
of the non-perception or non-apprehension of the distinctness or differ
ence of Purusa which is consciousness, by cognition present in transpa
rent or pure understanding. Pratyaya, Intuition, is that particular
248 VAI£E$AIAK PHILOSOPHY.
transformation of understanding itself, which takes the form of
pleasure, pain, etc., through the channel of the senses alone, in conse
quence of the contact of garland, sandalwood, and other objects of
sense. Hence it is that cognition, pleasure, pain, desire^ aversion,.
volition, reminiscence, virtue, and vice are, all of them, particular
transformations of understanding, and being present in Pralcj'iti itself,
in subtle forms or in minute proportions, appear and disappear, accord
ing to difference of circumstances ; while Puritsa is as free from
adhesion or affinity or attachment as a lotus-leaf, but casts its shadow
in the understanding. This theory which the Sankhyas hold is thrown
away by the proof indicated in the above declaration of (these terms as)
synonyms. Thus, if the term, understanding, be derived in the instru
mental sense, viz., as that by which a thing is understood, then it comes
to be nothing else than the mind. Nor is the mind an object of percep
tion, whereas understanding is surely cognizable by perception in the
form of " I understand." , Nor are cognition, etc., the properties of the
internal sense, inasmuch as they are proved to exist only as being the
properties of an agent. For the manifestation of " I know," " I intuit,"
" I apprehend," takes place as having community of substratum with
I-ness or egoity. If they reply that this phenomenon is abhimdna or
conceit, we rejoin that it cannot be so, since there is no obstruction to
its being real. It cannot be contended that such obstruction is supplied
by the very characteristic of the Purusa as being seated in the cave,
that is to say, by its not being the receptacle of adventitious properties
or changes ; for, we would then reply that eternality is compatible
with the nature of being the substratum of adventitious modes. For
that which possesses a property and the property are not one and the
same reality, so that the production and destruction of the property
should themselves be the production and destruction of the substratum
of the property. It is only he, then, who is conscious, that also under
stands, cognises, apprehends, and intuits. Hence the hypothesis of
distinct entities (e. y., Soul and understanding) is not reasonable. This-
is the point. — 1.
Soul, Mind, Ether, Time, Space Air and Ultimate Atoms are not
(ordinarily') perceptible.
ITpaskdra. — This cognition, again, is two-fold, Vidyd, Science or true knowledge and
A.-vidyd, Nescience or false knowledge. Vidyd is of four kinds, characterised by perception,
inference, memory and testimony. A- Vidyd also has four kinds characterised by doubt,.
error or mistake, dream, and uncertainty or indecision or non-finality. Among the above
four kinds of true knowledge, that which is inferential, is not produced by the senses. Why
this is so, is explained here.
u c i \ \ * \\
<f3T Tatra, therein, among substances. Sff?*n Atma, soul, q^s
Manas, mind. ^ Cha, and others, e. y., Ether, Time, Space, Air and
Ultimate Atoms. W&rt A-pratyakse, non-perceptible, not objects of
perception.
2. Among Substances, the Soul, the Mind and other ara not
objects of perception. — 311.
KANiDA StiTRAS VII, 1, 2. 249
The word, soul, in the aphorism denotes the soul of another or one's
own soul. That even one's own soul is not an object of perception, has
been already declared, inasmuch as the casual mental intuition of the
I, aham, in one's own soul, is repudiated by such intuitions " I am
fair," " I am thin/' " I have long arms, etc. (where the I has reference
to the body). The word, "cha," extends the application of the predicate
to the substances, namely, ether, time, space, air, and ultimate atoms.
Sense-born cognition again is of two degrees, being that of the
omniscient and that of the non-omniscient. That of the omniscient is the
cognition of such and such complements of objects by means of the
proximity or presentation (or reaching upto ordinarily supersensuous
objects) characterised by virtue or merit springing from Yoga (i. e.t
inhibition of the activity of the internal organ, the mind, and con
sequent freedom of the all-pervading soul, in other words, the steadi
ness of the mind in the soul. Vide v. ii. 16 above-*) Thus ultimate
atoms fall within its sphere, (or are objects of perception), being de
monstrable, nameable, and existent.
Objection. — Since there is no material or data of such cognition,
how can this be the case ? Magnitude also is a cause of sense-percep
tion, but ultimate atoms do not possess magnitude. The possession of
colour, again is the cause of visual perception, but sapce, etc., do
not possess colour. How then can there be perception in these
oases ?
Answer. — The objection does not stand, for such omniscience is
possible by means of the mind alone as an auxiliary to the virtue or
merit born of Yoga, or by means of the eye and other senses under the
favourable influence of such mind. For the virtue or merit produced
by Yoga is of inconceivable efficacy, and does not stand in need of any
other auxiliary.
" The man whose omniscience is the subject of controversy, is
not omniscient, because he is a man like myself," — such reasonings,
however, are inapplicable, since they are void of argument which would
render impossible the proposition of the other side (maintaining the
existence of omniscience in the man in question), as is the case with
the reasoning, " A follower of Prabhdkara (a writer of the Mimamsa
school) is not versed in Mirnamsa, because he is a man like myself."
Perception of the non-omnisciont, again, is two-fold, discrimina
tive and non-discriminative- Discriminative cognition, according to
Dharmakirti and Dinndya and others of the Bauddha school, is not
certain knowledge or proof. Thus they argue : Such cognition owes
its manifestation or apparent reality to connection with words. But
the connection of an object with a word, a name, is not possible, that
there should be such intuition, coloured with a name, as it were, as
" A water-pot," or " A piece of cloth." Nor is jati, the universal,
really existent or objectively real, that the being distinguished with
the possession of it should be apprehended in objects by the sense. Nor
is possible connection of the existent characterised by itself with that
which is non-existent. Nor is the non-existent within the cognizance
of senses. Therefore, discrimination (alochanam) is produced by the
senses, and while in the process of being produced, and leading to
250 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
corresponding objects, by the power of the discrimination, discrimina
tive cognition is called perception and also proof. (To this the com
mentator gives the reply.) Now, while discriminative cognition may
be objectively unreal, besause it owes its manifestation or apparent
reality to connection with words, it may be at the same time real,
because it is the product of contact of sense and object. Hence
it is doubtful that discriminative cognition is unreal. Moreover, the
being distinguished with the possession of a name may very well be a
possible object in visual cognition, its appearance in consciousness
being possible form presentation by memory, as is the case with the
perception " Fragrant sandalwood." Or, it may be, the being distin
guished with the possession of a name does not come to light in perceptual
cognition, and there is only recollection of the name, which as soon as
it is recollected serves to. distinguish its corresponding object, like the
recollection of the counter-opposite in the case of the cognition of non-
existence. Also it has been proved that jAti, the universal or class,
ect., are immanent in objects or" entities, Hence, discriminative or
modified cognition also is perception, inasmuch as it is produced from
contact of senses and objects.
Objection. — Non-discriminative, or unmodified, cognition neither
excites to activity, nor is an object of current use. What then is the
proof of its existence ?
Answer. — The proof is discriminative, or modified, cognition itself ,.
for, this is a specialized cognition, or the cognition of a thing as pos
sessing, and being accordingly distinguished by, something else. Nor
can it be produced without the cognition of that which is possessed and
serves to distinguish or individualize, that is the distinctive element.
For it has been ascertained above that the cause of specialized cogni
tion is cognition of that which serves to specialize, contact of sense
and that which is going to be specialized, and non-apprehension of
non-connection of both. — 2.
Bhdsya: Among substances, Self, Mind, and Ether are not objects
of perception.
Cognition, how produced.
Upaiskdra.—lu order to elucidate how Coguition is produced, in what circumstances, and
from what causes, he says :
Jnana-nirddese, in the differentiation of a particular cog
nition. 5TFff^Gqfflf%fa: Jnana-nispatti-vidhih, mode or process of produc
tion of cognition. TTF: Uktah, stated, described.
3. The mode of the production of Cognition is being descri
bed, in connection with the differentiation of a particular Cognition.
—312.
A cognition should be marked off or distinguished from other
cognitions, in i-espeet of the mode of its production, in respect of its
subject matter, and in respect of its property. Now, differentiation of
KANADA SfiTRAS VIII, 1, 4. 251
cognition having .to be made, the process of the production of cognition
ia going to be described. This is the meaning. In ' uktah,' the past
participle affix Ha is used in the sense of incipient action. — 3.
Vivriti. — What is the cause of cognition ? There being this expect
ancy, he says :
' Jnana-nirddese/ i. e., in the third |book, where enunciation of
•cognition has been made. There too the process of the production of
cognition has been described. The meaning is that the causes of cogni
tion have been mentioned in. the aphorism, " That (i.e., knowledge>
which is produced from the contact of the soul, the sense and the objec.
is other (than a false mark) " (III • i. 18.) Thus, the soul is the combi
native cause of cognition, conjunction of the soul and the mind is the
non-combinative cause, and contact or contiguity of the object is the
efficient cause- This has been mentioned in that very aphorism. It
should be observed that the causality of contact has been stated under
the topic of perception.
Substance is the cause of cognition of Attributes and Actions.
.— He describes the mode of production (of cognition) :
11 ^ i ? i 3 n
Gruna-karmmasu, Attributes and Actions. ^TRT^55 Sannikris-
tesu, being in contact. jjTFTf^iVt: JMna-nispattehyo'f the production of
cognition, ^wf, dravyam, substance. ^TTW* Karanam, cause.
4. Substance is the cause of the production of cognition,
.where Attributes and Actions are in contact (with|the senses). — 313.
Substance is the cause of the cognition which is produced in respect
of attributes, e. g., colour, etc., and in respect of actions, e. g.} throwing
upwards, etc., Both of them are apprehended only in so far as they
inhere in substances appropriate or perceptible to the senses. Hence
it is the appropriateness or perceptibility of the substances which deter
mines their perceptibility. It is by substance, moreover, that their
co'itiict with the senses is constituted, they being apprehended by means
of their combination with the conjunct (i. e., Substance which is con
junct' with the sense). Althogh there is apprehended the odour of dis
persed particles of champaka flower, and of portions of camphor, which
aio all imperceptible, yet it is substance, imperceptible though it be,.
which effects their contacts. Although perceptibility of substance ia
not a requisite in the apprehension of sound, yet sound is apprehneded
Only as it is combined or inherent, therein and hence this itself is the
requisite. If it be asked, why is made this supposition of contact which
is invisible ? we reply that the production of cognition, being
an effect, necessitates the supposition of a cause. This is the import. — 4.
Substance is the cause of cognition of Genus and Species also.
UpaaJcdra.—He describes another mode of the production of knowledge :
'252 VAI^ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
n s i ? i
%*iJ<| Sainanya-vifiesesu, in genera and species.
Samanya-visesa-abhavat, in consequence of the non-existence of genus
and species, *T<T: Tatah, thence, from aubstrata. ^ Eva, alone. STT^J?
Jnanam, cognition.
5. In consequence oflthe non-existence of Genus and Species
in genera and species, cognition (of them) is due to that alone. — 314.
Existence is the (summum) genus, its species are substanceness,.
attribute-ness and action-ness. These again are genera, and their
species are earth-ness, etc., colour-ness, etc., throwing-upward-ness,
etc. Among these, omnisensuous cognition of the genera inhering in
substance is due to that only, that is, due only to appropriate or per
ceptible, particular substratum, and also to combination with the*
conjunct, combination with the combined with the conjunct, .and com
bination with the combined, all these combinations being related to
that substratum. Omnisensuous cognition, again, is produced, in the
case of attribute, from combination with the combined with the
Conjunct; in the case of sound-ness, fca-noss, etc., from combination with
the combined ; in the case of existence, from combination w'th the
conjunct, from combination with the combined with the conjunct, and
from combination with the combined. In the case of attribute, the
proximity or contiguity which is the condition of perceptibility, is not
Constituted by combination with the conjunct, or combination.
It may be objected : ' Tatah, eva/ i. e., from contact with or
contiguity to their substrata alone — auch delimitation or exclusion is
not valid. Because in genus and in species also there do exist other
genus and species. Contact with, or contiguity to, them also is a cause
of cognition. In anticipation of this objection, he says, * In consequence
of the non-existence of genus and species.' For genus and species do
not exist in genus and species, since that would entail infinite regres
sion. The intuition of their mutual distinctions arises from their own
forms or natures alone, or in this way, for instance, that the genus,
bovine-ness, is cognised from the distinctness of the upddhi, adjunct or
external condition, characterised by being present-in-all-bovine ai i-
inials ; while being absent from other than bovine animials. Similarly
with regard to pot-ness, etc., also. — 5.
•iol«nt*« and Species are causes of cognition of Substance, Attribute
° and Action.
*TI*_
Upaskdru. — It may be asked : As, in consequence of the non-existence of genus and
epeoies, cognition of genus and, species is absolutely independent of them, is it 'likewise
absolutely independent of them in (the case of substance, attribute and action also ? He
says, No :
n * i n 5 ir
CANADA SftTRAS VIII, 1, 8. 253
Samanya-visesa-apeksam, dependent upon genus and
species ^s^n^wfg Dravya-guna-karmmnasu, in respect of substance,
attribute and action.
6. (Cognition which is produced) in respect of Substance,
Attributes and Action, (is) dependent upon genus and species.
—315.
" Cognition is produced " — 'this is the subject in discourse. In
respect of substance, attribute and action, ithere is no doubt cognition
•specialized with the content of substance-ness, attribute-ness and
action-ness. Such specialized cognition, again, cannot be produced
without the contact of the subject specified, that which serves to
specify, a-.ctthe sense. Hence dependence upon genus and species is
there necessary. For there is such specialized cognition as " This is
substance," " This is attribute," " This is action." This is the
import. — 6-
Substance, Attiribute and Action are causes of cognition of Substance.
[fpaskdra.—Ia, then, in the case of substance also, cognition dependent only upon genus
and species ? To remove this curiosity, he says :
II c I ? l vs ii
^5^ Dravye ,in substance. ^s^JT^T^^I^n? Dravya-guna-karmraft-
apeksam, dependent upon substance, attribute and action.
7. (Cognition), in the case of Substance, (is) dependent upon
Substance, Attribute and Action. — 316.
" Cognition is produced" — this is the subject in discourse. " A
white cow, possessing a bell, is going," — .this is a cognition. Here subs
tance, the bell, is the distinction or that which serves to specify ; 'white'
denotes an attribute ; ' is going ' denotes action. Thus in specialized
cognition or intuition of a thing distinguished with the possession of
something else, there cannot be non-apprehension of the distinction or
that which serves to specify, nor can such specialized intuition take
place without relation to that which serves to specify. Hence in the
cognition of substance there is dependence upon substance, attribute
and action. Such is the import. — 7.
Attribute and Action are not causes of cognition of Attribute
and Action.
Upaskdra. — Is there, then, dependence upon attribute and action, also in the case of
attribute and action ? He saj's, No :
U c m c II
Guna-karmmasu, attributes and actions. n^TW^faraT^ Gruna-
karuuna-abhavat, in consequence of the non-existence of attribute and
action. JpJHJ^ft^t Gruna-karinnia-apeksam, dependent upon attribute and
ctioa . f Na, not. f%€T^ Vidyate, exists.
254 VAT^ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
8. (Cognition), dependent upon Attribute and Action, does-
not exist in the case of Attributes and Actions, inasmuch as Attri
bute and Action do not exist in Attribute and Action. — 317.
" Cognition " is the complement of the aphorism. Since there is
no cognition of attribute as distinguished with the possession of an
other attribute, and since there is no cognition of action as dis
tinguished with the possession of another action, there is no cognition
thereof, which is dependent upon attribute and action. For there
exists no attribute in an attribute nor action in actions, whereby .they
might appear as distinctions in them. This is the import. — 8.
Combination (as well as Attribute^ is a e< use of Cognition.
Upaskdra.— Lest it might be asked that since thore is manifestation of attribute and
action (in the cognitions thereof), why there should not be dependence upon attribute and
action in the cognition of attribute and in tho cognition of action, BO ho begins another
topic in reply to that :
ii * i n s. u
Samavayinah, of that in which combination exists, the
substratum, "tfaqr^ovaityat, from whiteness. >%q§^: Svaitya-buddhehr
from cognition of whiteness. =g Cha, and. £ft Sveto, in a white object.
gfe;: Buddhih, cognition, ^ Te, they. ^ Ete, those. ^T5^^^ Karyya-
karana-bhute, related as effect and cause.
9. The cognition, (' It is white ') in respect of a white object,
(results) from whiteness of the substance in which combination of
whiteness exists, and from the cognition of whiteness. These two,
(cognition of white object, and cognition of whiteness), are related
as effect and cause. — 318.
By using the term 'Samavayinah' he states the causality of relation.
Thus, inasmuch as combination of attribute does not exist in attribute,
and inasmuch as combination of action does not exist in action, in
their respective cognitions there is no dependence upon attribute and
action as distinguishing marks or qualifications ; but there does exist
dependence upon attribute and action as subject-matter or objects of
cognition. This being so, it is stated that in the case of such intuitions
as " A white conch shell/' the combination of whiteness, the attribute
whiteness, and the cognition of whiteness as a distinction or that which
serves to specify, are the causes. So that relation with the distinction r
the distinction, 'and cognition of them are the causes of specialized
perceptual cognition. Hereby is proved all that has been stated.
before. — 9.
Bhasya. — reads VIII. i. 9 as two aphorisms, viz., Samavdyinah
Svaitydchchhaiiya buddhescha svete buddhih, and Ta ete kdryakdrana-
bhtite.
KANiDA SftTRAS VIII, 1, 11. 255
Exception to the above. In the case of Substances, Cognition is not
a cause of cognition.
Upaskdra. — It may be objected. As in the case of " possessing a bell," cognition of
substance (e. g.t the cow possessing the bell) is dependent upon substance (e. g., the bell), so
also in the case of (the serial cognitions of) " It is a pillar," It is a jar," etc., where the
the cognition does not embrace another substance as a distinction, cognition of (the first)
substance, (the pillar), is the cause (of the cognition of the second substance, jar),
(and so or). Thus nowhere can there be cognition of substance in the first instance
or at first hand.
Dravyesu, in substances. %(P)d\d<^KU(|: An-itara-itara-kai anali,
11 ot causes, one of another.
10. In the case of Substances, (cognitions are) not causes of
one another. — 319.
Accoodingly he says .
" Cognitions " is the complement of the aphorism. Cognition of
the jar, even though it takes place immediately after the cognition of
the pillar, is yet not the effect of the cognition of the pillar, inasmuch
as the pillar cannot properly be the distinction of, or that which serves
to specify, by being containedlin, the jar. — 10.
The exception explained.
Upaskdra. — It may be urged that the sequence of the cognitions of the water-pot, the
cloth, etc., is observed, and that that sequence is due only to the relation of effect and
•cause. So he says :
Karana-ayaugapadyat, ifrom non-simultaneity of
causes- ^TKm**ll<^ Karana-Kramat, from succession of causes. ^ Cha,
and- ^rerf^^l'ri Ghata-pata-adi-buddhinam of the cognitions of the
water-pot, the cloth, etc. 3W Kratnah, succession. ^ Na, not.
Hetu-phala-bhavat, in consequence of the relation of cause and effect.
11. The sequence of the cognition of the water-pot, the cloth,
etc., (results) from the sequence of their causes, due to the non-
simultaneity of the causes, and not in consequence of the relation
of cause and effect (amongs the cognitions.) — 320.
The sequence of the cognitions of the water-pot, the cloth, etc., is
dependent upon the sequence of their causes, and not dependent upon
the relation of cause and effect. If it be asked, where the sequence of
causes itself comes from, so he says, ' from the non-simultaneity of the
causes.' Simultaneity of cognitions has been denied or disproved.
Hence there is not simultaneity also of diverse causes of cognition, If,
256 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
on the other hand, there were simultaneity of causes, it would entail
simultaneity also of effect, and thus the argument that non-production
of simultaneous cognitions is the mark of the existence of the mind,
would be shattered. This is the import. — 11.
Here ends the first chapter of the eighth book in the Commentary
of Sankara upon the Vaisesika Aphorisms.
Vivriti. — The sequence or order, in the form of antecedence and
subsequence, of the cognitions of the water-pot, cloth, etc., arises, not
from the relation of cause and effect amongst them, but from the orderr
or the antecedence and subsequence, of the contacts, etc., of the water-
pot, cloth, etc., (with the senses), which contacts are the causes of those
cognitions. The word ' cha,' and, implies the addition of non-simul
taneity which is not mentioned here, and this word is to be construed
after the word sequence or order. The mean.ing, therefore, is this that
the non-simultaneity of the cognitions of the water-pot, cloth, etc., is>
due to the non-simultaneity of their causes, e. g., contacts with senses,,
etc. Where, however, simultaneity of the contacts, etc., of the water-pot
and the cloth exists, there is simultaneously produced'a collective cogni
tion of all the objects in contact with the senses for the time being.
Hence it is also to be understood that simultaneity of effects follows.
from simultaneity of causes, . and non-sequence of effects from non-
sequence of causes.
Understanding or Intelligence, buddhi, is primarily divided into
presentation, anubhtiti, and representation, smTiti. Presentation,
according to the doctrine of Kanada, is again two-fold, being divided
into perception pratyaksa and inference, anumdna. Perception is of
six kinds, as derived from smelling, etc., (t. a-, from the five external,
and the internal, senses) ; and is two-fold, as discirminative, saviTeal-
paka, and non-discriminative, mrvikalpaka ; and two-fold, as ordinary
or popular, laukika, and super-ordinary or hyper-popular, alauTciJca.
Inference, again, is three-fold, as produced by illation from only positive
conditions, kevala-anvayi, or purely agreemental ; from only negative-
conditions kevala-vyatireki or differential ; and from both positive and
negative conditions Sdmdnyato-drista, or inference from commonly
observed marks. For example, " This is expressible by words, inas
much as it is knowable," etc., are illations from purely positive condi
tion (or by Mill's method of agreement). " Earth differs from other
substances, inasmuch as it is possessed of odour," and the like are illa
tions from purely negative conditions, (or by Mill's method of differ
ence) ; and " The mountain is fiery, inasmuch as it smokes," and the-
like are illations from both positive and negative conditions (or by
Mill's method of agreement and difference.) Representation, reproduc
tion or memory, on the other hand, is uniform, dependent on that form
of Samshdra which is called Hhdvand or permanent mental impression,,
having the same form as the original presentation and dependent upon
certain cognition in which inattention played no part. In another
point of view also, understanding is two-fold, science or correct know
ledge, pramd, and nescience or incorrect knowledge, apramd. Science-
is cognition ' a certain form of that which has that form. Nescience
is cognition in certain form of that in which there is non-existence-
KANADA SfiTRAS VIII, 1, 11. 257
of that form. Understanding or Intelligence is also two-fold accord
ingly as it is divided into doubt, sam^aya, and certitude, niSchaya.
Doubt is a cognition whereof the form is (mutually) repugnant exis
tence and non-existence in one and the same object; certitude in regard
to a thing is cognition in the form thereof, and not in the form of the
non-existence thereof. In this doctrine, in the case of cognition of
similarity, and in that of knowledge of terms, an inference takes place
by the production of a judgment respecting the inferential mark,
subsequently thereto. Evidence or proof, pramdnay is of two kinds,
perception and inference ; and science is exact experience or correct
presentation or presentation in accordance with reality. Tnis will be
explained by the author of the aphorisms himself in the sequel.
258 VAlSESTKA PHILOSOPHY.
BOOK EIGHTH— CHAPTER SECOND.
Cognition of a doubly specialized nature, illustrated.
Upaskdra. — Having described the mode of production of percoptual cognition, both
<hscriminative and non-discriminative, now the author, with a view to describe the per
ception of (a doubly specialized nature, or) the being specialized in the specialized, gives a
few examples:
I e: | ^ | \ \\
Ayam this, ^r: Esah that. ?*W\ Tvayii, by you. $rf Kritam,
done. tfpTq Bhojaya, feed y*H En am, him. ffr Iti, such. f^«n^ Buddh'i-
apeksam, dependent uponunderstauding or cognition.
1. This,' ' That,' ' Done by you,' ' Feed him'— such (cogni
tions are) dependent upon Understanding. — 321.
The cognition, 'this,' arises in respect of an object which is near
and, 'that/ in respect of an object which is dista.it. 'By you' _ such
cognition, coloured with the characteristic of being an agent, presup
poses or depends upon the cognition that he is independent in the
action. The cognition of the act, namely, 'done,' de: ends upon the
cognition that it is the subject of the operation of the instrument of
act! n. The cognition, 'feed/ depends upon the cognition that he in
the agent in the act of feeding, and also the employer of the instru
ment. The cognition, 'him,' depends upon the cognition that he is the
subject of the operation or relation of the fed and the feeder. Similar
other instances of cognition, dependent upon cognition, should be
understood. —
Dependence of cognition upon cognition, explained.
Upaskdra.— He says that this (i.e., dependence of cognition upon cognition in some o-
is proved by induction from agreement and difference:
d*f *TRRseiGwraR[ ii * i * i R n
?tw Dristesu, in the case of objects seen. «rRT^ Bhavat, from their
existence or appearance. SK|<| A-dristesu, in the case of objects ui-.seen.
Abhavat, from their non-existence or non-appearance.
2. (Such cognitions depend upon previous other cognitions),
inasmuch as they appear in respect of objects seen, and do not
appear in respect of objects unseen. — 322.
When the contiguous object of the cognition 'This;' the object,
though distant yet presented in consciousness, of the cognition 'That,'
the object, i-e., the contiguous agent, of the cognition 'By you/ the
object, i. e., the action, of the cognition 'done/ the object, i.e.", the em
ployer and the employed, of the cognition 'Feed/ the object, i.e., the
occupation of both of them, of the cognition 'Him/ — when these objects
come into contact with the senses, then such cognition is produced.
Whereas with reference to unseen objects these cognitions do not
KANADA StiTRAS VIII, 2, 5. 259
appear. Hence this (i.e-, the dependence of cognition upon cognition
can be inferred from agreement av.d difference. This is the mean
ing.— 2.
Substance, Attribute and Action are called artka or object.
\3pankara. — Ho now begins another topio :
II c: I R I % II
H*: Arthah object. *fr Iti, such. jfw^Wg Dravya-guua-karm-
masu, in respect of substance, attribute, and action.
3. (The Vaisesikas apply) the term, object, to Substance,
Attribute and Action. — 323
Of these, i. &-, Substance, Attribute and Action, the characteristic
of being sought after or apprehended (by the senses) or objectified in
such and such ways, has been stated. Hence, '(It is) an object/— such
is the terminology of the Vaisesika thinkers with regard to 'hem, inas
much as as they are presented by the term, object. Accordingly it has
been said by Professor Praaastadeva, "The characteristic of being
denoted by the term, object, belongs to the three. "-
IV- ii. 2, re-called.
Upaskdra. — He introduces another topic.
H * i * i * ii
, Dravyesu, under substances. *|gnw«!7?^. PaScha-atmakatvam,
t.euta-subsfcantiality, the characteristic of being a compound of five
-substances. stfM^H Pratisiddham, denied, contravened.
4. In (the topic dealing with the ascertainment of) Substances,
(the theory) that bodies, etc., are a compound of five elements, has
been refuted. — -324.
'Under substances' — the term indicates the topic of the determina
tion <>f the predicable, substance. By the aphorism (IV. ii. 2, supra*)",
"Of things perceptible and imperceptible, etc.," the penta-substantiality
of the body, etc., that is to say, (the theory, that they are compounds
of five elements, ;pratisiddham,' has been refuted. As a variety of
constituent causes does not belong to the body, so also it does not belong
to the senses of smell, etc., which are going to be described, It, there
fore, becomes proved that the senses are uniformly percipient of their
corresponding attributes. This is the import. — 4.
The Sense of Smell is constituted by the element of Earth.
a.—yie states the proposition for which the topic was begun :
II 5 I R I V, II
260 VAI^ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
Bhuyastvat, by reason of preponderance or predominance.
Gandha-vatvat, by reason of possession of smell. ^ Cha, and.
Prithivi; earth. 7TOITFT G-andha-jnane, in (the constitution of) that
by which smell is perceived, i. e., the olfactory sense, gfift: Prakritih,
matter, material cause, essence.
5. By reason of (its) predominance, and of possession of
Smell, Earth is the material cause of the olfactory sense. — 325.
That by which smell is cognised, is ' gandha-jnanaih/ that is, the
olfactory sense. Therein ' prithivi,' Earth, alone is ' prakritih,' the
material cause. It may be asked, why is it so ? Accordingly he says
4 gandha-vatvat ;' for it has been said already that that which possesses
smell cannot be originated by that which isivoid of smell. The posses
sion of smell (by the olfactory sense) or its odorousness is proved from
the rule or well-known uniformity of nature that the external senses
themselves possess attributes similar in kind to those which are appre
hensible by them. If it be urged, how then can there be such unifor
mity that the characteristic of being the revealer of smell does not
belong to the other members of the body but only to the olfactory sense-
orwan, even when terrene-ness belongs to all of them without distinction V
80 he says ' bhuyastvat.' It is the being constituted or originated by
terrene particles uninfluenced by other substances, which is called
' bhuyastvam,' ' predominance.' This, ' bhuyastvam,' is a technical
term, and has been so used in the kindred system (i. e., the Nydya-
Sutram) also. — 5.
Similarly the Senses of Taste, Colour and Touch are respectively
constituted by the Elements of Water, Fire and Air.
Upaskdra.—'B.G extends the argument to the other senses :
I c I R I ^ II
Tatha, in like manner, snq: Apah, waters, ^n: Tejah, fire ^pj:
Vayuh, air. *3 Cha, and. m^^TyiffSHl^ Rasa-rupa-sparsa-avifiesat be
cause of the non-difference of taste, colour and touch.
6. In like manner, Water, Fire and Air (are the material
causes of the sense-organs of Taste, Colour and Touch), inasmuch
as there is no difference in the Taste, Colour and Touch (which they
respectively possess, from what they respectively apprehend). — 326.
1 The material causes of the organs of the tongue, the eye, and the
akin' — this is the complement of the aphorism. Water, etc., are then
respectively the material causes of the tongue, etc., inasmuch as the
latter respectively apprehend the objects with which they are uniformly
related. Here too it is ' bhuyastvam,' ' predominance,' which governs
the uniformity (that the characteristics of being the revealer of taste>
etc., belong respectively to the tongue, etc-) It has been declared that,
KANlDA SCTRAS VIII, 2, 6. 261
it is the rule or uniformity that the tongue, etc., possess particular
.attributes of the same kind as are apprehensible by them, that is the
proof of the possession of taste, etc., by the tongue, etc. Likewise the
organ of hearing is only a portion or division of Ether confined within
the hollow of the ear and favourably influenced by particular adyistam
or destiny. — 6.
Here ends the second chpater of the eighth book in the Commentary
of Sarikara upon the Vaisesika Aphorisms.
262 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY
BOOK NINTH— CHAPTER FIRST.
Perception, e. g., of antecedent non-existence is produced ly other means
than conjunction or combination.
Upaskdra. — After the determination of popular or ordinary perception produced"
from contact or contiguity in the form of either conjunction or combination, the author
begins the ninth book of whioh the object is to demonstrate ordinary or popular and super-
ordinary or hyper-popular perception produced from proximity or presentation due to other
causes :
II S. I t I t II
i?i consequence of
the non-existence of application or predication of action and attribute.
prak, prior, antecedently. *RT^ A-sat, non-existent.
1. In consequence of the non-application of Action and
Attribute (to it), (an effect is) non-existent prior (to its produtcion.)
—227.
'An effect/ — such is the complement of the aphorism. 'Prak/ i. e.
prior to the production of the effect, 'an effect/ e. g., a water-pot, cloth,
etc., 'a-aat/ (i. e., non-existent), that is to say, the counter-opposite or
contradictory of the contemporaneous non-existence of its own pro
ducer. Here the reason is the impossibility of the application of action
and attribute. If the effect, e. y., a water-pot, etc., were really existent
during that time also, then it would be affirmed to possess action and
attribute- As in the case of a water-pot already produced reference-
can be made to it in such forms as "The water-pot is at rest/' "Th&
water-pot is in motion/' "The water-pot is seen to possess colour," etc.,
there can be no reference made to it in like manner also prior to its
production. It is therefore inferred that the water-pot is during that
time, non-existent, And this, antecedent non-existence; in such cases
as while straws are in the course of weaving or threads in the course
of joining, or when clay is placed on the potter's wheel, while the-
activity of the potter, etc., is yet going on, is the universally experien
ced perceptual cognition that there will be in that place a mat, or a
piece of cloth, or a water-pot, inasmuch as such cognition takes place-
as soon as the eyes are opened. Here proximity or presentation con
stituted either by conjunction or by combination cannot be the cause
of the cognition. Hence proximity or presentation in which the thing
in itself or the qualification or distinction of that which is connected
with the sense, (indriya samboddha visesanata) is here the necessary-
condition of perception. It cannot be said that in this explanation
there is mutual dependence (of cause and effect) in as much as the-
distinction of antecedent non-existence being existent, there is percep
tion of it and the perception being existent, there exists the distinction
for the characteristic of being the distinction is here really the proper
or essential form of both the cause and the effect and it is capable of
producing perception in which both are mutually involved and that is-
really existent even prior to the perception so it has been declared in.
KANADA SttTRAS IX, 1, 2. 26?
the Nydya-Vdrtika, "In the case of combination as well as if Non-exis
tence, the relation of vis?sna that which serves to specify and visesya
that which is specified, (is the proximity between the sense and the
object)."
This same antecedent non-existence is productive of its counter-
opposite (that is, the object not yet existent). For when a water-pot
is produced, it is not produced just at that very moment. Even though
the other (partial) causes existed at the time, the iniperfectness of the
cause, being pursued, should pursue only the imperfectness consisting
of the antecedent non-existence of the water-pot itself. If it be
objected that the (antecedently non-existent) water-pot itself would
then be an impediment to its own production; our reply is that since,
by its non-existence at the time, it constitutes the absence of impedi
ment, its causality should not be thrown away. Nor can it be objected
that the water-pot itself constituting the non-existence of its antecedent
non-existe.ice, it would follow that its antecedent non-existence will
again appear when the water-pot is destroyed; for, the destruction of
the water-pot also is repugnant to its antecedent non-existence, so
that there can be no appearance of a contradictory also during the
•existence of another contradictory. For the contradiction between
them is not merely spafci il, so that they might be simultaneous like (the
genera of) bovine-ness and h-jrse-ness. The contradiction is temporal
also, and therefore how can they be existent at one and the same
time? — 1.
Note. — In this and the few following aphorism*, the author deals with the topic of
non-existence. Now, non-existence is primarily divided into two kinds, samsarga-abhdva
and anyonya-abhdva. Anyonya-abhdva or reciprocal non-existence is characterised as non-
existence of which ithe counter-opposite (i. e., the object non-existent) is determined by
the relation of identity ; in other words, it is equivalent to absence of identity, that is,
difference. Samsarga-abhdva or relational non-3xistenco is non-existence other than
reciprocal non-existence, and it is sub-divided as antecedent, consequent, and absolute
non-existences.
Bhdsya. — Non-Existence is not the seventh predicable inasmuch as
absolute non-existence, e. y., a castle in the air, is not a predicable at
all, while non-existence of the existent, in the forms of non-production,
destruction, and absence of identity, cannot exceed the number of
the six-predicables.
Consequent non-existence also is proved by perception and inference.
Upatkdra. — He states that another (form of) non-existence is established by the foroe
«>f cognition.
?3T£ Sat, existent. 5RTc^ A-sat, non-existent.
2. The existent (becomes) non-existent. — 328.
As the non-existence of the effect, prior to the operation of the
cause, is proved by perception and inference, so is it proved by percep
tion and inference, after the operation of a club, etc., which destroys
it, that a really existent effect, e. g., a water-pot, etc., is now non
existent. And this same non-existence is commonly described a«.
264 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
annihilation or destruction (or consequent or emergent non-existence.)
For there arise such cognitions as that the water-pot is now destroyed,
annihilated, that the letter ga which was heard before, no longer exists,
etc. This is the import. — 2.
existent is a different thing from tli<j non-existent, so that
after annihilation there can be no continuation of existence.
Upaskdra.—lt may be objected : It is the same water-pot that under a partioulai
condition gives rise to the idea, or conventional use, of annihilation ; and not that th
annihilation of the water-pot is different from the water-pot :
& I t I ^ II
: A-satah, from the non-existent. fsKmTOtf^r^Wn^T^ Kraiya-guna-
vyapadesa-abhavat, in consequence of the non-existence of reference-
by, or predication of, action and attribute. ?T*lfaT?:JI Artha-antaranu
a different object.
3. (The existent is) a different object (from the non-existent),
inasmuch as Action and Attribute cannot be predicated of the non
existent. — 329.
Accordingly he says :
"The existent" — such is the complement of the aphorism. The-
existent is a different object from 'the non-existent. If it be asked,
How ? So he says, 'kriya-guna-vyapadeia-abhavat.' For there can
be no such predication, during the period of annihilation also, as-
" The water-pot remains," " The water-pot exists at this moment,''
" The water-pot possesses colour," " Bring the water-pot," etc. In
consequence of this difference, therefore, the existent is a different
thing from the non-existent. — 3.
Bhd$ya. — Whatrver is non-existent prior to its apperanoe as air
effect, is non-existent only by the nature of an effect, but is really
existent at the time by the nature of a cause, and that, therefore, it is-
essentially different from absolute non-existences.
Reciprocal non-existence or absence of identity, explained.
Upaskdra. — Antecedent and consequent non-existences being proved, the p resent
Aphorism is laid down with the purpose of proving mutual or reciprocal non-axistence :
II S. I * I 8 II
^ Sat, the existent. ^ Cha, and, also. 3RT^ A-sat, non-existent.
4. The existent also is non-existent. — 330.
Where. a really existent water-pot etc., are spoken of as being non-
, there non-existence of identity is perceived. For the-e arise-
" The horse is non-existent by the nature of the cow,"
<v is non-existent by the nature of the hoi^se," " Apiece of cloth
KANADA SftTRAS IX, 1, 5. 265
is non-exist«nt by the nature of a water-pot," "A piece of cloth is a not-
water-pot," "A cow is a not-horse," " A horse is a not-cow," etc. Nowy
" A cow possesses reciprocal non-existence with a horse," " A water-
pot possesses reciprocal non-existence with a piece of cloth/' — it is this
reciprocal non-existence, otherwise called absence of identity, that
appears in the above cognitions. Here identity is that which de
termines the counter-oppositeness or contrariety (of absence of
identity). And this (reciprocal) non-existence has the same substratum
or denotation or extension as its counter-opposite (»'. e., identity); for
there is such cognition as that the water-pot is not the ground (on
which it lies). It is also eternal, for it is impossible that there should
be at any time identity between a water-pot and a piece of cloth.— 4.
In addition to antecedent, consequent, and reciprocal, non-existence,
there is absolute non-existence.
Upaskdra.—Novf he describes the fourth (kind of) non-existenoe called absolute
non-existenoe.
M £. I ? I ¥, M
q^ Yat, that, which. =g Cha, and. ST«l^ Any at, different.
A-sat, non-existent. ?ffi: Atalj, from these, i. e., antecedent, consequent,
and reciproeal, non-existents. ^ Tat, that. ITOc^ A-sat, non-existent.
5. And that which is a different non-existent from these, is
(absolutely) non-existent.- — 331.
' Atah/ from the three forementioned non-existences, *yat any at
a-sat tat a-sat/ (that which is a different non-existent is non-existent)
*. e., that is absolute non-existence. The word 'a-sat' (non-existent) is
in both the places used in a substantive sense. Of these, one 'a-sat/
is the subject and the other ' a-sat' is the predicate in apposition with
the subject. The meaning of the aphorism, therefore, eomes to be this
that non-existence which is different from the three fore-mentioned non-
existences, is absolute non-existence. Amongst these, antecedent non-
existence is limited in the future or at the end, consequent non-
existence is limited in the past or at the beginning, and reciprocal
non-existence has the same substratum or extension as its counter-
opposite ; but absolute non-existence differs from all the three. Hence
it is the fourth (kind of) non-existence. — 5.
i. — There are three things repugnantto absolute non-existence,
viz., the counter-opposite or the object non-existent, its antecedent non-
existence, and its consequent non-existence. The ancients teach that the
cognitions that dark colour does4not exist (after baking) in a red water-
pot, and that red colour does not exist (before baking) in a dark water-pot,
are conversant about consequent and antecedent non-existences, but not
absolute non-existence. The moderns, on the other hand, maintain that
consequent and antecedent non-existences are not repugnant to absolute
non-existence and hence that there certainly is absolute non-existence
also by reference to annihilation, production, etc. They hold that when
a water-pot, etc., previously removed, are brought back to a place,
there is no cognition of the absolute non-existence of the water-pot, so
266 VAI£E§IKA PHILOSOPHY.
long as the water-pot exists, inasmuch as the time during which the
water-pot is existent does not constitute connection with non-existence.
Some, again, teach that when there has formerly stood in any place a
water-pot, and this has been removed and brought back again, there
arises in this case cognition of a fourth kind of non-existence under
the aspect of connection (Samsarga-alhdva), called temporary non-
exist«nce, and not of absolute non-existence.
Causes of the perception consequent non-existence.
Upaskdra. — He nowibegins another section and therein states the causes of the perception
of consequent non-existenoo :
A-sat, non-existent, jfr Tti, such. 3JFTJK<r5TPTT3T^ Bliftta-pratyaksa-
abhavat, because of the non-existence of the perception of a past object.
Bhuta-smriteh, because of the recollection of a past object.
Virodhi-pratyaksa-vafc, similar to the perception of the
contradictory or opposite.
6. "(It is; non-existent " —such (perceptual cognition) is similar
to the perception of the counter-opposite (of non-existence), because
fin both cases) there is non-existence of the perception of that which
is past and gone, and there is recollection of the past.-— 332.
' A-sat iti ' ; By the word, ' iti/ he indicates cognition in the form
of perception. Thereby (it is obtained that) there is such perceptual
cognition as " The water-pot is non-existent," " The water-pot has-
been destroyed," " The water-pot is now in a state of annihilation."
An example of this cognition is given by l virodhi-pratyaksa-vat ' ; as
there is clear perception of the counter-opposite (of existence) e. </., a
water-pot, etc., so there is of its annihilation or consequent non-exis
tence also. The reason of this stated as 'bhuta-pratyaksa-abhavat,' which
means, because there is non-existence of the perception of ' bhuta,' i. e.,
a water-pot, ete., which having been first produced have been subse
quently destroyed. Hereby the non-apprehension of the (once) appre
hensible is stated. There, again, the following argument is confirma
tory (of the perceptual cognition) : If there were a water-pot here,.
it would be seen, as the place is seen ; but it is not visible ; therefore
there is none. He mentions another auxiliary cause : ' bhuta-smriteh,'
which means, because there is recollection of the counter-opposite, e. </.,
a water-pot, etc., which is past and gone. Hereby recollection of the
counter-opposite is stated. — 6.
VivTiti- — The four kinds of non-existence being explained, the per
ception of consequent non-existence is explained.
' A-sat, iti,' " The water-pot is non-existent," The water-pot is
destroyed/5 " The water-pot is annihilated," — such perception, 'virodhi-
pratyaksavat,' is similar to the perception of the water-pot which is the
KANlDA SftTRAS IX, 1, 7. 267
counter-opposite (of ita non-existence), that is to say, is proved by
sense-experience and produced from the ordinary or popularly under
stood contact (of sense and object). Between them there is, however,
this difference that the perception of the counter-opposite is produced
from the conjunction of the eye, etc-, (with their objects), while the per
ception of consequent non-existence is produced from there being a»
modification or qualification (e< g., non-existence of water-pot in.
("plac.e possessing non-existence of water-pot") conjoint with the eyer
etc. He mentions another point of difference, viz., ' bhuta-pratyaksa-
abhavat.' The meaning is that perception of consequent non-existence-
is produced from a cause in the form of the non-apprehension of the3
apprehensible consequent on the non-existence of the perception of the-
past, i. «., the counter-opposite, e. g., the water-pot, etc., and also from
the recollection of the past water-pot etc., in other words, from cogni
tion of the counter-opposite, which cognition is here identical with
recollection. Thus the perception of consequent non-existence is pro
duced from the non-perception of its counter-opposite as well as from
the cognition of the counter-opposite, whereas the perception of the-
eounter-opposite is not so produced. There is, therefore, difference
between them in this respect also. This is the import. * It should be
observed that recollection as such is not intended (in this aphorism,.
though the word has been used), but mere cognition is intended. Thai
being so, the idea is this that as the water-pot, etc., are proved by
perception, so also are their consequent non-existences.
Causes of the perception of antecedent non-existence.
Upaskdra. — Extending to (antecedent non-existence the mode in which consequent
non-existence is an object of perception, he says :
ii & i ? i va u
<fl>JT Tatha, similarly. Wt& A-bhave, in the case of (antecedent)
non-existence. HTMH?^?^!^ Bhava-pratyaksa-tvat, in consequence of
the perceptibility of the .existent, xj Cha, also.
7. Similarly (there is perceptual cognition) of (antecedent)
non-existence, in consequence also of the perceptibility of the
existent. — 333.
Although this word, non-existence is a general terra, still from the
context it signifies antecedent non-existence. As there is perceptual
cognition in the case of consequent non-existence, so also in the case of
antecedent non-existen«e. Q. — How? A — ' Bhava-pratyksatvat' : 'praty-
aksatvat,' in consequence of the characteristic of being made an object
of cognition by perception, ' bhavasya,' of straws, etc., while these are
in the course of weaving (for a mat which is then antecedently non-exis-%
cent). Or, the meaning is this: 'pratyaksatvat,' in consequence of the 'fit
ness' (for the senses) or apprehensibility, 'bhavasya/ of the substratum as
well as of the counter-opposite (t. e., the mat after production) ; in
asmuch as the apprehensibility of the substratum as well as the appre
hensibility of the counter-opposite govern the apprehension of Samsarga-
abhdva or relational non-existence. The word ' cha,' also, brings
268 VAI/SE§IKA PHILOSOPHY.
forward the recollection of the counter-opposite and the argument
already stated (in the preceding aphorism, as contributory causes of
the perception of antecedent non-existence.) (It ia to be obserred that),.
although antecedent non-existence has no beginning, and although
consequent non-existence has no end, yet they are preceptible under
particular conditions only. — 7.
Vivfiti. — It may be asked, inasmuch as antecedent non-existence
has no beginning, how is it that there is no perception of it long before
the production of the conjunction of the two halves of a water-pot,
etc., the fore-mentioned causes (of such perception) being possible at
that time also? Hence the author adds, 'bhava-pratyaksatvat.'
* Bhava ' means the final collocation of causes, according to its deriva
tion from the root bhti,, 'to be' by the affix ghaK, in the ablative sense
that it springs from this. ' Bhavapratyaksatvat ' means the state or
condition of that whereof perception takes place by means of ' bhava.'
The resultant meaning of the term, therefore, is, because it must be mani
fested by the final collocation of causes. Thus, the import is, in the
instance in question, there can be no perception of antecedent non-exis
tence in consequence of the non-existence of the final collocation of
cause.
Causes af the perception of reciprocal non-existence.
.—Ho shows that reciprocal non-existenoo is an object of perception :
II £. I ? I c l|
Eton a, hereby. *TTC: A-ghata^, not-water-pot. *pft: A-gauh,.
not-cow. Wiwf: A-dharmalj, not-dharma. ^ Cha, and, also. cWMTft:
Vyakhyatah, explained.
8. Hereby also are explained * not-water-pot,' ' not-cow/
1 Etena' — by this term he extends (the causality of) the recollection
of the counter-opposite, apprehension of the substratum, and the .•argu
ment stated before. Non-apprehension of the apprehensible is the same
in all cases. The word, 'cha,' also, has the object of bringing forward
what has been stated before. ' A-dharma^' : By saying that the
reciprocal non-existence of dharma, merit, though it is supersensible,
is an object of perception in its substratum, e. g.: pleasure, knowledge,
etc., he suggests that in the apprehension of reciprocal non-existence,
apprehensibility of the counter-opposite is not the governing condition,
but that only the apprehensibility of the substratum is the governing
condition. How otherwise eould the reciprocal non-existenoe of a
fiend, in the form that the pillar is not . a fiend, be apprehended in the
pillar ? For, the non-apprehension of a fiend as being coincident or
'identical with the pillar is the cause of the apprehension of the re
ciprocal non-existence of a fiend (in the pillar), and, it is again
impossible, were the pillar identical with a fiend, that there should be
such non-apprehension (of a fiend in the pillar), since such non-
apprehension is contradictory to, or contravened by, the existence of
the entity (e. </., a fiend) which is the counter-opposite (of its non-
existence.)
KANiDA SftTRAS IX, 1, 9. 269
Objection. — Identity with a fiend is not in this instance the counter-
opposite. Is it then a fiend ? But it may be that though it is present
in the pillar, yet, like its gravity, it is not apprehended. Hence its
non-apprehension would not be contradictory to the existence of the
•entity which is the counter-opposite, (viz., a fiend.)
Answer. — It is not so, for, like the non-apprehension of the counter-
opposite, the non-apprehension of that which determines the charac
teristic of being the counter-opposite, also causes the apprehension of
non-existence.
Objection. — The apprehension of reciprocal non-existence is depend
ent upon the apprehension of counter-opposite-ness, and counter-oppo-
^iteness is of the nature of the absence of reciprocal non-existence;
and hence it follows that the apprehension of reciprocal non-existence
is really dependent upon the apprehension of reciprocal non-existence.
Answer. — This is not the case; for, as has been already stated, it is
a. property which is cognised as being not present in any given subs
tratum, that determines the characteristic of being the counter-opposite,
but the apprehension of that property also as that which determines
counter-opposite-ness, is not the governing condition (of the apprehen
sion of reciprocal non-existence.) — 8.
Vivriti. — The causes of the apprehension of reciprocal non-exis
tence are determination (or possession of attribution, or intrinsic form)
in relation to the senses, — indriya-nambaddha-visesanatdj — non-appre
hension of the counter-opposite, and cognition of the counter-opposite-
The difference, however, is this that the perceptibility of the counter-
opposite is the condition of apprehension of Samsarga-abhdva or rela
tional non-existence, whereas it is the perceptibility of the substratum
that is the condition of apprehension of reciprocal non-existence. Thus,
in spite of the super-sensibility of dharma or merit, there is no impedi
ment to the perception of its reciprocal non-existence in the sensible
•substratum thereof, e. g., pleasure and the like. Whereas some have
taught that perceptibility of both the counter-opposite and the sub
stratum is the condition of apprehension of relational non-existence,
this is inaccurate ; for, were this the case, since the perception of non-
existence of fragrance in a stone, of non-existence of bitterness in
treacle, of non-existence of colour in air, and of non-existence of touch
.as well as sound in ether would be impossible their respective substrata
would not be perceptible to the several senses cognisant thereof res
pectively. It is from this consideration that Paksadhara Misra has
maintained that the perception of the destruction (or cessation) of the
touch of air is produced by the determination or qualification thereof
by time conjoint with the skin.
Perception of absolute non-exivtence, how produced.
Upaskdra —Now in this aphorism he says that absolute non-existence is an object of
perception:
ii s. i ? i s. ii
A-bhutam, not produced. 5f Na, not. tff^T Asti, exists, ffa Itir
this. *H*lfrtH?j; An-artha-antaram, not different objects.
270 VAI£E§IKA PHILOSOPHY.
9. That which has not been produced, does not exist; — this is-
an identical proposition. — 335.
That which was produced, at present does not exist — such cogni
tion rests upon annihilation, and is not conversant about, or does not
bring out, the having been produced; whereas perceptual cognition
which embraces simply this that it does not exist, reposes upon absolute
non-existence. 'A-bhutam,' (that which has not been produced),
denotes non-cognizance of production and destruction. The being
'an-artha-antaram,' not different objects, also has the same purport
only. For example, Earth-ness dues not exist in Water, and Water-
ness does not exist in Earth. For, were there Earth-ness in watery
wholes, it would be perceived, but it is not perceived, therefore it does
not exist; — a reference to such argument is to be observed in this case
also. We must, in like manner, hold that there is absolute non-exis
tence of a thing where such a thing will never be, nor even has been,
produced. The cognition, on the other hand, in the form that it does not
exist, of the non-existence in their substratum, of that which has been,
and that which will be, depends upon consequent non-existence and ante
cedent non-existence. Hence it is that this (absolute non-existence) is de
signated as absolute or illimitable and as of trinal time or eternal. — 9.
Vivriti. — 'Na asti iti,' perception in the form that something does
not exist, which is 'abhutam/ not conversant about the past, 'an-artha-
antaram,' that is, has for its object nothing but absolute non-existence,
such as consequent non-existence etc. * * * *. The word 'bhuta' or
past includes the future also.
The perception, "Tht water-pot dot-u not (71010) wist in the room," explained.
Upaskdra.—It may be objected: The non-existence of the water-pot in the room
is not absolute non-existenoe, because of the existence of the water-pot there at some
time or other. Nor is it either antecedent non-oxietenoe or consequent non-existence,
for they appear only in combinative causes. Nor is it absolute non-existence undergoing
production and destruction, for the expression 'absolute non-existence undergoing pro-
dcution and destruction' involves a contradiction in terms. Nor is it a fourth kind
of samsarga-abhdva or non-existence of association, since inithat case the three-fold division
of the non-existenoe of association would be disproved.
To meet this objection, he says : ,
: u
«f Na, not. uf^T Asti, exists, qi: Grhatah, water-pot, ff^ Gehe, in
the room. $f?T Iti, such. ^T: Satah, existent, vrapj Grhatasya, of water-
pot. Jfr^nEffafrre^ Geha-samsarga-pratisedhah, negation of association
with the room.
10. The water-pot does not exist in the room — such is (the
form of) the negation of association of the existent water-pot with
the room. — 336.
(* Geha-samsarga-pl-atisedhah 'means) the negation or privation of
the association or conjunction of the water-pot with the room. And it
would be simply absolute non-existence, if the water-pot do not exist
KANADA SUTRAS IX, 1, 10. 271
at any time whatever ; antecedent non-existence, in the case of the
water-pot which will exist; and consequent non-existence, in the case of
the water-pot which had its existence in the past.
Objection. — That being so, the cognition should have been in this
form that connection of the water-pot does not exist in the room.
Answer. — What is meant by ' the cognition should have been ; ? If
it means l the cognition of which the actual object or content is the
-connection of the water-pot, should have been,' and so conveys the
sense of inclusion, then what is desired is obtained. If, on the other
hand, it means '(the cognition) which refers to or suggests that (i. e.,
connection of the warer-pot),' then (we reply that), it is the reference
to the substratum, viz-, in the room, which leads to, and results in, the
reference to the connection, inasmuch as it is the being the substratum
that appears in the form of con.nection of the property (or conjunction
-of the contained.)
Objection. — Does then the water-pot really exist there V
Answer. — What do you mean by ' really exist '? Is it combined or
•conjunct ? It cannot be the first since there is in the room non-exis
tence, of the water-pot as combined with it (that is, since the room is
not the material cause of the water-pot). Nor the latter, since there is
denial of conjunction.
Objection. — It would then follow that the water -pot, etc., are always
present, inasmuch as there is everywhere denial only of the one or the
other of their conjunction and combination.
Answer. — This would not follow, since the denial itself of both of
them is idcntial with the denial of the water-pot. Are then the water-
pot and its conjunction one and the same thing, whereby denial of con
junction of the water-pot would be the denial of the water-pot ? Are
then the water-pot and its combination one and the same thing, where
by the admission itself of its combination would be the admission of the
water-pot ? For, there is not presence of the water-pot there where
both of them (conjunction and combination) are denied, whereby the
water-pot might be in constant agreement. Thus it is the denial or
negations of the admission or affirmation of something, that constitutes
the denial or negation of that thing. .. /
Or, it may be that there is really absolute non-existence of tho
water-pot in the room in the relation of being in combination, and that
it is this (absolute non -existen.ee) that is the object of the cognition that
the water-pot does not exist in the room ; as for example, (there is
absolute non-existence of the water-pot) in the potsherd in the relation
of being in conjunction.
Objection. — Such being the case, the water-pot would be non-exis
tent, being the counter-opposite of the constantly present absolute
non-existence.
Answer- — It would be so, were it everywhere non-existent under the
joint characteristics of being in conjunction and being in combi
nation. — 10.
272 VAI£E§IKA PHILOSOPHY.
Perception of the Soul, how produced, in the yogins who are (called)
united.
Upaskdra. — Having thus ascertained popular perception having for its object existence
and non-existence, he begins a new section in order to ascertain the perception of the
yoyint :
fi. I ? I « I
Atmani, in the soul. «TTW?^T: Atma-manasoh, of soul and
mind. ^nftMftsflMT^ Samyoga-visesat, from a particular conjunction-
Atma-pratyaksara, perception of the soul.
11. Perceptual cognition of the Soul (results) from a particu
lar conjunction of the Soul and the Mind in the Soul. — 337.
" Knowledge is produced " — such is the complement (of the aphor
ism.) Now, the yogins or ascetics are divided into two classes ; those
whose internal organs have been steadied in samddhi or deep medita
tion, and they are called united ; and those whose internal organs are
no longer steadied in samddhi, and they are called disunited- Therein
those who are united, having with eagerness fixed their mind on the
object to be presented to it, are engaged in constant meditation ; and
in them cognition of the soul, of their own souls as well as of the souls
of others, is produced. ' Atrna-pratyaksariV means in the manner of the
cognition in which the soul is the percept or object of immediate
presentation or intuition. Although in ourselves and others also,
cognition of the soul sometimes exists or appears, yet, as it is obscured
by avidyd or nescience, it has been declared to be virtually non-existent.
' Atma-manasoh samyoga-visesat ' means from particular contiguity
between the soul and the mind, i;amely, a favourable influence by virtue
born of yoga or holy communion. — 11.
Vivriti. — Having examined perception produced through ordinary
or physical presentation or contiguity, he now explains perception
produced through super-ordinary or hyper-physical presentation or
contiguity.
* Atma-manaso^ samyoga-visesat,' from the conjunction of the soul
and mind, accompanied by the power or virtue born of yoga, or holy
communion ; ' Atmani,' there being effort or volition towards the origi
nation of understanding, (dtmdjne&uing volition) on the authority of
the lexicography : " Soul or Atmd, Volition, Patience or Contience,
Understanding (are synonymous)," — that is to say, when there arises
the thought^ produced by volition towards the origination of under
standing ; 'Atma-pratyaksam/ perception of one's own soul as well as
of the souls of others ; " takes plaee/' this is the complement of the
aphorism.
ITow, super-ordinary or hypher-physical presentation or contiguity
is three-fold, according to its division as Sdmdnya-lakaand, having the
form of the genus, jfidna-laksand, having the form of cognition, and
yogaja-dharma, virtue or power born of holy communion. Therein
yogaja-dharma is a particular merit or virtue produced by the practice-
KANADA StiTRAS IX, 1, 13. 273
of yoga or holy communion, and to the existence of which the Vedas,
Puranas, etc., testify. It is again two-fold according to the two-fold-
ness of the yoyins as those who are united or have attained to holy
communion mid those who are in the process of being united or are in the
course of attaining to holy communion. Among them those are called
the unit t'd, who have subdued their mind or inner sense by the practice
of yoga and have achieved the siddhis or < powers/ perfection or attain
ments by means of Samddhi or meditation. It is they that are also
called the specially united, on account of their possessing conspicuous
or advanced yoga. Those who are in the process of being united are they
whose minds are turned away from objects of the senses and who are
immediate beholders of all objects through the accompaniment of con
templation. The present aphorism has been laid down with reference to
such yog-inn only.
Xott. — It would seem that the word viyukta has been differently used by SaAkara Misrct
and Jayandrdyana ; by the former in tho sense of the disunited, and by the latter as denoting
those who are specially united through the possession of highly advanced yoga Vide IX. »'. IS
infra, Upaskdra. Sahkara Misra obviously does not recognise the distinction, made by
Jayanilrdyana, of the united and those in the process of being united. According to him, yogiut
are of rwo classes, namely, the united and the ultra-united or dis-united.
Omniscience of the united yogins, how possible.
L'pathira. — Do then the tinned have cognition in respect of the -soul only? How there
fore oau they possess omniscience ? In roplyito these possible queries, he says :
N & i ? i 33 ii
mil Tatha, similarly. 3*11^3 Dravya-antaresu, in the case of other
substances. SCT^R Pratyaksaih, perceptual.
12. Perceptual (cognition is) similarly (produced) in the case
of the other substances. — 338.
" Cognition is produced '• —this is implied by the context. <Tath& '
means by the mind, only as favourably influenced by, or accompained
with, the virtue or power, born of yoga or holy communion. ' Dravya-
antaresu ' means in respect of the four kinds of ultimate atoms, the
mind, air, space, time and ether. By the term, substance, are included
attribute, action and genus inhering in substance ; the predicable,
species, combination ; also gravity, elasticity, etc., appertaining to
things which are not objects of perception ; and also volition, the sourc*
of vitality (or spontaneity), non-discriminative thought, dharma,
adharma, etc., residing in the soul. For the favourable influence of the
virtue or power born of yoga is equivalent to a perceptive apparatus ;
otherwise omniscience would not be affirmed (of those who are
united.') — 12.
Omniscience belong also to those yogina who are (called) dis-united.
Upnskiira. — Having described the perceptual cognition of the united, he now describe*
that of tho disunited.
I! €. I ? I t^ II
274 VAI!§ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
A-samahita-antahkaranah, whose internal organs
are not attached to meditation. SH*f£d^*TT>5ni: Upsamhrita-samadhayahj
who have given up meditation, for Tesam, their. «5 Cha, also.
13. They whose internal sense-organs are not attached to
meditation, are those by whom meditation has been given up. They
too (have perception of hidden and distant objects.) — 339.
1 Upasamhrita-samadhayah ' is simply an explication of ' asamahita-
antahkaramih.' Or, to the question, why they are called ' asmahita-
antahkaranal? ' V the reply is given by ' upasamhrita-samadnayah,'
meaning, because they are those by whom. ' Sarnadhi ' of which
the essence is constant meditation, ' upasamhrita,' has been thrown
away. For they, being able to transced the senses through the
influence ^>f Samddhi, absorption or intentness of mind on o;ie
acquiring Sarira-Siddhi, powers over, or perfection of, the physical
object only, and, organism, e. </., the power of attenuation, etc., and
Indriya-Siddhi, powers over, perfection of, the senses, e. (/-, the power
of hearing at a distance, i. c., clair-audience, etc., and then feeling
the insufficiency of Samddhi itself, realise the need of other parctices
as referred to in following and other texts of the Veda : rTT^^I^J
f%< m^t f%*ft^T ^*I 3*T?**I, There is need for it so long as I am
not freed and fulfilled. They learn that every form of blioya or
experience whether agreeable or disagreeable, must be undergone,
and that they will undoubtedly reach firm ground from which there is
710 fall, only after experiencing Karma-dtaya, vehicles of karma, » c.,
physical organisms, previously merited or acquired, in different
countries, divisions of the land, peninsulas, etc., by different births as
horses, elephant, birds, serpents, etc., as well as by existence as celes
tials, sages, or men. They, therefore, make the whole universe of
things, hidden and distant, the objects of their perception, the powers
of their senses having been enlarged or heightened by the force
of the virtue or power born of Yoga. — 13.
Vivriti. — After describing the perception of the yoyin who is in
course of union, he describes that of the yoyin who has attained union.
'Asamahita-antahkaranah,' those whose internal sense is destitute
of tiamddhi or meditation ; 'upasamhrita-samadhayah,' those by whom
samadhi or deep meditation has been consummated, that is, carried to
fruition, in whom are produced the various siddhiy, perfections or
attainments which are the fruit of samddhi or deep meditation; — such
united yog ins attain perception of souls and other substances. Such is
the sense to be gathered from the aphorism- In fine, in the perception
of the yoyin who is in course of union, there is need for dhydna, thought
or contemplation, while in the perception of the yoyin who is united,
there is no need of satnddhi or meditation involving thought or con
templation.
. According to the vivriti, 'the word 'asam4hita-antahk»ranah' would seem not to
have syntactical connection in the approhism. The classification of yoyins, made by
Jayantirdyana, is, therefore, so far unsatisfactory.
KANlDA StTTRASIX, 1,14. 275
The Yog in' a perception of Substance, Attribute and Action,
popularly explained.
UpasMra. — It may be objected: In them (»' «., substances, etc.) cognition (of the Ypgins)
is not mental, inasmuch as the mind is no* self-dependent outside its sphere. Nor ia it »•
product of the external senses; for, they apprehend objects present as being connected with
them, depend upon the development of colour, etc., as the case may be, to the degree of
perceptibility, and particularly depend also upon light, etc.
In anticipation of this objection, he proves 'proximity' (». «., the medium of cognition) in
the case of certain predioables, and says:
Tat-samavayat, from combination with that, i.e., subs
tance. qTFFtJTQt!! karmma-gunesu, in respect of actions and attributes.
14. (Perception) of Actions and Attributes (arises) from (their)
combination with Substance. — 340.
" Perceptual cognition is produced" — this is the complement (of
the aphorism.) If the elemental senses are dependent upon some pre
sentation or contiguity (of objects to them for the apprehension of
those objects by them), then from the combination in that which is in
conjunction with the mind of the perceiver, cognition of the genera
of attributes combined or inhering in the ultimate atoms, ether, space
and timo, is produced and in the case of other substances, since
there is conjunction with them of various sterile (seed-less ?) minds,
favourably directed towards, or taken over for, the experience of mortal
coils, cognition is produced in respect of the attributes, etc., of those
substances through their combination in those substances which are
thus conjoint with those minds. This is declared here, regard being had
to, or in view of easy demonstration. In fact, in the case of the external
senses as well as of the mind, it is the virtue or power born of yoga that
constitutes the ' proximity ' or presentation to the senses, inasmuch
as all uncertainty or impossibility of proof is set at rest by it alone.
Tho drinking up of the ocean by Agastya (the sage), and the conver
sion of the kingdom of Dandaka into a forest are examples in point.
-.14.
Vivriti. — It may be urged that omniscience is not possible or proved
in the 1'oyin, for though there be perception of substances, there is no
such cognition of attributes, etc. Accordingly he says :
The meaning is that from combination of ' that/ i. e., conjunction
of mind facilitated by the power or virtue born of Yoga or holy com
munion, there is produced in the Yogin, whether united or in course of
union, perception of attributes and actions.
* * * The term k of actions and attributes ' is indicative, and
genus, etc., also are to be understood. In a like manner, should be
understood perception produced from super-ordinary or hyper-physical
presentation or contiguity in the form of Sdmdnya-laJesana or general
implication, and jndna-laksana or implication of cognition.
276 VAlgE§IKA PHILOSOPHY.
The Y ogins perceive the attributes of their own souls in the popular way.
Uva«kdra.—ls it then, it may be asked, combination with that which is conjoint with
,ome other substance, that constitutes the presentation or ' proximity 'to the mind ^ even i
the case of one's own understanding, etc. ? He replies, No :
^ Atma-Samavajat, from combination in the soul.
Atma-Gunesu, in respect of the attributes of the soul.
15 (Perceptual cognition) of the attributes of the Soul
(results) from (their) combination in the Soul. — 341.
« Perceptual cognition of the yogins is produced"— this is the topic
Perceptual cognition of understanding, etc., combined in the soul is on
the other hand produced simply from combination in the conjoint
(t.c , the soul which is conjoint with the mind), as it is with ourselves'
and others Ihe meaning, therefore, is that in such cognition there ik
no dependence upon any other form of contiguity or presentation'
Now, ordinary or popular perception is cognition, which is never
changing, produced from the contact of the senses and objects It
may be said to be produced by objects. Perception is connected with
the genus of presentation (that is, without some form of immediate
presentation, there can be no perception). And this is common to
ordinary or popular and to super-ordinary or hyper-popular Co«mi-
t!071S. - 15.
n*4t?~\vevr'*°^PLnt.heililltlbook °f the Commentary
of bankara on the \ aisesika Aphorisms. y
BhCtsya.-lii the view of Kandda, there are only three independent
and ultimate predicates, namely, Substance, Attribute, and Action
jr while describing the process of yoyic cognition of all realities, he
deals with these three predicates only and is entirely silent with regard
to the other so-called predicables.
KANiDA S&TRAS IX, 2, 1. 277
BOOK NINTH— CHAPTER SECOND.
Marks of inference enumerated.
Upaskdra. — Thus in the preceding chapter the perception of goyins and non-yogin*
IIBH been determined aouording to its cause, its nature, and its characteristic. Of the two
kinds into which pramJna or proof has been divided, viz., perceptual or sensuous and
inferential or produced by marks, the author now commences to determine that which is
produced by means of marks :
has
II 5. I R I ? II
Asya, of this, f^ Idam, it. qn«4 Karyyam, effect. Tl^Hi Karanam,
cause. *f4lfa Samyogi, conjunct. f^ttfe Virodhi, contradictory, ?=R«rTfo
.Samavayi, combined. «gf Cha, or. jft Iti, such. 5fflF«FH Laingikam, produced
by the mark of inference, mediate.
1. "It is the effect or cause of, conjunct with, contradictory
to, or combined in, this," — such is (cognition) produced by the^
mark of inference. — 342.
' Cognition' — this is the topic in hand. ' Laingikam ' means pro
duced from liny am or mark. Line/am is a property of the paksa, possess
ing vydptij pervasion or invariable concomitance with the major term.
Therein vydpti has been already declared. (Vide III. i. 14, supra.} One
thing is paksa in relation to another, when there is in the former non-
existence of proof or evidence repugnant to the desire for proving the
latter. Such evidence includes proof and disproof, or is demonstrative
as well as obstructive, for a paksa or minor term is that which contains
non-existence of both of them. For, there existing either demonstrative
or obstructive evidence, no one feels doubt or desire of demonstration.
It is for this reason that the ancients defined the paksa to be an object
wherein the existence of the sddhya, that which has to be established,
the major term, is doubtful, or an object wherein the existence of the
xddhya, is desired to be demonstrated. According to Jlvandtha Miira,
a paksa is that in which there is non-existence determined by the being
evidence preventive of the appearance of doubt terminable by the ascer
tainment of the possession of producible sddhya. Some others say that
that is & paksa in which there isnon-existence of demonstrativeevidence
accompanied with absence of desire of proof. In this view, the nature
of the paksa will exist even in the case of obstruction (i. e., even where
obstructive evidence, in other words evidence which disproves the
•existence of the major term in the minor, exists.) This then may be
seen in the Anumdna-Mayukha.
It then becomes apparent that the property or characteristic of
this paksa is the lih-ja or mark of inference. And the cognition, in the
form of a preseutative state of consciousness, which the mark, whether it
be a visible, an inferred, or a heard one, produces, is ' laingikam' or
that which is produced from a mark. Accordingly it has been said.
278 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
That mark is the medium of inference, which is connected with
that which is to be inferred, is known to exist in that which is accom
panied with that which is to be inferred, and does not exist at all
where that does not exist.
If is, therefore, the mark which is the instrument of inferential
cognition, and not its pardmarsa, subsumption, inasmuch as subsnraption,
being destitute of function, lacks causality whereas lit is the same (i. e.r
to cause inference) that is th* function of the mark.
Objection. — How can there be illation or inferential cognition,
where the smoke, etc., (i. e., marks) are either past or future ?
Answer—This is not a valid objection, as in this case the sddhya
or that which is to be proved, is also inferred as past or future.
Objection. — How can there be illation where, in consequence of au
impediment in the case, it is not ascertained whether the smoke etc.,
be past, future or present ?
Answer— There can be by no means, since in such an instance
there is uncertainty also as to the sddhya, that which is to be proved.
Objection.— How can an illation take place where there is certainty
as to the existence (of the mark) on a previous and a following day
and uncertainty as to the intermediate day ?
Answer. — In such a case, the inferential cognition results from the
inference of fire, etc., limited to those days, by means of smoke, etc ,
limited to those days, such having been ascertained to be the causalitv
of vydptt,, pervasion or the universal concomitance of the major and'
minor terms, (in the process of inference.)
Objection — How does inferential cognition arise from a cloud of
dust mistaken for smoke V
Answer. — It is because that which is understood to be pervaded
(i. e., the cloud of dust, supposed to be smoke, and therefore pervaded
by fire), is the mark of inference, and because the inference is
correct or incorrect according to the correctness or incorrectness of
such understanding ; else how should your own paramar-sa or subsum j-
tion be the instrument (of inferential cognition) in such a case V
Objection.— In the case of a ' supersensible mark, pardmarsa or sub-
sumption not being producible thereby, how can the mark have
the function (of being the means of inference) ?
Answer. — Such function is effected by there being a practical or
saving argument demonstrative of existence ( ksaimika sddhanata), for
otherwise, the function of combination in the case of hearing, etc .'
would not be possible.
Inference results from a mark which is an effect, as the inference
of fire, etc., from smoke, light, etc. ; also from (a mark which is) a
cause, as the inference of sound by a deaf man from a particular con
junction of the drum and the drumstick, or the inference of dharma or
merit, heaven, etc., by a pious man from the due performance of.
KANiDA S&TRAS IX, 2, 2.
sacrifice, ablution, etc., or the inference of rain from the due perfor
mance of kdrlri or Sacrifice for rain, or the inference of the efflux of
water from a channel which men are digging out from a river, etc., full
of water, or the inference of the rising of a stream from the observation
of rain overhead. This is, then, a single connection, characterised as
the relation of effect and cause, which has been stated in two ways.
Inference from a conjunct object is such as the inference of the sense-
organ of the skin from the observation of the physical organism which
is in conjunction with it. Inference from a contradictory or repugnant
object is such as the inference of an ichneumon concealed by bushes,
•etc., from the observation of an excited snake which is its natural
-ants:-j'>:iist. Inference from a combined object is such as the inference
of fire connected with water by means of the warmth of the water. — 1.
Vivriti — * * * * Cognition by means of marks is of three kinds,
according as it contains a cause, or an effect or a co-existent thing as the
mark, and is called 2>^rva~va^ sesa-vat, or sdmdnyato-dristam. Piirva-vat
means that which contains as the mark the antecedent, that is, the cause.
$ 'sa-vat means that which contains as the mark the consequent, that is, the
effect. Sdmdnyato-dristam means that which contains as the mark some
thing other than a cause or an effect. The author explains these forms
of inference, which have been also explained in the aphorisms of Gau
tama (i.e., the Nydya-S&tram).1 Asya idam karyyam' ;<Asya,' of this, i. «.,
of the sddhija or that which is to be proved, ' idam,' this the sddhana or
that which will prove the sddhya, is 'karyyam/ i.e., the effect — where such
usage arises, there it is the case of inference by means of an effect as
the inferential mark. e. </., the inference of fire and the like, by the
mark of the smoke and the like ' Asya idam karanam ' : that is infer
ence of which the mark is a cause is as, e. </., the inference of a shower
by means of a particular ascent of clouds. Sdmdnyato-dristam or that
which appears in the form of that of which the inferential mark is
something other than a cause or an effect, is manifold ; as, for example,
the inference of the iron ring as being in conjunction with the mortar
and the like, by means of the mark of a particular pestle which is
conjoint with the iron ring (at its end) ; so also is the inference of an
ichneumon concealed behind bushes and the like, by the sight of a
particular excited snake which is the enemy of the ichneumon ; and
also the inference of fire and the like (as existing) in a frying pan and
the like, by means of the hot touch combining in fire, in the form of the
counter-opposite of combination favourable to fire.
Inference and the Law of Cause and Effect, how related.
(Jpaskdra. — It may be objected that this enumeration (of marks) is inadequate, since it
floes not include the inference of the heaving of the ocean from the rising of tho moon, of the
rise of Canopus (a bright star in the southern constellation Argo navis) from the tranquility
-or clearness of the waters of the rising of tho moon from the expansion of the Nymphaja, of
the sotting of the fourteen lunar mansions or naksatras from the rising of the other fourteen,
of colour from taste, or of a particular taste from a particular colour.
II & I ^ I R It
Asya, its, to it. ^ Idam, it. ^T^WH^^f^?*: Karyya-karaua-sam-
•bandhah, (The suggestion or introduction of the relation of effect and
280 VAI£E§IKA PHILOSOPHY
cause.) ^ Cha, and, whereas. SRT^n^ Avayavut, from a member of the-
argument or syllogism, vr^fr Bhavati, arises.
2. l It is its ' ( — this cognition is sufficient to cause an illation
to be made) ; whereas (the introduction of) the relation of effect
and cause arises from a (particular) member (of the argument).
— 343.
In anticipation of this objection, he says.
' It is its ' — 'this much only becomes the instrument of illation.
' Asya/ i. e., of the means of illation, e. g., smoke, etc., ' idam/ i. e., (it
is) that which is to be established, e. </., fire, etc. ; or, l asya/ I. e., of the
pervader, e. g., fire, etc., ' idam,' i. e., (it is) that which can be pervaded,.
e. jr., smoke, etc. It is, therefore, only the apprehension of the being
that which can be pervaded, that governs (the process of illation), and
not also the relation of effect and cause, etc. Lest it might be objected
that the enumeration (of marks of inference) in the preceding aphorism
is consequently futile, he adds ' the relation of effect and cause.' Other
relation (i. e., of the conjunct, the contradictory, and the combined),
mentioned above, are also hereby implied. In the word l relation/
there is the tropical suggestion of that in which relation is the thing
contained. ' Relation ' accordingly means the introduction or talk of
relation. Whence does the introduction or talk or relation arise '? He
gives the reply by saying 'avayavat, i. <>., from a part or member (of the
argument), that is to say, only from the uddharana or example or illus
tration. The fifth case-ending or the ablative inflection (HI 'avayavat '}
bearsithe sense of the infinite. The meaning, therefore, is that, in this
Darsana or philosophy as well as in the Samkhya and other Darsanas
the introduction of the relation of effect and cause, etc., has been made
in conformity with, or regard being had to, the uddliarana or illustra
tion (q. v.} further below).
Thus, then, vydpyatva, the being that which can be pervaded (as the-
mark, by that of which it is the mark) denotes the possession of a
natural connection, the natural being that which is not accidental or
adventitious. This quality of being non-accidental is in the case
of perceptive object, known simply from its being ascertained, in some
cases that they do not pervade (or are not invariably concomitant with)
that which is to be proved (or that which is denoted by the major term),
and from the certainty, in other cases that they pervade the instru
ment of inference or inferential mark. Of supersensible objects esta
blished by proof, some are pervasive of both (that which is to be proved,
and the instrument of inference), or non-pervasive only of the instru
ment of inference, or non-pervasive only of that which is to be proved.
Amongst these, the quality of being non-accidental is to be ascertained,
in the first case, from their being pervasive of the instrument of infer
ence ; in the second case, from their being non-pervasive of that which
is to be proved ; and in the fourth case also, from their being pervasive
of the instrument of inference. In the third case also, there being room
for the further inquiry that while it is not possible or proved why that
which pervades, should pervade only this much (t. e., the instrument of
inference) and not more, how it is at the same time possible for that
KANlDA SOTRAS IX, 2, 2. 281
which does not pervade, to pervade even so much (i. e., the instrument
of inference), and thus acquisition and preservation (or loss and
gain) being counter-balanced, and from other considerations, the
quality of being non-accidental should be determined. The attitude
of mind that the demon of apprehension that some upddhi, accident,
adjunct, or external condition, may exist is these cases, attacks
all rules of conduct, prescriptive and prohibitive, should be
rejected, inasmuch as there is possibility of certainty of non-accidental
nature. The definitions of upddhi nnd vydpti (pervasion) have been
already stated.
This inference is of two kinds self-satisfying or logical, and other-
satisfying or rhetorical. Therein inference for the sake of , or origina
ting from, oneself, arises from the investigation by a person himself
of vydpti, pervasion or universal concomitance of the major and middle
terms, and paksadharmatd, the being a property or characteristic of
the minor term or the existence of the middle in the minor term ; and
inference for the sake of, or originating from, another, results from the
knowledge of vydpti and paksadharmatd produced from an argument
(nydya,') enunciated by another.
A nydya argument or syllogism is a proposition productive of
verbal cognition which leads to the recognition or sub-sumption of the
mark of illation in the third member of the syllogism. The members
thereof are five ; and membership here denotes the being a proposition
productive of verbal cognition, which again is productive of another
verbal cognition leading to the recognition or sub-surnption of the infer
ential mark in the third member. Such propositions are : pratijnd,
enunciation ; hetu, mark or reason ; uddharana, illustration ; upanaya,
application, ratiocination, or deduction ; and nigamana, conclusion. Of
these the pratijnd, enunciation, is aproposition which is a member of the
argument or syllogism, conveying verbal cognition the object whereof
is neither less nor greater than that of the inferential cognition desired ;
the hetu, mark or reason, is that member of the syllogism, ending with
the ablative inflection, which is applied to the instrument of inference
or the middle term under consideration ; the uddharana, illustration, is
that member of the syllogism which is declaratory or demonstrative of
the inseparable existence of the given major and middle terms ; the
upanaya, application or deduction, is that member of the syllogism
which establishes that the hetu which is so distinguished by the posses
sion of inseparable existence, is a distinguishing characteristic or con
tent of the paksa, the subject of the conclusion, %. e.} the minor term ;
and the nigamaua, conclusion, is that member of the syllogism which
declares that the object denoted by the given major term is a distin
guishing characteristic or content of the paksa. Thus the syllogism
proceeds as follows : —
Sound is non-eternal, — pratijfid,
Because it is an effect, — hetu.
Whatever is an effect or producible is non-eternal, — uddharana,
It (sound) possesses effectness or producibility pervaded by
non-eternality, — upanaya.
282 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
Therefore, (it is) non-eternal, — nigamana.
The significant appellations given by the'l Vaifesikas to these very
members are pratijnd (enunciation of that which is to be proved),
apadesa (reason), nidarsana (instance), anusandhdna (investigation),
and pratydmndya (re-stateraent of the pratijnd'). In this connection,
the mode of the application of vdda, theory or discourse, jalpa, disputa
tion or demolition of the argument of the opponent and establishment
of one's own theory, and vitandd, controversion or only destructive
criticism, and the characteristics of chhala, misconstruction, jdti, futile
or adverse reply, and nigraha-sthdna, ground of defeat, ^. e., misapplica
tion or non-application of the argument advanced, may be sought in
the Vddi-vinoda. — 2.
Inferential Cognition includes Verbal Cognition.
U"paskdra.—With the purpose of including other forma of proof into (the {inferential, ho
commences another topic.
Etena, hereby. STT*^ Sabdam, verbal. sqT93TrTO( Vyakhyatam,
explained.
3. Hereby verbal (cognition is) explained. — 344.
This cognition is ' Sabdam ' (verbal), produced by the instrument
ality of sound or word — this doctrine, maintained by the Nydya school,
is also, ' vydkhydtam,' explained, ' etena ' (by this), by the characteris
tic of being inferential, that is to say, simply as being produced from
marks (of inference). As inferential cognition depends upon vydpti,
pervasion, paksadharmatd, the existence of the middle in the minor
term, and recollection, so does verbal cognition also. Thus, e. </., "These
objects denoted words, or meanings of words, are mutually connected,
since they are represented in memory by words possessing expectancy
for, or dependence upon, one another, etc., as are the meanings of words
in l Drive away the cow.' " Here it is by observing or apprehending the
characteristic of being represented in, or called to, memory by a
number of words possessing expectancy for, or dependence upon, one
another, which characteristic is pervaded by the possession of mutual
connection by these meanings of, or objects denoted by, those words,
that one infers the possession of connection. What then is the use of
the supposition of sound or word or language as a form of proof ?
Objection. — There can be no inference in cognition produced by
words, inasmuch as such inference fails where the words are spoken by
an untrustworthy person, e. g., that there are fivs fruits on the river
bank.
Answer. — The objection does not arise, as the words must have
the qualification of coining from the mouth of an dpta or trustworthy
person. For trustworthiness denotes the possession of knowledge of
the meaning of the statement corresponding to objective reality within
the reach of the meaning of the given statement, and not merely that
a person is not a deceiver.
KAWADA StiTRAS IX, 2, 3. 283
Objection. — But this is hard to apprehend, prior to the intuition
of the meaning of the statement.
Answer. — Not so, for even those who hold the theory of the autho
ritativeness of word or language, admit the apprehensibility of the
quality of being spoken by a trustworthy person, which serves to
differentiate fallible or false language.
Objection — They depend upon that (i. e., the quality of being
spoken by a trustworthy person) for the apprehension of authoritative-
ness, whereas verbal cognition is produced even without the apprehen
sion of that quality. In your case also the apprehension or inference
must needs be in accordance with nature of the inferential mark. And
that which is pervaded (i. e., the middle term), is qualified with the
possession of the quality of being spoken by a trustworthy person.
Answer. — The objection is not successful, since it is possible to
have such general apprehension as " He is here infallible."
Objection — But the term ' here ' ultimately means the same thing
as the term 'the connection under consideration/ So that to apprehend
that (i. e., the quality of being spoken by a trustworthy person), previ
ously, is simply impossible.
Ansict'r. — It is not, in consequence of the possibility of ascertain
ment of the inferential mark by means of the possibility of ascertain
ment in a general way of the quality of being spoken by a trustworthy
person, from the force of association with the topic and other circum
stances. If even then discrepancy sometimes appears the inferential
process proceeds as by the property of smoke (mistaken) in vapour, etc.
Objection. — What is in this case the vddhya or the major term ? Is
it that the meanings of words are in fact connected, or that their
connection is something possible ? It cannot be the first, as it is not
the case with the statement of an untrustworthy person. Nor can it
be the second, for, even though mere connectibility or coherence of
words be proved, still inference cannot proceed unshaken, in conse
quence of the uncertainty of actual connection. Moreover, coherence
being previously known as the qualification of the inferential mark,
what is the use of inference ?
Answer. — This is not a valid objection, inasmuch as it is the gene
ral proposition or uniformity which is the addhya or the thing to be
proved, and, there can be no violation of the rule in consequence of
the qualification, as has been already stated, by the characteristic of
being spoken by a trustworthy person.
Objection. — Expectancy or interdependence of the words of a sen
tence is equivalent to antecedent non-existence in the hearer of the
cognition of connection (of the meanings of words) producible by it. It
is only so long as it exists as such that it can be the inferential mark.
The futility of inference (in verbal cognition), therefore, follows from
this that in order to the cognition of expectancy, the cognition of con
nection must take place beforehand, and not at any other time.
284 VAlgESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
Answer. — This is not the case, for we do not say that expectancy
is merely antecedent non-existence of the eognition of connection. On
the other hand, expectancy is distinguished with the possession of
inseparable existence or universal agreement of what is presented to
consciousness by the words and what is represented in memory, as it is
from the cognition of this adjective element that the cognition of
expectancy results.
Objection. — Let then 'inseparable existence itself constitute ex
pectancy.
Answer. — By no means. For, " The water of the river is pure,"
" The buffalo grazes in the basin of the river " — in these cases also it
would entail the consciousness of the connection of the river and the
basin by means of their inseparable existence in the form of the cogni
tion that the buffalo grazes in the basin of the river of pure water.
And in such instances as " The water-lily is blue," in the presence of
inseparable existence of the water-lily and blueness even in particular
cases, would make the inseparable existence of the substance and
attribute presented to consciousness by the words, possible (that is, that
all water-liles were blue.)
Or, it may be that expectancy is nothing but the desire to know
or enquiry with reference to the object recalled by words, or that it is
the complement of the connotation. Still the cognition of it is neces
sary, inasmuch as in a cause which is being known, there must appear
divergence in characteristic from what is not a cause, appro
priate to such cognition, as is the case with pervasion or univer
sal concomitance. It is for the very same reason, whether
connectibility or coherence of the words of a sentence mean
the absence of certainty of non-agreement, or the non-existence of
contradictory evidence, or the observation of agreement with similar
other words, or that in the connection of the meaning of the one
word (e.</., fire) with that of another (e.g.. wets), there exists as something
contained therein, certain knowledge that the one (e. </., fire) is not
the counter-opposite of absolute non-existence inherent in the other
(e. y.j wetsj, that cognition of coherence is necessary. Cognition of
adjacency of the words of a sentence, in the form of recollection
without interval of the objects denoted by them, is also a condition.
It may be that differences or peculiarities of connection of words result
only from the peculiarities of differences of the words which are going
to be connected ; and the proof of the peculiarity or difference in this
way, is not undesired. Or, the desired peculiarity may be proved by
the characteristic of its so determining cognition, inasmuch as the
inference takes place that these words, being a collection of words
possessing expectancy, co-herence, and adjacency, are preceded by, or
liave for their antecedent, cognition of the connection of the ideas or
mailings represented in memory, as is the case with the group of the
words " Drive away the cow." The opposition that the sddhya or thing
to be proved is that these words have the connection of the meanings
recalled, and that the possession by words of connection with the
meanings of those words, is impeded, is better left unnoticed. Nor is
it the being expressive of, or the means of making known, connection, by
KANADA StiTRAS IX, 2, 3. 285
being the inferential mark, that is the possession of connection by the
words, since the mark not being proved to exist prior to the inference,
there can be no apprehension or cognition of the peryasion thereof.
Some say that expressive movement or gesture is a new form of
proof. To this it is replied: Gesture is of two kinds, conventional, and
non-con-ventional. Therein that which is conventional, calls back to
mind the sound or word lying in the understanding or intent or com
mon consent, but does not also produce certain cognition of connection
(between gesture and its significance), as letters do. It is sound or word,
rising up in memory, that is the means of proof there, and it has been
.already declared that the chracteristic of being a mark of illation
belongs to sound or word. Nor is recollection of the word a collateral
or secondary function of gesture, inasmuch as, in order to exercise
-such function, gesture would have to be uniformly present in all
cases,, whereas there takes place intuition of meanings from words even
without the intervention of gesture.
Objection. — This being so, how does the conduct of a deaf person
come to depend upon, or spring from, gesture ? For, it is impossible for
him to have knowledge of the convention in a given instance.
Answer. — The objection cannot prevail, for it is to be considered
how he derives certain knowledge of the meaning or idea even, from
gesture, when it is impossible for him to grasp the sense or connection
of the meaning or idea also. His conduct, again, springs from the
apprehension of inseparable existence (or serviceable associated (habit),
in the same way as particular adaptations of conduct are possible in
the case of the elephant and the horse in accordance with the pricks of
the goad and strokes of the whip.
On the other hand, non-conventional gesture, — that kind of it
which, further, is in agreement or association with action, — causes
.-activity in the employee by reminding him of the intention of the
-employer, but does not produce sure cognition in any case. For example,
as according to the instruction " You should come on the blowing of
"the conch-shell/' the man turns up on hearing the blowing of the
.conch-shell, so a man strikes another at the proper time- according to
the pre-ordination " You should strike him when I shall raise my
forefinger," but this does not prove anything. Non-conventional
gesture, again, which is in agreement with cognition, is either pro
minent on its subjective side, as in " By the raising of the ten fingers,
it should be understood by you that the number of coins, (or contor
tions of the limbs in ascetic posture), or of the purdnas is ten ; " or it
is prominent on its verb or predicate side, as in " You should come up,
after seeing contraction of the hand." Thus, by this form of gesture
the meanings of words are no doubt recalled, but only severally or
•each independently of the rest ; but their mutual association or con
nection also is not illuminated by it, as it is by nominative, objective,
And other case-endings which explain that inter-relation, inasmuch as
in the case under consideration, invariable or constant components of
.gesture do not exist.
Objection. — How do then activity and inactivity proceed from
gesture in the absence of cognition of connection ?
286 VAlgESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
Answer.— Yon may take it that these follow from either the one or
the other of doubt or uncertainty amd pratibhd or inventive genius or
instinct. Gesture also is, therefore, no proof. _ 3.
Sound or word cannot produce cognition of its sense or meaning.
UpasMra.—li may be »Bked, how sound (or word) conld be a mark of illation, when-
its difference from the nmrk appear* from its posting the nature of an apadeia or I
description. Anticipating this, he says :
\g: Hetuh, reason. *jq^: Apadesah, description. Sound,
Lingam, mark. JWWT Prainanarn, proof, ^ Karanam, instrument.
fftr Hi, these. fR*rf??R3( An-artha-antaram, not different things.
4. Reason, Description, Mark, Proof, Instrument— these are
not antonyms. — 345.
' Apadesah ' means sound (or word), according to its derivation
that by it objects are referred to, i. e., affirmed or described. And it is
really a synonym of hetu, reason, and linya, mark. 'Pramanam' means the
instrument of true cognition in the manner of the inferential mark. In
like manner, the word ' karanam ' also is equivalent to the mark itself
which is the instrument (karana) of inferntial cognition. For the
operation of karana or the instrument is two-fold : Some karana
operates or exercises its function under ur subject to contact or conti
guity, and some karana exercises its function on the strength of inse
parable existence. Sound (or word;, on the contrary, has neither
contact nor inseperable existence with the object or meaning ; htmee,.
how can it lead to the object ?
Objection.— -It leads to the object with the help of arbitrament or
according to direction.
Anawer.—It cannot do so, for arbitrament or direction is with.
reference to the meaning of words, and not to their connection.
Objection^- There may be arbitrament or direction with reference
to that also.
Answer.— No for that connection being of a manifold nature it is
impossible that ,t could be the object of reference by arbitrament Or
QI recti on.
O^zon.-But it iB'from the force of arbitrament or direction in
e°afni&0t:dS ^ ^"^ ^ ^ ™^ ^ a ^^nce also
Answer.— This i is not the case, as there would be then over extei
sion or undue application of the principle, if something is oroughV
thing else!'*' "P 7 arbltrameilt or directjo" with regard to some-
fT,ia 0^c**?»-r-IfY*riB,l)le antecedei^e or pervasion of connection in,
this case will be that of connection as recalled by sound.
KANADA 8CTRA8 IX,/2, 5. 287
Answer. — If it be so, then, by that admission, inference itself finds
admittance on the strength of invariable antecedence or pervasion.
Arbitrament or direction also, if it implied mere intention or desire,
would be unduly applied or too wide.
Objection. — -But the desire of tsvara, G-od, cannot be said to be too
^vide.
Answer. — Yes, it may be so, inasmuch as even in the absence of
divine will, the words, river or Ganga (Ganges), etc., suggest or call up
the ideas of the bank, etc.
This is enough of over-forwardness in a logician. — 4.
Comparison, Presumption, Sub-sumption, Privation, and Tradition
are all included in Inference.
UpaskAra. — For the purpose of showing that comparison, etc., also, recognised of others
(as so many independent means of proof) and which proceed on the strength of inseparable
•existence or universal concomitance, are merely different forms of inferential cognition, he
.says :
Asya, its. f^* Idam, it. fft Iti, such. This. ^MMRidrMl^ Buddhi-
Apeksitevut, because of the cognition or notion being needed.
5. (Comparison, Presumption, Sab-sumption, Privation, and
Tradition are all included in Inference by marks), because they
depend, for their origin, upon the cognition, namely, " It is its."
— 346.
The words " of comparison, presumption, comprehension or sub-
sumption and privation " complete the aphorism. ' Asya,' of the per-
vader, i idam ' (it is) the pervaded, — the cognition is in this form. The}'-
are dependent upon it, by which it is depended upon as their originator.
•< Buddhi-apeksitatva ' means the state of being so dependent. In
consequence of such dependence, — -this is the meaning of the term, it
being a relative compound formed similarly to dhita-dgnih (by whom
fire has been deposited), or formed with the affix ita (which signifies
that something, e.g., dependence upon the cognition, has been produced
in the something else, e. y., comparison, etc.), according to the rule that
it is applied to the words star, etc., (so that tdrakd + ita = tdrakita =
starry, heaven).
Upamdna, comparison or analogy, is in every respect nothing but
<inumdna, or inference, by means of words. Now the sentence, " A
gavaeus or gayal looks like a cow," is spoken by a forester in reply to
-the enquiry by a twonsman, viz., " What does a gayal look like to ? "
Here immediately after hearing the above sentence at distant place,
"the townsman determines the meaning of the name, gayal, of the
strength of the community of substratum, namely that which is like a
cow is the object of reference by, or designate of, the word, gayal.
Then when ho goes to the forest and meets an animal body of that des
cription, he recognises that that is that which is the designate of the
•word, gayal.
288 VAI£E§IKA PHILOSOPHY.
Objection. — At the time of hearing the sentence at a distant placer
the generic nature of the gayal, which is condition or occasion of the
recognition or application of the name, is not known. How then can
there be such determination by, or application of, the name '?
Answer. — There can be such determination, as the cognition there
of (i. e., of the generic nature) is possible by means of suggestion or
metaphorically.
Objection. — But where is the room for suggestion, when in the
sentence, " A gayal looks like a cow/' there is no want of proof of the
agreement or positionjof the subject and predicate ?
Answer. — There is room for suggestion, inasmuch as complete equi
valence of the two terms still remains to be proved. For it is not
proper to hold up before one, who desires to be enlightened Tn the
matter, likeness to a cow as the condition or occasion of partial appli
cation of the name. Therefore, it (the name) refers to a particular
genus or class in its entirety. Hence arises the possibility of sugges
tion. Or, the word, gayal, is denotative of the animal, gayal, being
applied thereto by the elect, and there existing no other application
of it. Other applications being non-existent, whatever word is applied
by the elect to a certain object, the same is denotative of that, as the-
word, cow, is of the cow. It is from this inference that the application
of the name, gayal, comes to be determined.
And the reasoning which you may set forth as being auxiliary to
upamdna, comparison, would better go with anumdna, inference, which
has been established as a method of proof. What is the use of upamdna
which, as a method of proof, is yet to be supposed ?
More detailed consideration on this subject may be sought in the
Anum Ana-May tikha.
Arthdpattiy Presumption or Explanation, also is nothing but infer
ence. Thus, (1) presumption from the observed, arises where by means
of the non-existence of Chaitra who is living, in the house, ascertained
by stronger evidence, (e. g., perception), his existence outside it is
presumed. Here the cognition of Chaitra's existence outside the house
is wholly dependent upon the ascertainment of the relation of the
pervader between the demonstrable and the demonstrator. For, as a
matter of fact, the non-existence of a living person in the house is
accompanied with this existence outside it, or there arises the cogni
tion that the non-existence of a living person in the house is impossible
without his existence outside it. In the first case, there is apprehen
sion of positive pervasion or concomitance, and, in the last, of negative-
pervasion.
Objection. — Pervasion does exist, but the apprehension thereof does-
Hot here take place.
Answer. — Were this the case, then, in the absence of the
apprehension of pervasion, there would be no scope or occasion for the-
manifestation of presumption, and there would consequently be sup
position of only that which, as an entity, would demonstrate pervasion
existing in its proper form or as such. This is the direction or point.
K ANiDA StiTR AS IX, 2, 5. 289
The inclusion of presumption due to the instrumentality of doubt
or uncertainty as well as of that due to the instrumentality contra
diction or contrast or opposition, in inference, should be also under
stood or inferred ; for contrast or opposition, characterised as unifor
mity of non-co-existence, also is constituted by pervasion or (negative)
concomitance.
(2) Presumption from what is heard, is also inference by means of
the inferred. " Deva-datta, who is stout, does not eat by day" — By this
proposition, stoutness is inferred, and, by means of that stoutness, there
takes place inference of eating at night in this way that Deva-datta
eats at night, because, as he does not eat by day, stoutness cannot
otherwise appear in him.
fSamhhava, Comprehension or Sub-sumption, also is merely a form
of inference. For, the examples of it are : A drona (a standard measure)-
does nut exceed a khdri (one khdri = 4t dronas) ; an ddhaka does not
exceed a drona (one drona = 4i ddhakas) ; a hundred does not not exceed
a thousand ; etc. Here a khdri contains a drona, being constituted by
it. One thing being constituted by another thing, the former is
possessed of the latter by means of the latter, as a water-pot is possessed
of its components. Other instances should be similarly understood.
That learning is probable in a Brdhmana (because Brdhmanas as a class
are learned), that valour is probable in a Ksatriya (because Ksatriyas as
a class are valiant), etc., on the other hand, do not at all become means
of proof, inasmuch as they do not produce certainty.
Abhdva, Non-existence or Privation, also is not a different form of
evidence ; for, being similar to the inference of the cause by means of
the effect, the inference of the non-existence of the cause by means of
the non-existence of the effect, is included within inference itself, as
pervasion or universal concomitance is the ground of such inference
by means of non-existence.
The Jthattas (Prabhdkara and other Mimdmsakas), however, maintain
that the evidence which causes the apprehension of non-existence in the
ground, etc., (v.g-, The water-pot does not exist on the groundj, is called
non perception. Now, this evidence or proof is in some cases included in
perception, and in other cases, inference, inasmuch as non-existence is
apprehended by the eye, etc., themselves. For, it cannot be said that the
senses are exhausted Justin the apprehension of the substratum (of
non-existence, e. </., the ground), since their function continues up to
the apprehension of non-existence.
AitUiya, Tradition, is a succession of sayings of which the authors
are not known. Itiha — this collection of expletives appears in the
narration of past events. The state of being such narration of past events
is called aitihya, traditional saying. If it is not impeded in its meaning,
then, coining under the class of verbal cognition, it is a made of
inference. For example, In this Banyan tree there dwells a Yaksa
There is a Gaurt (a Buddhistic Spirit) in the madhttka tree (Bassia
latifolia*) etc. Now, if the traditional sayings come from the mouth of
trustworthy persons, then they are as has been already declared ; if
they do not come from the mouth of trustworthy persons, then they are
no evidence at all.
a90 VAI^ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
Accordingly it is established that proof or evidence is of two kinds
only, perception and inference __ 5.
Wvriti.—Sambhava or Probability is cognition dependent upon a
plurality of concomitances ; e. g., learning is probable in a Brdhmana •
a hundred is probably contained in a thousand.
Note.— The construction put by Jayandrdyana upon the word,
Sambhava is explicitly rejected by Sankara Misra. In the lexicon
Medmi also we find that the meaning of the word is Adheyasya
ddhdrdnatiriktatvdm, i. e., the state of what is contained not exceeding
that which contains it, or, simply, the relation of the part not bein?
greater than the whole.
Reminiscence, how produced.
Upatkdra.— Inferential cognition having been explained, he now begini another
topic.
Atma-manasot, between the soul and the mind.
Samyoga-visesat, from a particular conjunction. ^TRPj; Samskarat,
from impression or retention or latency. ^ Cha, and. *nfr:Sm ritilj,
Reminiscence.
6. Reminiscence (results) from a particular conjunction
between the Soul and the Mind and also from Impression or
latency. — 347.
" Results"--This is the complement of the aphorism. ' Samyoga-
vise^afc' means contact or contiguity such as reflection or meditation or
inter-penetration, etc. From this as the non-combinative cause, in the
soul as the combinative cause, < Srnritifc/ (reminiscence), a particular
kind of cognition or knowledge, is produced, He states the
efficient cause by ' Samskarat.' By the word ' cha ' he implies past
experience which too is operative here as the object recalled. Re
miniscence or recollection imitates the correctness of the previous
experience, such alone being the recollection of him who has mistaken
a rope for a snake and has consequently fled from it. It does not,
moreover, follow that reminiscence should take place at all times or
continually, einee it depends on the resuscitation of the mental im
pression. Accordingly it has been said by the revered Prasastadeva,
4< Reminiscence, caused by the inferential process (as in inferring fire
from smoke there is recollection of the universal concomitance of fire
and smoke), desire, re-produetion (or suggestion of one idea by an
other), and aversion, and having for its content the past, among
objects seen, heard, and otherwise experienced, (results) from a parti
cular conjunction between the soul and the mind, due to the observa
tion of a suggestive mark, voluntary attempt at recollection, etc., and
from impression or latency produced by intuitions constantly repeated
vnd attended to with interest."
KANADA SCTRAS IX, 2, 7. 291
The cognition of highly advanced sages, or their intellectual
intuition has not been separately noticed by the author of the apho
risms. It is included within perception by Yogins or ascetics (See IX-
ii. 13 below). In tho treatise, called the Paddrtha-Pradefa, an account of
it has been given, which is as follows : •' Prescient or inventive cogni
tion which is produced from conjunction between the soul and the
mind, and also from a particular d/tarma, virtue or merit, independently
of inferential marks, etc., in advanced sages, the promulgators of the
Vedas, in respect of objects, supersensible, or past, present, arid future,
or in respect of dliarma, etc., as preserved in books, — that is called
sagely cognition. " This form of cognition at times arises in ordinary or
wordly people also ; as when a young maiden says, " My heart assures
me my brother will depart to morrow." — 6-
Dreamy how produced.
Upankdra. — Thus four-fold vidyd, or true cognition, or knowledge, having been
explained, it now becomes proper to explain \avidyd or false cognition or knowledge.
Therein doubt or uncertainty and error have been incidentally ascertained before. For the
purpo.se of ascertaining dreaming, he says :
H S. I * I vs ||
, Tatha, so. ^Jf: Svapnah, dreaming.
7. So (also is) dreaming. — 348.
The meaning is that as reminiscence results from a particular con
junction between the soul and the mind, and from impression or latency,
so also does cognition in dreaming. Cognition in dreaming is the mental
experience, through the channels of the senses, belonging to one, when
one's senses have ceased to be active and one's mind is in a quiescent
state. And this is of three kinds (1) It partly arises from acuteness of
impression or facility of reproductiveness ; as in a man who, in love or
in auger, thinks intently on some object, when he goes to sleep, in that
state, cognition resembling perception, in the form, " This is the contest
between Karna and Arjuna " (two heroes of the Mahdbhdrdta), is pro
duced, through the influence of impression, reproductiveness or latency,
produced by previous hearing of the Purdiias, etc. (2) It arises partly
from deran gemeut of the humours or affections of the body, viz., wind,
bile, and phlegm. Therein, in consequence of disorder of the wind, one
dreams of moving about in the sky, wandering about on the earth,
fleeing with fear from tigers, etc., and the like ; under the influence of
an unwholesome excess of the bile, one dreams of entering into fire,
embracing flames of fire, golden mountains, corruscations of flashing
lightning, sudden extensive conflagrations, etc. ; while, through predo
minance of phlegmatic deragement, one dreams of swimming upon the
sea; immersions in rivers, sprinklings with showers of rain, silver
mountains, etc., (-3) Dreams appear also uuder the influence of adrstam
(the invisible after-elfects of past acts) or deserts. These are cognitions,
produced in one whose internal sense has been lulled to sleep or over
powered with sleep, in respect of the experiences of the present or
previous states of existence. Therein soinnial cognition, signifying
good, results from dharma or merit, and has for its object the riding
upon elephants, ascending on mountains, acquistion of the royal
2&2 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
umbrella, feasting upon pudding, interview with the sovereign, and the
like ; whereas soranial cognition, signifying evil, arises from adharmi
or demerit, and has its object unction with oil, falling into blind wells,
riding upon camels, immersion in mire, the seeing of one's own nuptials,
and the like.
The above three, only as jointly operating, have causality here (i.e.,
in the production of dreams). It should be further observed that this
division of causes, is based on the predominance of one or another of
the qualities of these causes in their effects. — 7.
Cognition accompanying dreaming, how produced.
Upatkilra.—- It may bo objected :— The cognition which springs up in tho midst of a
dream, in the form of reoollootion of the very same object which is experiencad in sonmial
cognition, does not posaoss tho nature of dreaming inasmuch as dreaming takes the form of
perceptual experience. From vrhat cause, then, doea it arise ?
To this he gives the reply :
Svapna-antikara, that which intervenes in, or lies near
to, or accompanies, dream.
8. (So is) consciousness accompanying dreams.— 349.
The word ' so ' comes in from the preceding aphorism. The mean
ing, therefore, is that as dreaming, so also consciousness accompanying
dreaming arises from a particular conjunction between the soul and the
mind and also from impression or retention. The difference between the
two cases extends only thus'.f ar that soranial cognition results from impres
sion or retention produced by former experience, while consciousness
accompanying dreaming results from impression or retention produced
by experience arising at the very time (of dreaming.) It has been accord
ingly stated by Professor Parsatttadcva, " Somnial cognition is merely
recollection, inasmuch as it results from looking back upon past cogni
tions." The writer of the vritti also says, " Somnial cognition, its
function being the illumination of experienced objects, is not a different
thing from recollection.''
Some teach that ' consciousness accompanying dreaming ' is cogni
tion amounting to certitude, in the midst of dreams, as, for example,
" I am in a state of lying on the bed," etc. — 8.
Another cause of dreaming and of cognition in dreaming.
Upttakdra. — He adds another cause of dreaming and consciousness accompanying
dreaming.
II S. T R I 5. II
Dharmat from dharma or merit, ^r Cha, also.
9. (Dreaming and consciousness accompanying dreaming
result) from dharma also. — 350.
The word ' cha ' is used with the purpose of adding adharmar
demerit. This has been already explained. — 9.
KAN AD A SftTRAS Ix, 2, 11. 293
Vivrlti. — * * * * Some think that this aphorism has been laid
down for the purpose of showing that in some cases dreaming, etc., are
also produced from dharma, etc., alone, even without the action of
Samskdra or impression, and that the poetic observation of Sriharsa
that the maid Sleep brings before the vision of man, through the all-
pervading efficacy of adfistam, even objects which have not been
•observed before, accordingly becomes explained.
Causes of Avidya or Incertitude.
I7paskdra.-—Now, referring to the series (of doubt, dream, incertitude) he says :—
n s. i * i?o H
Indriya-dosat, from imperfection of the senses.
13amskara-dosat; from imperfection of impression. *3 Cha, and.
A-vidya, false knowledge. Incertitude.
10. False knowledge (arises) from imperfection of the Senses
and from imperfection of Impression. — 351.
The word ' A-vidya/ though a general term, applies to incertitude,
according to the context, doubt, dream, and incertitude having
been mentioned. Therein imperfection of the senses is inefficiency
caused by predominance of the bile, etc. Imperfection of impression
is the being accompanied with non-observation of distinctions ; for
under such non-observation, false cognition is produced. — 10.
Vivfiti. — Understanding according to another mode is divided into
two kinds, certitude and incertitude. Of these, he states the cause of
incertitude.
' Indriya-dosah,' is such as opthalmia, etc. ' Samskara-dosah ' ig
the being the effect of erroneous experience, etc. The word ' and '
implies the. addition of such imperfections as remoteness, etc., and also
sub-sumptions of false marks or middle-terms, etc. The cause, then, of
false knowledge or incertitude is imperfection ; and imperfection, aa
•consisting of biliousness, remoteness, etc., is of diverse kinds.
The characteristic of Avidya.
.— He states the characteristic oridefinition of avidyd in general :
II & I * I U N
^ Tat, that. Avidyd. false knowledge. £g9MH Dusta-jfianam, im
perfect cognition.
11. That (/. e., Avidya) is imperfect knowledge. — 352.
' Tat,' an indeclinable word, conveying the sense of a pronoun,
alludes to avidyd. That, avidyd, is 'dustajnanam', i.e., cognition which is
anduly applied, cognition that a thing is what in fact it is not, in other
words, cognition determined in the manner of a divergent object, and
294 VAI£E§IKA PHILOSOPHY.
having the mode which does not reside in the object in question. Imperfec
tion consists also of cognition taking the form of uncertainty. Doubt,
therefore, even where there is only one alternative, is vicious, being
identical with non-assurance or non ascertainment.
The four (forms of avidyd), therefore, namely, Doubt, Error, Dream,
and Regression or Indecision are included in this aphorism. — -11.
The characteristic of Vidya.
Upatkdra.— (He declares what scientific cognition is :)
II S. I R I ?R II
Adustatn, not imperfect. Free from imperfection, f^nj Vidya
true knowledge, Vidyd.
12. (Cognition) free from imperfection, is (called) Vidya or
scientific knowledge. — 353.
The word " Cognition " comes in (from the preceding aphorism).
* Adustam ' means produced by organs of sense which are not inefficient
or defective (in consequence of any derangement mentioned above).
The meaning, therefore, is that vidyd is the experience of a thing in its
proper place, or the experience of a thing in the same manner in which
another thing having a common substratum with the former ig experi
enced, or experience of a thing not having the mode which does not
reside in the thing in question. It is of two kinds, immediate or sensu
ous, and mediate or inferential. — -12.
Cognition by tiaycis Siddhas, how produced.
Upaskdra. — It may be objected : The cognition (of objects beyond tho reach of senses),
by advanced sages, also appears in tho very samo form in which other cognitions, having
a common substratum with the former, take placu. It is again not produced by the senses,
inasmuch as it cognizes objects which are not in contact with them. Nor is it produced
by means of inferential marks, as it is produced in tho absence of any investigation of such
marks. Hence it follows that there is a third form of proof (besides perception and inference)
which is the instrument of suoh cognition.
In view of this objection, ho says :
: n a. i ^ i \\ n
Arsam, sagely. Of advanced sages, fa^fa Siddha-darsanam,
viiion of tho Perfected Ones. ^ Cha, and. vwqfVif : Dharmmebhyah, from
dharma or merits.
13. Cognition of advanced sages, as also vision of the Per
fected Ones, (results) from dharma or merits. — 354.
' Arsrn ' or sagely cognition is the cognition of sages such as Gdlava,
etc., having for its object things past and yet to come. 'Siddha-darfianam'
means the vision by those who have attained success in the direction of
cognition apprehensive of objects remote as well as screened from view, by
means of mantra or incantation, herbs, eye-salve prepared from cocoort,
etc. Both of them arise from dharma or merit, such that there
cognition of objects, in their true light. The author of the
KANADA SttTRAS IX, 2, 13. 295
observes that this cognition is not a different kind of vidyd or scientific
knowledge, as it is included in Yogic or ascetic perception. Sagely
cognition is really the fourth kind of vidyd, and it occurs to sages as
well as to worldly people. And it is simply a form of mental percep
tion, being produced by the mind accompanied with inattention (to
internal and external objects), or produced by inferential marks such
as faithful observances of the rules of conduct. The cognition of
pervasion which is the ground of inference is here solely dependent
upon or due to Samvkdra, or impression having its origin in a former
state of existence I. e-, in the same way as is the pervasion or universal
concomitance of sucking the breast and the cognition that this is the
means of securing what is desired, (in the case of the instinctive
application of the baby to sucking the breast.)
The revered Professor Prasas£a<ieva,however,says that'Siddhadaria-
nam,' cognition of the Perfected Ones, is not a different form of cognition.
His reasoning is as follows : If it is said that cognition, by the
Perfected Ones, of objects remote and hidden from view, takes its rise
from conditions brought about by means of eye-salve prepared from
cocoon, and the like, then it is nothing but perception. If it be, on the
other hand, cognition which apprehends objects beloging to the earth,
the region lying between the earth and the vault of heaven, and the
space beyond it, and which is dependent upon the conditions or
inferential marks such as the movements, etc., of planets and the lunar
mansions (naksatras^ then it is nothing but inferential cognition,
inasmuch as pervasion, or universal concomitance of the thing to be
inferred and the mark of inference, is determined by the observation
of such accompaniment.- — 13.
Here ends the second chapter of the ninth book in the Commentary
of £aiikara upon the Vaisesika Aphorisms.
296 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
BOOK TENTH— CHAPTER FIRST.
Pleasure and Pain are two different things.
Upa»kdra.-—ThQ purpose of the tenth book is the exposition of the differences of the-
attributes of the soul according to their causes. Now, in the aphorism of Qautama, which
enumerates or classifies the provablea or objects of certitude, viz., «' Soul, Body, Sense,
Object, Understanding, Mind, Activity, Fault, Metempsychosis, Desert, Pain, and Emanci
pation are the provable" Nydya-Sdtram, I. i. 9.), there bein<4 no mention of pleasure, the
error may arise that pleasure is really not different from pain. With the purpose of
dispelling this possible error, the author first of all points out the difference of pleasure and
pain themselves.
: II *o I t I t II
Ista-anista-karana-visesat, in consequence of the-
differrence of causes, (in the forma of) desirables, and undesirable facjvftfj
Virodhat on account of opposition. ^ Cha, and. faaj: Mithah, between
them, towards each other, mutual, g&£:&qt: Sukha-duhkhayoh, between
plasure and pain. ^farc^TR: Artha-antara-bhava^, relation of different
objects.
1. In consequence of the difference of (their) causes, in the
form of desirables and undesirables, and on account of (their)
mutual opposition, Pleasure and Pain stand in the relation of
objects different from each other. — 355.
1 Sukha-duhkahayoh/ (between pleasure and pain there exists)
' mitha^/ mutual, l artha-antara-bhavah,' distinction that is to say
heterogeneity. Whence (does this distinction arise)? To this quention
the author replies, ' ista-anista-karana-visesat ' i. #., in consequence of
'visesah,' distinction or difference, of their causes which have, in the one-
case, the form of 'istam,' desirable objects such as garlands, sandal-paste,
women, etc., and, in the other case, the form of ' anistam/ undesirable
objects such as snakes, thorns, etc. For heterogeneity of effect
necessarily follows from heterogeneity of cause. He lays down another
principle of distinction, viz., ' virodhat/ on account of opposition
characterised by non-dwelling together, for pleasure, and pain are-
not experienced in one and the same soul at one and the same time.
The word, ' cha,' and, brings forward the difference of the effect of
pleasure and pain as a further means of distinguishing betwean them.
Thus, graciousness, the embrace, clearnesss of the eyes, etc., are the effects
of pleasure, while despondency, a sullied countenance, etc., are the effects
of pain; hence on this ground also pleasure and pain must differ from
each other. Accordingly it has been stated by Professor Prasaftta-devaf
"Pleasure has the characteristic of agreeable feeling. In the presence
of garlands and other desirable objects, from the contact of the senses-
and objects in the recognition of something desirable being produced,.
and from the conjunction of the soul and the mind and dependent upon
dharma or merit and the like, that which is produced and is the cause
of complacence, embrace, and kindliness of the eyes, etc., is pleasure."
KAN ADA SOTRAS X, 1, 2. 207
In the «ase of garlands, sandal-paste, etc., enjoyed in the pait, plearure
arises from smriti, reminiscence, and, in the case future objects, it
arises from $an/ra/pa, desire or appetency or imagination or will.
The non-enumeration of pleasure in the aphorism of Gautama is in
order to promote indifference or dispassion, in other words, to teach
that dispassion would arise in one who should account even pleasure as-
pain. (Cf- Nydya IStitram, IV. i. 58, 5:wfr^T§HTfa»n»rT«^, The idea of
pleasure takes place in an alternative form of pain). —
Pleasure and Pain are not forms of cognition.
Upaakdra. — It may be urged : Lot pleasure a»d pain bo mutually distinct. But ( h«y
way be non-different from cognition, like recollection and perception of sensation.
Accordingly the author says :
Samsaya-nirnaya.antara-abhjiva, non-inclusion in
doubt and certainty. •* Cha, and. 10*1*^$ JMna-antaratve, in the
matter of being different from cognition. \g: Hetuh, reason, mark.
2. And the non-inclusion (of Pleasure and Pain) either in
Doubt or in Certainty, is the mark that they are other than
cognition. — 356.
The meaning is that non-inclusion either in doubt or in certainty
is the mark of inference that pleasure and pain are other than, i. e..
different from, cognition. The idea is this ; Were pleasure or pain a
kind of cognition, it would either have the form of doubt, or have the
form of certainty. It cannot be the first, as the two alternatives (which
must be present in doubt; do not exist ; nor can it be the seeond, as
the single alternative does not exist (see Vivriti— below). And the
species or parts being thus excluded, the geuns or whole is necessarily
excluded. For the species of cognition, are two only, the characteristic
of doubt and the characteristic of certainty. And both of them are
excluded from pleasure as well as from pain ; hence the characteristic
ofcognition also finds no place in them.
The word, ' cha ' and, a Ida on the exclusion of external sensation or
perception. The perception of pleasure and pain is mental i. e.t by the
inner sense, in the forme, " I feel pleasure," " I feel pain " • whereas
perception of them does not take such shape of form as in "I k <ow "
" I and doubtful," " I am certain."— 2.
i- — * Neither pleasure nor pain has the form in which
two repugnant alternatives are present together, that it should be
probable that they have the nature of doudt, nor has either possession
of a given form together with absence of negation of that form, that it
should be likely that they have the nature if certainty. The supposi
tion of a third form of cognition is chimerical like the horn of a hare.
Ooncequently neither pleasure nor pain can come under knowledge.
Pleasure and Pain are not form cognition — continued.
UpaikAra. — Ho laya down another principle of differentiation,
298 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
?r4t: Tayoh, their, of doubt and certainty, f^qfw: Nispattih, pro
duction. S^fTl^fff'fiP^'J, Pratyaksa-laiagikabhyarn, by means of percep
tion and inference.
3. The production thereof (i.e., of Doubt and Certainty) is
by means of perception and inference. — 357.
'Tayoh,' of doubt and certainty, 'nispattih,' production, (is) from
perception and from inferential marks. Neither pleasure nor pain is
produced by the perceptive apparatus or by inferential marks. For,
pleasure is four-fold, being objective, subjective, imaginative or
•sympathetic, or habitual. Of these, the last three by no means possess
the characteristic of taking their origin from the contact of the (outer)
senses (with their objects). Should it be contended that the first is
cognition, inasmuch as it is generated by contact of the senses and
their objects, we reply that it is not so, for a part only of the whole
cause, (being the same), cannot entail homogeneity in the effect ; else
ill and sundry effects would come to be. homogeneous as they must have
'pace and time as their common antecedents. Moreover, (if pleasure
ivere cognition), the pleasure which is not produced through contact of
r,he senses and their objects, would be either non-discriminative or
udefinite, or discriminative or definite. But it cannnot be the first,
1>r then it would be supersensible ; nor can it be the second, inasmuch
as it does not consist of a judgment respecting two objects in
the relation of subject and predicate. Again, pleasure and pain
are necessarily accompanied with sensibility ; (were they forms
of cognition), there would be involved in the (consequent) notion of a
sensibility of cognition a regression to infinity. 'Laingikam'
(the adjective) meaus merely ' lingam ' (the noun), mark, as the word,
objective, (means an object).
The author of the VTitti, on the other hand, explains the aphorism
thus, that the origin thereof, i. e., of cognition and pleasure, is explain
ed, ' pratyksa-laingikam,' L e., by the explanations of perceptual and
inferential cognitions, that is to say, that whereas perceptual cognition
is produced by the senses, and inferential by marks of illation, it is not
•so with pleasure, etc. — 3.
i _ It may be urged that as non-discriminative cognition is
neither "doubt nor certitude, so too may be pleasure and pain. Accord
ingly he says :
The proof of pleasure and pain is furnished by perception and
inference. In one's own soul, pleasure and pain are proved by per
ception ; in other souls, pleasure is inferred by brightness of the eyes,
etc. and pain by paleness of the face, etc. So that, had they the form
of non-discriminative cognition, there could be no perception, nor
could it be possible for them to be the subject of inference by such
marks as brightness or paleness of the face, and the like. Hence,
the import is, they are not included in cognition.
KANADA SftTRAS X, 1,5.
Pleasure and Pain are not forms of cognition.—— continued.
Upattkdra. — Ha points out the difference of pleasure, etc., from inferential tqgnltion.
depending upon a difference of their modes or appearance.
MO i * i * M
Abhut, (it) was. ffa Iti, such modal distinction. <jfo Api, also.
4. '« (It) was " — such (modal distinction) also (establishes the
difference between pleasure or pain and cognition.) — 358.
The word ' iti ' indicates the form. The word l api ' implies another
form, viz., " (It) will be." Thus, in inferential cognition, e. g.t " Ther&
was or will be lire in the mountain," the modal distinction of the past,
etc., is observed ; but pleasure or, pain, produced under this form, has
never been observed. — 4
Vivriti — * * * * Cognition is conversant about objects past,
future, and present. But of other pleasure or pain, no object whatever
exists. Therefore, by the application of contradictory properties, viz.,.
objectivity and non-objectivity, it follows that pleasure and pain ara
not identical with cognition.
Plcasiire and Pain are not forms of cognition — continued.
Upasledra. — He brings forward a further ground of differentiation :
U ?* I \\ * II
Sati, existing. «ar Cha, also. ^TT^jfofTT^ Karyya-adarsanat, be
cause of the non -observation of the effect.
5. Also (Pleasure and Pain are not forms of cognition),
inasmuch as the effect, (pleasure or pain), is not observed, where
(the antecedents of cognition) are present. — 359.
Pleasure or pain is not merely perception or merely inferential
cognition, since the effect, pleasure or pain, is not observed, where
contact of the senses and objects exists, or where there is recognition of
the universal concomitance (which is the ground of inference), of the
mark of inference being a property of the minor term, etc. The mean
ing, therefore, is as follows : It has been already stated that pleasure
and pain are not cognition in general, (i. e., non-discriminative cogni
tion). Should they be cognition in particular (or discriminative
cognition), they would be either perceptual cognition or cognition in
the form of inference". (Pleasure and pain cannot be the former),
inasmuch as the experience of the element of pleasure does not take place
during the perception of garlands, sandal-paste, etc., on the contact
of the senses and their object ; nor can they be the latter, since there
is no experience of the pleasurable or the painful, as the case may be
where there exists an inference respecting sandal-paste, etc., or an
inference respecting fire, etc. In like manner, pleasure and pain being;
300 VAI£E§IKA PHILOSOPHY.
not experienced in any particular act of perception or in particular act
of inference, they are also not the particulars of that perception or
that inference. — 5.
Bhdtya reads tiaticlia of X i. 5 as a separate aphorism, and explain/*
it thus : Cognition arises, Sati, i. «., iu respect of objects actually exist
ing at the moment. Cognition accordingly relates to past, present, and
future objects. But this is not the case with pleasure and pain. Herein
also, therefore, there is difference between cognition, on the one hand,
and pleasure and pain, on the other.
Above continued : Causes of Ple,a*ure and Pain.
Upaikdra. — He mentions another! differentiating characteristic.
I ?« \ \ \ \ II
Eka-artha-samavayi-karana-antaresu, there ex
isting other causes co-inherent in one and the same object. JffTFT
Driftatvat, from the being observed. Because they are observed.
6. (Pleasure and Pain are not form of cognition), because
they are observed, when there exist other causes co-inherent in one
and the same object, (i. e., the soul). — 360.
" Of pleasure and pain " — such is the complement (of the aphorism).
In relation to pleasure, uncommon or specific causes co-inherent in one
and the same object are dharma or merit, attachment to, or attraction
for, pleasure, desire for the cause of pleasure, volition or striving to
secure the material (cause) of pleasure, and cognition of garlands,
sandle-paste, etc.; while in relation to pain, they are adliarma, or
demerit, and cognition of thorns and other undesirable object. The
meaning is that (pleasure and pain differ from cognition;, inasmuch
as they are observed on the co-inherence of these causes in one and the
same' object. But cognition which is non-discriminative, does not at
*11 stand in need of an uncommon cause co-inherent in the same object
(with it). Discriminative cognition, of course, depends upon a cogni
tion of predication or attribution (or judgment), but this is not another
cause, that is, a cause heterogeneous to the cause of the cognition itself.
Conjunction of the mind, as being a cause common (to pleasure and
pain with cognition), does not require mention. Though reminiscence
requires samskdra, impression or reproductiveness, as its specific or
uncommon cause, yet the difference therefrom is quite obvious, as it is
for this reason that the difference (of pleasure and pain) has been
investigated with reference only to cognition or perceptual experience.
Although in inferential cognition there is dependence upon the recollec
tion of pervasion or universal concomitance, the cognition that the mark
is a property of the minor term, etc., yet it is thrown overboard by
the very word ' antara,' other, (in the aphorism). The probative sense
(of the aphorism) is, therefore, that pleasure and pain are different
from cognition, inasmuch as they are the products of uncommon or
particular causes, of their own kind, co-existing in the same subs
tratum with them, as is the case with reminiscence, and with the first
•sound (in a series of sounds). — 6.
KANiDA SfrTRAS X, 1,7. 301
An objection answered.
L'paskAra. — It may be objected; If the difference ef pleasure and pain from cognition
•depend on the difference of their causes, and if the difference of pleasure and pain from eaoh
other be just like the mutual difference between a pillar and a water-pot, etc., then there oan
be no mutual difference between the body and its parts euoh as the head, the feet, the back,
the stomach, etc., there being, in regard to ihese, no difference in their causes, whether they
be thf! ultimate atoms, binary atomic aggregates, etc., or blood and semen.
To meet thi* objection, he «ays:
Eka-dese, in the part. f% Iti, such. This, j^rf^i^ Ekasrain, in
one 'body). f*K' Sirah, the head. 1% Prietham, the back. Wf^ Udarain,
the stomach. <rotff% Marmmani, the vitals. 5T%jfa: Tat-viAesah, their
distinction. rTfi^r^^: Tat-visesebhyah, from the distinctions or their
causes .)
7 . The head, the back, the stomach, the vitals are in the
parts of one and same (body) ; this their difference (results) from
the differences thereof (/. £., of their causes). — 361.
1 Eka-desa iti ' means, in the part. ' Ekasmin ' means, in the body ;
* Siralj ' —this is one part ; ' udaram ' ; ' pristham ' ; and ' marmmani,'
1. ?., the sinews, etc. ; their ' viiesah/ difference in kind, (results). ' tat-
visesebhyah,' from the difference in kind of their causes. There, again,
(i.e., in the case of the heterogeneity of the causes), heterogeneity
results only from the heterogeneity of the causes (of those causes) ; for,
the combinative causes of the stomach, the back etc., also are not just of
the same kind as that of the head ; just as the heterogeneity of a spiece
of eloth, a water-pot, etc., results from the heterogeneity of threads,
postherds. and other material causes ; heterogeneity being possible,
in them also, the heterogeneity of threads, postherds, etc., also, results
from the heterogeneity of fibres, dust, etc. Heterogeneity is, in like
manner, to be sought in the successive material causes : for, while the
ultimate atoms may be common, the heterogeneity of the respective
material causes universally gives rise to heterogeneity (in their res
pective effects) ; whereas homogeneity of the material «auses, constitu
ted by their substanceness, does not cause such heterogeneity. This is
the point. — 7.
Hkdsya : — rtad Ekadeie iti of X. i. 7 with X. i. 6, and explains it
as giving an additional reason why pleasure and pain cannot be forms
of cognition, the meaning being that pleasure and pain are localised
in the body, whereas cognition is not so localised.
Here ends the first chapter of the tenth book in the Commentary oE
•Sankara upon the Vaiaesiki Aphorisms.
302 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
BOOK TENTH— CHAPTER SECOND.
Substance is tlie only combinative cause.
Upaskdra. — As a collateral topic, the author now commences a special discrimination of
the three causes :
II ?° 1 H I ? U
Karanam, cause. ffa Iti, such. ^ Dravye, iu substance.
Karyya-samavayat, from the combination of effect.
1. "(It is the combinative) cause" — such (intuition and usage),
with regard to Substance, (arise) from the combination of effect
(in it).— 362.
1 Karanam/ that is, that it is the combinative cause ; < iti/ such
intuition and usage, are to be observed, l dravye,' with regard to
substance. Why so ? He gives the reply : ' kfiryya-samavayat/ be
cause effect, viz., substance, attribute, and action, combine in it
alone. — 1.
Vivriti. _ •* * * * The definition of a cause in general is that
causality consists in constant antecedence, there existing at the same
time voidness of failure to produce the effect (that is to say, in Mill's
phraseology, causality o-onsists in invariable and unconditional antece
dence). There are three kinds of causes, according to their division into
the combinative or material, non-combinative or formal, arid instru
mental or efficient. * * * *
Substance i-s- effcient cause also.
tfpatkdra. — It may bo aaked : Do then subatancoa (possess only combinative causa
lity ?
So he says :
Samyogat, from conjunction, ^l Va, or, and.
2. And, through conjunction, (Substance becomes the efficient
or conditional cause also). — 363.
As combinative causality, so also efficient causality, belongs to the
threads, in the production of a piece of cloth. Inasmuch as conjunction
of the shuttle and the threads is also a cause of the cloth, the shuttle
and the thread, are, mediately through that conjunction, also efficient
cause of the cloth. The word ' va ' is used in a collective sense,
inasmuch as, though the thread possesses combinative causality to
wards the conjuction of the shuttle and the thread, yet it possesses
efficient causality towards the cloth, mediately through such conjunc
tion. — 2.
Vivriti. — He says that combinative causality belongs to subs
tances, not only because effects combine in them, but also because they
are fields for the operation of non-combinative causes.
KANADA SftTRAS X, 2, 4. 303
' Samyogat ' means because they are the support or substratum
wherein takes place c&njunctiou which is the non-combinative cause.* *
Actions are non- combinative causes.
Upaskara. — He explains what causality resides iu Action :
MO
Karane in the cause. <4*HNK Samavayat, from combination.
Karmmani, actions.
3. Through combination in the (combinative) cause, Actions
(are non-combinarive causes). — 364.
" Non-combinative causes" — such is the complement (of the apho
rism.) Non-combinative causality is causality combined or co-inherent
in one and the same object connected with the state of effect and cause.
Such causality results either from combination in the same object with
the effect, or from combination in the same object with the cause. Of
these the former is called, in the terminology of the VaisesiJeas, the
slighter or minor, and the latter, the greater or major, proximity. If it be
asked by means of which proximity, then, actions possess non-covnbin-
ative causality towards disjunction, and samsJcdra or impression ; it is
here replied, 'karane samavayat,' (that it is; through combination in the
combinative cause of conjunction, etc. The meaning, therefore, is that
non-combinative causality is exercised by action in (the production of)
conjunction, etc., by means of the minor proximity characterised as
combination in the same object with the effect. — 3.
Certain Attributes are non- combinative causes, and occasionally
efficient causes also.
Upaskdra. — In anticipation of the question as to what kind of causality pertains to
ooloui and other attributes residing in the (conseituent) parts, in relation to the attributes of
the wholes, he says :
O I R I 8 II
WH\ Tatha, so. ^T Rupe, in colour. «BTCm«in«?'*nwn^ Karana-eka-
:artha-aaraavayat, through combination in the same object with the
cause. ^ Cha, and, also.
4. So also in Colour (there is non-combinative causality)
through combination in the same object with the cause. — 365.
The expression ' colour ' indicates colour, taste, smell, touch, num
ber, magnitude or quantity, separateness, gravity, fluidity, viscidity,
etc. The term 'so' extends (the application of) non-combinative causality.
' Karana-eka-artha-samavayat ' : (This non-combinative causality of
colour,' etc.) originates the colour, etc., of the wholes, by means of the
major proximity (constituted) by (their) combination in the same object
with the whole, which is the combinative cause of the colour, etc., of that
•whole ; as, for instance, the colour, etc., of the potsherds originate the
304, VAI£E§IKA PHILOSOPHY.
colour, etc., in the water-pot, and similarly it should be observed in all
other cases. The word <cha' implies that occasionally colour, etc.,
possess efficient causality also. — 4.
X. ii. 4 as two aphorisms, viz., Tatkd r&pc, and
KAr&nai-kdrtha-Samavdydcheha.
(Jon junction in a non-combinative cause.
Cpatkdra.—He states that the minor proximity belongs to conjunction whil« it is a
non-combinative cause in the origination of substances :
II ? o | *n U. II
Karana-samavnyat, through combination in the cause.
: Samyogah, conjunction, q^q Patasya, of the cloth.
5. Through combination in the (combinative) cause, Conjunc
tion (is a non-combinative cause) of the cloth. — 366.
The meaning is that, through combination in the combinative cause,
conjunction also is a non-combinative cause, in the production of effects
such as a piece of cloth, etc., by means of the proximity characterised
as combination in the same object with the effect. The word l cloth '
indicates product substance in general.
A certain author maintains that if, on the other hand, conjunction
of part with part be also a non-combinative cause of a piece of cloth
and the like, then combination in the same object with the cause is also
(a non-combinative cause). — 5.
Above continued.
^Upaskdra. — He says that causality sometimes pertains to oonjuuotion by means of the
major proximity :
o I ^ I ^ ||
. Karaua-karaua-samavayat, through combination
in the cause of the cause, ^r Cha, and, also.
6. And, through combination in the cause of the cause,
(conjunction becomes a non-combinative cause by means of the
major proximity) also. — 367.
The conjunction, technically termed prachaya, (loose) coalition
aggregation, and residing in the constituent parts of a bale of cotton
originates magnitude in the bale of cotton. Here the proximity is
-constituted by combination in the same object with the cause. This is
the meaning. — 6.
Efficient causes declared.
UpavMra.— Having thus ascertained causality determined by the combinative cause ha
begins a new section for ascertaining efficient causality.
11 1 • . i ' V t it, (
SftrRASX,2, 8. 305
*TS«!*nWPlT^ Samyukta-samavayat, through combination in the con
junct. m? Agneh, of fire, t^lfa^ Vaisesikam, distinctive attribute.
The distinctive attribute of Fire, (i. e., heat), (becomes an
efficient cause), through combination in the conjunct. — 368.
1 Vaisesikam,' distinctive attribute, ' agneh,' of fire, in other word
lieat, becomes an efficient cause in relation to the effects (colour, etc./
produced by burning or baking, through combination (of colour, etc.,)
in the conjunct, (i. e., the water-pot placed in fire.) This is indicative';
in relation to cognition everything possesses efficient causality. Under
standing, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, and
impression possess efficient causality only. It should be observed that
this system or elaboration of thought has the purposes of establishing
the mutual differences of pleasure, etc. — 7.
Vicfiti — * * * * The general definition of an efficient cause is
to be understood to be a cause other than the combinative and non-
combinative causes. * * * *
Observances produru adristam an their fruit, on the authority
of the Veda.
Upask.ira. — Xow, in order to confirm the authoritativeness of the Vedas, he repeate the
very same statement which has been made by him before :
in* * i * n
T DristanAm, of acts observed or known to be productive of good.
Drista-prayojananam, of acts the purpose of which has been
taught. ^€T*n% Drigta-abhave, in the absence of visible or observed.
faults or defects. spfm : Frayogah, performance. SFi^W? Abhyudayfiya,
for the production of exaltation or adfistam.
8. The performance of acts of observed utility and of acts
the purpose whereof has been taught (in the sacred writings), is,
for the production of adristam, (as these teachings are authoritatArie
being the word of God in whom) the defects found in ordinary
speakers do not exist. — 369.
'Dristunum' means, of acts which have been proved to be useful by the
evidence of experience, e.</., sacrifices, almsgivings, ablution, and the like.
Drista-prayojananam' means, of acts the purpose whereof has been
taught. For, thus, "in such precepts as " He who desires heaven, shall
perform sacrifice," u He who desires heaven, shall offer oblation in the
aynihotra sacrifice," etc., the fruit or purpose is mentioned at once
along with the injunction ; in some cases, the purpose is given out by
way of a recommendation, as in a The pitrt-x or departed ancestors of
him who studies during these nights, pour down upon, or send down to,
806 VAlgESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
him streams of clarified butter and streams of honey," etc. ; in other
cases, the purpose is left to be imagined, as in " He shall perform the
Viivajit sacrifice," etc., for, here the purpose is neither mentioned along
with the injunction nor presented by way of a recommendation, and is
therefore, suppositional, and (it cannot be any thing but heaven), for
heaven alone should be supposed as the purpose or fruit which is
charming in itself. That being so, it does not stand to reason that
these acts which so shortly come to their end, should have causality
towards the production of fruits or results in the distant future. Hence,
the meaning is, 'prayogah, the performance, of these acts, is ' abhyuda-
vava, for the purpose of apfirvam, that is, adTistain, or deserts. It might
be objected as follows : This would have been the case, were the
authoritativeness of the Vedas a fact. But that is hard to maintain.
For the authoritativeness of the Vedas as being eternally free from
faults or defects in themselves, is not desired by you, (t. e., the Va-is-
faifca), as it is by the Mimdmsd school, inasmuch as you recognise them
as the production of a person, and in that case, it is possible that
mistake, absence of mind, intention to mislead, and other defects exist
ed in the person. To this the reply is given by the phrase, ' drista-
abhave ' which means, there being non-existence of personal defects
such as error, absence of mind, desire to mislead, and the like, which
are found in other persons, namely, in ourselves and others ; inasmuch
as the Supreme Person, inferred whether as the Creator of the earth or
as the Speaker of the Vedas, is presented to us entirely under the
characteristic of freedom from faults or defects. So that His words
can neither have no meaning, nor convey a contrary meaning, nor
convey a useless meaning. It is only impurities caused by error,
absence of mind, inefficiency of the senses, and the like, due to defec-
tiveness of the elements constituting the physical organism, the external
senses, and the mind, that may possibly vitiate speech. But they cannot
possibly lurk in the word of ffivara. It has been accordingly de
clared :—
—Being influenced by passion, ignorance, and the like, a speakei
may tell untruths. But these do not exist in Isvara. How can He
speak otherewise (than truthfully) ? — 8.
NotQ—~Cf. VI. ii. 1, supra.
Vivriti. — Thus the Prcdicables have been ascertained, as also Res
emblance and Difference. This Sdstra or System of Self-culture faci
litates manana, intellection or 'thinking about things, in them only
wfiose chitta, or inner sense or mind, has been purified by the perfor
mance of acts, and not in them whose cliitta has not been so purified.
Observances are productive of purity of cliitta, as declared by such
text of the Veda as " They desire to know," etc. The same has been
mentioned before. ' He repeats it for further confirmation.
* : * Observances, *** when performed disinteres
tedly, do not produce elysian bliss, etc., as their fruit, but produce at
their result purity of .cliitta or intellect, etc., according to the text of
KANADA StfTRAS IX, 2, 2. 307
the of. Veda, " They desire to know," and the /SmTiti, " When worldly
attachment has, by observances, borne its fruits, knowledge is after
wards produced."
Authoritativencas of the Veda established.
UpasMra — It may be urged : The Veda has been revealed b}' God,— it is here that there-
is conflict of opinions.
Accordingly he says :
11 to R i s. H
Tat-vachanat, from being the word of Him, G-od.
Amnayasya, of the Vedas, sn»TT*rtf Pramanyam, authoritativeness
finis. According to Sridhara, author of Nyaya kandati, " " tat refers
to Risis.
9. The authoritative ness of the Veda (follows) from its beintr
the Word of God.— 370.
' iti ; indicates the conclusion of the Sdstra or system. The authori-
tntiveness, ' amnayasya/ of the Veda, (is derived), l vaehanat,' from its
being the composition, 'tena,' by tsvara. For, thus,, we have already
proved that the Vedas have a personal author, inasmuch as they are a
collection of sentences or declarations. Nor can we and others possibly
l.e the speakers of them, divided and sub-divided as they are in a thou
sand branches, for they treat of objects which transcend the senses, and
beings of our nature cannot behold objects which transcend the senses.
Moreover, the Vedas must have been spoken by a trustworthy person, in
asmnch as they ar.e accepted by men of light and leading. That which is
not spoken by a trustworthy person, is not accepted by men of light and
leading, the Vedas are accepted by men of light and leading, therefore
they have been spoken by a trustworthy person. To be spoken by a
trustworthy person is to be declared by a self-governed or independent
person ; and to be accepted by men of light and leading is to be
believed in, and acted upon, by persons attached to all the systems of
thought. It has been stated before that non-appearance of the fruit or
result, which occasionally happens, is due to defect or flaw in the act,
or performance, the agent, and the means or requisites. If it be denied
that this is so, there being no recollection on the part of the agent ;
we reply that the denial has no value, it having been already proved
that there is recollection on the part of the agent. The composition
thereof by Him is proved, inasmuch as they could be declared only
by an independent person, while such independent power to declare
the Vedas in their thousand branches is as has been said, impossible
fryr beings of our nature. Moreover, since certitude must be the product
cf excellence or superiority, the certitude derived from the Vedas must
also have excellence for its condition, and excellence must in this case
be pronounced to be only the speaker's accurate knowledge of the true
meaning of the sentences. The speaker of the Veda must, therefore
308 VA1&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
1)6 one of that description, one who has immediate cognition of heaven,
•udristam and like other objects ; and there is none such but tsvara
alone. This is well said. — 9.
Xotf. — ty. I. i. 3, supra.
|
The fortunate Sahkara, who is the son of Bhavandtha by Bhavda,}.,
and who is devoted to the worship of Siva, has written this commentary
on the Aphorisms of Kandda.
Even though this production of mine may not find favour \\ith
others, nay, may be an object of ridicule with them, yet, (it is hoped),
it will be adored a thousand times and over by my pupils, out of respect
for their teacher.
_ + _
Here ends the second chapter of the tenth book in the commentary
on the Vaisesika Aphorisms by $ri Sankara Misra, son of Mahamahopa-
<lhyaya Bhavanatha Misra.
And complete is also this treatise.
APPENDIX 1.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.
(Compiled h-om the Vjdvakosa and Hull's Catalogue}.
An -nit* of Work*.
1 A.p»aabda.-khandana
2 A-hetu-aama-yvakarana
:> Atiua-tattva-vi vekn
4 -~kal},alaf:a
~t -didh.it i
r> K auada-rahasya
8 K.anadtt-riihasya-saiiigraha
l. ' K ana da-samgrah a vy a khy a
1 0 Kanada-siitnv-vyakhyfui »
1 1 Knrikfxvali
10
17
18
tika
— prakaia
... — kafiika ...
vy a khy ft
20 -bhaskara
21 ...... — rahasya ,.,
22 Kusumunjali (-karika)
-v-yakhyu...
-oraktUa
-makaranda
-vritti
vvakhva
'•¥2 Kornala-tika-tika
->3 Guna-kiranAvali
-34 ...... -tika ','/.
'^ ...... -praka^n
:36 liuna-didhiti-tippani
37 ^nna-prakaAa'-didhiti
...... ... -raathtm
...... -vivriti
.......... bhava-praka$ika
41 Guna-rahasya
4--J Guna-6irauiahi
44
40 GunA,iuuidi (oji No. 22)
46 JAti-satka-j)rakarana
47 Tattva-jfsana-vivrid'dhi-praka4a
48 Tattvanusandhana
f
Karuulu
LJdayana ^Icharya.
Saukara Misra.
Raghnnatlia Bhattacliary*
Padiuaiiabha Mifiva.
Saukara .Misra.
Anonymaux.
RaghudeVa Nyayalaukftrai
Visvanaiiha.
Udayana Achai'ya.
Udayaua.
Krisiva JBliatta..
Blmjjjiratlia Thukkura.
Mathuratiatha.
Vardhamana Upadhyav i.
Meglia Bhagiratha.
Unknown.
Padmanabha Varadaraj-t
Mathuranatha.
Udayaua Acharya.
Haiidaaa Bhattacharyn
Rumabhadra
Rudra F>hattucha rya.
Misra.
Vardhamann (Jpadhyay*.
Ruchidatta.
Unknown*
Narayana Tirtha Yati.
TriJoohaua Deva.
Visvauatha.
Untraced.
Untraced.
Vardhamana.
Jayarama Bhattacahrya.
Kaghanatha.
Mathuranathft.
Raghunatha.
Rudra BhattachArya
Rfimbhadra.
Madhava Deva.
Raghunatha.
RAmakrisna
Gunatianda.
YiSvamltha
*••
Unknown.
310
APPENDIX I.
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
32
83
84
85
86
87
SB
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
100
-prakasa
Tarka-karika
Tarka-kaumudi
Tarka-dipika
Tarka-pradipa
Tarka-bhasa
Tarka-inaujari
Tarka-ratua
Tarka-sariigraha
- chart drika
-tattva-prakhsa ..
Tarka-samgrahopanyasa
Tarkamrita
-chasaka
-tatparya-tika
-tarangiui ..
Dravya-kiranavali-praka&a ..
-pariksa ...
-sabda-viveehana
Dravya-guna-paryuya
Dravya-nirupana
Drav\ a-pataka ...
Dravya-padartha
Dravya-prakaaa-vivaiti
Dravya-prakaAika
Dravya-bhagya-tika •••
Drayya-sara-samgraha
Dvandva-viohAra
Nirukti
Nyaya-kandali
Nyaya-tantra-bodhini
Nyaya-tarangi ni •••
Nyay a-bodhini •••
Nyaya-lilavati
-kanthabharana ...
... -prakasa ...
-didliiti,
... -viveka ...
-bhava-prakafca ...
Nyaya-aai'a ...
Nyaya-siddhanata-muktilvali ...
Nyayartha-laghu-bodhini ...
Pada-krrtya
Pada-samgraha
Padartha-khandara
-t.ika ...
•tatparya-tika ...
Fadartha-cliandrika •••
-vilasa ,4i •••
Pti-lArtha-tattvavaloka ..»
... -nirnaya •••
. Jivaraja Diksita.
Laugaksi Bhaskara.
Annain Bhatta.
. Nilaka^tha ^astri.
Konda Bhatta.
Vrisva;iHtha.
. Jivaraja Diksita.
Konda Bhatta.
. Viraraghava Sastri.
Aniiam Bhatta.
Mukunda Bhatta.
Unknown
Meru Sastri.
Jagadisa Tarkalankars.
(fangai a ma Jadi.
MukumJa Bhatta.
, Vardhainana.
Rudra Vachaapati.
Chandrafiekhara Bharati.
Untraced.
Untraeed.
Untraced.
Paksadhara.
Raghu.iatha.
Megha Bhagiratha fhakkur*.
Anonymous.
Baglmdeva.
Gokulanatlia Maithila.
Pattabhirama Sasfcri.
Sriidhara Aohirya.
V iftv i at ha.
Keaava.
Grovardha»a Misra.
V allabha A'.'harya.
Sankara Miara.
Vardhttuia ia. Upadhysiya.
Raghunatha Siromani.
VidyavagiAa Bhattacharya.
Bliagiratha.
Madhava Deva.
Visvauatha Panch&nana.
Govardhana Ranga Acharya.
Chaudraraja Simha.
Krisna Mist a
Raghunaih-i Siromani.
Govinda, Madhava, Kaghudeva.,
Ruchi-datta, and Ramabhadr*.
Krisna Misra.
Misaru Misra (or Sarngad-
hara ?)
Krisna Bhatta.
Viavanatha.
Anonymous.
APPENDIX 1.
311
101
102
103
104
105
10ft
107
lu8
J09
110
111
112
113
114
115
lit)
117
118
119
120
121
122
12-3
125
126
127
128
12 •
130
131
1 2
133
134
135
13(5
137
13S
1-J9
Padartha-dipika
Padartha-dharina-samgraha
Padartha-airupana ...
Padartha-parijata
Padartha-pr&aeSa
Padartha-bodha
Padartha-mani-mala
-prakaaa ...
Padartha-viveka (-siddhanta-
tattva)
-tika
P a r i b ha sa - v i se sa
Praiuaiia majijari
Baliyartha-bhanga-uirakaraiia
Bhasa-parichchheda ...
Bheda-prakasa
Mita-bhasiui
Mithya-tva-vana-rahasya
Mukti-vada-tika
Hutu a kosa
... -kara-padartha
... -tnata-vada
-karika-vichara
-mata-rahasya
-vada or -vic'hara...
•rahasya
Uasa sara
Ua lilhauta-muktahara
Laksanavali
-tika
Lilavati-rahasya
V a la-sudha tika ratnavali
Vaisea ka-vatna-ma!a ...
[•t-Sutra
-ii, askara
-tika ...
.. -bliasya ...
-vantika ...
-vi\ riti
-vritti
Sa()t;t-padarthi
-vyakhya
142
14 i
144
145
1 •
14/
148
149 Siddhanta-mnktavalr-prftkasa
Sibdartha-tai-kararita
Siirabandhopadesa
... -tika -
Siddhauta-chandrika
Siddhanta-tattva-viveka
Koiida Bhatta.
Prasastapada.
Ny ay a vac hasp at i.
Krisna Miara.
Saiikara.-harya.
Untraced-
Jayarama NyayapafichAuana.
Laugaksi Bhaskara.
Untraeed.
Gropinat.ha Muni.
Untraced.
Sarvadeva Pun'.
Visva tar,ha Pafichanana.
Sankara Afiara.-
Ma lhava Sarasvati.
Grokulai at,ha.
Visvanadia.
Prithvidhara Acharya.
Harira:na.
Grada 1 hava.
Malhava Vadindra.
Padmar.a'.ha MiSra.
jldaya i:. A -harya.
Sosa oa> anoradhra.
Math 11 1 a arha Tarkavagiaa.
Krisua M-sra.
Bha\adeva Pandita Kavi.
K ana. la
San kara M ;'fira.
Udayana Acharya ; ChandrA-
11 anda.
Havana / Raghudeva; Chandra-
kit : a,
Vijfia ia Bhikau.
Jay a a ay an a.
Bht>ja ?
Hari.
Mi'lra.
Jaykriana (or Kriana Maunin)
Baugadasa.
Gobardhana. . ^ •_. -.
Kriana Dhurjati DJksita. ,
Gokulanatha. -'v
Q-opinatha Maani.
A P PEN J) I X 11.
INDEX OF WORDS.
wfir
i n i u : in 13 n : * n iv.
*.nn •
inn
i«iii^
urn :
APPENDIX II.
HIS
314
APPENDIX II.
«4
•m
mi
IRK ;
IRK -,
IRU
Mill*
iir
n i
m IH ;
sTTcjnjur
arm
1111* ; 11111* ;
srr1?
APPENDIX II.
315
<* 1 1 1 1
5 «mi ;
M1IU
nun :
1RI%1
'-Rll i
1RI* :
'-hl">
11% 111 :
APVUN'WX II.
: 1RR
1RR
1M!^ : Hill*
: 1I1R* : 1R|1
1RR
APPENDIX II
317
Rll :
: 1RR
*RR
*I
ifr
*fr
•ftc
: IhK;
; ^hho-
^'
; IRIS, -, iRlu
5 S 111
mm
APPENDIX II
mi« ;
mi* ?
319
1RR :
firflrei
; »Ri**
•, <m|1*
;1°RI^
320
1RI11 5
5 1RI11
51T5TT
Ulil ,
: 1I1R1
1I1R* ; 1RR
5RR'
IIIR
*hll ;
APPENDIX II
32 1
qasr
qr
322
APPENDIX II
•, imu
APPENDIX II
32S
fsr^Tsf
f^flfllZ *|1|1<S :
fsrsta in i* ?
-,»mi»
11111 •,
S24
APPENDIX II
•;o ;
JT
1'llh
*RI1*
*RI1*
*R|1«
APPENDIX II
325
1111*5
«o {— —
R1
3(1
326
APPENDIX II
^17 {i
i o :
APPENDIX II
327
Is
APPEND! X— III.
INDEX OF APHORISMS.
j o — Words left out by *9we editor* are shown within brackets.
. V.ii, 13
... Hi, i, 6
... I, ii, 6
... in, i, 7
... II, ii, 6
: ... VII, it 14
: ... VII, i, 16
... VII, i, 11
: ... IV, ii, 4
... VII, i, 8
... VII, i, 10
V, ii, 17
v, H, a
srqi
V, ii, 3
tan ... IX, ii, 12
... VI, ii, 12
... II, i, 13
:V,i,
: ... II, iii 28
... VII, i, 18
,i,5
... IV, ii, 6 i
,.Lii, 11
V.ii, 11
in%5ts
q^: ... HI, i, 15
... VII, i, 4
.. II, ii, 5
V, i, 5
: ... V, i, 3
T«[^
... II, ii, 30
... IV, i, 8
: ... VII, ii, 9
.. VI, ii, 2
c
fq ... X, i, 4
329 )
... VI, ii. 8
ii, 17
... VIII, ii, 1
... IV, i, 12
... VIII, ii, 3
... VI, ii, 7
nrfT^qrSifT^: III, i, 8
'... IV, i, 5
... VII, i 21
: ... VI, ii, 6
... VI, ii, 9
VII.
... IX, i, 11
^T: 5ET%J
: IX, ii, 6
... IX, i, 15
VI, i, 5
ii, 15
:^ V,
... IX, i, 3
T?J
... IX, i, 6
... I, i, 26
... IX, i,
, ii, 5
... IX, ii, 2
,...IX,ii, 1
arsfjrfrr sr?*jnTcJTftr *rar^ qt^ni
r: . . Ill, ii, 14
III, ii, 18
III, ii, 9
... V, i, 6
... VI, i!, 16
... Ill, i, 18
... Ill, ii, 1
( tfrtft ) If ii; 14
: IX,
VI, ii, 14
... II, ii, 10
... IX, ii, 10
... Ill, i, 2
: ... X,i, 1
) ... VII, ii, 26
( ^*fffft»T ) I, i, 7
: ... .1, i, 13
330 )
VII, i» 12
VII, ii, 6
: VII, i, 15
I, ii, 15
: VII, ii, 3 ; II, i, 2
VII, ii, 21
cSITr ... VII, ';
''» 23
I^
, ]' 17
X, i, 6
c^ftr^l
H^T «wH^
... V, ii, 22
VIM, 0
^^ ... X, ii, 0
VII, ii, 22
... VII, i, (.)
r^TR: ... IV, i, 3
X, ii, 1
13
... I, i, 31
Hrr^rf^ft *T<JTT; V, ii. 2t
T T ... Ill, i, 4
fe* ... II,
i 22
ii, 16
f ii, 10 ( VIII, i, 11
ii 3 ' ^>T'^t *Fr«?: ... VII, i) 25
: . . V, ii, 20
§
,i, 12
... X, ii, 3
X, ii, 5
> i, 10
IX, i, 8
••• Ij 1? a
... VII, ii, 24
... VII, ii, 12
f^^r ... VII, ii, 7
I, i, 14
J ... Hi i, 25
... IILi, 5
( 331
II, i, 12
V, ii, 9
IV, ii, 5
?T5f Tcfrr
IX, i, 1
VIII, i, 8
ii,
i, 14
... V 1 1 1 , i , 2
... IX,
ITTJTT:
... \rl, ii, 15
I, i, 19
VIII, i, 4
VII, ii, 14
ii, 13
i,
... V, i, J<
.. V, i, 12
i 24
*r
, ii, 25
II, ii, 15
^lT
12
... IX ,i,
VII, ii, 25
: ... V, ii, 25 ; VII,
VII, ii, 15
, i, 29
rp:T3r
VI, n, 3
VI, ii, 13
VIII, i, 3
f^?T^ ... II, i, 5
... II, i, 29: II, ii, 8;
II, ii, 12; VII, ii, 28
...VIII, ii, 6
... VII, ii, 2
.. VI, i, 4
... IX,
i, 7
JT
X, ii, 4
: ... VI, i, 13
IX, ii, 7
V, i, 2
I, i, 3; X, ii, 9.
... IX, ii, LI
... VI, i, 6
... VI, i, 9
) . , .
( 332 )
jwftr ?\x\T&f IT
: ... V, ii, 16
II,
VI, ii, 1
i, 31
... VIL i, 23
X, ii, 8
VII, i, 13
... VIII,
V, 11, 18
i^fo^^
II i, 21
VI, ii, 11
X, i, 3
• II, i, 17
: III, ii, 8
i
III, 11, 2, III, ii, 5
wftrsr r^rcrtf ^t* ... VI,
i, 8
: ... IV, i, 10
. IT, ii, 22
... V, i. 11
II, ii, 4
V, ii 20
... II, i, 3
12
: ... Ill, ii,
Ill, 11, 15
... V, ii, 4
I, i ,l8
[5^T OT^
V,Ti, 19
^m
ii 8
... I,
... I, ii, 5
IV, i, 9
... II, i, 7
... V, iit 21
VI, i,7
... II, ii> 18
VII, a, 27
[5'«*Rc?ic%
II,n, 7 ; II, ii 11
II. i. 28
, i, 23
... I, i, 10
irr?f
) I, i, 16
VIII, i, 7
VIII, i, 1
: III, 11, 11
VIII, i, 10
( 333 )
II, ii, 33
... I, i, 25
, i» 4
.. IV, ii, 7
... IX, ii, 9
II, i, 10
... II, ii, 29
: I, ii, 2
«T <J
.. Ill, ii, 17
... I, i, 12
... I, ii 21
.V, ii, 5
...II, ii; 24
flrf ^Tclt ^l
.. IX, i, 10
... VII, i, 20
... H^ ii, 27
T ... VII, i, lg
... V, ii, 1
V, i, 8
...!!^, 26
s?n^m:...Vii, u, 23
...II, i, 27
: ... VI, i, 10
» ii, 1
... VII, i, 2
..., , 5
... II, ii, 9
) ... II, i, 20
... VII, ii, 16
V, ii, 23
r«
... vii, ii 4,
J ... V, i, 10
{^fTfTcn^
* ^ V, i,17
, ii, 6
TO: v&ft
... V> ii, 12
: II, i, 19
... IV, ii, 2
... II, ii, 34
:... V, i, 9
III, ii, 3
III, i, 19
: ... Ill, i, i
...III, i, 14
) III, ii, 4
... VI, i, 1
rr: ... VI, i, 3
vi, i, 2
( 334 )
...VI, ii, 4
... I, i, 28
: $TSc[: ... IT, ii, 32
I, ii, 4
...III, i, 12
... Ill, i, 13
... II, * , 15
II, i, 1-i
;fa: ... VIII, ii, 5
... VII, ii, 5
V, i. 15
T?.
i, (i
w>gr: IV,
... IX, i, •">
HT?T^PTT
... III. ii, (>
^T*S[FT: ... II, ii, 20
VII,
i, 22
... Ill, i, 11
... VI, i- I'J
51*
II, i, 8
V, ii, 7
I, i, 2
T ... V, i, 13
II, ii, 10
... IV, ii 11
t*r ... V, ii, 10
I i >>7
... -«•> i, — —
5TT5TT ... Ill, ii, 20
,
: ... VI, ii, 5
III, ii, 10
II, i, 30
. . Ill, i, 10
lftf?r ^T
Tfrarq; ... Ill, i, 17
... VII, ii, 18
... Ill, ii, 21
... VII, ii, 13
II» i, 1
... VII, ii, 1
: ^f^TT;
... IX, i, 4
W *l^1^3[f5TTr^...X, i, 5
...II, ii, 26
:} ... I, ir G
Tq
II, i, 2
... IX, i, 2
T.ii, 7
( 335 )
... IV,li 10
III, 11, 16
r
30
... II, ii, 35
VII I, i, Q<
.. IV, ii,
VI, i, 15
VI, i, 11
ii, 20
IflP
i, lOj III, ii, 7
II, ii,
VIII, i, (5
ar ... I, ii.
10; I, il, 12: I, ii, 14; I, ii, 16
... VIII, i, 5
,ii, 3
...IV, i, 11
II, i, 18
IV, ii, 9
..x,ii, 7
: VII, ii, 11
I, i, 20
, ,
^m^: 2R*jfoTJ...II, i, 23
II, 11, 31
II, i, 6
... VII,
TT VII, 11, H)
j. j_,
V, i, 7
.. Ill, i,
af
X, i, 2
V, i, 18
: ... II, i, 4
: ... II, i, 9
... IX, ii, 8
III, ii, 19
:...VI, ii/ 10
, i, 3
37
V, i, 11
V, ii, 14
: ... VI, i, 14
STOHJf
IX, ii,
BINDING SECT. OCT 2 19»i
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CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET
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132
V2K3
1923
Kanada
The Vaisesika sutras of
Kanada 2d ed., rev. and enl.
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